ORDER : Deepak Kumar Tiwari, J. 1. The appellant has filed this acquittal appeal under Section 378 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) against the judgment of acquittal dated 30.06.2018 passed by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa in Criminal Appeal No.02/2018, whereby, appeal of the respondents No.1 and respondents No.2 (appellants therein) was allowed by setting aside the judgment dated 12.12.2017 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pamgarh, District Janjgir-Champa in Complaint Case No.46/2007, consequently, the respondents/accused were acquitted of the charge under Sections 494 and 494/114 of the Indian Penal Code , respectively. 2. Necessary facts of the case, in brief, are that the appellant/complainant is legally wedded wife of respondent No.1 and during the subsistence of their marriage, respondent No.1 solemnized second marriage with respondent No.2 on 11.04.2003. After the second marriage, respondent No.1 started residing with respondent No.2 at another place i.e. Shanti Nagar, Banki Mongra. The complainant has made complaint before the concerned police station, however, no action was taken, therefore, a complaint case was filed before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pamgarh on 16.07.2003 against 9 persons, out of which, the complaint was registered against respondents No.1 and 2 (herein) only. 3. During the trial, in order to prove its case, the complainant examined as many as 5 witnesses i.e. Shyamlal (CW-1), complainant herself (CW-2), Bhulau (CW-3), Agamdas (CW-4) and Thanuram (CW-5) and exhibited 5 documents. On the other hand, the respondents/accused abjured their guilt and claimed to be tried. The respondents/accused in their statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC stated that they have been falsely implicated and examined 5 defence witnesses, namely, Jageshwar himself as DW- 1, Itwari (DW-2), Purshottam (DW-3), Maheshram (DW-4) and Chitrakumar (DW-5). 4. After evaluating the evidence on record, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class convicted respondent No.1 for the offence under Section 494 of the IPC and respondent No.2 for the offence under Section 494 /114 of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo Simple Imprisonment for 3 years and fine of Rs.1000/- each, in default of payment of fine Simple Imprisonment for 1 month. Against the said judgment, the respondents/accused preferred an appeal which was allowed by the Third Additional Sessions Judge and thereby, respondents No.1 and 2 were acquitted of the charges levelled against them. Hence, this appeal. 5. Against the said judgment, the respondents/accused preferred an appeal which was allowed by the Third Additional Sessions Judge and thereby, respondents No.1 and 2 were acquitted of the charges levelled against them. Hence, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/complainant submits that the learned appellate Court has not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective though material evidence is available on record to establish that the complainant is legally wedded wife of respondent No.1 and no divorce has taken place. He also submits that the respondent has filed divorce petition before the Family Court, Janjgir-Champa in Civil Suit No.148-A/2012 which has been dismissed vide judgment dated 01.07.2014. He also submits that the appellant/complainant has also filed maintenance application on her behalf and her minor daughter under Section 125 of the CrPC which was allowed in Misc. Criminal Case No.15/2006 vide judgment dated 21.12.2006. He also submits that the complainant and their witnesses categorically proved the fact regarding second marriage of respondent No.1 with respondent No.2, therefore, the trial Court has rightly convicted the respondents. However, without assigning any cogent reasons, the learned appellate Court has reversed the well reasoned finding of the trial Court and acquitted the accused. In view of such submission, he prays to allow the acquittal appeal. 6. On other hand, learned counsel for the respondents No.1 and 2 submits that the impugned judgment has been passed after proper appreciation of the evidence on record. He also submits that the appellate Court was absolutely justified in acquitting the respondents as the complainant has failed to prove the second marriage in accordance with provisions contained in Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and also failed to prove contravention of the conditions of Hindu Marriage as per Section 11 of the Act 1955 which relates to void marriages. In view of such submission, learned counsel for the respondent submits that this appeal has no merit and same deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 8. In order to have comprehension of the challenge made to the judgment of conviction and sentence, it would be profitable to reproduce Section 494 , IPC, which is produced hereunder: "494. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 8. In order to have comprehension of the challenge made to the judgment of conviction and sentence, it would be profitable to reproduce Section 494 , IPC, which is produced hereunder: "494. Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife-Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Exception.-This section does not extend to any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a Court of competent jurisdiction, nor to any person who contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by such person as being alive within that time provided the person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes place, inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so far as the same are within his or her knowledge." 9. A bare and close perusal of Section 494 , IPC would reveal the following essential ingredients of the offence under Section 494 , IPC: "(i) The accused spouse must have contracted the first marriage, (ii) While the first marriage was subsisting, the spouse concerned must have contracted a second marriage, and (iii) Both the marriages must be valid in the sense that the necessary ceremonies required by the personal law governing the parties had duly been performed." 10.At this stage, it would be pertinent to mention that the offence under Section 494 IPC would be attracted only if the second marriage becomes void by reason that it had taken place during the subsistence of the first marriage and in the lifetime of one of the spouse. 11.It is also profitable to reproduce Section 17 of the Act, 1955, which reads thus: "17. 11.It is also profitable to reproduce Section 17 of the Act, 1955, which reads thus: "17. Punishment of bigamy.-Any marriage between two Hindus solemnized after the commencement of this Act is void if at the date of such marriage either party had a husband or wife living; and the provisions of sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), shall apply accordingly." 12. Section 17 of the Act, 1955 clearly provides that the second marriage must be according to ceremonies required by law and if the marriage is void, its voidness will only lead to the consequence from such marriage. The combined effect of Section 17 of the Act, 1955 and Section 494 , IPC has been considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande and another v. The State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1965 SC 1564 , wherein, following observation has been made: "4...... Section 17 provides that any marriage between two Hindus solemnized after the commencement of the Act is void if at the date of such marriage either party had a husband or wife living, and that the provisions of Ss. 494 and 495, I.P.C. shall apply accordingly. The marriage between two Hindus is void in view of S. 17 if two conditions are satisfied: (i) the marriage is solemnized after the commencement of the Act; (ii) at the date of such marriage, either party had a spouse living. If the marriage which took place between the appellant and Kamlabai in February 1962 cannot be said to be 'solemnized', that marriage will not be void by virtue of S. 17 of the Act and S. 494, I.P.C. will not apply to such parties to the marriage as had a spouse living. 5. The word 'solemnize' means, in connection with a marriage, 'to celebrate the marriage with proper ceremonies and in due form', according to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. It follows, therefore, that unless the marriage is 'celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies and due form' it cannot be said to be 'solemnized'. It is, therefore, essential, for the purpose of S. 17 of the Act, that the marriage to which S. 494, I.P.C. applies on account of the provisions of the Act, should have been celebrated with proper ceremonies and in due form. It is, therefore, essential, for the purpose of S. 17 of the Act, that the marriage to which S. 494, I.P.C. applies on account of the provisions of the Act, should have been celebrated with proper ceremonies and in due form. Merely going through certain ceremonies with the intention that the parties be taken to be married, will not make the ceremonies prescribed by law or approved by any established custom." 13.In Kanwal Ram and others v. The Himachal Pradesh Administration , AIR 1966 SC 614 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court clearly held that the essential ceremonies of the second marriage must be constituted and proved and admission of the marriage by the accused is not an evidence of it for the purpose of proving the marriage, and held as under: "7. The learned Judicial Commissioner, however, thought that apart from the evidence about the marriage ceremonies earlier mentioned there was other evidence which would prove the second marriage. He first referred to a statement by the appellant Kanwal Ram that he had sexual relationship with Kubja. We are entirely unable to agree that this, even if true, would at all prove his marriage with Kubja. Then the learned Judicial Commissioner relied on a statement filed by Kubja, Hira Nand and Hiroo in answer to an application for restitution of conjugal rights filed by Sadh Ram against Kubja and others, in which it was stated that Kubja married Kanwal Ram after her marriage with Sadh Ram had been dissolved. Now the statement admitting the second marriage by these persons is certainly not evidence of the marriage so far as Kanwal Ram and Seesia are concerned; they did not make it. Nor do we think, it is evidence of the marriage even as against Kubja. First, treated as an admission, the entire document has to be read as a whole and that would prove the dissolution of the first marriage of Kubja which would make the second marriage innocent. Secondly, it is clear that in law such admission is not evidence of the fact of the second marriage having taken place. First, treated as an admission, the entire document has to be read as a whole and that would prove the dissolution of the first marriage of Kubja which would make the second marriage innocent. Secondly, it is clear that in law such admission is not evidence of the fact of the second marriage having taken place. In a bigamy case, the second marriage as a fact, that is to say, the ceremonies constituting it, must be proved: Empress v. Pitambur Singh, ILR 5 Cal 566 (FB); Empress of India v. Kallu, ILR 5 All 233, Archbold, Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice (35th Ed.) Art. 3796. In Kallu's case, ILR 5 All 233 and in Morris v. Miller ( 1767) 4 Burr 2057 : 98 ER 73, it has been held that admission of marriage by the accused is not evidence of it for the purpose of proving marriage in an adultery or bigamy case: see also Archbold, Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice 35th Ed.) Art. 3781. We are unable, therefore, to think that the written statement of Kubja affords any assistance towards proving her marriage with Kanwal Ram." 14. In Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh , 1971 (1) SCC 864 : ( AIR 1971 SC 1153 ), their Lordships of the Supreme Court clearly held that it is essential that the second marriage should have been celebrated with proper ceremonies and in due form and the prosecution is required to prove that the alleged second marriage has been duly performed in accordance with religious rites available to the form of marriage gone through by the parties and the admission of the accused cannot be, in law, treated as an evidence of the second marriage having been taken place. The following has been held by their Lordships at Para 16, 17 and 23. "16. The following has been held by their Lordships at Para 16, 17 and 23. "16. From the above quotations it is clear that if the alleged second marriage is not a valid one according to law applicable to the parties, it will not be void by reason of its taking place during the life of the husband or the wife of the person marrying so as to attract Section 494 , I.P.C. Again in order to hold that the second marriage has been solemnized so as to attract Section 17 of the Act, it is essential that the second marriage should have been celebrated with proper ceremonies and in due form. 17. In the said decision this Court further considered the question whether it has been established that with respect to the alleged second marriage the essential ceremonies for a valid marriage have been performed. After referring to the passage in Mulla's Hindu Law, 12th Edn. At page 615 dealing with the essential ceremonies which have to be performed for a valid marriage, this Court on the evidence held that the prosecution had neither established that the essential ceremonies had been performed nor that the performance of the essential ceremonies had been abrogated by the custom governing the community to which the parties belonged. In this view it was held that the prosecution in that case had failed to establish that the alleged second marriage had been performed in accordance with the requirement of Section 7 of the Act. The effect of the decision, in our opinion, is that the prosecution has to prove that the alleged second marriage had been duly performed in accordance with the essential religious rites applicable to the form of the marriage gone through by the parties and that the said marriage must be a valid one according to law applicable to the parties. 23. Further, as pointed out by this Court in Kanwal Ram's case ( AIR 1966 SC 614 ) (supra) the admission in Ex. 2 cannot in law be treated as evidence of the second marriage having taken place, in an adultery or bigamy case, and that in such cases it must be proved by the prosecution that the second marriage as a fact has taken place after the performance of the essential ceremonies." 15. 2 cannot in law be treated as evidence of the second marriage having taken place, in an adultery or bigamy case, and that in such cases it must be proved by the prosecution that the second marriage as a fact has taken place after the performance of the essential ceremonies." 15. Thereafter, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, following the decision of Bhaurao Shankar case ( AIR 1965 SC 1564 ) (supra), Kanwal Ram case ( AIR 1966 SC 614 ) (supra) and Smt. Priya Bala case ( AIR 1971 SC 1153 ) (supra) in Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan (1979) 2 SCC 170 : ( AIR 1979 SC 713 ), held that where a spouse contracts a second marriage while the first marriage subsists, the spouse will be held guilty of bigamy under Section 494 , IPC if it is proved in the sense that the necessary ceremony, required by law or custom, has been actually performed. In Laxmi Devi (Smt.) v. Satya Narayan and others, (1994) 5 SCC 545 : (1994 AIR SCW 3408) also, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that in the absence of proof of such a ceremony, the factum of second marriage cannot be held to have been made out. 16. In view of the aforesaid principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is clear that in order to prove the offence of bigamy under Section 494 IPC, the prosecution is required to prove the fact of second marriage strictly. However, if the prosecution is failed to prove the fact of second marriage, as required under the law, the accused cannot be held guilty for the offence under Section 494 IPC. 17. Further, generally the marriage is celebrated with proper ceremonies and in due form. It is essential for the purpose of Section 17 of the Act 1955 that the marriage to which Section 494 IPC applies on account of provisions of the Act, should have been celebrated with proper ceremonies and in due form. However, merely performing certain ceremonies with the intention that the parties will be taken to be married will not make the ceremonies prescribed under the law or approved by any established customs. 18. However, merely performing certain ceremonies with the intention that the parties will be taken to be married will not make the ceremonies prescribed under the law or approved by any established customs. 18. It is also true that the second marriage should be proved to be a valid marriage according to the personal law of the parties, though such second marriage is void under Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act having been performed when the earlier marriage is subsisting. The validity of the second marriage is to be proved by the prosecution by satisfactory evidence.{See: S. Nagalingam Vs. Sivgami, (2001) 7 SCC 487 }. 19. In the case at hand, the complainant Bhagwati (CW-2), Bhulau (CW-3), Aagamdas (CW-4) and Thanuram (CW-5) in their evidence only stated that second marriage has been solemnized by respondent No.1 with respondent No.2, however, prosecution witnesses did not utter any word as to whether the second marriage has been solemnized by the respondents by undergoing the essential ceremonies in accordance with the customs prevalent in his caste or community and in accordance with essential ingredients of provisions of Hindu Marriage Act. It is also revealed that respondent No.1 has made certain nomination in favour of respondent No.2 in the official record. However, it is well established that admission of marriage by any of the parties is not evidence of proof, as in absence of proof of such a ceremony, the factum of second marriage cannot be held to have been made out. 20. Even Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with an opinion on relationship by the Court, and the proviso thereto would reveal that an opinion of relationship shall not be an evidence to prove the marriage in a proceeding under Section 494 IPC. 21. Apart from the aforesaid, in the matter of V.N. Ratheesh vs. State of Kerala [ (2006) 10 SCC 617 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. It is further held that the paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. It is further held that the paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. It was also observed that the principle to be followed by appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. 22. Taking into consideration the aforesaid facts and in light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court herein-above, this Court is of the considered view that the appellant has failed to make out a case for interference in the well reasoned findings arrived at by the appellate Court and also failed to attract essential ingredients which are required to prove the offence under Section 494 IPC. Therefore, the appellate Court has not committed any error while acquitting the respondents. 23. In the result, the Acquittal Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.