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2025 DAILYLAW 89914 (PNJ)

NAKUL KUNDRA v. GURU NANAK DEV UNIVERSITY AND OTHERS

LPA/2623/2024 · 2025-01-22

Alok Jain, Lisa Gill

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Judgment text

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LPA No.2623 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT (109) Nakul Kundr Guru Nanak Dev University and Ors. CORAM: Present: ALOK JAIN 1. passed by learned Single 2017, vide which dismissed. Appellant sought 11/OM/7874 dated 20.06.2012 passed by Vic University whereby service of the appellant terminated and subsequent confirmation order passed by Syndicate in the meeting dated 25.06.2012 2. that appellant/ LPA No.2623-2024 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Nakul Kundra Versus Guru Nanak Dev University and Ors. HON’BLE MRS. LISA GILL HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK JAIN **** Mr. Naveen Daryal, Advocate for the Mr. M.K. Dogra, Advocate for the respondent *** ALOK JAIN, J. Present appeal arises out of impugned order dated 20.08.2024 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in writ petition No.7070 of vide which petition preferred by dismissed. Appellant sought quashing of impugned 11/OM/7874 dated 20.06.2012 passed by Vic whereby service of the appellant and subsequent confirmation order passed by Syndicate in the meeting dated 25.06.2012. Learned counsel for appellant has reiterated the factual matrix appellant/petitioner was appointed on 04.10.2011 to the Post of -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH LPA No.2623-2024 (O&M) Date of Decision:-22.01.2025 ……Appellant ……Respondents LISA GILL HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK JAIN Advocate for the appellant. Mr. M.K. Dogra, Advocate for the respondent-GNDU. impugned order dated 20.08.2024 of this Court in writ petition No.7070 of preferred by petitioner/appellant has been quashing of impugned office order No.7- 11/OM/7874 dated 20.06.2012 passed by Vice-Chancellor of respondent- whereby service of the appellant who was on probation was and subsequent confirmation order passed by Syndicate in the Learned counsel for appellant has reiterated the factual matrix petitioner was appointed on 04.10.2011 to the Post of s impugned order dated 20.08.2024 of this Court in writ petition No.7070 of has been - - was and subsequent confirmation order passed by Syndicate in the Learned counsel for appellant has reiterated the factual matrix petitioner was appointed on 04.10.2011 to the Post of Manju 2025.02.11 10:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA No.2623 Assistant Professor and during period of probation he was harassed at the hand which, appellant various occasions. It is submitted to his complaints, services of appellant Chancellor and subsequently, Deputy Registrar issued termination 3. and also filed disposed as premature. Subsequently, the Chancellor appellant that ambit of Statute 33.2 and Statute 42 of GNDU Calend no further action was warranted. Thereafter, appellant filed writ petition, which came to be dismissed by learned Single order dated 20.08.2024 4. judgment is bad in the eyes of law as termination of appellant of the provision of Statute. made by the Principal was subsequent approval by Vice which is the Learned counsel him before passing the termin LPA No.2623-2024 (O&M) Assistant Professor and during period of probation he was at the hands of respondent No.5, appellant informed Vice-Chancellor of respondent various occasions. It is submitted by counsel for appellant to his complaints, Head of Department recommended for termination of of appellant on 11.06.2012, which was Chancellor and subsequently, Deputy Registrar issued termination order dated 20.06.2012. Aggrieved with the above, appellant preferred statutory appeal also filed a writ petition bearing CWP No.21212 of 2012, which was disposed as premature. Subsequently, the Chancellor appellant that statutory appeal filed by appellant did not ambit of Statute 33.2 and Statute 42 of GNDU Calend no further action was warranted. Thereafter, appellant filed writ petition, which came to be dismissed by learned Single order dated 20.08.2024, which is assailed in Learned counsel for appellant submitted that impugned is bad in the eyes of law as termination of appellant of the provision of Statute. It is further submitted made by the Principal was erroneous on fact and in procedure. T subsequent approval by Vice-Chancellor is also bad as it was the which is the competent authority to terminate ounsel further submits that no opportunity of hearing was given to him before passing the termination order and there was no definite -2- Assistant Professor and during period of probation he was mentally by assigning various duties, for Chancellor of respondent-University on by counsel for appellant that as a backlash recommended for termination of on 11.06.2012, which was accepted by Vice Chancellor and subsequently, Deputy Registrar issued impugned Aggrieved with the above, appellant preferred statutory appeal bearing CWP No.21212 of 2012, which was disposed as premature. Subsequently, the Chancellor informed the filed by appellant did not fall within the ambit of Statute 33.2 and Statute 42 of GNDU Calendar-2007 and hence, no further action was warranted. Thereafter, appellant filed writ petition, which came to be dismissed by learned Single Judge of this Court vide which is assailed in the present appeal. pellant submitted that impugned is bad in the eyes of law as termination of appellant is in violation It is further submitted that recommendation erroneous on fact and in procedure. Therefore, Chancellor is also bad as it was the Syndicate to terminate service of the appellant. further submits that no opportunity of hearing was given to ation order and there was no definite mentally for University on backlash recommended for termination of accepted by Vice impugned Aggrieved with the above, appellant preferred statutory appeal bearing CWP No.21212 of 2012, which was informed the within the 2007 and hence, no further action was warranted. Thereafter, appellant filed writ petition, vide pellant submitted that impugned olation recommendation e, yndicate appellant. further submits that no opportunity of hearing was given to ation order and there was no definite Manju 2025.02.11 10:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA No.2623 recommendation by Institution concerned working. He further submits that learned Single Judge fell in error and did not consider the contention raised by appellant/petitioner fact that alleged advice performance 5. not find any ground to cause interference. petitioner was appointed as Assistant Professor vide order dated 04.10.2011 on probation for a period of 01 year which could be extended upto 03 years. Before expiry of 01 year of work and conduct of writ petitioner. Head of the Department where the Principal was working vide communication dated 11.06.2012 opined that work and conduct of the writ petitioner was not satisfactory and continuation in service would not be useful for Institution. In this view of the recommendation by Head of Department, Vice respondent- writ petitioner during period of probation as p the appointment coupled with Guru Nanak Dev University Calend 2007. This order was concededly approved in the meeting of Syndicate on 25.06.2012. but order of termination competent authority i.e. of any merit. I decision of Vice LPA No.2623-2024 (O&M) recommendation by Institution concerned wherein He further submits that learned Single Judge fell in error and did not consider the contention raised by appellant/petitioner alleged advice/recommendations made by Head of Department performance of appellant/petitioner’s work were not definite in nature Heard learned counsel for appellant at length, not find any ground to cause interference. petitioner was appointed as Assistant Professor vide order dated 04.10.2011 on probation for a period of 01 year which could be extended upto 03 years. Before expiry of 01 year of probation, report was sought with regard to work and conduct of writ petitioner. Head of the Department where the Principal was working vide communication dated 11.06.2012 opined that work and conduct of the writ petitioner was not satisfactory and nuation in service would not be useful for Institution. In this view of the recommendation by Head of Department, Vice University passed order dated 19.06.2012 terminating service of writ petitioner during period of probation as p the appointment coupled with Guru Nanak Dev University Calend . This order was concededly approved in the meeting of Syndicate on 25.06.2012. Argument raised that Syndicate was the competent authority of termination has been passed by Vice competent authority i.e. Syndicate, therefore should be set aside, of any merit. It is a matter of record that decision of Vice-Chancellor vide letter dated. 04.07.2012 (Annexure P -3- wherein appellant/petitioner was He further submits that learned Single Judge fell in error and did not consider the contention raised by appellant/petitioner with regard to the made by Head of Department qua were not definite in nature. counsel for appellant at length, however, we do not find any ground to cause interference. Admittedly, appellant/writ petitioner was appointed as Assistant Professor vide order dated 04.10.2011 on probation for a period of 01 year which could be extended upto 03 years. probation, report was sought with regard to work and conduct of writ petitioner. Head of the Department where the Principal was working vide communication dated 11.06.2012 opined that work and conduct of the writ petitioner was not satisfactory and nuation in service would not be useful for Institution. In this view of the recommendation by Head of Department, Vice-Chancellor of University passed order dated 19.06.2012 terminating service of writ petitioner during period of probation as per the terms and conditions of the appointment coupled with Guru Nanak Dev University Calendar Vol.1, . This order was concededly approved in the meeting of Syndicate on yndicate was the competent authority has been passed by Vice-Chancellor and not by , therefore should be set aside, is devoid that Syndicate has later ratified the dated. 04.07.2012 (Annexure P-23). appellant/petitioner was He further submits that learned Single Judge fell in error and did d to the qua we do Admittedly, appellant/writ petitioner was appointed as Assistant Professor vide order dated 04.10.2011 on probation for a period of 01 year which could be extended upto 03 years. probation, report was sought with regard to work and conduct of writ petitioner. Head of the Department where the Principal was working vide communication dated 11.06.2012 opined that work and conduct of the writ petitioner was not satisfactory and nuation in service would not be useful for Institution. In this view of Chancellor of University passed order dated 19.06.2012 terminating service of er the terms and conditions of .1, . This order was concededly approved in the meeting of Syndicate on yndicate was the competent authority Chancellor and not by devoid the . Manju 2025.02.11 10:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA No.2623 6. position, that not found to be satisfactory and, therefore, respondents considering the opinion of Acting Principal by terminating his services. by the Syndicate within seven days. appellant that said order is Institution while terminating his services duly gave him certificate, is completely devoid of any merit, hence rejected. This fact to the contrary reveals that the order is not stigmatic 7. period has been Rajasthan High Court v. Ved Priya & Anr. (2021) 13 SCC 151 the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that the purpose of any probation is to ensure that before the employee a employee, he should satisfactorily perform his duties and functions to enable the authorities to pass appropriate orders. the judgment are as under: LPA No.2623-2024 (O&M) A perusal of the record demonstrate , that while on probation, the work and conduct of not found to be satisfactory and, therefore, respondents considering the Acting Principal (Head of Department) by terminating his services. Order passed by Vice by the Syndicate within seven days. A appellant that said order is proved to be Institution while terminating his services duly gave him , is completely devoid of any merit, hence rejected. This fact to the contrary reveals that the order is not stigmatic It is imperative to record here that the purpose of probation period has been defined in Rajasthan High Court v. Ved Priya & Anr. (2021) 13 SCC 151 Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that the purpose of any probation is to ensure that before the employee attains the status of confirmed regular employee, he should satisfactorily perform his duties and functions to enable the authorities to pass appropriate orders. the judgment are as under: “14. The present case is one where the first probationer and not a substantive appointee, hence not strictly covered within the umbrella of such probation has been noted in Muzzammil v. State of Karnataka “25. The purpose of any probation is to ensure that before the employee attains the status of confirmed regular employee, he should satisfactorily perform his duties and f the authorities to pass appropriate orders. In other words, the -4- A perusal of the record demonstrates that it is an admitted the work and conduct of appellant was not found to be satisfactory and, therefore, respondents considering the (Head of Department), discharged the appellant rder passed by Vice-Chancellor was ratified Argument raised on behalf of proved to be stigmatic and illegal because Institution while terminating his services duly gave him an experience , is completely devoid of any merit, hence rejected. This fact to the contrary reveals that the order is not stigmatic here that the purpose of probation defined in the judgment of Rajasthan High Court v. Ved Priya & Anr. (2021) 13 SCC 151, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that the purpose of any probation is to ttains the status of confirmed regular employee, he should satisfactorily perform his duties and functions to enable the authorities to pass appropriate orders. The relevant paras from 14. The present case is one where the first respondent was a probationer and not a substantive appointee, hence not strictly covered within the umbrella of Article 311. The purpose of such probation has been noted in Kazia Mohammed Muzzammil v. State of Karnataka (2010) 8 SCC 155: “25. The purpose of any probation is to ensure that before the employee attains the status of confirmed regular employee, he should satisfactorily perform his duties and functions to enable the authorities to pass appropriate orders. In other words, the it is an admitted was not found to be satisfactory and, therefore, respondents considering the , discharged the appellant Chancellor was ratified of because experience , is completely devoid of any merit, hence rejected. This fact to here that the purpose of probation the judgment of wherein Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that the purpose of any probation is to ttains the status of confirmed regular employee, he should satisfactorily perform his duties and functions to The relevant paras from respondent was a probationer and not a substantive appointee, hence not strictly The purpose of Kazia Mohammed “25. The purpose of any probation is to ensure that before the employee attains the status of confirmed regular employee, he unctions to enable the authorities to pass appropriate orders. In other words, the Manju 2025.02.11 10:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA No.2623 LPA No.2623-2024 (O&M) scheme of probation is to judge the ability, suitability and performance of an officer under probation. …” 15. Similarly, in Rajesh Kumar Srivastava v. State of Jharkhand (2011) 4 SCC 447 it was opined: “… A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. There are var criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation. At that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the probationer (appellant) are generally under scrutiny and on the basis of his overall performance a decision is generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service. …” 16. It is thus clear that the entire objective of probation is to provide the employer an opportunity to evaluate the probationer’s performance and test his suitability for a particular post. Such an exercise is a necessary part of the process of recruitment, and must not be treated lightly. Written tests and interviews are only attempts to predict a candidate’s possibility of success at a particular job. The true test of suitability is actual performance of duties which can only be applied after the candidate joins and starts working. 17. Such an exercise undoubtedly is Respondent No.1’s contention that confirmation of probationers must be based only on objective material is far fetched. Although quantitative parameters are ostensibly fair, but they by themselves are imperfect indicators of future performance. Qualitative assessment and a holistic analysis of non quantifiable factors are indeed necessary. Merely because Respondent No. 1’s ACRs were consistently marked ‘Good’, it cannot be a ground to bestow him with a service. 18. Furthermore, there is a subtle, yet fundamental, difference between termination of a probationer and that of a confirmed employee. Although it is undisputed that the State cannot act arbitrarily in either case, yet there has to be a difference in judicial approach between the two. Whereas in the case of a confirmed employee the scope of judicial interference would be more expansive given the protection under the Constitution or the Service -5- scheme of probation is to judge the ability, suitability and performance of an officer under probation. …” Rajesh Kumar Srivastava v. State of it was opined: “… A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. There are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation. At that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the probationer (appellant) are generally under scrutiny and n the basis of his overall performance a decision is generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service. 16. It is thus clear that the entire objective of probation is to provide the employer an opportunity to evaluate the probationer’s performance and test his suitability for a particular post. Such an exercise is a necessary part of the process of recruitment, and must not be treated lightly. Written are only attempts to predict a candidate’s possibility of success at a particular job. The true test of suitability is actual performance of duties which can only be applied after the candidate joins and starts working. 17. Such an exercise undoubtedly is subjective, therefore, Respondent No.1’s contention that confirmation of must be based only on objective material is far- fetched. Although quantitative parameters are ostensibly fair, but they by themselves are imperfect indicators of future performance. Qualitative assessment and a holistic analysis of quantifiable factors are indeed necessary. Merely because Respondent No. 1’s ACRs were consistently marked ‘Good’, it cannot be a ground to bestow him with a right to continue in 18. Furthermore, there is a subtle, yet fundamental, difference between termination of a probationer and that of a confirmed employee. Although it is undisputed that the State cannot act arbitrarily in either case, yet there has to be a difference in ial approach between the two. Whereas in the case of a confirmed employee the scope of judicial interference would be more expansive given the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution or the Service Rules but such may not be true scheme of probation is to judge the ability, suitability and Rajesh Kumar Srivastava v. State of “… A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the ious criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation. At that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the probationer (appellant) are generally under scrutiny and n the basis of his overall performance a decision is generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service. 16. It is thus clear that the entire objective of probation is to provide the employer an opportunity to evaluate the probationer’s performance and test his suitability for a particular post. Such an exercise is a necessary part of the process of recruitment, and must not be treated lightly. Written are only attempts to predict a candidate’s possibility of success at a particular job. The true test of suitability is actual performance of duties which can only be subjective, therefore, Respondent No.1’s contention that confirmation of - fetched. Although quantitative parameters are ostensibly fair, but they by themselves are imperfect indicators of future performance. Qualitative assessment and a holistic analysis of quantifiable factors are indeed necessary. Merely because Respondent No. 1’s ACRs were consistently marked ‘Good’, it to continue in 18. Furthermore, there is a subtle, yet fundamental, difference between termination of a probationer and that of a confirmed employee. Although it is undisputed that the State cannot act arbitrarily in either case, yet there has to be a difference in ial approach between the two. Whereas in the case of a confirmed employee the scope of judicial interference would of Rules but such may not be true Manju 2025.02.11 10:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA No.2623 regard to probation especia reproduced in the impugned order have clearly been followed by respondent- Learned counsel for appellant has been unable to point out any violation of the said provisions much less any infringement of fundamental rights of appellant. Argument raised by learned counsel for appellant that there is no definite recommendation by Head of the Department is opposed to record as has been noted in the foregoing par LPA No.2623-2024 (O&M) in the case of probationers who are denuded of such protection(s) while working on trial basis. 19. Probationers have no indefeasible right to continue in employment until confirmed, and they can be relieved by the competent authority if found unsuitable. Its only in a very limited category of cases that such probationers can seek protection under the principles of natural justice, say when they are ‘removed’ in a manner which prejudices their future prospects in alternate fields or casts aspersions on their character or violates their constitutional rights. of ‘stigmatic’ removal only that a reasonable hearing is sinequanon. Way back in v. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 36 opined that: "28.... In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishm no evil consequences and so Article 311 even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of complied with." Perusal of the relevant provisions of GNDU Cal regard to probation especially Rules 31.1 and 31.2 and 31.3 duly reproduced in the impugned order have clearly been followed by University while taking action against appellant/writ petitioner. Learned counsel for appellant has been unable to point out any violation of e said provisions much less any infringement of fundamental rights of appellant. Argument raised by learned counsel for appellant that there is no definite recommendation by Head of the Department is opposed to record as has been noted in the foregoing par -6- in the case of probationers who are denuded of such protection(s) while working on trial basis. Probationers have no indefeasible right to continue in employment until confirmed, and they can be relieved by the authority if found unsuitable. Its only in a very limited category of cases that such probationers can seek protection under the principles of natural justice, say when they are ‘removed’ in a manner which prejudices their future elds or casts aspersions on their character or violates their constitutional rights. In such cases of ‘stigmatic’ removal only that a reasonable opportunity of non. Way back in Parshotam Lal Dhingra 1958 SC 36, a Constitution Bench "28.... In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, iency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be Perusal of the relevant provisions of GNDU Calendar-2007 in lly Rules 31.1 and 31.2 and 31.3 duly reproduced in the impugned order have clearly been followed by University while taking action against appellant/writ petitioner. Learned counsel for appellant has been unable to point out any violation of e said provisions much less any infringement of fundamental rights of appellant. Argument raised by learned counsel for appellant that there is no definite recommendation by Head of the Department is opposed to record as has been noted in the foregoing paras. There is a specific in the case of probationers who are denuded of such Probationers have no indefeasible right to continue in employment until confirmed, and they can be relieved by the authority if found unsuitable. Its only in a very limited category of cases that such probationers can seek protection under the principles of natural justice, say when they are ‘removed’ in a manner which prejudices their future elds or casts aspersions on their In such cases opportunity of Parshotam Lal Dhingra , a Constitution Bench "28.... In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima ent and carries with it is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, iency or other disqualification, then it is a must be 2007 in lly Rules 31.1 and 31.2 and 31.3 duly reproduced in the impugned order have clearly been followed by University while taking action against appellant/writ petitioner. Learned counsel for appellant has been unable to point out any violation of e said provisions much less any infringement of fundamental rights of appellant. Argument raised by learned counsel for appellant that there is no definite recommendation by Head of the Department is opposed to record as. There is a specific Manju 2025.02.11 10:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA No.2623 recommendation Principal on the basis of which action has been taken. 8. to test overall performance not for the Court to assume the rol employee, which is a Learned counsel for appellant is unable to point out any in irregularity or illegality in the orders impugned before the learned Writ Court or impugned order dated 20.08.2024 passed by learned No other argument has been addressed. Ac dismissed being devoid of any 9. (ALOK JAIN) JUDGE 22.01.2025 manju LPA No.2623-2024 (O&M) recommendation qua the work and conduct of appellant by the Acting Principal on the basis of which action has been taken. Moreover, it is settled principle to test overall performance of any employee not for the Court to assume the role of employer to adj which is a task squarely within the domain of the employer. Learned counsel for appellant is unable to point out any in irregularity or illegality in the orders impugned before the learned Writ Court or impugned order dated 20.08.2024 passed by learned No other argument has been addressed. Ac being devoid of any merit. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of. (ALOK JAIN) Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether Reportable:- Yes/No -7- and conduct of appellant by the Acting Principal on the basis of which action has been taken. it is settled principle that an employer has the right of any employee during probation period. It is of employer to adjudge suitability of an squarely within the domain of the employer. Learned counsel for appellant is unable to point out any infirmity, irregularity or illegality in the orders impugned before the learned Writ Court or impugned order dated 20.08.2024 passed by learned Single Judge. No other argument has been addressed. Accordingly, present appeal is Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of. (LISA GILL) JUDGE Yes/No Yes/No and conduct of appellant by the Acting right during probation period. It is udge suitability of an squarely within the domain of the employer. firmity, irregularity or illegality in the orders impugned before the learned Writ Single Judge. , present appeal is Manju 2025.02.11 10:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document