- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA WRIT PETITION NO.36132 OF 2015 (LA-UDA) BETWEEN: DR. NALINI K. URS W/O LATE B.P. KRISHNE URS, AGED ABOUT 78 YEARS, R/AT NO.42/2, RAMESHWARA NIVAS, 2ND MAIN, JAYANAGAR, BENGALURU-560 082. (AMENDED VIDE ORDER DATED 06.04.2022) …PETITIONER (BY SRI S.S. NAGANAND, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SMT. SUMANA NAGANAND, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF URBAN & HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-560 001, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY. 2. THE MYSURU URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, JHANSI RANI LAKSHMI BAI ROAD, MYSURU-570001. REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER. 3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, MYSURU DISTRICT, MYSURU-570001. 4. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, THE MYSURU URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Digitally signed by MAHALAKSHMI B M Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 JHANSI RANI LAKSHMI BAI ROAD, MYSURU-570001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI HARISHA A.S., AGA FOR R-1 & R-3; SRI T.P. VIVEKANANDA, ADVOCATE FOR R-2 & R-4) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE NOTICES DATED 24.02.2000 ISSUED UNDER SECTION 12(2) OF THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 (REPEALED ACT) (ANNEXURE-H, H1, H2, H3, H4 TO THE WRIT PETITION) ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT AND THE SAME MAY BE HELD TO BE WITHOUT JURISDICTION, THE PROCEEDINGS ARE NON EST AND ETC. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDER, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA ORAL ORDER The petitioner has called in question the acquisition of her lands measuring 32 acres 11 guntas in Survey Nos.152/A, 153, 154/A, 157/A and 158 of Nachanahalli, Kasaba Hobli, Mysuru Taluk initiated under the provisions of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 (‘KUDA Act’ for short) on the principal ground that: i. Physical possession has not been taken. ii. The scheme has not been substantially implemented within the period prescribed under Section 27 of the KUDA Act. - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 iii. There is an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than 15 years in depositing the compensation. Brief facts: 2. The petitioner claims ownership and possession over several agricultural lands situated in Nachanahalli, Kasaba Hobli, Mysuru Taluk, measuring in all 32 acres11 guntas in Survey Nos.152/A, 153, 154/A, 157/A and 158. The properties were originally the joint family properties of her father, late Mallaraje, and his children, partitioned under a registered partition deed dated 10.03.1963. Acquisition proceedings were initiated by Mysuru Urban Development Authority (MUDA) under the KUDA Act through a preliminary notification dated 30.01.1992, followed by a final notification dated 09.03.1998. 3. The petitioner's brother challenged the acquisition proceedings in W.P. No.14086/2001, which was dismissed on 18.02.2003, W.A. No.3598/2003 was dismissed on 03.03.2014 and the subsequent SLPs were - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 dismissed on 08.08.2014. During the pendency of the writ appeal, MUDA passed a resolution on 04.09.2003 deciding to drop the acquisition on the ground that the petitioner's family had relinquished 06 acres 11 guntas for ring road formation. The Government, however, rejected the MUDA's proposal. 4. An award was passed on 18.08.1999, but the compensation was neither paid nor deposited until 03.03.2015, and even then, the deposit was made in the name of petitioner's father who died in 1964. 5. Notices under Section 12 (2) were issued only in 2015, a decade after the award and were never served on the petitioner. It is asserted that the possession was never taken; the notification issued under Section 16 (2) dated 20.09.2001 pertains only to Survey No.158. For the remaining survey numbers, Section 16 (2) notification were issued only on 26.03.2015, i.e., 17 years after final notification. Meanwhile, MUDA allotted sites out of the - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 petitioner's land to third parties in 2003 and again during the pendency of this writ petition, (violating the interim orders dated 11.09.2015), which led to contempt in CCC No.662/2022. 6. Respondent No.2-MUDA filed objections contending that the writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. It is asserted that the acquisition was initiated validly under Section 17(1) of the KUDA Act through a preliminary notification dated 30.01.1992 followed by the final notification dated 09.03.1998, covering all lands including those claimed by the petitioner. The revenue records indicated several khatedars, including M. Mallaraje Urs and others and no objections were filed by any of them at the stage of Section 17. 7. After issuance of notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘LA Act’ for short), none of the notified khatedars submitted claims for - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 compensation. An award was passed on 18.08.1999 and approved on 07.03.2000. Section 12 (2) notices were issued on 24.04.2000 to the notified landowners. It is only after two years that certain members of the petitioner's family initiated litigations in W.P. Nos.30059-30061/2000 and 14086/2001. These writ petitions challenged the validity of the notification on the ground unrelated to compensation or possession. The writ petitions were dismissed on 18.02.2003 and the W.A. No.3598/2003 was also dismissed on 03.03.2014. SLPs were later dismissed on 08.08.2014. It is stated that these litigation concluded upto Apex Court. 8. The present challenge is barred by Order II Rule 2, since the grounds under Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation, Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (‘Act, 2013’ for short) were available during the pendency of writ appeal and SLP, but were never urged. It is asserted that - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 petitioner cannot now reopen the issues which already stand concluded. 9. It is contended that despite 1963 partition deed, the family never updated the mutation entries, and the RTC continued to show Mallaraje as the khatedar. The petitioner, who was about 55 years of age in 1992, did not object at any stage, nor did she or her siblings intervene in the earlier proceedings. It is contended that she cannot now claim to represent the joint family ‘without producing any authorization or bringing all the legal representatives on record’. 10. It is further stated that the possession was already taken on 05.12.2000 and this was recorded in the earlier writ proceedings. It is stated that the petitioner cannot argue that the compensation must be prior to taking possession, because Section 16 of the LA Act, does not require payment before possession and they also rely on Sections 16, 31 and 34 and 28 to contend that taking - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 possession precedes payment of compensation and that the statutory provisions for interest exist precisely for delayed payment. 11. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the entire acquisition has deemed to have lapsed. First, under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, since the award was passed in 1999 but compensation was not paid/deposited within five years and possession was also not taken. The belated deposit made on 03.03.2015 in the name of a dead person, it is argued, no deposit in the eye of law. It is further contended that the issuance of 12 (2) notices in 2015, long after the repeal of LA Act, is without jurisdiction. Further, the MUDA has acted mala fide in forming sites and executing the registered sale deeds in 2003 even before depositing compensation, and again - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 selling lands during the pendency of the very petition despite subsisting interim orders. It is contended that the scheme stands lapsed under Section 27 of the KUDA Act because a. The MUDA failed to take possession; b. The MUDA failed to deposit the compensation and; c. The MUDA failed to substantially execute the scheme within five years from the date of Section 19 (1) declaration dated 09.03.1998. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the following decisions: i) Late M.C. Leela, Since deceased rep. by LRs. vs. The State of Karnataka1 (M.C. Leela) ii) Naganna and others vs. The State of Karnataka and others2 (Naganna) iii) Ram Chand and others vs. Union of India and others3 (Ram Chand) 1 W.P. No.11155/2016 D.D. on 16.12.2024 2 ILR 1998 KAR 3503 - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 iv) Gokak Patel Volkart Limited vs. Collector of Central Excise, Belgaum4 (Gokak Patel Volkart Limited) v) Kolkata Municipal Corporation and another vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and others5 (Bimal Kumar Shah) vi) Special Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee for Fruits and Vegetables Rep. by its Secretary vs. State of Karnataka Represented by its Secretary Revenue Department and others6 (Special Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee) 14. To assert that the possession after lapse of the scheme is void. 15. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents contends that the earlier challenges to the same acquisition proceedings were dismissed upto the Apex 3 (1994) 1 SCC 44 4 (1987) 2 SCC 93 5 (2024) 10 SCC 533 6 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 17111 - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 Court and that the grounds under Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 were available, but not raised, and thus, the present petition is barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC. It is submitted that the petition lacks maintainability, as the RTCs continue to show Mallaraje Urs as the Khatedar. The earlier litigation never mentioned joint family representation, and it is contended that the petitioner cannot now file the petition both as an absolute owner and simultaneously on behalf of the joint family. 16. It is contended that in the earlier round of litigation, the Court accepted MUDA’s statement that possession had been taken, and that Section 16 permits taking possession after the award is passed and not necessarily after payment of compensation. It is submitted that delay in issuing a notification under Section 16(2) does not invalidate the taking of possession. The learned counsel relies upon the following decisions: - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 i) Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and another vs. Shah Hyder Beig and others7 (Shah Hyder Beig) ii) Meghmala and others vs. G. Narasimha Reddy and others8 (Meghmala) iii) V. Chandrasekaran and another vs. Administrative Officer and others9 (V. Chandrasekaran) iv) Lakshmamma and others vs. State of Karnataka and others10 (Lakshmamma) v) M/s. Evershine Monuments and others vs. The State of Karnataka, rep. by its Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development and others11 (M/s. Evershine Monuments) vi) Smt. K.S. Meenakshi and others vs. Stat of Karnataka and others12 (Smt. K.S. Meenakshi) 7 (2000) 2 SCC 48 8 (2010) 8 SCC 383 9 (2012) 12 SCC 133 10 2018 SCC Online Kar 4106 11 ILR 2018 KAR 731 12 W.A. No.1274/2018 D.D. on 19.04.2021 - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 vii) Offshore Holdings Private Limited vs. Bangalore Development Authority and others13 (Offshore Holdings Private Limited) viii) Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority, Faizabad vs. Dr. Rajesh Kumar Pandey and others14 (Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority) ix) Sri M.K.Thyagaraja Guptha and others vs. The State of Karnataka and others15 (M.K.Thyagaraja Guptha) x) Krishnamurthy vs. Bangalore Development Authority16 (Krishnamurthy) xi) Sri Basheer Ahmed and Others vs. The State of Karnataka and others17 (Basheer Ahmed) xii) Basheer Ahmed and Others vs. The State of Karnataka and others18 (Basheer Ahmed) xiii) M.A.Muktha Devi Since dead by Lrs. Vs. State of Karnataka and another19 (M.A.Muktha Devi) 13 (2011) 3 SCC 139 14 (2022) 18)SCC 507 15 W.A. Nos.1944-1946/2011 D.D. on 18.06.2012 16 ILR 1996 KAR 1258 17 W.A. No.1900/2013 D.D. on 01.02.2023 18 Order in SLP Dairy No.19349/2023 - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 xiv) Sri N.S.Sudarshan vs. The State of Karnataka and another20 (N.S.Sudarshan) xv) Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and others21 (Indore Development Authority) 17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the points that arise for consideration are: “i. Whether the respondent-MUDA has established, by production of lawful and contemporaneous material, that actual possession of the petition lands was taken in accordance with law? ii. Whether the scheme notified under Section 17 (1) and Section 19 (1) of the KUDA Act has been substantially implemented within the time contemplated, or whether the admitted non- development of large extent 76 acres renders the scheme as having lapsed? iii. Whether the 15 year unexplained delay in depositing the compensation despite there being no stay on compensation proceedings, vitiates the 19 W.P. No.40400/2011 D.D. on 01.02.2023 20 Order in SLP Dairy No.26747/2023 21 (2020) 8 SCC 129 - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 acquisition, and whether such delay is consistent with the State's obligation to act with a reasonable time under Article 300A of the Constitution? iv. Whether the subsequent cause of action arising from a. Non-taking of possession, b. Non-implementation of the scheme, and c. long-delayed deposit of compensation, constitutes a fresh and distinct cause of action, thereby rendering the present writ petition maintainable and not barred by res judicata or constructive res judicata under Order II Rule 2 CPC?” 18. The factual matrix is undisputed. i. 08.01.1992 - The preliminary notification under Section 17(1) of the KUDA Act was issued. ii. 09.03.1998- The final notification under Section 19(1) of the KUDA Act was issued . iii. 18.08.1999/07.03.2000 -award was passed and approved. iv. 24.04.2000 - Section 16(2) notification only for Survey No.152A. - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 v. 06.06.2001/13.05.2003- Interim orders staying dispossession in earlier litigation W.P. No.14086/2001 and W.A. No.3598/2003. v. 03.03.2015 - Compensation has been deposited before the Court after 15 years of delay. vi. 26.03.2015 - Section 16(2) notification for remaining lands issued 17 years after final notification. vii. 24.08.2015 - the present writ petition was filed. viii. 11.09.2015 - interim order was granted by this Court restraining the MUDA from alienation. viii. 05.06.2024 - Contempt petition was closed after MUDA admitted the wrongful allotments during the pendency of the present writ petition. 19. The case of the petitioner is that the acquisition has lapsed, as actual possession was never taken, the scheme has not been substantially implemented, and the compensation was deposited 15 years after the issuance of the final notification, without any explanation for the delay. - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 20. The petitioner places reliance upon the decision of the Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court, in the case of M.C. Leela to contend that in respect of the adjacent land acquired under the same scheme, this Court has recorded a categorical finding that mere publication of Section 16 (2) notification does not establish that possession had been taken and that the lands therein continued to remain with the owners and that the same infirmity persists in the present case. 21. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2-MUDA, submits that against the decision in M.C. Leela, MUDA has preferred W.A. No.670/2025 and the Division Bench of this Court has granted stay of the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 22. The fact remains that, in the absence of any contemporaneous mahazar or cogent material, this Court cannot presume taking over of possession. On the question of implementation of the scheme, the material - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 placed by the MUDA does not inspire the confidence, except for a few CA site allotments covering about 8 acres, no credible records evidencing development has been produced. The petitioner has demonstrated that more than 6 acres, (including the 32 acres and 44 acres forming subject matter of M.C. Leela (remain barren and undeveloped, though the final notification covered approximately 148 acres. The documents produced by the MUDA do not establish substantial execution. 23. The Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court, in the case of Naganna, held at paragraph No.14 as under: “14. Admittedly, the declaration under sub- section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act was made on 12th of March 1992 and the Award was made on 10th of March 1997. Even according to the Development Authority, which is seriously disputed by the petitioners, the possession of the land in question was taken only on 10th of April 1997. Therefore, the award was passed just a few days before the expiry of five years' period mentioned in Section 27 of the Act. Thus, possession of the land, - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 even according to the Development Authority, was taken after the expiry of five years' period from the date of the declaration made under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act. Section 27 of the Act mandates the Development Authority to execute the Scheme substantially within a period of five years from the date of publication of the declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Authorities Act. The said provision further provides that if the Development Authority fails to execute the Scheme substantially, the Scheme stands lapsed and the provisions of Section 36 of the Authorities Act shall become inoperative. Therefore, from the provisions contained in Section 27 of the Act, it is clear that passing of the award, taking of possession, substantial implementation of the Scheme prepared in respect of which a declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 17 was made, must be implemented within a period of five years from the date of declaration made under sub- section (1) of Section 19 of the Act. On the undisputed facts, it is not possible to accept the contention of Sri Reddy that the Scheme in its entirety or even a portion of it, has been substantially implemented, if the scheme was not substantially implemented before five years from the date of declaration made under Section 19(1) of the Act, the scheme stands lapsed. Therefore, it is - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 not permissible for the respondents to take possession of the land after the scheme stood lapsed. The possession, if any, taken by the Authority or attempt made to take possession after the lapse of the scheme would be without the authority of law. Therefore, in view of the provisions contained in Section 27 of the Act, the Scheme also stands lapsed. Therefore, my answer to Question No. 2 is also in favour of the petitioners.” 24. Non-implementation of the scheme, coupled with non-taking of possession results in the lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 27 of the KUDA Act. The delay in depositing the compensation is equally fatal. Though the award was passed in 1999, the compensation was deposited only on 03.03.2015, after a delay of more than 15 years. The interim orders passed in W.P. No.14086/2001 and W.A. No.3598/2003 merely stayed the dispossession and did not prohibit MUDA from depositing compensation. Thus, the explanation sought to be offered by the MUDA-respondent No.2 is unsatisfactory. - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 25. The Apex Court in the case of Ram Chand has held at paragraph No.14 as under: “14. The Parliament has recognised and taken note of the inaction and non-exercise of the statutory power on the part of the authorities, enjoined by the provisions of the Act to complete the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time and because of that now a time-limit has been fixed for making of the award, failing which the entire proceeding for acquisition shall lapse. But, can it be said that before the introduction of the aforesaid amendment in the Act, the authorities were at liberty to proceed with the acquisition proceedings, irrespective of any schedule or time-frame and to complete the same as and when they desired? It is settled that in a statute where for exercise of power no time-limit is fixed, it has to be exercised within a time which can be held to be reasonable. This aspect of the matter can be examined in the light of second proviso to Article 31-A of the Constitution, which in clear and unambiguous terms prohibits making of any law which does not contain a provision for payment of compensation at a rate, which shall not be less than the market value thereof. The Act is consistent with the second proviso to Article 31-A, because it provides for payment of compensation at the market value of the - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 land acquired. But, whether the constitutional and statutory requirement of the payment of the market value to the persons, whose lands have been compulsorily acquired, is not being circumvented and violated by keeping the land acquisition proceedings pending for more than a decade and half, without making the awards and paying the compensation, which has been pegged to the dates of notifications under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act, which in the present cases had been issued 14 to 21 years before the making of the awards. If a person is paid compensation in the year 1980/1981 at the market rate, prevailing twenty years before, will that be compliance of the constitutional and statutory mandate? Ignoring the escalation of the market value of the lands, especially near the urban agglomeration or metropolitan cities, will amount to ignoring an earthquake and courts can certainly take judicial notice of the said fact. The interest and the solatium, which have to be paid under the provisions of the Act, are linked with the market value of the land with reference to the date of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. If a decision had been taken as early as in the year 1966, by issuance of declarations under Section 6, that the lands belonging to the different cultivators, who held those lands within the ceiling limit for cultivation, were needed for public purpose, - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 respondents should have taken steps for completion of the acquisition proceedings and payment of compensation at an early date. In the present cases, unless a justification is furnished on behalf of the respondents, can it be said that the statutory power of making an award under Section 11 has been exercised within a reasonable time from the date of the declaration under Section 6? Due to escalation in prices of land, more so in this area, during the preceding two decades, in reality, the market rate, on the date of the notification under Section 4(1) is a mere fraction, of the rate prevailing at the time of its determination in the Award.” 26. The Apex Court in the case of Gokak Patel Volkart stated supra, has held at paragraph Nos.4 and 5 as under: “4. It is not disputed by the revenue that the appropriate period of limitation to apply to the facts of the case is six months as provided in Section 11-A of the Act and that the notice issued on May 20, 1982 was beyond that period. Reliance was placed on the Explanation for obtaining extension of that period. The Explanation reads thus: - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 “Where the service of the notice is stayed by an order of a court, the period of such stay shall be excluded in computing the aforesaid period of six months or five years, as the case may be.” The provision in the Explanation incorporates a well known principle of law. Section 15 of the Limitation Act of 1908 (also of Section 15 of the Limitation Act of 1963) incorporates the same principle. This Court in Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, dealt with the effect of an order of injunction in the matter of computation of limitation. At page 1302 of the Reports, Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was, spoke for the court thus: “It is plain that, for excluding the time under this section, it must be shown that the institution of the suit in question had been stayed by an injunction or order; in other words, the section requires an order or an injunction which stays the institution of the suit. And so in cases falling under Section 15, the party instituting the suit would by such institution be in contempt of court.... But, in our opinion, there would be no justification for extending the application of Section 15 on the ground that the institution of the subsequent suit would be inconsistent with the spirit or - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 substance of the order passed in the previous litigation.” In the instant case, the order of stay passed by the Karnataka High Court had only stayed the collection of the excise duty, which is a stage following levy under the scheme of the Act. Obviously there was no interim direction of the High Court in the matter of issue of notice for the purpose of levy of duty. The relevant portion of Section 11-A provided: “(1) When any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded, a Central Excise Officer may, within six months from the relevant date, serve notice on the person chargeable with the duty which has not been levied or paid or which has been short-levied or short-paid or to whom the refund has erroneously been made, requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice: * * * (2) The Assistant Collector of Central Excise shall, after considering the representation, if any, made by the person on whom notice is served under sub-section (1), determine the amount of duty of excise due - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 from such person (not being in excess of the amount specified in the notice) and thereupon such person shall pay the amount so determined.” Reference to Section 3 of the Act which contains the charging provision clearly shows that levy and collection are two distinct and separate steps. This Court in N.B. Sanjana, Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. at page 514 stated: (SCC p. 344, para 14) “The charging provision Section 3(i) specifically says ‘There shall be levied and collected in such a manner as may be prescribed the duty of excise....’ It is to be noted that sub-section (i) uses both the expressions ‘levied and collected’ and that clearly shows that the expression ‘levy’ has not been used in the Act or the Rules as meaning actual collection.” 5. The High Court having directed stay of collection had, therefore, not given any interim direction in the matter of issue of notice or levy of the duty. The Explanation in clear terms refers to stay of service of notice. The order of the High Court did not at all refer to service of notice. Therefore, there is force in the submission of the appellant that - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 the benefit of the Explanation is not available in the facts of the case.” 27. The law is well-stated that the State cannot indefinitely postpone its statutory obligation in the absence of a specific legal bar, and any such delay vitiates the process. Respondent No.2's own conduct in executing the sale deed in 2003 and making allotments even during the subsistence of interim orders in the present petition belies the plea of ‘a hands-off approach’. 28. The plea of constructive res judicata and the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC is misconceived. The earlier writ petition challenged only the validity of the notification. The grounds now urged namely, lapse under Section 27, failure to take possession, and long delay in depositing the compensation, constitute a subsequent cause of action, which had not arisen when the earlier petition was were instituted. This position is supported by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Special Agricultural Produce - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 Marketing Committee, stated supra and held at paragraph Nos.28 and 29 as under: “28. Even if we accept all the contentions raised by the learned senior Counsel for the appellant, it was for the beneficiary to have prevailed on the Government to pass the award within the statutory time limit, in case the public need was so pressing. We fail to see what prevented the acquiring authority and the beneficiary from taking appropriate steps to pass the award within time. Having already suffered a finding that the notification was liable to be quashed for non compliance of statutory timelines, the appellant ought to have taken appropriate steps to see that the remaining timelines are strictly adhered to. This was not done. More so, we notice that the acquiring authority who was duty bound to pass the awards in time has not even filed an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 29. The learned Single Judge has considered all the contentions raised in detail and has found that even if all the contentions raised by the beneficiary are accepted, the awards should have been passed at least within the permissible time limit from the date of dismissal of the SLP that is - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 17.04.2017. There is no dispute that the award is passed only on 25.08.2020. We have no hesitation to hold that the contentions raised in the appeals with regard to extension of time limits are totally devoid of merits. We are also of the opinion that the cause of action which led to the present batch of Writ Petitions is totally different and the principle of constructive res judicata can have no application, where the cause of action as well as the issues raised are entirely different. The issue raised in this batch of writ petitions that the acquisition had lapsed on account of the award not being passed within the statutory time limit as prescribed in Section 11A of the 1894 Act was never in issue in the previous round of litigation.” 29. These grounds constitute a distinct and independent cause of action. 30. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Offshore Holdings Private Limited to contend that the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (‘BDA Act’ for short) akin to KUDA Act, is a self contained code for land development, and that the LA Act is only incidental, with - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 the State Act prevailing. The Central Land Acquisition Act provisions apply only to the limited extent incorporated in the State Act, and that importing the entire LA Act or the principles of the Act, 2013 would frustrate the scheme of development. 31. The decision in Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority was relied upon to contend that the interim orders, which stall acquisition-related steps must be excluded when computing statutory timelines, and that the landowners cannot take advantage of delays caused by their own litigation. Delay attributed to Court orders is not a ground to invalidate acquisition or compensation proceedings. 32. With respect to M.K.Thyagaraja Guptha, the proposition sought to be relied upon is that a challenge raised after two decades of acquiescence is barred, as silence and inaction indicate acceptance of acquisition. - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 Writ petitions filed after an inordinate lapse of time cannot be entertained. 33. In Krishnamurthy’s case, reliance is placed to contend that the legislature incorporated only Section 11A of the Central Land Acquisition Act into the BDA Act, thereby indicating selective adoption. For lapse under Section 27 of the KUDA/BDA Acts, the burden lies on the landowners to show substantial failure in implementing the scheme within five years. Mere delay is not sufficient; there must be a clear dereliction of statutory duty. 34. In M. Basheer Ahmad, the proposition sought to be relied upon is that a delay of seven years in approaching the Court is fatal. Landowners cannot assume that acquisition will lapse on its own, and failure to act promptly amounts to laches, disentitling them to relief. 35. In M.A.Muktha Devi, the proposition is that petitions suffering from delay and laches must be dismissed. In the absence of any credible explanation for - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 the belated challenge, the acquisition cannot be reopened by a person approaching belatedly. 36. In regard to N.S.Sudarshan, the proposition relied upon is that the Apex Court declined interference despite controlling delay. When the High Court's view is plausible, the Supreme Court does not upset concurrent findings, indicates judicial reluctance to reopen concluded acquisition matters. 37. The decision in Indore Development Authority is relied upon to contend that Section 24 of the 2013 Act cannot be used to revive stale or concluded acquisition; only when the award is more than five years old and both conditions -compensation not paid/deposited, and possession not taken, lapse occurs. Litigants cannot take advantage of delays caused by their own obstruction, and that Court should repel delayed challenges to acquisition proceedings. - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 38. The decisions placed reliance by the respondents are distinguishable, for the reason that Offshore Holdings Private Limited applies only when development is substantially executed. Where possession has not been taken and the scheme remains unimplemented for decades, it does not cure the statutory lapses under Section 27. The interim orders granted in the present petition only stopped dispossession. MUDA was never restrained from depositing compensation. Hence, delay is only attributable to the MUDA-respondent No.2. Hence, the decision in Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority is not applicable. 39. M.K.Thyagaraja Guptha involved a challenge to the acquisition notifications themselves, whereas the present petition is founded on a subsequent cause of action arising from non-possession, non-implementation and delay in compensation. - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 40. In Krishnamurthy’s judgment, the Court held that while assessing whether the authority has failed in its duty, the burden lies on the authority to establish lawful possession and substantial implementation. No materials are produced by the MUDA to show that lawful possession, proof of possession, or implementation of the scheme. 41. There can be no quarrel with the proposition laid down in the above decisions. They reiterate that: i. Development Authority Statutes are self- contained codes. ii. Stale and belated challenges to concluded acquisition are not to be entertained. iii. Landowners cannot take advantage of the delay occasioned by their own litigation, and iv. Courts should be slow to unsettle acquisitions that have culminated in vesting and development. - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 42. However, the applicability of the precedent depends upon the facts proved in the given case. The above decisions proceeded on the foundational premise that possession has been lawfully taken, the scheme had been substantially implemented or that the challenge to the acquisition notifications themselves after long acquiescence. None of those foundational facts stand established in the present case. Thus, while the legal proposition enunciated in the respondents’ judgments are acceptable, the factual predicates are absent in the present case, rendering them inapplicable. 43. From a cumulative reading of the authorities cited by both sides, two clear and consistent principles of law emerge. i. Possession and vesting must be real, and provable- Mere Statutory Notifications or Paper formalities do not amount to lawful vesting. For an acquisition to attain finality, the acquiring authority must establish - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 actual, physical and lawful taking of possession, supported by contemporaneous records such as a mahazar or a panchanama as held by the Apex Court in A.P Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar and Others22 (A.P Electrical Equipment Corporation). In the absence of such proof, vesting cannot be presumed, regardless of lapse of time. ii. Delay attributable to the inaction of the acquiring authority vitiates the acquisition. While Courts will not permit landowners to take advantage of delays caused by their own litigation, equally the State cannot indefinitely postpone their statutory obligations. 44. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, this Court is satisfied that; i. Respondent No.2 has failed to establish lawful taking of possession by producing contemporaneous evidence, and the land continues 22 2025 SCC Online SC 447 - 37 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 to remain undeveloped and in possession of the petitioners. ii. The delay of over 15 years in depositing the compensation is only attributable to the acquiring authority and is unsupported by any legal or factual justification. 45. The present writ petition is therefore not an attempt to revive a settled or concluded acquisition, but a challenge founded on subsequent statutory lapses arising from prolonged inaction of the authority. The cause of action is distinct, recurring and constitutionally significant. 46. The cumulative effect of these infirmities leads to the conclusion that the acquisition has lapsed. Accordingly this Court pass the following: ORDER i. The writ petition is allowed. Accordingly, acquisition proceedings initiated under the preliminary notification dated 08.01.1992 and final - 38 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49587 WP No. 36132 of 2015 notification dated 09.03.1998 insofar as they relate to the lands of the petitioner stand quashed. ii. All consequential actions taken by the MUDA in respect of the petitioner's lands, including any allotments or alienations, shall also stand annulled. iii. It is made clear that this order shall not preclude the respondents from initiating acquisition, if so advised, in accordance with law. Sd/- _____________________ JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA MBM List No.: 1 Sl No.: 82