Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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2025:CGHC:33837
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 432 of 2019 1 - Jitenedra Kumar Dewangan S/o Shri Ramkhilawan Dewangan Aged About 40 Years Occupation Executive Engineer, Rural Engineering Service, Govt. Of Chhattisgarh At Present Posted At Koriya District- Koriya, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Shri Ramkhilawan Dewangan S/o Late Shri Shanker Lal Dewangan Aged About 71 Years Occupation Retired Govt. Servant, R/o Near Kakkoo Kirana Stores, Katiyapara Juna Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Smt. Phool Bai Dewangan W/o Shri Ramkhilawan Dewangan Aged About 65 Years Occupation House Wife, R/o Near Kakkoo Kirana Stores, Katiyapara Juna Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
... Applicants Versus Smt. Niti Dewangan Aged About 36 Years Occupation Assistant Professor, K.M.T. Govt. Girls College, Raigarh R/o Palace Road, Kostapara, Near Nursing Mandir Gali, Raigarh, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh., District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh
---- Non-Applicant (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Applicants
: Mr. Prakash Tiwari, Advocate as well Mr. Shayon Kar, Advocate. For Non-Applicant
: Mr. Abhishek Sinha, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Ghanshyam Patel, Adv. KUNAL DEWANGAN Digitally signed by KUNAL DEWANGAN
2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Order on Board 17 /07/2025
1. By way of this criminal revision, the applicants have prayed for following relief:-
“It is therefore, prayed before this Hon’ble Court that under the facts and circumstances mentioned above the impugned order passed by the learned Appellate Court is arbitrary, frivolous and in serious violation of provisions of Section 23 of the Act, 2005 which deserves to be set-aside and possession of the disputed house deserves to be set- aside and possession of the disputed house deserves to be restored to the applicant No. 1, in the interest of justice.”
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present matter are that the Applicant No. 1 and the Non-Applicant are husband and wife, whose marriage was solemnized in the year 2008. At the time of marriage, Applicant No. 1 was posted as Sub-Divisional Officer at Kasdol, District Raipur. Subsequently, he was transferred to Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa in 2009 and thereafter to Kharsia, District Raigarh from 2010 to August 2017. During this period, he was also serving as a Casual Guest Lecturer at P.D.S. College, Raigarh. It is alleged that from the very inception of marriage, the
3 Non-Applicant regularly resided at her parental home in Raigarh and did not live with Applicant No. 1 except for occasional weekend visits. This assertion is sought to be corroborated by documentary evidence including the Non-Applicant's college pay slips, voter ID, Aadhaar card, and her application form for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor. It is further submitted that Applicant No. 1 was frequently required to visit her parental house and bear the financial burden of her parental family. In the first week of April 2016, Applicant No. 1, the Non- Applicant, and their minor child shifted to their matrimonial home situated at Krishna Vatika, Boirdadar, Raigarh. However, shortly thereafter, the Non-Applicant allegedly began insisting on returning to her parental home, resulting in frequent disputes. It is further alleged that her parents and relatives frequently visited Krishna Vatika and pressurized the Applicants to send the Non- Applicant back to her parental house. 3. In order to avoid any further confrontation, Applicant No. 1 requested Applicant Nos. 2 and 3 (relatives) to visit and help in pacifying the situation.
On their intervention, and with the mutual consent of the Non-Applicant and her parents, a written family settlement/consent was drawn up on 19.04.2016, pursuant to which the Non-Applicant went to reside at her parental home. Subsequently, following a medical procedure (piles surgery) undergone by the Non-Applicant, she was brought back to the matrimonial home at Krishna Vatika on 22.05.2016 with the
4 consent of her parents, and another familiar consent deed was executed on 02.06.2016. 4. However, it is alleged that disputes resumed shortly thereafter, and on 13.04.2017, during the official absence of Applicant No. 1, the Non-Applicant left the matrimonial home with the help of her parents and 5–6 other relatives, allegedly carrying away gold jewelry and household items worth approximately Rs. 7 lakhs, loaded in a pickup vehicle. She allegedly left behind an unsigned letter. Applicant No. 1 made several efforts to resolve the dispute through community mediation, including approaching the Dewangan Samaj in Bilaspur and Raigarh, but to no avail due to alleged non-cooperation and threats from the Non-Applicant and her family. 5. With a view to prevent further complications, Applicant No. 1 also approached the Mahila Thana, Raigarh on 09.08.2017 and submitted an application narrating the above facts, requesting no action be taken. After inquiry, the complaints were allegedly found to be baseless. 6. Thereafter, the Non-Applicant filed an application under Sections 12 and 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raigarh, through the Protection Officer, Mahila Bal Vikas, Raigarh. It is submitted that the said application was forwarded without any local/domestic inquiry having been conducted by the Protection
5 Officer. The Non-Applicant also filed a reply to the application under Section 23 of the Act, wherein she placed on record her version of the facts, including the financial status of the household. 7.
After perusal of the reply, the learned trial Court rejected the application filed by the Non-applicant vide its order dated 10.07.2018, observing that the Non-applicant is financially competent to maintain herself and also capable of managing her residence, considering her monthly income of Rs.54,913/-. Therefore, no order for interim maintenance was warranted at that stage. 8. Thereafter, an appeal was preferred before this Hon'ble Court, in which this Hon’ble Court was pleased to pass an order dated 29.08.2018 in M.A. No. 72/2018, holding that the plaintiff (Applicant No. 1) shall not be dispossessed except in accordance with the due process of law. 9. Being aggrieved by the rejection of her application, the Non- applicant preferred an appeal under Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 before the learned Sessions Judge, Raigarh. The learned Vth Upper Sessions Judge, Raigarh, partially allowed the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, directing that the Non-applicant may reside in the disputed house (which is in the possession of Applicant No. 1) until the final disposal of the pending case, vide order dated
6 27.09.2018 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 114/2018, and transmitted the case to the trial Court for compliance. 10. In compliance with the said order, the learned trial Court issued directions to the Protection Officer, Mahila Bal Vikas, Raigarh on 10.10.2018, directing submission of a compliance report on or before 03.11.2018. The Protection Officer, Mahila Bal Vikas, Raigarh, subsequently issued a notice to Applicant No. 1 to remain present on 16.10.2018 and to allow the Non-applicant to enter the house by unlocking it, failing which the order would be enforced. No such specific direction was issued by the learned Appellate Court against Applicant No. 1, and further, he was engaged in Vidhan Sabha election duty during that period. He accordingly informed the Protection Officer of his official assignment.
Despite this, the applicant was allegedly dispossessed from the house in question by breaking the locks, and the Non-applicant entered the premises with the assistance of the Protection Officer, Mahila Bal Vikas, Raigarh, and the local police. The action taken by the Protection Officer and the consequential entry of the Non-applicant into the house is arbitrary, unwarranted, and in violation of the provisions of Section 23 of the Act, 2005. Hence, the present revision petition. 11.
Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the order passed by the learned Appellate Court is bad in law, arbitrary, and in gross violation of the procedure prescribed under Section 23 of
7 the Act, 2005. It is further submitted that the appellate Court, during the pendency of proceedings under Section 23, had no jurisdiction to pass a residence order or to permit re-entry into the shared household. As per Section 19(1) of the Act, such a residence order may only be passed by the Magistrate at the time of final disposal of the application under Section 12(1), after being satisfied that an act of domestic violence has occurred. He further submits that the learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate that the factum of domestic violence is yet to be established, and the inquiry is still pending. Moreover, the Non-applicant had voluntarily left the house on 13.04.2017, as admitted in her own letter, and was not left without shelter. She has been residing at her parental house both before and after marriage, which is supported by documentary evidence filed on record and not denied by her. It has been contended that the learned Appellate Court also failed to appreciate the interim order dated 29.08.2018 passed in M.A. No. 72/2018 by this Co-ordinate Bench, which specifically protected the possession of Applicant No. 1 and restrained dispossession except in accordance with law. Therefore, the present revision deserves to be allowed. 12. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Non- applicant opposes the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants and submits that the order passed by the learned Appellate Court is well-reasoned, legal, and passed in exercise of its powers under Section 29 of the Protection of
8 Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, read with Section 19 of the said Act. It is submitted that the Appellate Court, upon due appreciation of the material on record and in the interest of justice, rightly permitted the Non-applicant to reside in the shared household, which she is legally entitled to as per the statutory scheme of the Act.
It is further contended that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is a welfare legislation enacted with the objective of protecting the rights of aggrieved women who are victims of domestic violence, and its provisions must be interpreted in a liberal and purposive manner to give effect to its beneficent object. The learned Appellate Court, having found a prima facie case of domestic violence and deprivation of residence, rightly exercised its jurisdiction under Section 19 to pass an interim residence order to protect the rights of the Non- applicant pending final adjudication of the case. It has been contended that the argument that such orders can only be passed at the final stage under Section 12(1) is wholly misconceived, as nothing in the statute bars the appellate Court from granting interim relief under Section 29 read with other provisions of the Act. The appellate Court is vested with the same powers as the trial Court under the Act while hearing an appeal, including the power to pass interim, protective, or residence orders in appropriate cases. It is further submitted that the plea of voluntary abandonment of the shared household by the Non-applicant is factually disputed and cannot be conclusively determined at the
9 interim stage. In any case, the Non-applicant, being the legally wedded wife, has a right to reside in the shared household under Section 17 of the Act, which is independent of ownership or title and cannot be taken away arbitrarily or without due process of law. Regarding the order dated 29.08.2018 passed in M.A. No. 72/2018, it is submitted that the said order only directs that dispossession shall not take place except in accordance with law, and the same cannot override the statutory rights of the Non- applicant under the Domestic Violence Act, especially when her re-entry was effected pursuant to a judicial order passed by the competent Appellate Court. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Appellate Court does not warrant any interference and has been passed to safeguard the statutory rights of the Non- applicant, which are protected under the Domestic Violence Act.
Hence, the revision petition filed by the applicants is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with due care and consideration. 14. The contention raised on behalf of the Applicants that such an
order could not have been passed under Section 23 of the Act in the absence of a final finding of domestic violence is wholly misconceived. The Supreme Court, in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414, has held that a wife has a right to reside in the shared household under Section 17 of the Act
10 independent of any proprietary right. The Court further held that the right to residence flows from the relationship and not from the title.
15. Moreover, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vaishali Abhimanyu Joshi v. Nanasaheb Gopal Joshi, (2017) 14 SCC 373, has clarified that the remedy under Section 19 of the Act is civil in nature and the Courts have a wide discretion to grant interim residence orders even during the pendency of proceedings, in
order to protect the aggrieved person from deprivation of shelter. 16. The appellate Court, in exercising its power under Section 29 read with Section 23 of the Act, rightly passed the residence order considering the vulnerability of the Non-Applicant and the fact that she had been living in the shared household, and there was no material to suggest that she had been lawfully evicted through a decree of a competent court. 17. The allegations of voluntary desertion and financial self-sufficiency are factual matters that must be decided by the trial Court in the final adjudication under Section 12 of the Act. Such claims do not by themselves disqualify the Non-Applicant from asserting her right to residence under Section 19 pending trial. 18. Furthermore, in Shalini v. Kishor, (2020) SCC OnLine SC 990, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that interim orders passed to prevent further hardship to an aggrieved person cannot be lightly interfered with unless shown to be manifestly illegal or perverse. 11
19. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the records of the Trial Court, Appellate Court, and the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter “the Act”), this Court finds that the order passed by the learned Appellate Court under Section 29 of the Act, directing the Non-Applicant’s re-entry into the shared household under Section 19 pending final adjudication, does not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity. The learned Appellate Court, upon prima facie satisfaction of entitlement, rightly exercised its discretion to pass an interim residence order to protect the rights of the Non- Applicant in accordance with the law. 20. The contention of the applicants that re-entry or residence orders can only be passed at the final stages under Section 12(1) is misconceived. The Appellate Court was empowered to grant interim or protective relief under Sections 19 and 29, as part of the broader custodial and remedial jurisdiction vested in courts to protect aggrieved parties under the Domestic Violence Act. The Non-Applicant’s alleged voluntary departure from the matrimonial home on 13.04.2017 alone does not confer legal immunity to deprive her of the right to reside therein, especially when subsequent findings of prima facie entitlement had been recorded by the Appellate Court. Her long-standing residence at her parental house and documentary proofs of identity do not negate her statutory rights as a legally wedded spouse to occupy the shared household. 12
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Moreover, while this Court contemplated the interim order dated 29.08.2018 in M.A. No. 72/2018, it should be noted that that order protected physical possession pending final adjudication and did not bar the Appellate Court from passing protective interim orders under the Domestic Violence Act. The actions of the Protection Officer and local police, including the forcible re-entry into the premises, were undertaken in compliance with the valid interim
order of the Appellate Court and within the framework of protective measures envisaged by the Act.
22. In light of the above, the revision petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. The impugned order dated 27.09.2018 passed by the learned Vth Upper Sessions Judge, Raigarh, in Criminal Appeal No. 114/2018, is affirmed. No further directions are called for in this revision.
23. The parties are directed to proceed with the main petition under Section 12 of the Act before the Trial Court. Any further disputes regarding possession, residence, or maintenance must be adjudicated on merits, following due process under the Act.
24. However, this Court hopes and trust that the trial Court would make an earnest endeavour to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible preferably within a further period of two month from today, if there is no legal impediment.
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25. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned trial Court for necessary compliance and follow up action. Sd/-
(Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Kunal