2025:JHHC:18218-DB -1 of 6- L.P.A. No. 248 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI I.A. No. 3319 of 2025 In/And L.P.A. No. 248 of 2025 1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Human Resources Development Ranchi, P.O. + P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi 2. The Director, Primary Education, Human Resources Development Ranchi, P.O. + P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi 3. The Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa, P.O. + P.S. + District-Garhwa 4. District Superintendent of Education, Garhwa, P.O. + P.S. + District-Garhwa 5. The Secretary, Department of Education, State of Bihar, P.O. + P.S. + District- Patna .. ... ... Appellants Versus 1. Kamlesh Kumar Pathak, Son of late Vamneshwar Pathak Present Resident of Village-Jhagrakhand, P.O.- Jharkhand, P.S. Bhawanathpu, Dist-Garhwa 2. Girija Nandan Vishwakarma, son of late Keshav Viswakarma, at present Resident of Village-Parti, P.O.- Ketar, P.S.- Bhawanathpur, District- Garhwa. 3. Rajesh Kumar Yadav, son of Sri Ram Prasad Yadav, at Present Resident of Village-Makri and P.O.- Makri, P.S.-Bhawanathpur, District-Garhwa … ... Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR --------- For the Appellants: Mr. Manish Kumar, Sr. S.C. II For the Respondents: -------- Reserved on: 02.07.2025 Pronounced on: 08 / 07 /2025 M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.(Oral) 1) The instant interlocutory application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by the applicants to condone the delay of 216 2025:JHHC:18218-DB -2 of 6- L.P.A. No. 248 of 2025 days in filing the LPA challenging the judgment dt. 8.7.2024 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 6057 of 2017. 2) In the application filed seeking condonation of delay it is stated that the District Superintendent of Education, Garhwa wrote a letter on 24.12.2024 submitting the statement of facts to the Joint Secretary, Primary Education, School Education and Literacy Department of the Government of Jharkhand seeking approval for preferring the LPA. 3) It is then stated that the file was put up before the Area Education Officer on 10.1.2025 for verifying the statement of facts submitted by the District Superintendent of Education, Garhwa by Legal Executive, and the file was handed over to the Legal Executive on 24.1.2025, and the latter checked and approved the draft after making certain changes and submitted the same on 31.1.2025. 4) It is stated that the file was then sent to the office of Advocate General on 11.2.2025 and he granted approval on 14.2.2025 and thereafter memo of appeal was drafted and the appeal was filed on 11.3.2025. 5) Admittedly the judgment of the learned Single Judge was pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the applicants. Therefore, the applicants were aware of the same. Yet through the judgment was pronounced on 8.7.2024 till 24.12.2024 the process for taking steps to file the appeal was not commenced i.e. more than five months. No explanation is offered for this lethargic conduct on the part of the applicants. 6) Undoubtedly the applicants were aware that the limitation for filing the LPA is only 30 days from the pronouncement of the judgment of the 2025:JHHC:18218-DB -3 of 6- L.P.A. No. 248 of 2025 learned Single Judge in the writ petition, and so they ought to have, therefore, acted more diligently in taking steps to file the appeal within the time permitted by law. 7) In this era of instantaneous communications, decision sought to be taken with more speed by the applicants and not in the manner they have done in the instant case. 8) In Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and another1, the Supreme Court held: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9- 2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person- in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances 1 (2012) 3 SCC 563 2025:JHHC:18218-DB -4 of 6- L.P.A. No. 248 of 2025 and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” (emphasis supplied) 9) These observations equally apply to the instant case where the applicants have acted in a similar manner as in the said case. 10) The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai vs. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd.2, Pr. Commissioner Central Excise 2 (2022) 3 SCC 159 2025:JHHC:18218-DB -5 of 6- L.P.A. No. 248 of 2025 Delhi-1 vs. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India vs. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others4, Union of India & Others vs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another5, and State of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs. Sabha Narain & others6. 11) In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR 7, the Supreme Court held that it could not look into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the 3 (2022) 2 SCC 327 4 (2021) 11 SCC 557 5 (2022) 9 SCC 263 6 (2022) 9 SCC 266 7 2024 INSC 262: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 2025:JHHC:18218-DB -6 of 6- L.P.A. No. 248 of 2025 explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. 12) This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary8. 13) In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the applicants have been negligent in taking steps to file the Letters Patent Appeal and they have not shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 216 days in filing the LPA. 14) Therefore, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal is also dismissed. 15) All pending applications shall stand closed. (M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) A.F.R. Sharda/- c.p.02 8 Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt. 29.11.2024