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2025 DAILYLAW 8918 (RAJ)

MAHAMANTRI , TONK DIVISION v. SAHAYAK ABHIYANTA

CW/7352/2002 · 2025-08-08

Anand Sharma

body2025

Judgment text

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[2025:RJ-JP:30702] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7352/2002 Chief Secretary Tonk Division, P.W.D. Employees Union, Tonk ----Petitioner Versus 1. Assistant Engineer. P.W.D. National Highway-II, Tonk. 2. Judge, Labour Court No.2, Jaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. M.F. Baig For Respondent(s) : Mr. Dheeraj Tripathi, AGC HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Order 08/08/2025 1. Feeling aggrieved by award dated 04.05.2001 passed by Labour Court No.2, Jaipur (for short 'the Labour Court') whereby, reference dated 23.03.1990 has been answered against the petitioner, the instant writ petition has been filed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that feeling dissatisfied with termination of workmen namely; Surajmal, Kajrod, Mohan, Nathu, Mohan S/o Madan, Vilas & Kailash, the Employees Union raised industrial dispute, which was ultimately referred by the appropriate Government to the Labour Court for adjudication; where terms of reference were as to whether termination of aforesaid employees was valid and proper or not, and if not, for what relief the workmen were entitled too. [2025:RJ-JP:30702] (2 of 3) [CW-7352/2002] 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that in their claim petition as well as affidavit, the employees have given specific date of their appointment i.e. 01.04.1986 and different dates of respective workmen with regard to their termination. A contention was also made that all the workmen had completed more than 240 days of service in a calendar year just preceding the date of termination. Hence, under these circumstances, without making compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, the termination could not have been made. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the petitioner filed an application for summoning relevant muster roll on record and despite direction by the Labour Court, same was not produced by the respondent-Department on the pretext that the record were misplaced and one F.I.R. was also lodged in relation to misplacement of record. Learned counsel further submits that not producing the record would lead to adverse inference against the respondents-Department. However, without drawing such adverse inference in favour of the petitioner, a factual finding has been given that the workmen had failed in proving continuous service of more than 240 days and the reference has been erroneously answered against the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit that only due to bona fide reasons that the record was misplaced from their office, one F.I.R. was lodged by the respondents-Department. However, mere non-availability of the record due to bona fide reasons cannot lead to any adverse inference against the respondents-Department and more particularly, under these circumstances, where the workmen themselves have utterly failed [2025:RJ-JP:30702] (3 of 3) [CW-7352/2002] to point out their specific placement at the particular site, nor could they point out that under whose instructions or under whose control they were working, the Labour Court has rightly recorded a finding that the workmen could not prove working of 240 days. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents also submits that the finding arrived at in the impugned award by the Labour Court is based upon meticulous appreciation of the evidence and such factual finding cannot be interfered in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the record. 8. It is settled proposition of law that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, factual finding arrived at by the Labour Court cannot be interfered. In the instant writ petition, the petitioner has failed to prove that the findings are either manifestly illegal or perverse. Under these circumstances, the instant writ petition is hereby dismissed. (ANAND SHARMA),J DIVYA /20