2025:HHC:22698 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 234 of 2021 Reserved on: 18.6.2025 Date of Decision: 15.7.2025. Sandeep Rana ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Sat Prakash, Advocate. For the Respondent No.1 : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Ashwani Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Ms. Nisha Nalot, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 140 of 2020, dated 14.8.2020, registered at Police Station Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 447, 504, 506 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:22698 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police stating that he had been residing at Village Badol for 39 years. He had constructed a house at Khasra No. 998 and purchased Khasra No. 996 in the year 1993 to provide access to his house. Petitioner-Sandeep Kumar owns the land bearing Khasra No. 997, located adjacent to Khasra No. 996. Petitioner encroached on Khasra No. 996 while constructing his house. He also tried to encroach upon Khasra No. 998. The informant filed a civil suit in which a Local Commissioner was appointed. Local Commissioner submitted a report showing that Sandeep Kumar had encroached upon Khasra No. 996/1, measuring 00-00-13 hectares. The possession of the informant was found in Khasra No. 997/1, measuring 00-00-12 hectares. The parties had settled the matter, Khasra No. 996/1 was given to the petitioner, and Khasra No. 997/1 was given to the informant. It was agreed that the informant could raise construction on Khasra No.996/2 after leaving a space of 18 inches from the wall of the petitioner’s house. The informant started raising construction, and the 3 2025:HHC:22698 petitioner made various complaints. The informant started raising the boundary wall after leaving 18 inches of space. The petitioner and his family members abused the informant and asked him to stop the work. The informant replied that the work was being executed as per the law, and the petitioner should make a complaint to the police or the Court. The petitioner and his family members threatened the mason who stopped the work. The work was restarted on 24.5.2020 at approximately 9:00 am. The petitioner brought a tractor and 8-10 labourers. They started putting the concrete on the drain adjacent to the wall. When the informant’s son and his wife tried to stop the petitioner and his family members, they threatened them. The informant’s son and daughter-in-law sustained injuries in the incident. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. A charge sheet was filed before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings. It was asserted that the accused No.1 Kulveer Rana, is an Administrative Officer (HAS), who took advantage of his 4 2025:HHC:22698 position. The petitioner and his family members were not admitted to the hospital. Accused No.3, Tek Chand Rana, is a practising Advocate. The police have not taken any action under their influence. Accused No.2 threatened to break the heads of the petitioner and his family members. FIR No. 140 is an abuse of the process of law, which is full of discrepancies and ambiguities. Section 447 of IPC was wrongly added because the trespass was committed by the informant and his family members. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply making preliminary submissions that the petitioner’s father went to the Police Station and reported the matter. FIR No. 91 of 2020 was registered against the informant and his family members. The informant also made a complaint to the police, and FIR No. 140 of 2020 was registered on his complaint. The police filed a charge sheet before the Court in both the FIRs after the conclusion of the investigation. Both parties sustained injuries. The police investigated the matter in a fair, free, and transparent manner. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5 2025:HHC:22698 5. Informant filed a reply making preliminary submissions regarding lack of locus standi and cause of action, and the petitioner having not approached the Court with clean hands. The contents of the FIR No. 140 of 2020 were reproduced. It was asserted that the petitioner’s father had filed Civil Writ Petition No.2370 of 2020 regarding the incident, which was decided by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court on 7.9.2020. The challan has been filed before the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply filed by respondent No.2 and affirming those of the petition was filed. 7. I have heard Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Sat Prakash, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State and Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Nisha Nalot, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant. 8. Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the Investigating Officer had wrongly added Section 447 of IPC to the present case. As per the 6 2025:HHC:22698 settlement between the parties. Khasra No. 996/1 was given to the petitioner, and the informant had no right over it. The drain existed on Khasra No. 996/1 as per the report of the investigation, and is stated to be owned by the informant, which is factually incorrect. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and Section 447 of IPC be deleted. 9. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State submitted that the learned Trial Court has framed the charges and statements of witnesses have been recorded. This Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction when the alternative remedy of challenging the order framing charges was available to the petitioner and was not availed of. He prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. Mr. Ashwani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/informant, submitted that there is a voluminous record on the file of this Court and this Court is not to appreciate the same while exercising inherent jurisdiction. The statements of the witnesses have been recorded, and the learned Trial Court should be left to decide the matter as per the law. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7 2025:HHC:22698 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 8 2025:HHC:22698 (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 9 2025:HHC:22698 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 13. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and 10 2025:HHC:22698 guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 14. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. It is undisputed that the charges have been framed by the learned Trial Court, and the statements of witnesses have been recorded. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in the rare cases. It was observed at page 145: - “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any 11 2025:HHC:22698 ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Investigating Officer has wrongly recorded that Khasra No. 996/1 is owned by the informant, whereas this Khasra No. was admittedly owned by the petitioner, who could not have trespassed on the land owned by himself. Therefore, Section 447 of the IPC was wrongly invoked by the Investigating Officer. This submission cannot be accepted. The report of the Local Commissioner shows that Khasra No. 996/1 is part of the petitioner’s house. The FIR also mentions that the petitioner had encroached upon Khasra no. 996/1 by constructing the house. Therefore, the conclusion of the investigation that Khasra No. 996/1 is the drain between two houses is contrary to the report of the Local Commissioner submitted to the learned 12 2025:HHC:22698 Trial Court. Hence, the submission that Khasra no. 996/1 is a drain owned by the petitioner is prima facie not supported by the material on record. 17. As per the allegations made in the FIR, the accused had given beatings to the informant party. They had abused and threatened them. Therefore, prima facie, the FIR discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, and the same cannot be quashed at this stage. 18. A charge sheet has been filed before the learned Trial Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, 13 2025:HHC:22698 the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 19. No other point was urged. 20. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 21. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 15th July, 2025 (Chander)