2025:HHC:22070 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 197 of 2025 Reserved on: 1.7.2025 Date of Decision: 10.7.2025. Rohini Thakur ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Nitin Soni, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, with ASI Om Prakash, IO, PS Sadar, Solan, District Solan, H.P. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 151 of 2023, dated 17.7.2023, registered at Police Station Solan, District Solan, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:22070 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 171 and 201 of the IPC. It was alleged that the informant had made a complaint to the police, stating that the petitioner/accused had submitted fake educational certificates to support her application for recruitment in the Department of Posts. A verification was conducted by the National Institute of Open Schooling (NIOS), and it was reported that the documents were not genuine and appeared to be fake. The accused had submitted the matriculation and Class 10+2 certificates, and as per remarks, the roll number and data did not exist in the database, and the data did not match with the database. Hence, a charge sheet was filed before the Court to take action against the accused as per the law. 3. Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the FIR and the consequential proceedings. It was asserted that the petitioner was selected as a Postal Assistant in the year 2009. Her documents were sent to the Regional Director at the NIOS-YMCA Complex. These were verified, and the communication to this 3 2025:HHC:22070 effect was received. The petitioner applied under the Right to Information Act and was informed that the offline admission form and enclosures were retained for five years, and no record was available. The verified copies of the certificate were available in the records of the Director of Postal Services. There was no system of uploading the admission document w.e.f. From 2005 to 2010. The allegations in the FIR are false. The documents produced by the petitioner are of unimpeachable character and were issued by the Director, Postal Services. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, the petition. 4. The petition was opposed by filing a status report reproducing the contents of the FIR and the result of the investigation. It was submitted that the petitioner had produced the false certificate because the roll number and data did not exist in the database of NIOS, and the data did not match the database. Hence, the status report. 5. I have heard Mr. Nitin Soni, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 4 2025:HHC:22070 6. Mr. Nitin Soni, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the documents of the petitioner were verified in the year 2009. These were found to be correct. The petitioner cannot be held liable if the data was not uploaded to the server. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings be quashed. 7. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the charge sheet has been filed before the learned Trial Court and the petitioner has a right to approach the learned Trial Court for seeking her discharge. This Court should not exercise its jurisdiction in the present case. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to 5 2025:HHC:22070 be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the 6 2025:HHC:22070 commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- 7 2025:HHC:22070 cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the 8 2025:HHC:22070 dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. A letter was written by the Superintendent of Post Office, Solan, to the Regional Director, NIOS, YMCA, for the verification of the documents submitted by the petitioner on 8.5.2009. A response was sent by the Assistant Director (Administration), NIOS, Regional Office, Chandigarh, giving the result, status, marks obtained in the secondary examination and the Senior Secondary Examination. It was further mentioned that the certificates were returned duly verified. The State has not contended that these documents are fake. These documents are issued by the Director, Postal Services and are verified from the original. Therefore, their genuineness is beyond dispute. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Rajvir Industries Ltd., (2008) 13 SCC 678: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 824: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 89  that the Court can look into the evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt while exercising inherent jurisdiction. It was observed at page 686: “22. Ordinarily, a defence of an accused, although appears to be plausible, should not be taken into consideration for 9 2025:HHC:22070 the exercise of the said jurisdiction. Yet again, the High Court at that stage would not ordinarily enter into a disputed question of fact. It, however, does not mean that documents of unimpeachable character should not be taken into consideration at any cost for the purpose of finding out as to whether continuance of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of the court or that the complaint petition is filed for causing mere harassment to the accused. While we are not oblivious of the fact that although a large number of disputes should ordinarily be determined only by the civil courts, but criminal cases are filed only for achieving the ultimate goal, namely, to force the accused to pay the amount due to the complainant immediately. The courts, on the one hand, should not encourage such a practice; but, on the other, cannot also travel beyond its jurisdiction to interfere with the proceeding which is otherwise genuine. The courts cannot also lose sight of the fact that in certain matters, both civil proceedings and criminal proceedings would be maintainable.” 13. A similar view was taken in Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta, (2015) 1 SCC 103: (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 580: (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 433: (2015) 190 Comp Cas 77: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 848 wherein it was observed at page 127: “34.4. No restriction can be placed on the High Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court always uses and must use this power sparingly and with great circumspection to prevent inter alia the abuse of the process of the court. There are no fixed formulae to be followed by the High Court in this regard, and the exercise of this power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court at that stage does not conduct a mini-trial or roving inquiry, but nothing prevents it from taking unimpeachable evidence or totally acceptable 10 2025:HHC:22070 circumstances into account, which may lead it to conclude that no trial is necessary qua a particular Director. 14. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Viren Shah v. Redington India Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 305: (2024) 2 SCC (Civ) 230: (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 425: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 143 wherein it was observed at page 308: “6. We also notice this Court to have observed, in regard to the exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482CrPC, in cases involving negotiable instruments that interference would not be called for, in the absence of “some unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable circumstances which may clearly indicate that the Director could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques and asking him to stand the trial would be abuse of process of Court. (Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya case [Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya v. Gharrkul Industries (P) Ltd., (2023) 14 SCC 770: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 915], SCC para 24)” This principle, as held in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals [S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1975], was followed in Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya v. Gharrkul Industries (P) Ltd. [Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya v. Gharrkul Industries (P) Ltd., (2023) 14 SCC 770: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 915]. 15. Thus, the documents were verified in the year 2009, and it is not explained why the Department of Post decided to reverify the documents submitted by the petitioner. Once it was mentioned by NIOS that the documents were genuine and the details were given, there was no necessity to re-verify the documents. 11 2025:HHC:22070 16. The response of the NIOS relied upon by the prosecution shows that the roll number was not available in the database, and the overall data did not match the database. The response does not show that the roll number was allotted to some other person or that it was not allotted to any person, showing that the certificates are fake. The documents cannot be said to be forged simply because the roll number was not available in the database, or the overall data did not match the database. No person from the NIOS was cited in the charge sheet to show that the petitioner had not appeared in the examination conducted by the NIOS, the Roll number mentioned in the certificate was not allotted to any person, or it was allotted to some person. No person has stated that the letter written by the NIOS in the year 2009 was incorrect. Reliance was placed upon the letter written by the NIOS stating that the roll number was not available in the database, and the overall data did not match the database, which is not sufficient to establish forgery. 17. It was submitted that the charge sheet has been filed before the Court, and this Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel 12 2025:HHC:22070 and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. (28.08.2024 - SC): MANU/SC/1495/2024 that the High Court can quash the FIR even after filing the charge sheet, if it is satisfied that the continuation of the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law. It was observed: “7. The question of law involved in these two appeals as to whether quashing of the FIR should have been refused for no other reason than that the investigating officer has filed the charge-sheet is no longer res integra. Decisions of this Court to such effect are legion. We may profitably refer to the decisions of this Court in Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo MANU/SC/0621/2011: 2011:INSC:395 : (2011) 6 SCC 479, Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Home Department   MANU/SC/1281/2018: 2018:INSC:1060 : (2019) 11 SCC 706 and Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0950/2023. 8. On the authority of the aforesaid decisions, law seems to be well-settled that the High Court Under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure retains the power to quash an FIR, even after charge-sheet Under Section 173(2) thereof is filed, provided a satisfaction is reached, inter alia, that either the FIR and the charge-sheet read together, even accepted as true and correct without rebuttal, does not disclose commission of any offence or that continuation of proceedings arising out of such an FIR would in fact be an abuse of the process of law as well as of the Court given the peculiar circumstances of each particular case.” 18. Therefore, the filing of the charge sheet will not prevent this Court from exercising the jurisdiction vested in it under Section 528 of BNSS corresponding to Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 13 2025:HHC:22070 19. Since the documents were found to be correct by the NIOS in the year 2009, therefore, they cannot be said to be fake in the year 2025. Consequently, the continuation of the proceedings before the learned Trial Court will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and cannot be permitted. 20. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and the FIR No. 151 of 2023, dated 17.7.2023, registered at Police Station Solan, District Solan, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of the IPC and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR are ordered to be quashed. 21. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 10th July, 2025 (Chander)