Page No.# 1/7 GAHC010049362018 2025:GAU-AS:6035 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/1498/2018 URRUNABAND TEA ESTATE (REPRESENTED BY THE SENIOR MANAGER), P.O. SALGANGA, P.S. UDHARBOND, DIST. CACHAR, ASSAM. VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR. REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM, LABOUR WELFARE DEPARTMENT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI 2:BARAK VALLEY CHA MAZDOOR SANGHA (REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL SECRETARY) SILCHAR DIST. CACHAR ASSA Advocate for the Petitioner : MR S CHAKRABORTY, MR. R SARKAR Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM, MR B KOTAKY,MR. R P SARMAH BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA ORDER 15.05.2025 Heard Mr. S. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S.R. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and Mr. R.P. Sarmah, Page No.# 2/7 learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent No.2 assisted by Mr. D. Doley. 2. The petitioner has prayed for setting aside the order dated 30.06.2017 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Cachar, Silchar in Reference Case No.5/2010, wherein it held that the lock-out declared by the management of the tea estate for the period 26.02.2009 to 23.05.2009 was not justified. As the management was not justified in denying the payment of wages and rations to all eligible workers during the lock-out period, the respondents were entitled to get both wages and rations during the lock-out period. 3. The facts of the case is that on 24.02.2009, the garden Dhobi and his sister had manhandled the Senior Manager of the management in the garden office. A lock-out was thereafter declared by the management on 26.02.2009 and the same was lifted on 23.05.2009. The workers of the tea garden thereafter made a claim for wages for the lock-out period. The conciliation proceedings that was initiated due to the claim made by the workers of the garden having ended in failure, the State respondents, vide Notification dated 18.03.2010, referred the following issues for adjudication by the learned Industrial Tribunal, which are as follows:- “(i) Whether the management is justified for denial of paying of wages and rations to all eligible workers during the lock-out period with effect from 26.02.09 to 22.05.09? (ii) Whether the workers will be entitled to get full wages and rations for and during the lock-out period; if they are partially responsible for the lock-out." 4. The learned Tribunal thereafter came to a finding that the lock-out that had been declared by the petitioner had been done without issuing any prior Page No.# 3/7 notice, as required under Sections 22(2)(a) to (d) and Section 23(a) & (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Further, the management witnesses in their cross- examination had admitted that there was law and order situation prevailing during the relevant period, which justified the management to declare a lock- out. As such, the learned Tribunal came to a finding that the lock-out declared by the management from 06.02.2009 to 22.05.2009 was not justified and the workers were thus eligible for payment of their wages and rations during the lock-out period. 5. The petitioner’s counsel submits that Section 22(2)(a) to (d) of the Act only pertains to Public utility service and does not pertain to a tea garden. Further, Section 23 of the Act does not come into the picture, inasmuch as, the lock-out had not been declared during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or during the pendency of any other proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal. 6. The petitioner’s counsel further submits that the cross-examination of the management witness Nos.1 & 2, as recorded in the impugned Award, clearly goes to show that the MW-1 & MW-2 had denied the suggestion that no circumstances had prevailed for declaring a lock-out or that no law and order situation had arisen, which justified the management to declare a lock-out. 7. The petitioner’s counsel thus prays that the impugned Award should be set aside, as the findings of the learned Tribunal for declaring the lock-out illegal, was not supported by the provisions of the Act and the evidence of the management witnesses. Page No.# 4/7 8. Mr. R.P. Sarmah, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent No.2, on the other hand, submits that the Senior Manager of the management had not been manhandled by any of the regular workers of the tea garden. The assault on the Senior Manager had been done by a causal worker, who was a Dhobi. He further submits that the assault by a causal employee on the Senior Manager of the tea garden, did not lead to such a situation, which required the declaration of a lock-out, thereby depriving the workers from earning their livelihood. 9. Mr. S.R. Baruah, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 admits to the fact that the impugned order could not have been passed on the basis of Sections 22(2)(a) to (d) and Section 23(a) & (b) of the Act. 10. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 11. Sections 22(2)(a) to (d) and Section 23(a) & (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 states as follows:- “22. (2) No employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock-out any of his workmen- (a) without giving them notice of lock-out as hereinafter provided, within six weeks before locking-out; or (b) within fourteen days of giving such notice; or (c) before the expiry of the date of lock-out specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or (d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings.” Page No.# 5/7 “23. General prohibition of strikes and lock-outs.- No workman who is employed in any industrial establishment shall go on strike in breach of contract and no employer of any such workman shall declare a lock-out- (a) during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before a Board and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings; (b) during the pendency of proceedings before [a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] and two months, after the conclusion of such proceedings;” 12. Section 2(n) of the Act defines “public utility service” to mean- “(i) any railway service [or any transport service for the carriage of passengers or goods by air]; [(ia) any service in, or in connection with the working of, any major port for dock or any industrial establishment or unit engaged in essential defence services];] (ii) any section of an industrial establishment, on the working of which the safety of the establishment or the workmen employed therein depends; (iii) any postal, telegraph or telephone service; (iv) any industry which supplies power, light or water to the public; (v) any system of public conservancy or sanitation; (vi) any industry specified in the [First Schedule] which the appropriate Government may, if satisfied that public emergency or public interest so requires, by notification in the Official Gazette, declared to be a public utility service for the purposes of this Act, for such period as may be specified in the notification: Provided that the period so specified shall not, in the first instance, exceed six months but may, by a like notification, be extended from time to time, by any period not exceeding six months, at any one time if in the opinion of the appropriate Government public emergency or public Page No.# 6/7 interest requires such extension;” 13. A perusal of Section 2(n) and Schedule-I to the Act clearly shows that a tea garden does not come within the meaning of Public utility service. 14. In view of the above reasons, it is apparent that the learned Tribunal has made a completely wrong finding with regard to the issue of whether the lock- out declared by the management was illegal, without realizing the fact that a tea garden is not a public utility service. 15. It is also not the case of any of the parties herein that there was any conciliation proceedings or any other kind of proceedings before the learned Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal during the time the lock-out had been declared. 16. In view of the reasons stated above, the finding of the learned Tribunal that there was a violation of Sections 22(2)(a) to (d) and Section 23(a) & (b) of the Act is not sustainable and the same is accordingly set aside. 17. The question as to whether the management witnesses had admitted in their cross-examination that the law and order situation prevailing at the relevant point of time, justified the declaration of lock-out by the management, can be seen from the cross-examination of MW-1 and MW-2, which is reflected in the impugned Award dated 30.06.2017. The extract of the cross-examination of MW-1 is as follows:- “He denied in his cross-examination that no law and order situation arisen which justifies the management to declare lockout.” Page No.# 7/7 The extract of the cross-examination of MW-2 is as follows:- “He denied in his cross-examination that no such circumstances prevailed for declaring lockout on 24.02.2009.” 18. A perusal of the above clearly goes to show that the management witnesses had denied the suggestion that there was no law and order situation or that the circumstances were not prevailing at the relevant time for declaration of a lock-out. As such, the finding of the learned Tribunal with regard to the above has been made without any basis. Further, it is in direct contradiction to the evidence given by the management witnesses. 19. In view of the above reasons, the impugned order dated 30.06.2017 passed in Reference Case No.5/2010 is accordingly set aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned Tribunal to consider the matter afresh, without taking recourse to Sections 22(2)(a) to (d) and Section 23(a) & (b) of the Act and to decide the reference on the basis of the materials available on record. 20. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant