HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AGARTALA IA No.01/2025 in/and WA No.77 of 2025 1. The State of Tripura, represented by the Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura, Department of Higher Education, Government of Tripura, Khejur Bagan, P.O. Agartala, P.S. NCC, District: West Tripura, Pin-799001 2. The Commissioner & Secretary, Department of Finance, Govt. of Tripura, New Secretariat Complex, Gorkha Basti, P.O. Kunjaban, P.S. NCC, District: West Tripura, Pin-799001 3. The Directorate of Higher Education, Government of Tripura, Estt. (N.G.) Section, Old Secretariat Complex, P.O. Agartala, District- West Tripura 4. The Principal, Tripura Institute of Technology, Narsingarh, Airport Road, Singerbil, P.O. Agartala, P.S. Airport Police Station, District: West Tripura, Pin-799009 .........Applicant/Appellant(s); Versus 1. Juled Hossen (43 years) S/o Taher Miah, R/o- Maharani, Udaipur, District- Gomati Tripura, Pin-799120 2. Sri Sudip Kar (50 years) S/o Late Balai Chandra Kar, R/o Ushabazar, Chinaihani, P.O. Agartala Airport, P.S. Airport, District: West Tripura, Pin- 799009 3. Sri Tapas Kanti Rakshit (50 years) S/o Late Sitangshu Sekhar Rakshit, R/o Joynagar, Dashamighat, P.O. Agartala, P.S. West Agartala, District: West Tripura, Pin-799001 .........Respondent(s) For Applicant/Appellant(s) : Mr. Dipankar Sarma, Addl. G.A. For Respondent(s) : None. HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA Date of hearing : 20.08.2025 Date of Judgment & Order : 26.08.2025 Whether Fit for Reporting : YES JUDGMENT & ORDER (M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.) This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 237 days in filing the Writ Appeal challenging the judgment dt.20.08.2024 of the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.777 of 2023. Page 2 of 8 2. The fourth applicant herein is the Tripura Institute of Technology. 3. It is contended that the said applicant obtained downloaded copy of the impugned judgment from the internet for examination, and when the file was under examination, it received a representation from the respondents on 09.09.2024, and it was forwarded to the Higher Education Department on 12.09.2024. 4. It is contended that the Department of Higher Education, after examination of the file, referred the matter to the Law Department for views on 25.11.2024, and the Law Department, after giving their views, returned the file to the said department on 26.11.2024. 5. Thereafter the Higher Education Department again examined the file, and referred it to Finance Department for their views on 16.12.2024, and the said department gave their views and returned the file on 27.12.2024. 6. Subsequently, the Higher Education Department again referred the matter to the learned Advocate General for opinion on 11.04.2025, and he gave his opinion on the very same day. 7. Thereafter the file was handed over to the advocate for filing appeal on 17.04.2025, and after the drafting of the memo of appeal, it was again sent to the Advocate General for vetting on 21.04.2025. 8. The Advocate General on 22.04.2025 vetted the memo of appeal, stay petition and the delay condonation petition, and returned the file to the counsel for the applicants. 9. Thereafter application for certified copy was made on 24.04.2025, and then the appeal came to be filed on 15.05.2025. Page 3 of 8 10. It is contended that on account of the above reasons, the delay in filing the appeal occurred and the same was on account of movement of file from one authority to another, and so the said delay is liable to be condoned. 11. Such a plea on part of the state was not accepted by the Supreme Court in Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another1, the Supreme Court held: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person- incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance 1 (2012) 3 SCC 563 substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs, Chennai v. Volex Interconnect (India) Private Limited2, Principal Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-I v. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India v. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others4, Union of India & Others v. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another5, and State of Uttar Pradesh & Others v. Sabha Narain & Others6. 13. In Union of India & Another v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir 7, the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to look into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it 2(2022) 3 SCC 159 3 (2022) 2 SCC 327 4 (2021) 11 SCC 557 5 (2022) 9 SCC 263 6 (2022) 9 SCC 266 7 2024 INSC 262 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. 14. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary8. 15. In the judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh9 referred to by the counsel for the applicants, no doubt, there are observations indicating that though delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, it has to be kept in mind that, if in a particular case merits need to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of limitation. 16. Inder Singh ( 9 supra ) was a case where the learned Single Judge of the High Court had allowed an application for condonation of delay in filing a Second Appeal, though, the appeal had been filed with a delay of 1537 days, and the Supreme Court did not deem it fit to interfere with the same. 17. It appears that the attention of the Bench of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh ( 9 supra ) was not drawn to the judgments referred to by us in Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy ( 7 supra ) and in the case of Ramkumar Choudhary ( 8 supra), where the Court had stated that while considering pleas 8 Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt.29.11.2024 9 Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.6145 of 2024 dt. 21.03.2025 of condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation of delay. It also stated that if there is a long inaction, party would lose the right to have the matter considered on merits and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical consideration. 18. Counsel for respondents also relied on Ramchandra Shankar, Deodhar & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Others10 and also the judgment in Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others v. Union of India & Another 11, to contend that liberal approach should be taken in condoning delays where the limitation ground undermines the merits of the case and obstructs substantial justice. 19. In Sheo Raj Singh ( 11 supra ), referred to in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh ( 9 supra ), the High Court had condoned the delay of 479 days in filing the Land Acquisition Appeal in the High Court and the explanation offered found favour of the Supreme Court. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that it was not hearing an application for condonation of delay, but sitting in appeal over a discretionary exercise of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay; in the case of the former, whether to condone or not, would be the only question, whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of prayer for condonation, would be the question; that the law is well-settled that a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the 10 (1974) 1 SCC 317 11 (2023) 10 SCC 531 discretionary exercise by the courts below; and that the appellate power should be exercised only when the order challenged in appeal is clearly wrong and not when it is merely not right. 20. Both these decisions cannot help the applicants, since, in the instant application, this Court has to consider the question whether sufficient cause has been shown by the applicants to condone the period of delay. It is not considering an order passed by a subordinate forum condoning the delay or refusing to condone it. 21. In the judgment of State of Rajasthan and Another v. Bal Kishan Mathur (dead) through legal representatives and others 12 cited by the counsel for the applicants, the delay on the part of the State in filing the Special Appeal Writ was only 98 days. Also in the facts of that case, the High Court had declined to condone delay which was not explained merely for a period of six days out of 98 days. It was undoubtedly a harsh approach on the part of the High Court, and therefore the Supreme Court rightly intervened, set aside the judgment of the High Court and condoned the delay. But where the delay as in the instant case is 237 days, such a view cannot be adopted. 22. In Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat v. G. Arumugam (dead) by legal representatives13 cited by the counsel for the applicants, a delay of 1373 days in filing Second Appeal by the Executive Officer of a Panchayat in relation to Panchayat property was condoned on the ground that there were deliberate lapses on the part of the previous Executive Officer of the Panchayat at the relevant time, and there was an attempt on the part of the Government officials or public servants to defeat justice by causing delay. In 12 (2014) 1 SCC 592 13 (2015) 3 SCC 569 the instant case there is no such contention raised, and therefore the said judgment also has no application. 23. We may also point out that the applicants were undoubtedly aware that the limitation for filing the appeal is only 30 days, and they cannot take their own sweet time to decide on filing the appeal, and file it whenever they feel like it ignoring the period of limitation for filing the same. 24. The facts narrated above indicate that the fourth applicant and the other applicants acted in a very leisurely manner knowing fully well the period of limitation for filing the Writ Appeal. When the Finance Department returned the file to the Higher Education Department on 27.12.2024, no reason is offered why till 11.04.2025, for 4 months, the file was not referred to the Advocate General. 25. Also there is an inordinate delay in applying for certified copy of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, and such application was filed only on 24.04.2025 though the judgment was delivered on 20.08.2024. No explanation is offered for this delay by the applicants. 26. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the applicants were clearly negligent in taking steps in filing the Writ Appeal, and no sufficient cause has been shown by them for condoning the inordinate delay of 237 days in filing the Writ Appeal. 27. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently the Writ Appeal is also dismissed. 28. Pending applications shall stand closed. (S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA, J) (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ) Pijush/ MUNNA SAHA Digitally signed by MUNNA SAHA Date: 2025.08.26 13:02:55 +05'30'