IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Leave to Appeal No. 172 of 2025 With Government Appeal No. 42 of 2025 State of Uttarakhand … Applicant Versus Ravindra … Respondent Mr. K.S. Bora, Deputy Advocate General, with Mr. Dinesh Chauhan, AGA, for the State/appellant. J U D G M E N T Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J. Hon’ble Subhash Upadhyay, J. (Per: Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) By this petition under Section 419(3) of BNSS, State is seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 5.5.2025, passed by Special Sessions Judge (POCSO Act), Uttarkashi in Special Sessions Trial No. 31/2024, thereby acquitting the respondent from the charges framed against him for the offences punishable under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and Section 5j(ii) read with Section 6 of POCSO Act. 2. We have heard learned State Counsel and perused the impugned judgment and order. 3. As we gather from the impugned judgment, it is a case wherein the FIR was registered, on 15.7.2024, on the basis of information received from a hospital that a minor girl had delivered a child. During 2 investigation, it was revealed that the prosecutrix had allegedly been in a relationship with the accused and had become pregnant as a result. The school records showed her to be a minor, and accordingly, the accused was charged under the aforesaid sections of the IPC and POCSO Act. 4. To prove its case, prosecution examined the prosecutrix as PW-1, her father as PW-4, and her mother as PW-6. All three witnesses did not support the prosecution case and turned hostile. Remaining witnesses are formal witnesses. We further gather from the impugned judgment that as per the prosecution, date of alleged incident is 15.11.2023 and as per the school record, the date of birth of prosecutrix is 4.5.2008 and thus based on school record, prosecutrix was minor on the date of alleged incident. However, PW-1 (prosecutrix) deposed that her real date of birth is 4.5.2005 and she loved the accused and voluntarily married him. She further deposed that no force or coercion was applied upon her and that she had physical relations with the accused with her full consent. Father (PW-4) and mother (PW-6) of the prosecutrix, supported her version and further stated that her age had been deliberately reduced in the school admission record for convenience. 5. Based on the deposition of PW-1, PW-4 and PW-6, the trial court held that in the absence of any medical evidence to the 3 contrary, and in view of the consistent and corroborated statements of the victim and her parents, it would be reasonable to conclude that the school record does not reflect the true age of the victim and, therefore, reliance solely on the school certificate to determine minority, in this case, would be misplaced. 6. As regards other charges, the trial court took note of the admitted fact that the prosecutrix and the accused were engaged in physical relations and both the prosecutrix and the accused have unequivocally acknowledged that their physical intimacy led to the birth of a child. 7. Thus, after appreciation of the evidence on record, the trial court arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution failed to establish the charges against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused-respondent. We are in full agreement with the judgment of the trial court. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is also a settled principle of law that when the star witness of the prosecution, i.e., the victim in a POCSO case, does not support the case of the prosecution, the entire case falls to the ground unless corroborated by independent, reliable and cogent evidence. In the present case, not only the prosecutrix but also her parents have testified that she was major and had voluntarily married the accused. Since all of 4 them specifically deposed that her age was intentionally reduced at the time of school admission, the evidentiary value of the school record stood substantially diluted. It is also noteworthy that there is no allegation of force or coercion or abuse against the accused from the prosecutrix. Thus, in the absence of conclusive evidence of minority and in view of the consistent and unequivocal testimony of the prosecutrix and her parents in favour of the accused, the trial court was left with no reliable evidence to convict the accused. We find no infirmity in the impugned judgment that calls for interference. 8. It is settled law that in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, ordinarily the finding of acquittal should not be upset unless it is found that the same is totally perverse and some important piece of evidence, which might have resulted in the conviction of the accused, has not been considered by the trial court. In the present case, no such evidence has been pointed out. 9. Consequently, leave to appeal is refused. Leave petition is dismissed. Government appeal also stands dismissed accordingly. (Subhash Upadhyay, J.) (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) 16.7.2025 Pr PRABODH KUMAR Digitally signed by PRABODH KUMAR DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=3a082a00a95aff911a9559743af8f21c50602ff6eae4e61af3aeab1 98d462503, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=0DC111E8D8CA66E16B940EFDF806ACCC1AB588052DF6 FCA58C67F3C91957BE53, cn=PRABODH KUMAR Date: 2025.07.29 17:38:33 +05'30'