1 2025:CGHC:16564 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No.81 of 2025 Vinay Singh Rajput S/o Late Shri B.S. Rajput Aged About 30 Years R/o Vivekanand Nagar, Street No. 4, Dhamtari, Tahsil And District Dhamtari (C.G.) (Complainant) ... Appellant versus Shubham Gupta S/o Shri Rajendra Gupta Aged About 28 Years R/o Amapara Ward Dhamtari, Tahsil And District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh Near Dukan Chameli Chowk, Beside House Of Mahendra Pandit, Dhamtari, Tahsil And District Dhamtari (C.G.) (Accused) ... Respondent For Appellant : Shri BL Sahu, Advocate. For Respondent : Ms. Sweksha Sharma, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Judgment on Board 08.04.2025 1. This Acquittal Appeal under Section 419 (4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Samhita, 2023 (for short ‘the Act of 2023) has been preferred against the judgment dated 13.12.2024 passed by the Judicial Digitally signed by SISTLA NEELIMA VISHNU PRIYA Date: 2025.04.11 11:48:40 +0530 2 Magistrate First Class, Dhamtari, District Dhamtari in Complaint Case No.2010/2022 whereby, learned trial Court has acquitted the Respondent/accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘the NI Act’). 2. As per the complaint, out of personal terms, the Respondent/ accused has taken loan from the Appellant/Complainant and for repayment of the same, he has issued a cheque dated 01.07.2022 (Ex.P-1) to him amounting to Rs.2,50,000/-. When the said cheque was presented for encashment, the same was dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, a legal notice (Ex.P-6) was sent to the Respondent/accused but even then, payment was not made, therefore, a complaint case has been filed against him. 3. Learned trial Court has, after evaluating the evidence on record, acquitted the Respondent/accused of the charge under Section 138 of the NI Act. Hence, this Appeal has been filed. 4. Shri Sahu submits that the trial Court has not appreciated the facts and evidence of the case in its proper perspective and there is a legal presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act and prays to allow the Appeal. 5. On the contrary, Ms. Sharma supports the judgment impugned and submits that presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act is rebuttable and the Respondent/accused has successfully proved the non-existence of consideration by raising probable defence, therefore, the trial Court has been sagacious in acquitting him and prays to dismiss the Appeal. 3 6. Heard learned Counsel for the parties, perused the documents annexed with the Appeal as also gone through the judgment under challenge with due care. 7. In the matter of Budh Singh vs. State of U.P. reported in (2006) 9 SCC 731, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in a matter of Appeal against acquittal, the High Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, although the view of the Appellate Court is a more probable one. However, while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, it is free to consider the entire evidences on record so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. It is also entitled to consider as to whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court has failed to take into consideration the admissible evidence and has taken into consideration evidences brought on record contrary to law. 8. Further, in the matter of V.N. Ratheesh vs. State of Kerala reported in (2006) 10 SCC 617, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is no embargo on the Appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court said that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is 4 favourable to the accused should be adopted. It is further held that the paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. It was also observed that the principle to be followed by appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 9. It is well established that the High Court has full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, however, the High Court should only interfere when the reasoning of the trial Court is totally absurd. In the matter of Prandas Vs. the State reported in (1950) SCC 62 : AIR 1954 SC 36, the aforesaid principle was reiterated after relying upon the leading case of Sheo Swarup Vs. Emperor reported in AIR 1934 PC 227, which provided the following guidelines:- "Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred 5 by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice.” 10. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the Appellant/Complainant is a private school teacher and was drawing a salary of Rs.20,000/- per month. Further, he has deposed that out of personal terms, he has advanced loan to the Respondent/accused but he has not stated as to on which date, he has given him the said loan and no documents have been executed to this effect either. Moreover, the agreement (Ex.P-3) shows that it has been executed on 02.08.2022 whereas, the cheque has been issued on 01.07.2022. The agreement executed between both the parties shows that Rs.2,70,000/- was received by the Respondent/accused on 02.08.2022 and as such, the said agreement does not add up with the cheque (Ex.P-1), which was issued on an earlier date i.e. 01.07.2022 for a lesser amount. In the complaint preferred by the Appellant/Complainant, the consideration was reported to be Rs.3 lacs, therefore, it appears that the Appellant/Complainant himself was lacking clarity. In the complaint, it has also been stated that the Respondent/accused has taken the loan 3 years ago and the complaint has been made on 16.07.2022. In these 6 circumstances, apparently, a cheque might not have been issued for any legally enforceable debt. 11. In view of above, this Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court, therefore, no interference is required. 12. Accordingly, the Appeal sans merit and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) JUDGE Priya