ORDER : Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging order (Annexure P-1) dated 11-4- 2017 issued by respondent No. 2, whereby service of petitioner has been terminated with immediate effect, on the ground of unauthorized absence from the duty for long period. 2. Facts of the case, as projected by the petitioner are that, she was appointed on government job on 20-10-1986 and she was working as Montessary Teacher at Child Observation Home, Durg, CG. She sent applications for casual leave on 10-12-2013, 11-12-2013, 12-12-2013 and 13-12-2013, subsequently, she sent application (Annexure P-2) dated 16-12-2013 to the respondent No. 4/ District Programme Officer, Durg for grant of 10 days earned leave on the ground of her illness. Thereafter, respondent No. 4 issued show cause notice (Annexure P- 3) dated 17-2-2014 mentioning therein that, she had sent earned leave application for 10 days in plain paper on 16-12-2013, hence, she ought to have present on 25-12-2013 on duty, but, neither she appeared on her duty nor sent earned leave application in prescribed format, thus, she is absent unauthorizedly without submitting appropriate application, which is violative to Rule 3 of CG Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 (in short, hereafter referred to ‘Conduct Rules, 1965’) therefore, submit her explanation within a week as to why, disciplinary proceeding be not initiated against her. The petitioner again sent application (Annexure P-4) dated 10-3-2014 for grant of earned leave from 26-11-2013 to 28-3-2014. Thereafter, vide Annexure P-5 dated 13-3-2014 to Annexure P-9 dated 22-4-2014, she was engaged in election training/duty in the month of March and April, 2014, in pursuance thereof, she got election training and also engaged as member of election party in respect of Lok Sabha Election, 2014. On 25-6-2014, respondent No. 4 served copy of charge sheet vide Annexure P-10 to her and directed her to submit her reply. Petitioner submitted her reply vide Annexure P-11 dated 21-7-2014 mentioning therein that, because of ill health, she could not present on her duty, therefore, she had sent application in plain paper and had also communicated about these facts to respondent No. 4 over mobile, thereafter, she was engaged in election duty in the month of March and April, 2014. Petitioner submitted her reply vide Annexure P-11 dated 21-7-2014 mentioning therein that, because of ill health, she could not present on her duty, therefore, she had sent application in plain paper and had also communicated about these facts to respondent No. 4 over mobile, thereafter, she was engaged in election duty in the month of March and April, 2014. Vide Annexure P-12 dated 17-11-2014, Enquiry Officer sent notice to her for her appearance before him on 10-12- 2014 in departmental enquiry proceeding. Thereafter, vide Annexure P-14 dated 7-1-2015, Annexure P-16 dated 30-3-2015, Annexure P- 18 dated 7-5-2015 (it appears that date is wrongly mentioned as ‘7-5- 2014’), Annexure P-22 dated 15-7-2015, the Enquiry Officer sent notices for her appearance before him on the date mentioned in the notices. In reply to aforesaid notices, petitioner again and again sent applications i.e. Annexure P-15, Annexure P-17, Annexure P-19, Annexure P-21 and Annexure P-23, mentioning therein that, since her health has not improved, therefore, she could not appear before him. 2.1 Since despite repeated notices, petitioner did not appear before Enquiry Officer, therefore, Enquiry Officer examined departmental witnesses and submitted ex-parte enquiry report Annexure D-3 dated 14-3-2016 to the Disciplinary Authority, holding guilty to the petitioner that, she is unauthorizedly absent from her duty since 16-12-2013 without sanction of leave. The Disciplinary Authority accepted enquiry report and the finding mentioned therein and based on that report, vide impugned order dated 11-4-2017 (Annexure P-1), terminated service of petitioner with immediate effect. Being aggrieved from (Annexure P-1), the petitioner has challenged the same by filing instant petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that, as per charge levelled against the petitioner, she was unauthorizedly absent from her duty from 16-12-2013 without sanction of leave, but petitioner was not willfully absent from her duty, as she could not attend her duty because of her ill health and as her health was not improved for long time, therefore, she also could not appear before enquiry officer. Whenever she received notice from inquiry officer, then she had submitted application mentioning her ill health and getting excuse from her presence, therefore, it cannot be held that, she was willfully absent from her duty. In this regard, learned counsel relied in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India and another [ (2012) 3 SCC 178 ]. Whenever she received notice from inquiry officer, then she had submitted application mentioning her ill health and getting excuse from her presence, therefore, it cannot be held that, she was willfully absent from her duty. In this regard, learned counsel relied in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India and another [ (2012) 3 SCC 178 ]. He further submit that, charge sheet is vague as it does not contain the date, from which period to which period, the petitioner was unauthorizedly absent from her duty. Learned counsel further submits that, the Disciplinary Authority accepted enquiry report in toto and only because of unauthorized absence of petitioner, without holding it to be willful, inflicted major penalty of termination of service of petitioner, that too, without serving copy of enquiry report and without providing due opportunity of hearing to her, which is highly disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct and also against the provision of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India . He further submits that as per memo No. C- 6-26/92/3/1 dated 20-8-1992 issued by the then Govt. of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh), Department of General Administration, prior to imposing penalty against delinquent employee, service of enquiry report to him/her is compulsory, but without service of enquiry report, major penalty has been inflicted upon the petitioner, therefore, he submits that, impugned order (Annexure P-1) and Enquiry Report (Annexure D-3) may be set aside/quashed and respondents may be directed to reinstate the petitioner in service. 4. Respondents/State has filed its reply. Referring to its reply, learned counsel for the State submits that, service of petitioner was terminated vide Annexure P-1, dated 11-4-2017. Instant petition has been filed by the petitioner belatedly on 20-3-2019, that too, without availing efficacious alternative remedy of filing appeal as provided under Rule 23 of the CG Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter, referred to as ‘CCA Rules, 1966’). Therefore , the petition is liable to be dismissed on this count alone. He further submits that, petitioner was absent from her duty without sanctioning leave since 16-12-2013. Thus, her absence was unauthorized. Even in departmental enquiry, she was sent repeated notices by the enquiry officer, despite that, she was not present before it, therefore, she has been held guilty for unauthorized absence for long period without leave. He further submits that, petitioner was absent from her duty without sanctioning leave since 16-12-2013. Thus, her absence was unauthorized. Even in departmental enquiry, she was sent repeated notices by the enquiry officer, despite that, she was not present before it, therefore, she has been held guilty for unauthorized absence for long period without leave. Learned counsel further submits that, various persons had made complaints against the petitioner and her husband, who is railway employee, to the effect that, they have obtained Rs. 30 lakhs from them by alluring them to provide government service. They had also fabricated appointment letters, which was under investigation of Police Station, Koni, district Bilaspur. In this regard, department had also received information regarding detention of petitioner in jail, therefore, she did not appear on her duty. Even if the petitioner was engaged in election duty in Lok Sabha election, 2014, the same cannot be said to be her presence at present place of posting. She has also not filed any document in this regard, therefore, without sanction of leave, unauthorized absence of petitioner for months/ years is unbecoming of a government servant, which amount to misconduct under Rule 3 of Conduct Rules, 1965, therefore, termination of petitioner from her service is well within the law/rules, hence, the petition is liable to be rejected. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. The petitioner has filed copy of charge sheet i.e. ^ vkjksi i=* Amputation of Charge, list of documents and list of witnesses. As per charge sheet, following charge was levelled against the petitioner on23-6-2014 :- 7. Annexure D-3 is inquiry report prepared by Enquiry Officer against petitioner, which concludes as under :- 8. Perusal of charge and finding of enquiry report shows that, petitioner was charged for her unauthorized absence without sanction of leave from 16-12-2013, to which, she has been held guilty, but it has neither been mentioned in charge nor enquiry report that, uptil when she was absent from duty. Perusal of charge and finding of enquiry report shows that, petitioner was charged for her unauthorized absence without sanction of leave from 16-12-2013, to which, she has been held guilty, but it has neither been mentioned in charge nor enquiry report that, uptil when she was absent from duty. Therefore, on one hand, though it is found that charge is vague upto some extent, but repeated notices i.e. Annexures P-14, P-16, P-18 and P-22 sent by enquiry officer to the petitioner for her appearance before him in enquiry proceeding and repeated applications i.e. Annexures P-15, P-17, P-19, P-21 and P-23 sent by petitioner to excuse her non-appearance because of ill health, shows that, petitioner neither was present on her duty at her place of posting i.e. Child Observation Home, Durg nor appeared before the enquiry officer, therefore, ex-parte enquiry report was submitted against her. If the petitioner had ill health, then also, she could have sent earned leave application to her officer-in-charge in prescribed format along with medical report/document to show her illness for grant of earned leave as also to excuse her non-appearance before enquiry officer well supported by medical document, but neither she had filed any such application coupled with medical report/documents before her officer-in-charge nor enquiry officer nor before this Court. Considering these aspects of the matter, though some irregularities, as have been mentioned above, have crept in charge/enquiry, but the same can be ignored because repeated notices sent by enquiry officer and applications submitted by the petitioner, shows that, she was absent from her duty without filing earned leave application in prescribed format coupled with medical report, which is unbecoming of a government servant. In that view of the matter, contention of learned counsel for petitioner that, absence of petitioner from duty is not willful, is not sustainable, because absence of any employee from duty for so many months without sanctioning leave and without submitting leave application in prescribed format itself amounts that, her/his absence is willful. Therefore, the case of Krushnakant Parmar (supra) referred by learned counsel for the petitioner is not helpful to her in the facts situation of instant case. 9. Respondent/State have not filed any appropriate document on record to demonstrate the fact that, in said period, the petitioner was arrested by the police and she was detained in jail, therefore, this contention of the State counsel is found to be baseless. 9. Respondent/State have not filed any appropriate document on record to demonstrate the fact that, in said period, the petitioner was arrested by the police and she was detained in jail, therefore, this contention of the State counsel is found to be baseless. 10. Perusal of record and documents, particularly show cause notices Annexure P-3 and Annexure P-12 to Annexure P-25 shows that, despite service of notice Annexure P-3, the petitioner did not file earned leave application in prescribed format along with medical document and she remained absent from her duty. It seems that, she was absent up-till issuance of charge sheet on 25-6-2014 and thereafter also, she did not appear before the enquiry officer, despite repeated notices issued to her. She sent applications mentioning her illness without filing any medical document. The fact that, whether the petitioner was suspended or not, has not been brought on the record by any of the parties. Even petitioner has also not stated that, she had ever joined or tried to join her duty after 25-6-2014 i.e. service of charge sheet to her. This fact further shows that, petitioner was absent from her duty till her termination. 11. Having considered the totality of the facts, it is found that, petitioner was unauthorizedly absent from her duty without sanction of leave and without filing any appropriate application for leave for months/years. Therefore, despite some irregularities in departmental enquiry, which does not affect root of the issue, it is found that, she has rightly been held guilty of misconduct. 12. So far as inflicting major penalty of ‘termination of service’ of petitioner is concerned, it seems to be disproportionate to the proven misconduct of the petitioner. In this regard, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India and others [ (1987) 4 SCC 611 ] has held in para 25 and 26 as under :- “25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the “decision-making process”. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [ (1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL) : (1984) 3 All ER 935, 950]Lord Diplock said: “Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’ which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community;. . .” 26. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh [ (1983) 2 SCC 442 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 342 : AIR 1983 SC 454 ] this Court held: [SCC p. 453, SCC (L&S) p.353, para 15] “It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.” The point to note, and emphasise is that all powers have legal limits.” 13. In the case of Union of India and another Vs. B.C. Chaturvedi [(1995) 6 SCC 750], Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 18 and 25 as under :- “18. In the case of Union of India and another Vs. B.C. Chaturvedi [(1995) 6 SCC 750], Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 18 and 25 as under :- “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 25. No doubt, while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts have to bear in mind the restraints inherent in exercising power of judicial review. It is because of this that substitution of the High Court's view regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible. But for this constraint, I would have thought that the law-makers do desire application of judicial mind to the question of even proportionality of punishment/penalty. I have said so because the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was amended to insert Section 11-A in it to confer this power even on a labour court/industrial tribunal. It may be that this power was conferred on these adjudicating authorities because of the prevalence of unfair labour practice or victimisation by the management. Even so, the power under Section 11-A is available to be exercised, even if there be no victimisation or taking recourse to unfair labour practice. In this background, I do not think if we would be justified in giving much weight to the decision of the employer on the question of appropriate punishment in service matters relating to government employees or employees of public corporations. I have said so because if need for maintenance of office discipline be the reason of our adopting a strict attitude qua the public servants, discipline has to be maintained in the industrial sector also. The availability of appeal etc. I have said so because if need for maintenance of office discipline be the reason of our adopting a strict attitude qua the public servants, discipline has to be maintained in the industrial sector also. The availability of appeal etc. to public servants does not make a real difference, as the appellate/revisional authority is known to have taken a different view on the question of sentence only rarely. I would, therefore, think that but for the self-imposed limitation while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no inherent reason to disallow application of judicial mind to the question of proportionality of punishment/penalty. But then, while seized with this question as a writ court interference is permissible only when the punishment/penalty is shockingly disproportionate.” 14. In instant case, petitioner has been terminated from service for her unauthorized absence without sanctioning leave, but for how much period, she was absent, is not clear, even from the charge or from enquiry report. Though in impugned order Annexure P-1, it has been mentioned that, she was absent for 3 years and 3 months, but the same is not very much clear from record. It has also not been brought on record that, the petitioner had been suspended or not. In facts situation of such vague allegation, termination of service of petitioner cannot be held to be proportionate to the misconduct of petitioner. Therefore, I feel inclined to reconsideration of penalty to be inflicted upon the petitioner, instead of termination of her service. 15. It is also apt to be noted here that, when any departmental enquiry is conducted against an employee under Rule 14 of the CCA Rules, 1966 and enquiry has not been conducted by the disciplinary authority, then after receiving enquiry report, the disciplinary authority is bound to serve copy of enquiry report to the delinquent employee and seek his explanation. In this regard, the General Administration Department of the Government of Madhya Pradesh (now Chhattisgarh) has issued two circulars, which are reproduced hereunder :- “1. In this regard, the General Administration Department of the Government of Madhya Pradesh (now Chhattisgarh) has issued two circulars, which are reproduced hereunder :- “1. General instructions "It will, therefore, have to be held that notwithstanding the decision of the Gujarat High Court in N.N. Prajapati case: (1985) 2 GLR 1406 and of the Central Administrative Tribunal in Premnath K. Sharma case (1988) 6 ATC 904 and of the other courts and tribunals, the law was in an unsettled condition till at least 20-11-1990 on which day the Mohd. Ramzan Khan case: AIR 1991 SC 471 was decided. Since the said decision made the Law expressly prospective in operation the law laid down there will apply only to those orders of punishment which are passed by the disciplinary authority after 20-11-1990. This is so notwithstanding the ultimate relief which was granted there which, as pointed out earlier, was per incuriam. No order of punishment passed before that date would be challengeable on the ground that there was a failure to furnish the enquiry report to the delinquent employee. The proceedings pending in courts/tribunals in respect of punishment passed prior to 20-11-1990 will have to be dicided according to the law that prevailed prior to the said date and not according to the law laid down in Mohd.Ramzan Khan case." 16. In instant case, as per impugned order (Annexure P-1) dated 11-4-2017, the appointing authority had sent show cause notice to the petitioner vide letter No. 6028 (Annexure P-26) dated 3-11-2016, as provided in aforesaid circulars. But that letter does not contain copy of enquiry report, rather, contents of aforesaid letter shows that, vide that letter, the petitioner was sought explanation as to why disciplinary proceedings under the CCA Rules, 1966 be not initiated against her. Thus, vide aforesaid letter dated 3-11-2016, neither copy of enquiry report was provided to the petitioner nor explanation was sought from her, as to why, she be not punished for her proven misconduct mentioned in enquiry report. This mistake committed by the respondent/authorities shows that, the petitioner has been inflicted major penalty of termination of her service without following aforesaid circulars issued by the State Government. Hence, on this count also, the impugned order Annexure P-1 dated 11-4-2017 issued by respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside/quashed. 17. This mistake committed by the respondent/authorities shows that, the petitioner has been inflicted major penalty of termination of her service without following aforesaid circulars issued by the State Government. Hence, on this count also, the impugned order Annexure P-1 dated 11-4-2017 issued by respondent No. 2 deserves to be set aside/quashed. 17. In view of above discussion, it is found that, punishment inflicted against the petitioner is not found to be proportionate to the gravity of misconduct proved against her and major penalty has been imposed against her by terminating her from service without compliance of circulars bearing No.C- 6-26/92/3/1 dated 20-8-1992 and No. C.-6- 5/94/3/1, dated 29-7-1994, therefore, I feel inclined to allow this writ petition in part. Since, impugned order Annexure P-1 suffers from perversity and illegality as discussed above,, therefore, contention raised by learned counsel that instant petition has been filed belatedly and without availing alternative remedy of appeal, is not sustainable. 18. Consequently, the impugned order (Annexure P-1) dated 11-4-2017 is set aside/quashed to the extent of inflicting major penalty i.e. termination of service of petitioner and the matter is remitted to the respondent authorities/respondent No. 2 to reconsider the matter afresh, complying with aforesaid circulars bearing No. C-6-26/92/3/1 dated 20-8-1992 and No. C-6-5/94/3/1 dated 29-7-1994 in respect of inflicting appropriate penalty against the petitioner proportionate to the proven misconduct against her. This exercise be done within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt / submission of copy of this order. 19. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. 20. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.