1 Reserved on : 11.07.2025 Pronounced on : 16.07.2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION No.14203 OF 2025 (GM - CPC) BETWEEN: THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER B.M.T.C NORTH DIVISION YASHAWANTHAPURA BENGALURU – 560 022 REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF LAW OFFICER B.M.T.C., CENTRAL OFFICE K.H.ROAD, SHANTHINAGAR BENGALURU – 560 027. ... PETITIONER (BY SMT. H.R.RENUKA, ADVOCATE) AND: SYED NAVEED S/O SYED SATTAR AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS R/O KURUVELI, URDIGERI HOBLI TUMAKUR TALUK, TUMAKUR DISTRICT – 560 026 ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI NAVEED AHMED, ADVOCATE) 2 THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE AWARD DATED 17/04/2025 IN EX PETITION NO. 2642/2023 PASSED BY THE XI ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE (ANNEXURE-E). THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 11.07.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CAV ORDER The petitioner/Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Corporation’ for short) is at the doors of this Court calling in question an order dated 17-04-2025 passed in Execution Petition No.2642 of 2023. 2. Heard Smt. H.R.Renuka, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Naveed Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 3 3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: - The respondent is appointed in the Corporation as a Driver on 01-07-2002. The respondent is said to have remained unauthorizedly absent from 26-01-2012. A domestic inquiry is instituted against the respondent to enquire into the charge of unauthorized absence. The Inquiry Officer, after a detailed inquiry, is said to have held the charges as proved. The Disciplinary Authority accepts the findings of the Inquiry Officer and holding that the respondent was unauthorizedly absent between 26-01-2012 and 24-04-2013 imposed penalty of dismissal from service. 3.1. The said order of dismissal is questioned by the respondent by raising an industrial dispute under Section 10(4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘the Act’ for short) in I.D.No.136 of 2014. The Labour Court is said to have recorded a finding that the Disciplinary Authority was not justified in holding the respondent guilty of the charges and on that basis sets aside the order of dismissal and directs reinstatement into service with 4 continuity of service but without back wages. The Corporation challenges the same in Writ Petition No.55896 of 2015. For 6 years the respondent did not file any application seeking wages under Section 17B of the Act. Such an application comes to be filed during the year 2021. The said application is heard and is allowed on 28- 06-2022 directing compliance with Section 17B wages, from the date the award was notified. Immediately thereafter, the Corporation seeks recalling of the order which was also rejected. The respondent institutes a contempt petition against the Corporation in C.C.C.No.81 of 2023 alleging disobedience of the order of the learned single Judge in W.P.No.55896 of 2015. The Division Bench hearing the contempt, without issuing notice, dismisses the contempt permitting the respondent to avail of remedy available in law. 3.2. The respondent then registers execution in Execution Petition No.2642 of 2023 seeking to execute the order of payment of Section 17B wages. The learned single Judge hearing Writ Petition No.55896 of 2015 rejects the same on 08-04-2024. A writ appeal against the said order also comes to be rejected. Again, a 5 contempt petition is preferred alleging disobedience of the order. During the pendency of the said contempt petition, the concerned Court noticing the absence of the Corporation, issues attachment warrant. It is then, the petitioner/Corporation is at the doors of this Court calling in question issuance of the order of attachment and the very institution of execution before the concerned Court. 4. Learned counsel Smt. H.R.Renuka appearing for the petitioner would take this Court through the entire order sheets in all those cases. It is her emphatic submission that the Corporation filed an application before the learned single Judge seeking recall of the order. The order was recalled and reinstatement was offered in lieu of Section 17B wages. The respondent accepts the reinstatement but complains that he is not able to work, therefore, Section 17B wages should be restored. The learned single Judge dismisses the petition but no observation with regard to Section 17B wages. The Division Bench rejects the writ appeal where also there is no order with regard to Section 17B wages. The respondent is reinstated and is working today. The issue now is only with 6 regard to any order under Section 17B wages to be executed before the executing Court. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel Sri Naveed Ahmed would refute the submissions in contending that Section 17B is a statutory right. It is automatic once there is an order of reinstatement. Therefore, from the date of the award even if the workman does not ask, the employer should pay Section 17B wages. He would contend that the respondent was right in seeking execution of the order. The execution was permitted by the Division Bench in contempt. Therefore, the Corporation cannot escape payment of Section 17B wages, even if there is no direction to that effect. He would seek dismissal of the petition. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. Certain dates assume significance in the case at hand. The dispute raised on the 7 dismissal of the respondent comes to be allowed by the Labour Court on 20-04-2015 directing reinstatement, continuity of service but without back wages. The Corporation aggrieved by the award challenges it in Writ Petition No.55896 of 2015. No application is made by the respondent under Section 17B of the Act. In the year 2021 application is preferred seeking wages as obtaining under Section 17B. Then comes a slew of orders passed by coordinate Benches of this Court. A coordinate Bench on 28-06-2022 has passed the following order: “ORDER Sri.Devaraj., learned counsel on behalf of Sri.B.L.Sanjeev., for petitioner has appeared through video conferencing. Sri.Naveed Ahmed., learned counsel for respondent has appeared in person. Counsel for respondent submits that an application in I.A.No.1/2021 is filed to direct the petitioner to pay wages under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 from the date of the Award i.e., 20.04.2015. Counsel further submits that Sri.Syed Naveed – the respondent has sworn to an affidavit stating that he is not gainfully employed in any establishment and he is ready and willing to join duty immediately if petitioner – Corporation provide him with employment. 8 Counsel also submits that petitioner has not filed objection to I.A.No.1/2021. Accordingly, he submits that I.A.No.1/2021 may be allowed. Submission is noted. I have perused the application and also affidavit filed by the respondent seeking 17-B wages. The conditions of 17-B are satisfied. Hence the respondent is entitled for 17-B wages. The petitioner – Corporation is hereby directed to pay 17-B wages to the respondent from the date of the award became enforceable till the disposal of the Writ Petition. Accordingly, I.A.No.1/2021 is allowed. Petitioner shall comply the order within two weeks.” (Emphasis supplied) The coordinate Bench allows the application in I.A.No.1/2021 and directs Section 17B wages to the respondent from the date the award became enforceable. The Corporation then files an application to recall the said order. The application to recall comes to be rejected with imposition of costs on 21-09-2022. The order reads as follows: “ORDER Sri.Sanjeev.B.L., learned counsel for petitioner and Sri.Naveed Ahmed., learned counsel for respondent have appeared in person. Counsel Sri.Sanjeev.B.L., submits that the Writ Petition was listed on 28.06.2022 and the Court allowed the application I.A.No.1/2021 and Corporation was directed to pay 17-B wages. 9 The petitioner has filed an application in I.A.No.1/2022 to recall the order dated:28.06.2022. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that reasons are narrated in the application to recall the order dated:28.06.2022. Counsel therefore, submits that the same may be taken note of and the application may be allowed and order dated:28.06.2022 may be recalled. I have considered the submission made on behalf of petitioner and also perused the application with utmost care. Heard, the learned counsel for petitioner and respondent on I.A.No.1/2022. I have carefully perused the daily order sheet and the Writ papers. The 17-B application is filed on 07.12.2021 and thereafter the matter was listed from time to time. The matter was listed on 19.01.2022. On that day, Sri.Srinivas., learned counsel on behalf of Sri.Sanjeev.B.L., appeared through video conferencing and sought a week's time to file statement of objections to I.A.No.1/2021. Accordingly, time was granted. Thereafter, the matter was again listed before the Court from time to time and as could be seen from the Writ papers, the petitioner has not made any efforts to file statement of objections to I.A.No.1/2021 till date. The order is passed to pay 17-B wages. I find no reason to recall the order dated:28.06.2022. Accordingly, I.A.No.1/2022 is rejected with cost of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only) payable to Advocates' Association Library Fund, High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru.” A memo is then filed by the Corporation that it would reinstate the respondent instead of payment of Section 17B wages. This is 10 accepted and the order comes to be passed on 02-11-2022. The order reads as follows: “Learned counsel for petitioner has filed a memo along with receipt for having paid the cost. With regard to payment of Section 17B wages it is the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that the petitioner would reinstate the respondent subject to result of writ petition. Learned counsel for respondent is agreeable to report for employment with the petitioner. In view of the said submission, respondent shall report for duty to the Head Office on 07.11.2022 at 10:30 a.m. and petitioner shall assign him suitable duty. Report of the same to be filed in the Court before the next date of hearing. Call on 14.11.2022.” (Emphasis supplied) The aforesaid order is clear that the respondent was directed to report for duty on 07-11-2022 and further directed that the Corporation would assign him suitable duty. The order can only be read as reinstatement in lieu of wages under Section 17B of the Act. Again on 14-11-2022, the petitioner filed a memo. On the memo the following order is passed on 14-11-2022: “Learned counsel for petitioner has filed a memo dated 14.11.2022 placing on record the fact that the respondent has been reinstated into service and is deputed to Depot-8. 11 Copy of the order is also enclosed along with the memo. Learned counsel for the respondent confirms the same. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent has been assigned to do heavy work. However he is not been able to do so and observation to that effect is also available in the impugned order. In the event the respondent makes any representation with regard to his inability to do heavy work together with necessary certificates and medical records as may be required, the petitioner shall consider the same as expeditiously as possible. At request call on 06.12.2022.” (Emphasis supplied) Again, the mater was posted to 06-12-2022 and on 06-12-2022, the following order is passed: The learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent are present. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that pursuant to the order dated 14.11.2022, the respondent has furnished a representation with regard to his inability to do heavy work along with the necessary documents. However, the said representation has not been responded to by the petitioner and the counsel further submits that a copy of the representation will be filed during the course of the day. Counsel for respondent further submits that despite an order of this Court, the petitioner has not paid the wages to the respondent as contemplated under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act upto the date of his reinstatement. Counsel for the petitioner seeks for a short accommodation to get instructions. 12 Counsel for the petitioner to take instructions regarding payment of 17B wages also and submit on the next date of hearing. Call on 08.12.2022.” (Emphasis supplied) Now the demand is that the respondent does not want work but wants Section 17B wages. On 08-04-2024 the aforesaid petition viz W.P.No.55896 of 2015 comes to be dismissed confirming the order of the Labour Court. The operative portion of the order of the learned single Judge is as follows: “…. …. …. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order passed by the Labour Court does not warrant interference and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed as devoid of merit with the aforesaid observation.” (Emphasis supplied) It was dismissed being devoid of merit. In the entire order there is nothing said about wages under Section 17B. A writ appeal is preferred by the Corporation only to be dismissed. The dismissal of the writ appeal is as follows: “…. …. …. 13 6. About the case of the workman that he was unable to discharge the duty as a driver, learned single Judge has proceeded to observe that it will be open for the workman to make a representation in this regard to the Corporation seeking assignment of light work on the basis of medical report. In these observations also, this Court is not inclined to interfere with. 7. The challenge to the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge is merit less. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. In view of dismissal of the appeal, the contempt petition will not survive. However, it is observed that the compliance of the order of learned single Judge shall be effect within four weeks from the date of service of certified copy of this order.” (Emphasis supplied) The order of the Division Bench was hearing both the writ appeal and the contempt petition preferred. The contempt was with regard to Section 17B wages. The Division Bench permitted compliance of the order of the learned single Judge within four weeks. It appears, the respondent had preferred a contempt petition, in which no notice was issued, and the petition was dismissed reserving liberty to the respondent to avail of the alternative remedy available. Based upon that, the respondent had preferred the execution petition in Execution No.2642 of 2023. In the execution the main claim is Section 17B wages to an extent of ₹21,26,619/-. 14 8. The issue now would be, whether there is any order that is executable for demand of wages under Section 17B of the Act? The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that wages under Section 17B is automatic and even without asking, the employer should make payment is the submission, which is noted only to be rejected. It is trite law that only when the employee who is the beneficiary of an order of reinstatement from the hand of the Labour Court files an application along with an affidavit the he has not gainfully employed, it is from the said date the wages under Section 17B would spring. 9. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in the case of MCD V. SANTOSH KUMARI,1 wherein the court holds as follows: “…. …. …. 29. We are of the considered view that the Single Bench in Food Craft Instt. (supra) gave a balanced interpretation to the aforesaid provision taking into consideration the interest of both the workman as well as the employer. It is the most equitable. What follows from a conjoint reading of Para (xii) and (xvi) enumerated therein that normally, the workman would be paid wages with effect from the date of the award. It should be in those cases where application is filed with promptitude and immediately on notice of writ petition 1 2012 SCC OnLine Del 4390 15 staying the operation of the order of reinstatement or proceedings against such an award. It should be within reasonable period. Thereafter, that would mean that such an application should normally be filed with the filing of the counter affidavit or reply to an application for interim relief and in the case of absence of such counter affidavit or reply, within the reasonable period from the date when workman has appeared himself or through counsel in the writ proceedings. This would be so even when the management has delayed in filing the writ petition challenging the award inasmuch as with such a delay, it cannot deprive the workman under Section 17B from the date of award. Thus, the expression “during the pendency of proceedings before the High Court” under Section 17B of the ID Act would not mean from the date of filing the writ petition. However, if there is a long or abnormal delay in filing application under Section 17B of the ID Act, we are of the opinion that in such an eventuality, it becomes an obligation of the workman to satisfactorily explain the delay. It would become relevant consideration for deciding as to whether the benefit is to be accorded from the date of application or the award. In case, it is unreasonable and unexplained delay, it would be within the discretion of the writ Court to direct payment of wages from the date of the application. There could be several reasons for adopting this course of action. One of us (Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.) had taken the justification by providing following reasons: “12.3……. A. Section 17B is in the nature of a subsistence allowance. It is intended to provide to the workman whose reinstatement has been directed by the Industrial Adjudicator, at least minimum wages, during the time that the judicial review of the award of the Industrial Adjudicator is pending consideration before this Court. The payment thereunder is a month by month payment and is not a payment of any lumpsum amount. Further, the said payment is subject to the workman, on affidavit, stating that he is unemployed and/or has been unable to find employment. The employer has a right to rebut the said averment of the workman and if succeeds in rebutting the 16 same, the workman under Section 17B would not be entitled to payment. B. The payment under Section 17B is not an automatic payment which starts running immediately on institution of proceedings to challenge the award. For the workman to be entitled to such payment, he is required to file an affidavit. Thus, payment is dependent upon a positive act of the workman. The High Court is not empowered to make the payment till such affidavit has been filed by the workman. C. Once payment/order requires a positive act of the workman, entitled to such payment of filing in court such affidavit, the ordinary rule of litigation is (as reiterated in Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 726 : AIR 2003 SC 833) that the right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the party approaches the Court. The Supreme Court in Mukund Lal Bhandari v. U.O.I., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 2 : AIR 1993 SC 2127, in relation to the pension of Freedom Fighters also held that the “benefit should flow only from the date of application and not from any date earlier”. Thus but for Section 17B providing for payment during pendency of the writ proceeding (and which has been interpreted as not from date of institution of the writ petition but from the date of the award impugned therein) under general law, an order under Section 17B would have been only from the date of the application under Section 17B. D. However such benefit given to the workman, of direction/order for payment from a date anterior to the filing of application should not be tilted against the employer by interpreting it to mean that the workman can apply under Section 17B at his whim and fancy and at any time. The workman cannot be permitted to apply under Section 17B when the writ petition matures for hearing and be held entitled to payment for several years together. To allow so, would be inequitable to the employer. E. In most cases, it is impossible for the employer to verify whether the workman is employed in another establishment or not. It would be more so difficult if the employer is required to verify the employment, if any, for say the last 10 years, as the petitioner herein would be required to, to rebut the affidavit filed by the workman. 17 F. If the application under Section 17B is made within a reasonable time, the employer can make arrangements for the payment. However, non-filing of the application by the workman can reasonably entitle the employer to believe that the employee is employed in another establishment and will not make any claim under Section 17B. The employer may arrange its financial affairs accordingly. An employer who has acted on the basis of such a representation of the workman cannot after a long period, 10 years as in the present case, be burdened with the liability under Section 17B from a back date which as a lump sum may represent an enormous amount and wreck the employer. Moreover it will provide a bounty rather than subsistence. G. The Supreme Court in Excel Wear v. U.O.I., (1978) 4 SCC 224 : AIR 1979 SC 25 held that principles of socialism and social justice cannot be pushed to such an extreme so as to ignore completely or to a very large extent the interests of the employer.”” (Emphasis supplied) The Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, holds that the payment of wages under Section 17B of the Act is not automatic and does not start immediately upon institution of the proceedings challenging the award. In cases of unreasonable and unexplained delay in filing the application under Section 17B it would be within the discretion of the court to direct payment of wages and it would be the obligation of the workman to satisfactorily explain the delay. 10. Admittedly, the respondent files the application after 6 years of the Corporation filing the petition. An order under Section 18 17B is granted but that tacitly gets modified by a memo filed by the Corporation that it would reinstate the respondent in lieu of Section 17B wages. Therefore, the claim of payment of Section 17B wages was modified with reinstatement. 11. The respondent accepts reinstatement, reports to duty, complains of the work to be heavy comes back to the Court and demands Section 17B wages yet again. The respondent’s later dissatisfaction with the nature of work assigned, does not revive the statutory claim that was by consensus substituted and waived. There is no order while rejecting the petition with regard to payment of wages under Section 17B. There is no order by the Division Bench with regard to payment of wages under Section 17B. It is ununderstandable as to what order the respondent is wanting to execute before the executing Court. There is no determination by any judicial fora that the respondent is entitled to receive huge amount of ₹21,26,619/- as wages under Section 17B. Having accepted the offer of reinstatement in lieu of Section 17B wages, the respondent now complains that he is entitled to Section 17B wages and seeks execution of the order. 19 12. The execution is admittedly sought in thin air, as what can be executed is only what is already determined. As observed hereinabove, there is no determination in the case at hand. Therefore, the very institution of execution petition, in the teeth of the aforesaid order, is a misconception of the respondent and the Court passing the order of attachment is again contrary to law. On all these facts, the petition deserves to succeed, more so in the light of the fact that the respondent is reinstated and is now working in the reinstated post with light work assigned to him. 13. The issue now would be, whether the execution petition must be permitted to be continued or not. Both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench did not have explicit directions for payment of 17B wages. Execution presupposes an executable order. The claim of entitlement cannot be conjured from the void, in the absence of a judicially mandated command for payment of Rs.21,26,619/-. The execution petition thus rests on shaky foundation. The institution of execution proceedings on the aforesaid frail footing and the attachment order arising therefrom cannot be sustained in 20 law and if permitted to continue, it amounts to seeking enforcement of a non-existed entitlement. In that light, the petition deserves to succeed in its entirety and the prayers sought to be answered. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: O R D E R (i) Writ Petition is allowed. (ii) The proceedings in Execution Petition No.2642 of 2023 pending before the XI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru stand quashed. Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2025 also stands disposed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE bkp CT:SS