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2025 DAILYLAW 89900 (KAR)

MR C GOPALAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

WP/13519/2024 · 2025-10-13

S R Krishna Kumar

body2025

Judgment text

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- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO. 13519 OF 2024 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: MR C GOPALAN S/O LATE P K PANICKER AGED ABOUT 84 YEARS HAVING OFFICE AT: NO.5, RICHMOND ROAD, BANGALORE - 560 025. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. K.N. PHANEENDRA, SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR SMT. KRUTIKA RAGHAVAN, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA THROUGH H.A.L POLICE STATION, REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. 2. N M NARENDRA S/O OF N.C. MUNIREDDY AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, NO. 103/6, 6TH MAIN ROAD, KOTE N C MUNIREDDY NILAYA, DODDANEKKUNDI, BANGALORE - 560 037. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1 SRI. ASHOK.N. NAIK AND SMT. SUKANYA.H.D, ADVOCATE FOR R-2) THIS W.P IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA R/W SECTION 482 OF THE CPC PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT DATED 29.04.2024 FILED BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 2 AGAINST THE PETITIONER HEREIN WITH THE RESPONDENT NO. 1 AT ANNEXURE -A. THIS PETITION IS BEING HEARD AND RESERVED ON 16.07.2025 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR CAV ORDER In this petition, petitioner - sole accused seeks quashing of the impugned complaint and FIR dated 29.04.2024 registered in Crime No.366/2024 by the 1st respondent - Police, pursuant to a complaint dated 29.04.2024 lodged by the 2nd respondent - de facto complainant for alleged offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 465, 468 and 471 IPC and for other reliefs. 2. Heard learned Senior counsel for the petitioner and learned Addl.SPP for 1st respondent-State and learned counsel for the 2nd respondent and perused the material on record. 3. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the impugned complaint and FIR in order to contend that necessary ingredients constituting the alleged offences have not been made out by the 2nd respondent. It was submitted that the petitioner and 2nd respondent and his brothers Sri.N.M.Tulasi Ram and Sri.N.M.Ravi had entered into agreements in relation to immovable property from - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 2003 onwards and the 2nd respondent is illegally attempting to convert an alleged civil dispute into a criminal action by filing the impugned complaint, which deserves to be quashed. In support of his contentions, learned Senior counsel placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (i) Binod Kumar and others vs. State of Bihar and Another - (2014)10 SCC 663; (ii) R.Nagender Yadav vs. State of Telengana and Another - (2023) 2 SCC 195. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would reiterate the various contentions urged in the statement of objections and submits that there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (i) Bhaskar Lal Sharma and Another vs. Monica - (2009) 10 SCC 604; (ii) Lallan Chaudhary & others vs. State of Bihar & Anr. - (2006) 12 SCC 229; (iii) Santosh B.Reddy & others vs. The State - Crl.P.No.8448/2023 Dated 19.07.2024; (iv) Supertech Limited vs. Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Association & others - (2021) 10 SCC 1; - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 (v) Sri.Kirti K.Mehta & Anr. vs. State of Karnataka & others - Crl.P.No.6658/2024 & connected matters Dated 21.10.2024; (vi) Ram Lal Yadav. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh - Crl.Misc.5939/1978 Dated 02.01.1989; (vii) Pramod Kumar Gadia vs. State of West Bengal - C.R.R.No.1450/2005 dated 02.10.2006; (viii) Aniruddh Singh vs. State of Rajasthan - S.B.Crl.Mis.(P) No.5116/2017 Dated 09.02.2018; (ix) Sanjay Pandey & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. - C.R.R.No.2342/2018 Dated 02.12.2019. 5. Both sides have filed their written synopsis in support of their contentions and the same are taken on record. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 7. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be apposite to extract the impugned complaint dated 29.04.2024 (translated version) which reads as under:- To, The Police Inspector, HAL Police Station, Bengaluru – 560037. Subject: Complaint against C. Gopalan, M/s Gopalan Enterprises, No.5, Richmond Road, for cheating, fraud, creating documents, and constructing buildings illegally-reg. Respected Sir, - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 I, the complainant, N.M. Narendra Reddy, son of N.C. Munireddy, aged about 57 years, residing at No.103/6, 6th Main Road, Kote N.C. Munireddy Nilaya, Doddanekkundi, Bangalore – 560037, hereby submit the following complaint: Mobile : 9880127208 on 07/03/03 to on 29/04/2024 2. My brothers 1) N.M. Ravi and 2) N.M. Tulasi Ram and I are the owners of land in Chinnappanahalli village, Survey No.16, area 5 acres 6 guntas, and Survey No.45, area 2 acres 39 guntas, totalling 8 acres 5 guntas. The accused, C. Gopalan, operates a partnership firm under the name M/s Gopalan Enterprises and has been engaged in building construction business in Bengaluru city. In this context, C. Gopalan approached us and proposed that if we give him the above- mentioned land according to a joint agreement, he would construct apartments and give us 47.5% of the apartments. The remaining 52.5% of the apartments would be taken by him. Based on this understanding, an agreement existed between myself, my two brothers, and the accused, C. Gopalan. 3. Despite this, C. Gopalan, with the intention of cheating us, took us to the Bengaluru East Taluk Sub-Registrar’s office and fraudulently created documents by getting signatures from us on some blank papers, claiming he would construct 47.5% of the apartments for us, while he would take 52.5% for himself. According to this, out of the 396 apartments already constructed, we are entitled to 188 apartments representing our 47.5% share. However, he has not given them to us till date. 4. Further, he has constructed approximately 126 apartments on the top of the A to H Block without obtaining project approval from BBMP, and did so without the consent of my two brothers and me. During this construction, C. Gopalan has defrauded us as well as BBMP and the government. 5. With the intention of making illegal profits, C. Gopalan has cheated us by constructing buildings and not giving us our entitled 47.5% share of a total of 247 apartments. Similarly, he has fraudulently sold apartments to other parties and has not given us the proceeds of the apartments that were due to us. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 Therefore, I request that legal action be taken against C. Gopalan, M/s Gopalan Enterprises, residing at No.5, Richmond Road, Bengaluru – 25, for cheating, obtaining signatures by fraud, and committing other fraudulent acts. Thanking you, Sd/-xxx Complainant (N M Narendra Reddy) Place: Bengaluru Date: 29-04-2024 On 29.04.2024 at 18:30 Hrs, the complainant appeared at the police station and submitted the complaint, which was received, and a case has been registered in the station Cr. No. 366/2024 under Section 420, 406, 465, 468, 471 of the IPC. Sd/-xxx ASI 8. A perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that after referring to the agreements, documents etc., entered into between the 2nd respondent and his brothers Sri.N.M.Ravi and Sri. N.M.Tulasiram with the petitioner, who is the partner of M/s.Gopalan Enterprises, who carries on business / activity of development of lands , the 2nd respondent merely alleges that the petitioner had committed breach of contract under the aforesaid agreements, documents etc., and necessary ingredients constituting the alleged offences are conspicuously absent, missing and not forthcoming in the complaint, which contains vague, bald, - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 omnibus and general allegations which taken at their face value cannot be said to incriminate the petitioner for the alleged offences; in fact, the specific details, dates, events, material particulars etc., pertaining to the commission of the alleged offences are also not contained in the impugned complaint which merely repeats the expressions 'fraud', 'cheating' etc., without expressly stating specific instances of the commission of the alleged offences by the petitioner; interestingly, though the documents, agreements, transactions etc., are entered into between the 2nd respondent and his brothers with M/s.Gopalan Enterprises, of which, the petitioner is a partner, the remaining partners and the partnership firm have not been arraigned as accused persons in the FIR. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that continuation of the impugned proceedings pursuant to the impugned complaint would amount to an abuse of process of law and the same deserve to be quashed. 9. A perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that even according to the complainant, the alleged offences are said to have been committed during the period from 2003 - 2006, when the said documents, agreements, transactions etc., were entered into between the 2nd respondent and his brothers with M/s.Gopalan - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 Enterprises; so also, litigations are pending between M/s.Gopalan Enterprises, Sri.N.M.Tulasiram - brother of the complainant from 2017 onwards in relation to the subject matter of the complaint; in fact, the complaint itself alleges that it is being given by the 2nd respondent on behalf of himself as well as his two brothers Sri.N.M.Ravi and Sri.N.M.Tulasiram and all three of them are arraigned as complainants in the impugned FIR; so also, absolutely no explanation whatsoever is offered or put forth in the complaint as to the long and inordinate delay and latches of more than 20 years in filing the complaint. Under these circumstances, in the absence of any explanation offered by the complainant as to the delay in filing the complaint in relation to the alleged offences said to have been committed by the petitioner more than 20 years back, the impugned complaint and FIR are vitiated on account of delay and latches and the same deserve to be quashed on this ground also. 10. In the case of Chanchalapathi Das vs. State of West Bengal and Another - 2023 SCC OnLine SC 650, the Apex Court held as under: - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 "18. It cannot be gainsaid that the High Courts have power to quash the proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Though the powers under Section 482 should be sparingly exercised and with great caution, the said powers ought to be exercised if a clear case of abuse of process of law is made out by the accused. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404] the Supreme Court had held that the criminal proceedings could be quashed by the High Court under Section 482 if the court is of the opinion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings are to be quashed. 19. This Court, way back in 1992 in the landmark decision State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , after considering relevant provisions more particularly Section 482CrPC and the principles of law enunciated by this Court relating to the exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 226, had laid down certain guidelines for the exercise of powers of quashing, which have been followed in umpteen number of cases. The relevant part thereof reads as under : (SCC pp. 378- 79, para 102) “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 20. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] this Court had observed that the court would be justified to quash the proceedings if it finds that initiation or continuance of such proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of court. 21. As regards inordinate delay in filing the complaint it has been recently observed by this Court in Hasmukhlal D. Vora v. State of T.N. [Hasmukhlal D. Vora v. State of T.N., (2022) 15 SCC 164 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 632] that though inordinate delay in itself may not be a ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, however unexplained inordinate delay must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor and ground for quashing a criminal complaint. 22. In the light of the aforestated legal position, if the facts of the case are appreciated, there remains no shadow of doubt that the complaint filed by the respondent complainant after an inordinate unexplained delay of eight years was nothing but sheer misuse and abuse of the process of law to settle personal scores with the appellants, and that continuation of such malicious prosecution would also be further abuse and misuse of process of law, more particularly when neither the allegations made in the complaint nor in the charge- - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 sheet, disclose any prima facie case against the appellants. The allegations made against the appellants are so absurd and improbable that no prudent person can ever reach to a conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the appellants-accused. 23. Before parting, a few observations made by this Court with regard to the misuse and abuse of the process of law by filing false and frivolous proceedings in the courts need to be reproduced. In the Court in Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. [Dalip Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 2 SCC 114 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 324] it was observed that : (SCC p. 116, para 1) “1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. “satya” (truth) and “ahimsa” (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which was in vogue in the pre- Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.” - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 24. In Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India [Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India, (2014) 8 SCC 470 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 424 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 712] it was observed as under : (SCC p. 642, para 191) “191. The Indian judicial system is grossly afflicted with frivolous litigation. Ways and means need to be evolved to deter litigants from their compulsive obsession towards senseless and ill- considered claims.” 25. We would like to add that just as bad coins drive out good coins from circulation, bad cases drive out good cases from being heard on time. Because of the proliferation of frivolous cases in the courts, the real and genuine cases have to take a backseat and are not being heard for years together. The party who initiates and continues a frivolous, irresponsible and senseless litigation or who abuses the process of the court must be saddled with exemplary cost, so that others may deter to follow such course. The matter should be viewed more seriously when people who claim themselves and project themselves to be the global spiritual leaders, engage themselves into such kind of frivolous litigations and use the court proceedings as a platform to settle their personal scores or to nurture their personal ego. 26. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case and for the reasons stated hereinabove, we deem it appropriate to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the appellants in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, arising out of FIR No. 33 of - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 2009 registered at Ballygunge Police Station, and quash the same." 11. A perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that the primary / main allegation made by the complainant is that the petitioner was guilty of committing breach of contract in not fulfilling or performing the obligations in terms of the agreements entered into by him with the 2nd respondent and his brother in relation to immovable property; it follows therefrom that in the light of the specific allegation regarding alleged breach of contract and in the absence of any specific instances and material particulars / details of any criminality alleged by the complainant, the impugned complaint and FIR seeking enforcement of the alleged rights of the 2nd respondent in pursuance of alleged breach of contract is not maintainable and the same deserves to be quashed on this ground also. 12. In the case of Sarabjit Kaur vs. State of Punjab and Another - (2023) 5 SCC 360, the Apex Court held as under: "13. A breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up promise will - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. From the facts available on record, it is evident that Respondent 2 had improved his case ever since the first complaint was filed in which there were no allegations against the appellant rather it was only against the property dealers which was in subsequent complaints that the name of the appellant was mentioned. On the first complaint, the only request was for return of the amount paid by Respondent 2. When the offence was made out on the basis of the first complaint, the second complaint was filed with improved version making allegations against the appellant as well which was not there in the earlier complaint. The entire idea seems to be to convert a civil dispute into criminal and put pressure on the appellant for return of the amount allegedly paid. The criminal courts are not meant to be used for settling scores or pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. Wherever ingredients of criminal offences are made out, criminal courts have to take cognizance. The complaint in question on the basis of which FIR was registered was filed nearly three years after the last date fixed for registration of the sale deed. Allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the court." 13. In the case of Naresh Kumar and Another vs. Sate of Karnataka and Another - 2024 SCC OnLine SC 268, the Apex Court held as under: - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 "8. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has held that every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise." 14. In the case of Rikhab Birani and Another vs. Sate of Uttar Pradesh and Another- 2025 SCC OnLine SC 823, the Apex Court held as under: "18. In Kunti v. State of Uttar Pradesh; (2023) 6 SCC 109, this Court referred to Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab; (2023) 5 SCC 360 wherein it was observed that a breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep a promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, the dishonest intention on the part of the party who is alleged to have committed the offence of cheating should be established at the time of entering into the transaction with the complainant, otherwise the offence of cheating is not established or made out." 15. A perusal of the material on record will also indicate that the dispute between the parties being essentially, predominantly and overwhelmingly of a civil nature / character, arising out of documents, agreements, transactions etc., relating to immovable - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 property, the 2nd respondent is illegally attempting to convert the said civil dispute into a criminal action by giving the same a criminal colour / flavour / texture, which is impermissible in law and the impugned FIR and complaint deserve to be quashed on this score also. 16. In the case of Urmila Devi and Others vs. Balram and Another - 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1574, the Apex Court held as under: 8.1. At the outset, we may place reliance on the seminal judgment of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph ‘102’ therein and sub-paras 1, 3, 5 and 7, which read as under: “102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. *** (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. *** (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. *** - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 8.2. On perusal of the record, it is noted that based on the complaint filed by complainant-respondent No. 1, a complaint case No. 627/2002 was registered against the appellants under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC. For ease of reference, the aforesaid Sections are extracted as under: “419. Punishment for cheating by personation.-Whoever cheats by personation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. xxx xxx xxx 467. xxx xxx xxx 467. Forgery of valuable security, will etc.- Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or with - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and also be liable to fine. xxx xxx xxx 468. Forgery for purpose of cheating.- Whoever commits forgery, intending that the [document or electronic record forged] shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. xxx xxx xxx 471. Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record.- Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document or electronic record which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document or electronic record, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document or electronic record.” 8.3. Upon giving our thorough consideration to the arguments advanced at the bar, we fail to understand as to how the allegations against the appellants herein who are only legatees under the Will in question, could be sustained in light of the material on record. 8.4. The allegations against the accused-appellants, in sum and substance, are that they entered into a conspiracy with other individuals to fabricate a forged will after the death of the testator that was then used to circumvent the sale deed dated 25.04.1994. 8.5. Upon appreciating the facts and circumstances, we do not find that the offences aforementioned are made out in the present case. Neither do we find any criminal breach of trust nor do we find any cheating by impersonation. We also do not find any cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. In these circumstances, we fail to see how it could be alleged that - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 the accused-appellants cheated and dishonestly induced the complainant-respondent No. 1. 8.6. It is writ large on the face of the record that the complaint case has been employed as a circuitous tool to abuse the process of law, especially after the complainant-respondent No. 1 failed to pursue the remedies available to it. The chronology of events indicates that the criminal proceedings in the year 2001 were instituted only after approximately seven years of the mutation order dated 27.09.1994, four years after the ex-parte ad-interim order issued on 30.07.1997 and three years after the rejection of the objections to the Mutation Order vide Order dated 09.01.1998. 8.7. In this regard, our attention was drawn to paras 42-44 and 46 of Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1, dealing with Sections 420 and 467 IPC, which are extracted hereunder: “42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning. 43. We shall now deal with the ingredients of Section 467 IPC. … 44. The following ingredients are essential for commission of the offence under Section 467 IPC: 1. the document in question so forged; 2. the accused who forged it; 3. the document is one of the kinds enumerated in the aforementioned section. x x x 46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.” (underlining by us) 8.8. This Court, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692, (Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia) reasoned that the criminal process cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose. This Court also observed that the court should quash those criminal cases where the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and no useful purpose is likely to be served by continuation of a criminal prosecution. 8.9. In R.K. Vijayasarathy, this Court held that while exercising powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., a High Court can examine whether a matter which is essentially of a civil nature has been given a cloak of a criminal offence. Recently, in Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680, this Court held that courts have to be vigilant to ensure that the machinery of criminal justice is not misused for achieving oblique motives and agendas. Tacitly endorsing such misuse only unnecessarily burdens the courts and the criminal justice system. In Anand Kumar Mohatta, this Court, whilst quashing the FIR and chargesheet therein, highlighted the following words of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, that describe the fundamental principle for exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.: - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 “7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice.” (underlining by us) 9. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged against the accused-appellants herein are made out. The instant case is just another one in a string of cases filed in recent years that seek to disguise a civil dispute as criminal. The complaint case against the accused- appellants has been pending for over two decades and its continuation would not serve any purpose. The observations made by this Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia inform our decision and the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub- paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102 extracted above, squarely apply to the facts of this case. In our view, it is in the interest of justice that present proceedings be quashed." - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 17. In the case of Anukul Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another - 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060, the Apex Court held as under: 17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.; (2006) 6 SCC 736, it was held that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process. The following paragraphs from the decision are apposite: “9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.” 18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal; (2007) 12 SCC 1, it was emphasized that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam; (2015) 9 SCC 647, this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process. 19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Criminal Appeal No. 2963/2025 decided on 14.07.2025 : 2025 INSC 869, this Court disapproved the practice of using - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money recovery cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs are relevant in this context: “9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No. 4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant - herein owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No. 4. However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant. 10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality. 11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh”, (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by the learned - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help the complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016. 12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature. 13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 4 whether his client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of law. - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 14. We could have said many things but we refrain from observing anything further. If the Respondent No. 4 has to recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal proceedings. 15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- to the Respondent No. 4 and thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. That's not what is expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the well-settled principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court in the “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal”, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335” 20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, it is manifest that the dispute - concerning repayment of loan money and the alleged coercion in execution of documents - is purely civil in character. The essential ingredients of cheating or forgery are not prima - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 facie made out. The institution of multiple FIRs in quick succession, particularly after the appellant had already initiated lawful proceedings, reinforces the inference of mala fides. 21. The High Court, in refusing to quash the proceedings, misdirected itself in law by failing to apply the ratio laid down in Bhajan Lal, and the subsequent authorities referred to above, which uniformly hold that the machinery of criminal law cannot be permitted to be misused for settling civil disputes or to wreak vengeance." 18. A perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that the 2nd respondent alleges the offences of both criminal breach of trust and cheating which cannot co-exist with each other as held by the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh - (2024) 10 SCC 690 followed by Arshad Neyaz Khan vs. State of Jharkhand and Another - 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2058. 19. In Arshad Neyaz Khan 's case supra, the Apex Court held as under: "16. The contents of the complaint as well as the FIR would have to be read in light of the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 IPC and the law settled by this Court through various judicial dicta. On perusal of the - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 complaint dated 29.01.2021, it is noted that the complainant/respondent No. 2 has filed the said complaint invoking Sections 406, 420 and 120B IPC. For ease of reference, the aforesaid Sections are extracted as under: “406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.— Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. xxx 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. xxx 120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.- (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence. (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.” 17. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 (“Inder Mohan Goswami”), - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 while dealing with Section 420 IPC, this Court observed thus: “42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducement must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning.” 18. In light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we find that the complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to make out a case that satisfies the basic ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC. We fail to understand as to how the allegations against the appellant herein could be brought within the scope and ambit of the aforesaid section. On a bare perusal of the FIR as well as the complaint, we do not find that the offence of cheating as defined under Section 420 IPC is made out and we do not find that there is any cheating and dishonest inducement to deliver any property or a valuable security involved in the instant case. 19. It is settled law that for establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant/respondent No. 2 was required to show that the appellant had a fraudulent or dishonest - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 intention at the time of making a promise or representation of not fulfilling the agreement for sale of the said property. Such a culpable intention right at the beginning when the promise was made cannot be presumed but has to be made out with cogent facts. In the facts of the present case, there is a clear absence of dishonest and fraudulent intention on the part of the appellant during the agreement for sale. We must hasten to add that there is no allegation in the FIR or the complaint indicating either expressly or impliedly any intentional deception or fraudulent/dishonest intention on the part of the appellant right from the time of making the promise or misrepresentation. Nothing has been said on what the misrepresentations were and how the appellant intentionally deceived the complainant/respondent No. 2. Mere allegations by the complainant/respondent No. 2 that the appellant failed to execute the agreement for sale and failed to refund the money paid by the complainant/respondent No. 2 does not satisfy the test of dishonest inducement to deliver a property or part with a valuable security as enshrined under Section 420 IPC. 20. On perusal of the allegations contained in the complaint, in light of the ingredients of Section 406 IPC, read in the context of Section 405 IPC, do not find that any offence of criminal breach of trust has been made out. It is trite law that every act of breach of trust may not result in a penal offence unless there is evidence of a manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation of property entrusted to him. In the case of criminal breach - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 of trust, if a person comes into possession of the property and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to its own use against the terms of contract, then the question whether such retention is with dishonest intention or not and whether such retention involves criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, the complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to establish the ingredients essential to constitute an offence under Section 406 IPC. The complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to place any material on record to show us as to how he had entrusted property to the appellant. Furthermore, the complaint also omits to aver as to how the property, so entrusted to the appellant, was dishonestly misappropriated or converted for his own use, thereby committing a breach of trust. 21. Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that if it is the case of the complainant/respondent No. 2 that the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined in Section 415, punishable under Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 690 observed that there is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property. In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously. Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are independent and distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other. 22. At this point, we must hasten to add that the complaint was filed after a delay of nearly eight years. Learned counsel for the complainant/respondent No. 2 has failed to impress the Court about the reason for the delay and hence this fact further raises a suspicion about the bona fides of the complainant/respondent No. 2. The delay in lodging of the complaint and FIR, coupled with the vague allegations do not inspire any confidence in the Court to allow the criminal proceedings to continue against the appellant. Further, the complainant/respondent No. 2 had an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit claiming damages for the alleged violation of his contractual rights which has not been availed but a route through criminal proceedings, when no ingredient of offence is made out, cannot be permitted. Criminal law ought not to become a platform for initiation of vindictive proceedings to settle personal scores and - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 vendettas. The appellant therefore, in our view, could not be attributed any mens rea and therefore, the allegations levelled by the prosecution against the appellant are unsustainable. 23. Furthermore, in Inder Mohan Goswami, it was held by this Court that the Court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. It was further held by this Court that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are of the firm opinion that to continue the criminal proceedings against the appellant herein would cause undue harassment to him because as observed hereinabove, no prima facie case for the offence under Sections 406 or 420 IPC is made out. 24. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to - 37 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the Accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior - 38 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 25. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judgment in the light of the facts of this case, we find that none of the offences alleged against the appellant herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations of criminal intent and other allegations against the appellant herein have been made with a mala fide intent and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102, extracted above, squarely apply to the facts of this case. In our view, it is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to continue. 26. At this juncture, we find it apposite to mention the observations of this Court in Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680 wherein it was observed that in recent years the machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested interests and for achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud. We say so for the reason that while the complainant/respondent No. 2 has made grave allegations against the appellant herein, he has failed to justify the same before this Court. Such actions would create significant divisions and distrust - 39 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 among people, while also placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial system, particularly criminal courts." Viewed from this angle also, the impugned complaint and FIR deserve to be quashed. 20. A perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that the same contains mutually consistent and destructive allegations, inasmuch as while on one hand, the complainant alleges that his signatures were taken on blank papers by the petitioner, in the very same complaint, the complainant admits the various agreements, documents etc., which are registered and alleges breach of contract by the petitioner; this mutually inconsistent and destructive allegations is sufficient to come to the conclusion that the complaint contains allegations which are so inherently improbable and cannot be countenanced in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, especially when the allegation with regard to non-giving of consent of the land owners or BBMP to the petitioner for putting up construction would clearly not amount to the commission of any criminal offence or attracting the ingredients of the alleged offences. Viewed from this angle also, the impugned complaint and FIR deserve to be quashed. - 40 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:40311 WP No. 13519 of 2024 21. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the view that the continuation of proceedings pursuant to the impugned complaint and FIR against the petitioner, would amount to an abuse of process of law warranting interference by this Court in the present petition. 22. Insofar as the judgments relied upon by the 2nd respondent is concerned, having regard to the peculiar / unique facts obtaining in the case on hand as discussed hereinbefore, the said judgments would not be applicable and as such, the same are not elaborately dealt with for the purpose of the present order. 23. In the result, I pass the following:- ORDER (i) Petition is hereby allowed. (ii) The impugned complaint and FIR in Crime No.366/2024 registered by the 1st respondent – Police for offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 465, 468 and 471 IPC, qua the petitioner are hereby quashed. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE Srl.