1 Reserved on : 24.09.2025 Pronounced on : 31.10.2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 31ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION No.12221 OF 2023 BETWEEN: 1 . B.M. MAHADEVAPPA S/O LATE MALLAPPA, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, SECRETARY, GRADE I PRESENTLY WORKING AT KAGALVADI GRAMA PANCHAYATH, CHAMARAJANAGARA TALUK, CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT, R/AT BHOGESWARA NILAYA, 6TH CROSS, BRAMARAAMBA LAYOUT, CHAMARAJANAGARA TALUK, CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 313. 2 . K.S.MANJUNATH S/O LATE K.S.SHIVAYYA, AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS, SECRETARY GRADE I YARGAMABALLY GRAMA PANCHAYATH, YELANDOOR TALUK, CHAMARAJANAGARA DISRICT, R/AT KESTURU VILLAGE, YELANDOOR TALUK, CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 441. 2 AND ALSO KESTURU VILLAGE YELANDOOR TALUK CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 441. 3 . SRI M.SHIVAPRASAD S/O LATE B.MALLIKARJUNAPPA, AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, SECRETARY, GRADE II SATTEGALLA GRAMA PANCHAYATH, KOLLEGAL TALUK, CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT, R/AT NO. 232 UTTAMBALI VILLAGE AND POST, KOLLEGALA TALUK CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 442. 4 . SMT.RAJAMANI S., W/O LATE D.SIDDAIAH, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, PDO, PRESENTLY WORKING AT HARALE GRAMA PANCHAYATH, KOLLEGALA TALUK CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT, R/AT NO.7/A-150, 4TH CROSS, BASAVESHWARA NAGARA, VASAVI ROAD KOLLEGALA TALUK CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 440. 5 . NANJUNDASWAMY S/O LATE BASAPPA DEVARU, AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS, SECRETARY GRADE II, PRESENTLY WORKING AT P.G PALYA, GRAMA PANCHAYATH, HANUR TALUK, 3 CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT, R/AT SHIVAPURA VILLAGE, CHENNALINGANAHALLI POST, KOLLEGALA TALUK CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 440. 6 . C.GOPALAKRISHNA S/O LATE S.CHIKKANNA, AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, ASST. DIRECTOR (NAREGA) TALUK PANCHAYATH KOLLEGAL CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 440. R/AT NO. 265, 8TH CROSS, GANGOTRI HUDKO LAYOUT, MYSURU – 570 009. 7 . SMT.G.SHOBHARANI D/O GURUMADAIAH J., W/O MAHALINGA S.L., AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS, PDO, PRESENTLY WORKING AT THELLUNUR GRAMA PANCHAYATH, KOLLEGALA TALUK CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT, R/AT GURUKRIPA NILAYA, BEHIND LUTHARER CHURCH, J.P. MALLAPURAM, KOLLEGALA TOWN CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 440. 8 . P.RAJESH S/O PUTTAMADASHETTY, AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, SECRETARY, GRADE II KANNUR GAMAPANCHAYATH, NOW AT PONNACHI GRAMA PANCHAYATH, HANUR 4 CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 440. R/AT LOKKANAHALLI VILLAGE, KOLLEGALA TALUK, CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 440. ... PETITIONERS (BY SRI K.RAVISHANKAR, ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS SHO, LOKAYUKTHA POLICE STATION, CHAMARAJANAGARA TOWN, CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 313. REPRESENTED BY LOKAYUKTHA SPECIAL P.P. M.S.BUILDING BENGALURU - 560 001. 2 . SRI NATARAJ T., DYSP (SHO),KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA, CHAMARAJANAGARA TOWN, CHAMARAJANAGARA DISTRICT – 571 313. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI B.S.PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR R-1) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.NO.174/2022 (CR.NO.9/2014) REGISTERED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT LOKAYUKTHA POLICE PENDING ON THE FILE OF PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, CHAMARAJANAGARA FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 465, 468, 466, 409, 417, 34, 471, 474, 420, 201 OF IPC AND SECTION 13(1)(c)(d)(i)(ii)(iii) OF P.C. ACT 1988 IN SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO THE PETITIONERS. 5 THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 24.09.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- CAV ORDER The petitioners are before this Court calling in question the proceedings in Special Case No.174 of 2022 registered by the 1st respondent-Lokayuktha for offences punishable under Sections 465, 468, 466, 409, 417, 34, 471, 474, 420, 201 of the IPC and Section 13(1)(c)(d)(i)(ii)(iii) of P.C.Act, 1988. 2. Facts in brief germane are as follows: 2.1. Petitioners, at the relevant point in time, were working as Secretary Grade-I Grade-II and Panchayath Development Officers in different Gram Panchayaths. Based on certain allegations, the Government, in terms of its order dated 09-09-2014, directed the Karnatka Lokayuktha to conduct investigation and submit report regarding misappropriation and certain irregularities in relation to implementation of kits and boards under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (hereinafter referred CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA 6 to as ‘the scheme’ for short). Based upon the said Government Order, a crime comes to be registered in Crime No.9 of 2014 by the Lokayukta Police against several unknown persons. The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet in Special Case 174 of 2022 against 72 persons who were working in different capacities in different Gram Panchayaths. The petitioners are arrayed as accused Nos.9, 20, 33, 40, 42, 46, 59 and all the petitioners were working in Chamarajnagara District and the allegation against them were also with regard to purchase of kits and boards under the scheme. The offences alleged while filing the charge sheet were the ones punishable under Sections 409, 417 and 34 of the IPC. On submission of the charge sheet cognizance is taken by the concerned Court against these petitioners along with others. The matter is pending before the concerned Court. 2.2. Contemporaneously, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against these petitioners and several others, on the same set of facts. The Enquiry Officer so appointed to hold a departmental enquiry against these petitioners, exonerates them of the charges in the departmental enquiry in terms of his report 7 dated 17-04-2018. Long after the permission so granted by the Government, the Government again by an order dated 28-03-2023 orders withdrawal of all proceedings and investigations pending and conducted by the Lokayukta in terms of the order dated 09-09-2014. Therefore, the order that stood for 9 years is withdrawn. The petitioners, on two circumstances, are now before this Court, calling in question the pendency of the criminal proceedings one, on the ground that they are exonerated in the departmental enquiry and the other being, the withdrawal of the Government Order itself which permitted registration of a crime against these persons among others. 3. Heard Sri K Ravishankar, learned counsel appearing for petitioner and Sri B S Prasad, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1. 4. The learned counsel Sri K Ravishankar appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that once the petitioners have been exonerated in the departmental enquiry on the same set of facts, criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to be continued. 8 He would take this Court through the opinion of the Lokayuktha as well, that the proceedings against these petitioners must not continue. 5. Per-contra, the learned counsel Sri B S Prasad representing the 1st respondent/Lokayuktha would submit that the petitioners are not exonerated pursuant to a regular departmental enquiry. No evidence is recorded while exonerating the petitioners. Therefore, he would submit that criminal proceedings cannot be quashed on the said score. He would submit that it is for the petitioners to come out clean in a full blown trial. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material on record. 7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The narration in the petition must begin from the Government Order which permitted enquiry and investigation against several employees of different municipalities on common allegations of purchase of knits 9 and boards. The Government Order permitted registration of crime and departmental enquiry to be initiated. Pursuant to the Government Order so passed, a crime in Crime No.9 of 2014 comes to be registered. The respondent/police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet. The concerned Court takes cognizance of the offence and registers Special Case No.174 of 2022. 8. Certain contemporaneous developments take place. A departmental enquiry was also initiated against these petitioners. The Enquiry Officer so appointed, conducts a departmental enquiry and submits an enquiry report exonerating the petitioners. The report of the Enquiry Officer, insofar as it is germane, reads as follows: “ಪಾವೆ:- ಾಮಾಜನಗರ ೆಯ ೊೇಾಲ, ಯಳಂದೂರು ಮತು %ಾಮಾಜನಗರ &ಾಲೂಕುಗಳ( ನೆಾ )ೕಜೆಯ* +ೇಕಡ-6ರ ಆಡ/&ಾತ0ಕ 1ೆಚ3ದ( ಾಮಫಲಕ ಮತು 56 ಗಳನು7 2010-11 ಮತು 2011-12ೇ ಾ(ನ( ಾಮ ಪಂ ಾ;< ಾಯ=ದ>=ಗಳ?/ಪಂ ಾ;< ಅBವೃDE ಅFಾGಗಳ? ಆHಾಯ ಪಂ ಾ;<ಗ/ೆ ಪIೆದುೊಂಡು, ಹಣವನು7 ಮLಾತ0ಾಂF ಾMNೕಯ ಾOೕಣ ಉQೊRೕಗ SಾತG )ೕಜೆಯ ಆಡ/&ಾತ0ಕ 1ೆಚ3Dಂದ ಸರಬಾಜುQಾರGೆ Vಾವ<WದುX, ಈ ಸಂಬಂಧ [ಾನR ಸಂಸದರು ಸಾ=ರೆ\ ಪತ ಬೆದು ಪIೆDರುವ ಾಮ]ಗಳ? ಕಳVೆ ದ^ೆ=Hಾ]ದುX ಮತು ಅವ_ಗ/ೆ `ೕ*ರುವ %ೆೆ ದು%ಾGHಾ]Qೆaಂದು ತ`Sೆ [ಾಡಲು ಸೂbWದರನcಯ [ಾನR VಾQೇ>ಕ ಆಯುಕರು ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟe ಾಮ - ಪಂ ಾ;< ಅBವೃDE ಅFಾG/ಾಯ=ದ>=ಗ/ಂದ 1ೈಯ5ಕ ಅBVಾಯ ಪIೆದು ಸಾ=ರೆ\ ವರD `ೕ*ರು&ಾೆ. ಸದG &ಾಲೂಕು ಪಂ ಾ;<ಗಳ( hೕಾFಾGಗಳ ಗಮನೆ\ &ಾರQೆ, ಾಮಫಲಕ ಮತು 56 ಗಳನು7 [ಾರುಕiೆe ದರ5\ಂತ Lೆb3ನ ದರವನು7 Vಾವ<W, ಖGೕDWರುವ ದೂGೆ ಸಂಬಂFWದಂ&ೆ `ೕ*ರುವ 10 ವರDಯ ಆkಾರದ hೕೆ ಉಪ `Qೇ=ಶಕರು, SಾD ಮತು ಾmೕQೊRೕಗ ಮತು `Qೇ=ಶಕರು, ೈಮಗn ಮತು ಜವ/ ಇಾSೆ, ಾಮಾಜನಗರ ಇವರುಗಳ? ವಸುಗಳ [ಾರುಕiೆe %ೆೆೆ ಅಂQಾW, %ೆೆ `ಗD [ಾ* ವರD `ೕ*ರುವ pೆ7ೆಯ( Lೆಚು3ವG ಅನುQಾನವನು7 Vಾವ<ಸಲು ಾರಣಕತ=ಾದ, ಾಯ=ದ>=/ಪಂ ಾ;< ಅBವೃDE, ಅFಾGಗ/ಂದ ವಸೂ( [ಾಡಲು ಾಯ=`1ಾ=ಹಕ. ಅFಾGಗ/ೆ ಸೂbಸಾ]ದುX, ಅದರಂ&ೆ ವಸೂಾ< [ಾಡಲು ಕಮ ವpಸಾಗು<ರುವ ಬೆn, ಸಾ=ರೆ\ [ಾp<ಯನು7 hೕೆ ಓದಾದ (1)ರ ಪತದ( ಮುಖR ಾಯ=`1ಾ=ಹಕ ಅFಾG, ಾ ಪಂ ಾಯt, ಾಮಾಜನಗರ ಸ(Wರು&ಾೆ. hೕೆ ಓದಾದ (1)ರ ಪಾವೆಯ( ಪಾuWರುವ ಅಂಶಗ/ೆ ಸಂಬಂFWದಂ&ೆ hೕಲ\ಂಡ (2), (3)ರ ಸಾ=ರದ ಆQೇಶದ( ಈ ೆಳಕಂಡವರನು7 ಇಾSಾ w ಾರxೆಯನು7 %ಾ5;GW, ೇ1ೆ;ಂದ ಅ[ಾನತುೊ/ಸಾ]ರುತQೆ. 1) >ೕ ^ೈಕೃಷz, pಂDನ ಾಯ=`1ಾ=ಹಕ ಅFಾG, &ಾಲೂಕು ಪಂ ಾ;<, ಾಮಾಜನಗರ 2) >ೕ ಎ|.ಎ}.ಮLಾQೇವಾcO (ಅಂDನ ಾಯ=`1ಾ=ಹಕ-ಅFಾG, &ಾಲೂಕು ಪಂ ಾ;<, ಯಳಂದೂರು), ಪಸುತ ಾಯ=`1ಾ=ಹಕ ಅFಾG, &ಾಲೂಕು ಪಂ ಾ;<, ೊೇಾಲ. 3) >ೕ Lೆ~.*.ಮLಾ(ಂಗಯR (pಂDನ ಾಯ=`1ಾ=ಹಕ ಅFಾG, &ಾಲೂಕು ಪಂ ಾ;<, ೊೇಾಲ), ಪಸುತ ಾಯ=`1ಾ=ಹಕ ಅFಾG, &ಾಲೂಕು ಪಂ ಾ;<, ಮಧು]G 4) >ೕ ಎಂ.ಇ.ಾಧಕೃಷz, pಂDನ ಾಯ=`1ಾ=ಹಕ ಅFಾG &ಾಲೂಕು ಪಂ ಾಯt ಯಳಂದೂರು (ಪಸುತ ಸLಾಯಕ ಾಯ=Vಾಲಕ ಇಂ`ಯ€ ನಂ.4 ಕ•` ಾಲ ಉಪ w‚ಾಗ ಾ1ೇG `ೕಾವG `ಗಮ ೊೇಾಲ &ಾಲೂಕು). hೕೆ ಓದಾದ (4)ರ ಅನFೕಕೃತ ƒಪ„xೆ Iಾ||>ವಣz ಸLಾಯಕ `Qೇ=ಶಕರು ಪಶುಸಂೋಪನ ಇಾSೆ ಇವರನು7 ಅ[ಾನತುೊ/ಸುವಂ&ೆ ೋGರುವ pನ7ೆಯ( ಸದG ಅFಾG;ಂದ ಸಾ=ರೆ\ Hಾವ_Qೇ ಆ†=ಕ ನಷe ಉಂiಾ]ರುವ_Dಲ. Lಾಗೂ ಅವರ wರುದX Hಾವ_Qೇ, >ಸುಕಮ ೈೊಳ?ವ ಅವಶRಕ&ೆ ಕಂಡುಬಂDರುವ_Dಲ1ೆಂದು ಪಶುಸಂೊಪೆ ಇಾSೆಯು </WರುತQೆ. ತದನಂತರ hೕೆ ಓದಾದ (5)ರ ಅ.ƒ ಯ( ಇಾSಾ - w ಾರxೆಯನು7 ನIೆಸಲು ಸಹಮ<ಯನು7 `ೕ*ರುತQೆ.” hೕೆ ಓದಾದ (6)ರ( ಕಾ=ಟಕ ಾಗGೕಾ ೇ1ಾ (ವ.`.hೕ) `ಯಮಗಳ?, 1957 `ಯಮ-11 Lಾಗೂ ಕಾ=ಟಕ ಾಗGೕಾ ೇ1ಾ `ಯ[ಾವ/ಗಳ? 1958 `ಯಮ 214 ರ* ಪದತ1ಾದ ಅFಾರವನು7 ಚಾ;W ಈ ೆಳಕಂಡ ಅFಾG/ೌಕರರುಗ/ೆ ಾರಣ ೇಳ?ವ ೋƒೕ} ನು7 ^ಾGೊ/ಸಾ]ರುತQೆ. …. …. …. 11 “hೕೆ ಓದಾದ-(7)ರ( ಪಾuWರುವಂ&ೆ 35 ಆVಾDತ ಅFಾG/ೌಕರರುಗಳ? ತಮ0 (Žತ Lೇ/ೆಗಳನು7 wwಧ Dಾಂಕಗಳಂದು `ೕ*ರು&ಾೆ. ಅವರುಗಳ (Žತ Lೇ/ೆಗಳನು7 ಪG>ೕ(ಸಾ] ಸದG ಆVಾDತ ೌಕರರುಗಳ? ಾರಣ ೇಳ?ವ ೋƒೕ} ನ( ಪಾuWರುವಂ&ೆ ಈ ೆಳಕಂಡ 30 ೌಕರರುಗಳ Vೈ5 22 ೌಕರರುಗಳ?, [ಾರುಕiೆe ದರ5\ಂತ Lೆಚು3ವGHಾ] Vಾವ<Wರುವ mತವನು7 ಸಾ=ರೆ\ ಜ[ಾ [ಾ*ರುವ_Qಾ], 4 ೌಕರರುಗಳ? Qೋ•ಾೋಪxೆಯ( ಪಾuWರುವ mತ5\ಂತ ಕ*ಮ mತವನು7 Vಾವ<WರುವQಾ] Lಾಗೂ 4 ೌಕರರುಗಳ? Vಾವ<Wರುವ_Dಲ ಎಂದು hೕೆ ಓದಾದ (8)ರ ಪತದ( ಮು.ಾ.`.ಅ .ಪಂ ಾಮಾಜನಗರ ರವರು ಸಾ=ರೆ\ ವರD [ಾ*ರು&ಾೆ.” …. …. …. “ಈ hೕಲ\ಂಡ 30 ೌಕರರುಗಳ Vೈ5 22 ೌಕರರುಗಳ? [ಾರುಕiೆe ದರ5\ಂತ Lೆಚು3ವGHಾ] Vಾವ<Wರುವ mತವನು7 ಸಾ=ರೆ\ ಜ[ಾ [ಾ*ರುವ_Qಾ], 4 ೌಕರರುಗಳ? Qೋ•ಾೋಪxೆಯ( ಪಾuWರುವ mತ5\ಂತ ಕ*h mತವನು7 Vಾವ<WರುವQಾ] Lಾಗೂ 4 ೌಕರರುಗಳ? Vಾವ<Wರುವ_Dಲ ಎಂದು hೕೆ ಓದಾದ-(8)ರ ಪತದ( ಮು.ಾ.`. .ಪಂ ಾಮಾಜನಗರ ರವರು ಸಾ=ರೆ\ ವರD [ಾ*ರು&ಾೆ. ಸದG ಪಕರಣದ( ‚ಾ]Hಾ]ರುವ hೕಲ\ಂಡ 30 ೌಕರರುಗಳ? 2012ೇ ಾ(`ಂದ ಇಾSಾ w ಾರxೆಯನು7 ಎದುGಸು<ದುX, ಅವರ wರುದE Qೋ•ಾೋಪxೆಯ( ಆೋuWರುವಂ&ೆ ಾ[ಾ]ಯನು7 ಖGೕDಸುವ ಸಂದಭ=ದ( Lೆಚು3ವGHಾ] Vಾವ<Wರುವ mತವನು7 2012ೇ ಾ(ನ(aೕ 22 ೌಕರರುಗಳ? Lಾಗೂ w ಾರxೆಯ ಸಂಧಬ=ದ( >ೕ •.ಎ}.ಾಮು ಪಂ ಾಯ< ಅBವೃDE ಅFಾG ರವರು %ಾ5 ಉ/ದ mತವನು7 ಸಾ=ರೆ\ ಜ[ಾ [ಾ*ರು&ಾೆ. ಇವರುಗಳ Vೈ5 ೆಲವರು `ವೃ</ಮರಣ LೊಂDರು&ಾೆ. 2012ೇ ಾ(`ಂದ ಇಾSಾ w ಾರxೆಯನು7 ಎದುGಸು<ರುವ_ದGಂದ Hಾವ_Qೇ ೇ1ಾ ೌಲಭRಗಳನು7 ಪIೆಯಲು ವಂbತಾ]ರುವ_ದನು7 ಪGಗ‘ಸು&ಾ, ಇವರುಗ/ಂದ ಪಸುತ Hಾವ_Qೇ ಆ†=ಕ ನಷe ಉಂiಾಗQೇ ಇರುವ_ದನು7 [ಾನwೕಯ ದೃMe;ಂದ ಅವರ (Žತ Lೇ/ೆಗಳನು7 ಒಪ_„&ಾ ಅವರುಗಳ wರುದEದ Dಾಂಕ:19.11.2013ರ - Qೋ•ಾೋಪxೆ;ಂದ - ಆೋಪ ಮುಾಯೊ/ಸಲು <ೕ[ಾ=`WQೆ. ಮುಂದುವೆಯು&ಾ, ಸದG ಪಕರಣದ( hೕಲುಸು1ಾG ನIೆಸQೆ ಕತ=ವRೋಪವನು7 ಎದುGಸು<ರುವ ಈ ೆಳಕಂಡ ಾಯ=`1ಾ=ಹಕ ಅFಾGಗ/ೆ ಸಂಬಂFWದಂ&ೆ w ಾರxಾFಾGಗಳ? Vಾರದಶ=ಕ `ಯಮವನು7 Vಾ(W, ಖGೕDWರುವ ಬೆn ಾ“Qಾರರ Lೇ/ೆ ಮತು ಉಭಯತರರ 1ಾದ ಮತು ಪ<1ಾದಗಳನು7 ಪG>ೕ(W, ೌಕರರ ಕತ=ವRೋಪ1ೆಸ]ರುವ ಬೆn ಾ”•kಾರಗಳ ೊರ&ೆ;ಂQಾ] ಆೋಪ ಾ•ೕ&ಾ]ರುವ_Dಲ `ೕ*ರುವ w ಾರxಾ ವರDಯನು7 ಅಂ]ೕಕGWQೆ. …. …. …. ಸಾ=ರದ ಆQೇಶ ಸಂSೆR: ಾಅಪ 70 wೇ• 2012 Dಾಂಕ:-17.04.2018 ಪಾವೆಯ( wವGWರುವ pನ7ೆಯ( ಈ ೆಳಕಂಡ ಾಯ=`1ಾ=ಹಕ ಅFಾG, ಪಂ ಾಯt ಅBವೃDE ಅFಾGಗಳ? Lಾಗೂ ಾಮ ಪಂ ಾಯt ಾಯ=ದ>=ಗಳನು7 ಸಾ=ರದ Dಾಂಕ: 19.11.2013 ರಂದು Lೊರ*Wರುವ Qೋ•ಾೋಪxೆಗಳ(ನ ಆೋಪಗ/ಂದ ಆೋಪಮುಕೊ/W ಆQೇ>WQೆ.” 12 The Disciplinary Authority, in terms of its order dated 17-04-2018, closes the proceedings against these petitioners. The other development that takes place is, the Government by its order dated 28-03-2023, withdraws the Government Order dated 09-09-2014 which gave foundation for registration of the crime and conduct of a departmental enquiry. The said order reads as follows: “ಸಾ=ರದ ಆQೇಶ ಸಂSೆR: ಆ€ *W-ಇಎ}/171/2021, %ೆಂಗಳ–ರು, Dಾಂಕ:28-03-2023. ಪಾವೆಯ( wವGWದ ಅಂಶಗಳ pನ7ೆಯ( ಮLಾತ0ಾಂF ಾMNೕಯ ಾOೕಣ ಉQೊRೕಗ Sಾ< )ೕಜೆ- ಕಾ=ಟಕ ಏu˜ 2007 Gಂದ [ಾ~= 2012ರ ಅವFಯವೆ]ನ ಾಯ=`ವ=ಹxೆಯ ಬೆn ‚ಾರತದ ೆಕ\ `ಯಂತಕರು ಮತು ಮLಾ ೆಕ\ ಪG+ೆ™ೕಧಕರ 2013ೇ ವಷ=ದ ವರD ಸಂSೆR-7ರ( ಕಂಡು ಬಂDರುವ ಅವRವLಾರಗಳ ಕುGತು ತ`Sೆ ನIೆW ವರD `ೕಡಲು ಕಾ=ಟಕ ೋಾಯುಕGೆ ವpWರುವ ಆQೇಶ ಸಂSೆR: ಾಅಪ 111 ಉSಾ)ೕ 2013 %ೆಂಗಳ–ರು, Dಾಂಕ: 09.09.2014 ರನು7 ತ”ಣDಂದ ^ಾGೆ ಬರುವಂ&ೆ ಆQೇಶವನು7 ಸಾ=ರವ_ pಂದೆ\ ಪIೆDರುತQೆ. ಅದರಂ&ೆ, ಸದG ಆQೇಶದನcಯ ೋಾಯುಕ ಕšೇGಯು ಹೂ*ದ / Qಾಖ(Wರುವ ಎಲ ಪಕರಣಗಳನು7 ತ`Sೆ;ಂದ pಂಪIೆಯುವಂ&ೆ ಆQೇ>WQೆ. ಕಾ=ಟಕ ಾಜRVಾಲರ ಆ›ಾನುಾರ Lಾಗೂ ಅವರ LೆಸGನ(. ಸp/-28/3/23. (ರಘ•ಾಥೌಡ ಎ}.Vಾƒೕಲ) ಸಾ=ರದ ಅFೕನ ಾಯ=ದ>=(ೇ1ೆಗಳ?-ಎ) ಾOೕxಾBವೃDE ಮತು ಪಂ ಾಯt ಾŸ ಇಾSೆ.” It now becomes germane to notice the report of the Lokayukta and its opinion qua all these 8 petitioners. The petitioners are 13 respondents 38, 44, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 58. At paragraph 98, the report is indicative of the fact that the enquiry is conducted against all these petitioners and they have been exonerated of the allegations. It therefore, becomes germane to notice those paragraphs of the report of the Lokayukta. They read as follows: “…. …. …. 96. Having regard to the findings of the I. O. and the comments offered by the Respondents mentioned above, it is opined that the material on records would prima facie indicate that Respondents have failed in proper compliance of guidelines issued under MGNREGA which has resulted in dereliction of duty on their part as a consequence of which there are materials pointing towards the misconduct on the part of Respondents as defined under Rule 3(i) to (iii) of KCS (Conduct) Rules, 1966. 97. However many of the Respondents commonly urged that already departmental enquiry is initiated against them and finally they are exonerated. Towards this end, they produced the copy of the final enquiry report and the action taken by the Government on the Report. Yet another contention of some of the Respondents is that as there is a provision to approach Ombudsman in respect of any allegations relating to MGNREGA Scheme, there is a bar to conduct Parallel investigation. Added further to this, some Respondents are already retired from their service. 98. The proceedings of Government of Karnataka dated 17/04/2018 shows that on the similar set of allegations made in the present case, already enquiry has been conducted against Respondent No. 38, 41 to 45, 47 to 54, 57 to 61, 63, 65 & 68 and finally as per Government No.UÁæC¥À 70 «¸Éé 2012 14 dated 17/04/2018 the aforementioned Respondents are exonerated from the charges leveled against them (copy of the Government order dated 17/04/2018 is available in the records of the case). 99. Thus it is clear that the aforementioned respondents have already faced departmental enquiry pertaining to similar Articles of charge and the Enquiry Officer already submitted his report dated 09/02/2018 stating that for the reasons mentioned in his report the Government servants named therein may be exonerated from the charges leveled against them. In this regard, copy of the entire proceedings of Government of Karnataka recorded as per the order of his Excellency, the Governor of Karnataka and bearing the signature of Under Secretary to Government, Department of Rural Development and Panchayath Raj Department is placed before this authority. 100. When the aforementioned Respondents have faced already Departmental Enquiry and are exonerated, they could not be again tried or punished on the same Articles of charge. Article 20(2) of the Constitution states that 'no one can be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once'. In other words when the Competent Authority has already applied his mind and after satisfaction that, by means of acceptable substantial evidence exonerated the aforementioned Respondents from the charges leveled against them, re-appreciation of such evidence is not permissible. Wherefore, I am of the opinion that though allegations made against the aforementioned Respondents are prima- facie made out, but for the aforementioned reasons it is unjust to submit a report recommending yet another Departmental Enquiry against them. 101. So far as the Respondent No. 39 is concerned as he is dead and no amount is due for recovery from him, it is not necessary to submit any report against him. 15 102. In respect of Respondent No. 55 namely Sri. Bhaskar Adiga, 56-Sri. D.G. Shekarappa, Respondent No. 62 Sri. M.R. Dharmaprabhu, Respondent No. 64 Sri. N. Mahadevaiah, R-66 Sri. Basavanna and Respondent No. 67-Sri. Munavar Pasha, they all retired from their services long ago respectively on 30/04/2014, 31/07/2011, 31/03/2016, 30/06/2016, 30/04/2012 and 30/06/2011. 103. The Respondent No. 55 Sri.G. Bhaskar Adiga retired on 30/04/2014, Respondent No. 56 Sri.D.G. Shekarappa retired on 31/07/2011, R-66 Sri. Basavanna retired on 30/04/2012 and Respondent No. 67-Sri. Munavar Pasha retired on 30/06/2011. The Government by its order dated 09/09/2014 entrusted the case for investigation to Lokayukta after the retirement of aforementioned Respondents No. 55, 56, 66 & 67. The alleged misconduct pertains to the year 2007 to 2012. Likewise, the Respondent No. 62 and 64 retired in the month of March & April of 2016. Wherefore, initiating any enquiry against the aforementioned Respondents is barred in view of the provisions under Rule 214(2)(b)(ii) of KCSR. 104. However, as regards Respondent No. 40 namely Sri. K.P. Satish Chandra and Respondent No.46-Sri. Devaraju are concerned, the negligent act committed by them is clearly reflected in the report of Investigation Officer. 105. The comments submitted by Respondents No. 40 & 46 are not acceptable. One of the objections raised by these two Respondents is that when there is a provision to file complaint before Ombudsman in respect of the work done under MGNREGA scheme, initiating separate enquiry against the concerned is not maintainable. Of course, there is a provision to file complaint before Ombudsman. But it cannot be ignored that MGNREGA division in the Ministry will look into all complaints received in the Ministry and will segregate it into A, B, C & D categories. Under category-C complaints relating to ineffective implementation of the Act are entertained and under Category-D complaints involving financial irregularities are dealt with. Cases pertaining to category-C will be referred to the State Government within 15 days after 16 receipt of the same. The concerned State Government will be asked to submit its detailed action taken report based the result of spot enquiry within 3 months of the receipt of reference from the Government of India. Cases pertaining to Category-D will also be submitted to the State Government within 15 days with the request to submit its action taken report within 3 months from the date of receipt of the complaints. In such case where financial irregularities are established, departmental proceedings against those found guilty is one of the measures ensured invariably. In the present case, as already noted the Government of Karnataka based on the report of Comptroller and Auditor General of India has entrusted investigation to Lokayukta. Wherefore the plea that there is a provision to approach Ombudsman is not maintainable. 106. Yet another contention of Respondent No. 40 and 46 is that in view of ratio laid down by Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Subhindra A Gumaste submission of report under Section 12(3) of Karnataka Lokayukta Act is not maintainable. Absolutely I find no merits in the said contention of the Respondents No. 40 & 46. Because, in the said case the concerned Government servant changed the revenue entries in compliance with the order of the decree of the civil court and therefore the Hon'ble High Court held that there was no intention/malice on the part of the Government servants in not issuing notice to the Judgment debtors, in as much as, the Government servants being the officers of the State with an anxiety to comply with the decrees of the Civil Court have changed the entries pursuant to the decrees passed in the civil suits. Wherefore there was no intention/mens rea/malice on the part of the Government servants, as the entries are changed pursuant to the decrees of the civil suit and thus set aside the report submitted under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act. But the present case stands on different footing and as such the aforementioned ratio is not applicable. 107. One more contention raised by Respondent No. 46 Sri. Devaraj is that he was not working as Administrative 17 Officer at the relevant time when orders were taken for purchasing at the relevant time when orders are taken for purchasing 25 name boards and giving approval for the same. But this Respondent admitted that he has signed the cheque leaf along with the Secretary of the Panchayat towards the payment of Rs. 55,264/- for purchase of name boards. As per the report of Investigation Officer, the amount paid towards the purchase of name boards is on higher side when compared with prevailing market value of the boards. Respondent No. 40 & 46 were expected to excercise the same vigilance in respect of expenditure incurred from public money as persons of ordinary purdance would excercise in respect of expenditure of their own money. Wherefore, the plea that the excess amount paid towards purchase of name boards is already recovered from the concerned Enterprises is not an acceptable theory. 108. In respect of Respondent No. 69 to 71, it is necessary to mention that they are the Ex-Presidents of concerned Grama Panchayaths. Therefore, recommendation is to be made to take action against them under Section 43(A), 48 and 268 of Karnataka Panchayath Raj Act 1993 for misconduct committed by them. 109. Therefore this is a fit case for making a recommendation to the competent authority for initiating disciplinary action against Respondent no. 40 & 46 and to entrust the same to this authority as per Rule 14A of KCS (CCA) Rules, 1957. 110. Hence, My Lord, if approved, draft report u/s. 12(3) of Karnataka Lokayukta Act to be sent to competent authority recommending for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against respondent no. 40 & 46 will be placed before Your Lordship by next date for approval. Submitted for kind approval of your Lordship.” (Emphasis added) 18 It is the opinion of the Lokayukta as found in the report supra, all the petitioners have been exonerated and again conducting departmental enquiry against them will become contrary to law. In the aforesaid circumstances, it becomes necessary to notice the law with regard to exoneration in a departmental enquiry and continuance of criminal proceedings, notwithstanding the said exoneration. 9. It is trite that in a departmental enquiry probabilities would be preponderant and in a criminal trial the charge will have to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Therefore, if an employee could not be found guilty on preponderance of probability he can hardly be found guilty in a criminal trial, which requires proof beyond all reasonable doubt. The said issue is no longer res integra. The Apex Court, in plethora of judgments, has considered this issue and has elucidated the law. 9.1. The Apex Court in the case of P.S. RAJYA v. STATE OF BIHAR1, holds as follows: 1 (1996) 9 SCC 1 19 “17. At the outset we may point out that the learned Counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the present case, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute the findings rendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it. On these premises, if we proceed further then there is no difficulty in accepting the case of the appellant. For if the charge which is identical could not be established in a departmental proceedings and in view of the admitted discrepancies in the reports submitted by the valuers one wonders what is there further to proceed against the appellant in criminal proceedings. In this context, we can usefully extract certain relevant portions from the report of the Central Vigilance Commission on this aspect: “Neither the prosecution nor the defence has produced the author of various reports to confirm the valuation. The documents cited in the list of documents is a report signed by two engineers namely S/Shri S.N. Jha and D.N. Mukherjee whereas the document brought on record (Ex. S. 20) has been signed by three engineers. There is also difference in the estimated value of the property in the statement of imputation and the report. The document at Ex. S. 20 has been signed by three engineers and the property has been valued at Rs. 4, 85, 000 for the ground floor and Rs. 2, 55, 600 for the second floor. A total of this comes to Rs. 7, 40, 900 which is totally different from the figure of Rs. 7, 69, 800 indicated in the statement of imputation. None of the engineers who prepared the valuation report though cited as prosecution witnesses appeared during the course of enquiry. This supports the defence argument that the authenticity of this document is in serious doubts. It is a fact that the income tax authorities got this property evaluated by S/Shri S.N. Jha and Vasudev and as per this report at. pp., 50 to_63 they estimated the property at Rs. 4, 57, 600 including the cost of land Rs. 1, 82, 000 for ground and - -. mezzanine floor plus Rs. 2, 55, 600 for first floor and Rs. 20, 000 for cost of land. Thus both the engineers who prepared the valuation report for income tax purposes also prepared the report for the CBI and there is no 20 indication in the subsequent report as to why there is a difference in the value of the property. A perusal of these two reports reveals that there is difference in the specification of the work. The valuation report prepared by Sri S.N. Jha for ground floor for income tax purposes clearly states that the structure was having “RCC pillars at places, brickwork in cement mortar, RCC lintel, 60 cm walls, 9 inch floor height, 17. 6, 8. 00, 8. 00 inch” but in the report for CBI which was also prepared by him the description is “RCC framed structure open verandah on three sides in the ground floor”. Similarly, for the first floor it is written in the report as “partly framed structure and partly load being walls, floor heights 3. 20 mm. Further Shri S.N. Jha on p. 54 of Ex. D. 1 had adopted a rate of Rs. 290 per sq. mtr. for ground floor and adding for extra height he had estimated ground floor including mezzanine floor at Rs. 2, 02, 600. But for the report at Ex. S. 20 the rate has been raised to 365 per sq. mtr. There is no explanation for this increase of rate by Rs. 75 per mtr. It is also observed that for the updating of the cost of index 5% was added to the rate of Rs. 290 as per p. 55 of Ex. D. 1 by Sri S.N. Jha but this has been raised to 97% as an escalation to the cost of index in Ex. S. 20 without explaining or giving the reasons therefor. It is surprising that same set of engineers have adopted different standard for evaluating the same property at different occasions. Obviously, either of the report is false and it was for the prosecution to suitably explain it. In the absence of it the only inference to be drawn is that report at Ex. S. 20 is not authentic. Since the same set of engineers have done the evaluation earlier and if subsequently they felt that there was some error in the earlier report, they should have explained detailed reasons either in the report itself or during the course of enquiry. Therefore, Ex. S. 20 is not reliable.” … … … … 20. Moreover a perusal of Ex. S. 20 reveals that Shri Vasudev, Executive Engineer has recorded a note as follows: “Hence the valuation of Sri S.N. Jha was never superseded by any other estimates. As is confirmed from the records, his estimated figures were only accounted for by the ITO Bokaro.” 21 Thus according to Shri Vasudev, who was the seniormost among the three CPWD engineers who prepared Ex. S. 20, the valuation of ground floor remains at Rs. 1, 82, 600 plus Rs. 20, 000 for the cost of land. The first floor as per Ex. S. 20 was estimated at Rs. 2, 55, 600 and a total of all this comes to Rs. 4, 57, 600 which is very near to the declaration of actuals to the income tax authority and also the estimated cost by the Bokaro Steel Township Engineer and the Government approved valuer. 21. It is dear from the above discussions that though the document cited in Annexure III is a joint report of two engineers what has been brought on record is a document signed by three engineers, the same set of engineers who evaluated the property for income tax purposes, and there is a vast difference in the specifications and the rates adopted for calculating the cost in Ex. S. 20 have been increased without any explanation and none of these engineers were produced during the course of enquiry to clarify the position. Hence the authenticity of Ex. S. 20 is doubtful as claimed by the defence. 22. It needs to be mentioned that the report at Ex. S. 20 has evaluated the ground floor at Rs. 4, 85, 300 and a note to the effect that 10% should be allowed for self-supervision and procurement of material has also been recorded at the end. On this basis the net value of ground floor comes to Rs. 4, 36, 810 (Rs. 4, 85, 344-Rs. 48, 534). The first floor has been evaluated at Rs. 2, 55, 600 after allowing the allowance for self-supervision and a total of both items would come to Rs. 6, 62, 410. Thus, even the report at Ex. S. 20 does not support the prosecution case that as per the report of CPWD Engineers the property is valued at Rs. 7, 69, 800. As the property assessed by the income tax authority for Rs. 4. 67 lakhs and even the valuation given by the Bokaro Steel Township Engineer and the Government approved valuer are very near to this figure, the reasonable value of this property could only be taken as Rs. 4. 75 lakhs assessed by the Bokaro Township Engineer on detailed estimate basis. 22 …. …. …. 20. At the risk of repetition, we may state that the charge had not been proved and on that basis the appellant was cleared of departmental enquiry. In this connection, we may also usefully cite a decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426. This Court after considering almost all earlier decisions has given guidelines relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing an FIR or a complaint. This Court observed as follows: (SCC pp. 378-79, paras 102-3) “In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR 23 do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non - cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (Emphasis supplied) 24 9.2. Later, the Apex Court though not referring to P.S. RAJYA, held in identical lines in the case of RADHESHYAM KEJRIWAL V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 581, that standard of proof in a criminal case is much higher than that of adjudication in a departmental enquiry. If in a departmental inquiry, the Competent Authorities have failed to drive home the charge, it would be improper to permit criminal trial any further. This view of the Apex Court, in the aforesaid case, is reiterated in the later three Judge Bench in the case of ASHOO SURENDRANATH TEWARI V. CBI,2 wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: “8. A number of judgments have held that the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding, being based on preponderance of probability is somewhat lower than the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding where the case has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897], the question before the Court was posed as follows : (SCC pp. 2-3, para 3) “3. The short question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether the respondent is justified in pursuing the prosecution against the appellant under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(l)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 notwithstanding the fact that on an identical charge the appellant was exonerated in the departmental proceedings in the light of a report submitted by the Central Vigilance 2 (2020) 9 SCC 636 25 Commission and concurred by the Union Public Service Commission.” 9. This Court then went on to state: (P.S. Rajya case [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1: 1996 SCC (Cri) 897], SCC p. 5, para 17) “17. At the outset we may point out that the learned Counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the present case, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute the findings rendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it.” 10. This being the case, the Court then held: (P.S. Rajya case [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897], SCC p. 9, para 23) “23. Even though all these facts including the report of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view [Prabhu Saran Rajya v. State of Bihar, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 5212 of 1992, order dated 3- 8-1993 (Pat.)] that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the report of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have already held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated above. These are the reasons for our order dated 27- 3-1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs.” 11. In Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B. [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721], this Court held as follows : (SCC pp. 594-%, paras 26, 29 and 31) 26 “26. We may observe that the standard of proof in a criminal case is much higher than that of the adjudication proceedings. The Enforcement Directorate has not been able to prove its case in the adjudication proceedings and the appellant has been exonerated on the same allegation. The appellant is facing trial in the criminal case. Therefore, in our opinion, the determination of facts in the adjudication proceedings cannot be said to be irrelevant in the criminal case. In B.N. Kashyap [B.N. Kashyap v. Crown, 1944 SCC OnLine Lah 46 : AIR 1945 Lah 23] the Full Bench had not considered the effect of a finding of fact in a civil case over the criminal cases and that will be evident from the following passage of the said judgment : (SCC OnLine Lah. : AIR p. 27) ‘… I must, however, say that in answering the question, I have only referred to civil cases where the actions are in personam and not those where the proceedings or actions are in rem. Whether a finding of fact arrived at in such proceedings or actions would be relevant in criminal cases, it is unnecessary for me to decide in this case. When that question arises for determination, the provisions of Section 41 of the Evidence Act, will have to be carefully examined. ‘ ……… 29. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Mr. Malhotra that the finding in an adjudication proceeding is not binding in the proceeding for criminal prosecution. A person held liable to pay penalty in adjudication proceedings cannot necessarily be held guilty in a criminal trial. Adjudication proceedings are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence of a little higher degree whereas in a criminal case the entire burden to prove beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution. ……… 31. It is trite that the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings is higher than that required before the Adjudicating Authority and in case the accused is exonerated before the Adjudicating Authority whether his prosecution on the same set of facts can be 27 allowed or not is the precise question which falls for determination in this case.” 12. After referring to various judgments, this Court then culled out the ratio of those decisions in para 38 as follow: (Radheshyam Kejriwal case [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721], SCC p. 598) “38. The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions can broadly be stated as follows: (i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously; (ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiating criminal prosecution; (iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent in nature to each other; (iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for criminal prosecution; (v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate is not prosecution by a Competent Court of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code; (vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit, prosecution may continue; and (vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal cases.” 28 13. It finally concluded: (Radheshyam Kejriwal case [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721], SCC p. 598, para 39) “39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would be to Judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the Court.” … … … … 15. Applying the aforesaid judgments to the facts of this case, it is clear that in view of the detailed CVC order dated 22- 12-2011, the chances of conviction in a criminal trial involving the same facts appear to be bleak. We, therefore, set aside the judgment [Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. CBI, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 5042] of the High Court and that of the Special Judge and discharge the appellant from the offences under the Penal Code.” (Emphasis supplied) In the aforesaid judgments, in the case of P.S. RAJYA and ASHOO SURENDRANATH TEWARI supra, the Apex Court has clearly delineated that, if allegations in the departmental inquiry could not be proved on merit and the person is held to be innocent, criminal prosecution on the said facts cannot be permitted to be continued on the underlying principle of criminal trial needing higher standard of proof. 29 10. If the elucidation of law by the Apex Court is pitted to the facts obtaining in the case at hand, the unmistakable inference that could be drawn is obliteration of the criminal proceedings on twin circumstance, of the petitioners getting exonerated in the departmental enquiry and the foundation itself being withdrawn by the State. In that light, I deem it appropriate to obliterate the proceedings against the petitioners, failing which, it would become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of Justice. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) *Criminal Petition is allowed. (ii) Impugned proceedings in Special Case No.174 of 2022 (Crime No.9 of 2014) pending before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chamarajanagara stands quashed qua the petitioners. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE bkp CT:SS * Corrected vide chamber order dated 23.12.2025