Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Himachal Pradesh · body

2025 DAILYLAW 9026 (HP)

KESHAV JOSHI v. STATE OF HP

CR.R/4017/2013 · 2025-08-29

Virender Singh

body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 2025:HHC:29473 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. :  4017 of 2013 Decided on :     29.08.2025 Keshav Joshi & Another …Petitioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1   Yes. For the petitioners : Mr. Rajesh Mandhotra, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, Additional Advocate   General,   and   Ms. Ranjna Patial, Deputy Advocate General. Virender Singh, Judge (oral) Petitioners have preferred the present criminal revision,   against   the   judgment,   dated   30th  April,  2013, passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge­ I,   Kangra   at   Dharamshala,   District   Kangra,   H.P. (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   ‘Appellate   Court’),   in 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:29473 Criminal Appeal No. 29­B/2008, titled as Keshav Joshi & Another versus State of Himachal Pradesh. 2. Vide   judgment,   dated   30th  April,   2013,   the learned Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal preferred by   the   petitioners,   against   the   judgment   of   conviction, dated 23rd  May, 2008 and order of sentence, dated 24th May,   2008,   passed   by   the   Court   of   learned   Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   ‘trial   Court’)   in Criminal Case No.21­II/2007, titled as State versus Keshav Joshi & Another. 3. The   learned   trial   Court,   vide   judgment   of conviction and order of sentence, as referred to above, has convicted   petitioner   Keshav   Joshi   for   the   offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’), and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the   M.V.   Act’)   and   petitioner   Bal   Krishan   has   been convicted, for the offence punishable under Section 180 of the M.V. Act, and sentenced them, as under:­ 1. Keshav Joshi 3 2025:HHC:29473 (i)  For the  offence  punishable  under  Section 279 IPC, he has been sentenced to undergo simple   imprisonment   for   a   period   of   three months   and   to   pay   a   fine   of 1000/­.   In ₹ default   of   payment   of   fine,   he   has   been directed   to   further   undergo   simple imprisonment for a period of one month; (ii) For the offence punishable under Section 337  IPC, the convict has  been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month and to pay a fine of 500/­.   In ₹ default   of   payment   of   fine,   he   has   been directed   to   further   undergo   simple imprisonment for a period of fifteen days; (iii) For the offence punishable under Section 338 IPC, he has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of 1000/­.In default of ₹ payment   of   fine,   he   has   been   directed   to further   undergo   simple   imprisonment   for   a period of three months; and For the offence punishable under Section 181 M.V.Act,  he   has   been sentenced  to   undergo simple   imprisonment   for   a   period   of   three months and to pay a fine of   500/­. In default ₹ of payment of fine, he has been directed to further   undergo   simple   imprisonment   for   a period of fifteen days. The   learned   trial   Court   has   directed   the   sentences,   so awarded, to run concurrently. 2. Bal Krishan For the offence punishable under Section 180 M.V. Act, he has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month and to pay a fine of ₹ 500/­. In default of 4 2025:HHC:29473 payment   of   fine,   he   has   been   directed   to further   undergo   simple   imprisonment   for   a period of fifteen days. 4. During the pendency of the criminal revision, before this Court, application bearing Cr.MP No.2422 of 2024, was moved, which was decided on 16.10.2024, by holding that at the time of commission of the alleged crime, petitioner No.1 was juvenile. Order dated 16.10.2024, is reproduced as under:­ During the pendency of the present revision, the applicants/petitioners   filed   an   application   to place on record the date of birth certificate of petitioner No.1 to show that petitioner No.1 was juvenile on the date of the commission of the offence and his date of birth is 24.08.1989. 2. The   State   has   filed   a   reply/status   report asserting that the date of birth of petitioner No.1 was not found registered in the record of Gram Panchayat and the authenticity of the date of birth   recorded   in   the   matriculation   certificate was   verified   from   H.P.   Board   of   School Education. As per the record maintained by the Board of School Education, petitioner No.1 was born on 24.08.1989. The documents in support of the status report have also been annexed. Thus, it is duly established at this stage that petitioner No.1 was a juvenile on the date of the incident. It   was   laid   down   by   the   Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan v. State of M.P. (2023) 5 SCC 504: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 217 that a trial conducted and conviction recorded by the Competent   Court   will   not   be   vitiated   even though the person is subsequently found to be a child  in conflict  with the  law. The  legislature intends   to   grant   the   benefit   regarding   the 5 2025:HHC:29473 sentence   and   not   regarding   the   conviction. It was observed at page 520: “34. There   is   another   reason   why   a   trial conducted   and   conviction   recorded   by   the Sessions   Court   would   not   be   held   to   be vitiated in law even though subsequently the person tried has been held to be a child. 35. The   intention   of  the  legislature  was  to give benefit to a person who is declared to be a child on the date of the offence only with respect to its sentence part. If the conviction was also to be made ineffective then either the   jurisdiction   of   regular   Sessions   Court would   have   been   completely   excluded   not only under Section 9 of the 2015 Act but also under Section 25 of the 2015 Act, provision would   have   been   made   that   on   a   finding being recorded that the person being tried is a   child,   a   pending   trial   should   also   be relegated to the JJB and also that such trial would be held to be null and void. Instead, under Section 25 of the 2015 Act, it is clearly provided that any proceeding pending before any   Board   or   court   on   the   date   of commencement   of   the   2015   Act   shall   be continued in that Board or court as if this Act had not been enacted. 36. Section 25 of the 2015 Act is reproduced hereunder: “25. Special provision in respect of pending cases. — Notwithstanding anything contained   in   this   Act,   all   proceedings   in respect of a child alleged or found to be in conflict with law pending before any Board or court on the date of commencement of this Act, shall be continued in that Board or court as if this Act had not been enacted.” 37. Having   considered   the   statutory provisions laid down in Section 9 of the 2015 Act   and   also   Section   7­A   of   the   2000   Act 6 2025:HHC:29473 which is identical to Section 9 of the 2015 Act, we are of the view that the merits of the conviction could be tested and the conviction which   was   recorded   cannot   be   held   to   be vitiated   in   law   merely   because   the   inquiry was   not   conducted   by   JJB. It   is   only   the question of sentence for which the provisions of the 2015 Act would be attracted and any sentence   in   excess   of   what   is   permissible under   the   2015   Act   will   have   to   be accordingly amended as per the provisions of the 2015  Act. Otherwise, the  accused  who has   committed   a  heinous   offence  and   who did not claim juvenility before the trial court would be allowed to go scot­free. This is also not the object and intention provided in the 2015   Act. The   object   under   the   2015   Act dealing with the rights and liberties of the juvenile is only to ensure that if he or she could   be   brought   into   the   mainstream   by awarding   a   lesser   sentence   and   also directing for other facilities for the welfare of the juvenile in conflict with law during his stay in any of the institutions defined under the 2015 Act.” 3. Thus, the benefit of juvenility will only extend to the sentence and not to the conviction. 4. In view of the same, the matter be listed for the   final   hearing   to   determine   whether   the conviction   was   legally   recorded,   correctly upheld, the sentence was legally imposed and if not what would be the appropriate sentence. The present application stands disposed of.” 5. In view of the order dated 16.10.2024, passed in Cr.MP No. 2422 of 2024, (supra) learned counsel for the petitioners has stated that the petitioners do not press the 7 2025:HHC:29473 present   criminal   revision   against   the   judgment   of conviction   and   prayed   that   the   order   of   sentence   may kindly be modified. 6. Since,   petitioner   No.1,   at   the   time   of commission of crime, was juvenile, as such, he is entitled to the benefit of juvenility, in the matter of sentence, and in view of the provisions of Section 15(1)(d) of the Juvenile Justice   (Care   and   Protection   of   Children)   Act,   2000 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the JJ Act’), in case, it has been found that the juvenile has committed an offence, then, he or his parents could be directed to pay fine. Section 15(1) (d) of the JJ Act, is reproduced as under:­ (d) order the parent of the juvenile or the juvenile himself to pay a fine, if he is over fourteen years of age and earns money; 7. In view of the above provisions, when, petitioner No.1, is held to be juvenile, then, he can be sentenced to pay   a   fine,   and   he   cannot   be   directed   to   undergo   the sentence of imprisonment, as ordered by the learned trial Court,   in   this   case. The   fine   amount   already   stands deposited, by petitioner No.1, as such, no sentence is to be imposed   against   him. Ordered   accordingly. Petitioner 8 2025:HHC:29473 No.1, is also held entitled to the benefit under Section 19 of the JJ Act. 8. So   far   as   petitioner   No.2,   who   has   been sentenced for a period of one month and to pay a fine of Rs.500/­ and in default of payment of fine, he has been directed to further undergo simple imprisonment for fifteen days, is concerned, by taking a lenient view about the fact that he has been convicted for the commission of offence punishable under the M.V. Act, instead of directing him to undergo simple imprisonment of one month, he is directed to pay a fine of Rs.1000/­, within a period of four days, in the Registry of this Court.   In case the amount of fine is deposited, Registry  is  directed  to  send  the same to  the learned trial Court to be deposited under the proper head. 9. With these observations, the criminal revision is disposed of. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are also disposed of accordingly. ( Virender Singh ) Judge August 29, 2025 ( ps )