CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AN Raj Singh and others Versus State of Haryana Chattar Singh and others Versus State of Haryana CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Present : Mr. Mr. For the petitioner (s). Mr. LAPITA BANERJI, J. By this common judgment, two writ petitions, being CWP No.22413 of 2025 and CWP No. Haryana and others and law arise therein. For the sake of No.22413 of 2025 ( are being taken into CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AN CHANDIGARH CWP NO.22413 OF 202 RESERVED ON: AUGUST 19, 2025 DATE OF DECISION: Raj Singh and others Versus Haryana and others AND CWP NO. Chattar Singh and others Versus Haryana and others HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, Senior Advocate Mr. Vikram Singh , Advocate, For the petitioner (s). Mr. Pradeep Prakash Chahar, Sr. DAG, LAPITA BANERJI, J. By this common judgment, two writ petitions, being CWP 22413 of 2025 Raj Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others and CWP No.22459 of 2025 Chattar Singh and others and others, are being disposed of, as common questions of fact and law arise therein. For the sake of convenience of 2025 (Raj Singh and others v. State of taken into consideration. IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CWP NO.22413 OF 2025 (O&M) RESERVED ON: AUGUST 19, 2025 DATE OF DECISION: SEPTEMBER 24, 2025 ...Petitioners ...Respondents CWP NO.22459 OF 2025 (O&M) ...Petitioners ...Respondents HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Advocate with Pradeep Prakash Chahar, Sr. DAG, Haryana. By this common judgment, two writ petitions, being CWP Raj Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others Chattar Singh and others v. State of disposed of, as common questions of fact convenience, the facts of CWP v. State of Haryana and others) SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 2. The prayer in the present petitio 227 of the Constitution of India is for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to release the land of pursuant to letters dated 15.05.1970 (Annexure P (Annexure P-9) and passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh and others petitioners have act upon the (Annexure P-10) and reminder dated April 08, 2024 (Annexure P thereby releasing their land 3. Brief facts of the case are as follows: i) L interest in village Bursham, Tehsil and District Panipat was acquired the irrigation department of the State for the purpose of installation of brick-kiln. ii) For in-interest did not receive any compensation as the Executive Engineer, Canal Division No.3, Panipat assured returned to them up the brick-kiln on the petitioners’ acquired land and therefore, v land was intimated Division No.3, Panipat CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 The prayer in the present petition filed under Articles 226/ 227 of the Constitution of India is for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to release the land of pursuant to letters dated 15.05.1970 (Annexure P 9) and the order dated November 12, 2003 (Annexure P passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others v. Gurcharan Singh and others, Civil Appeal petitioners have also prayed for directing the respondents to act upon the petitioners’ legal notice dated November 06, 2022 10) and reminder dated April 08, 2024 (Annexure P thereby releasing their land. Brief facts of the case are as follows: Land belonging to the petitioners and their predecessors interest in village Bursham, Tehsil and District Panipat was acquired the irrigation department of the State for the purpose of installation of For the acquired land, the petitioners interest did not receive any compensation as the Executive Engineer, Canal Division No.3, Panipat assured them that the excess land would be to them after completion of the project. kiln on the petitioners’ acquired land and therefore, vide letter dated May 15, 1970, intimated to be surplus by the Executive Engineer, Construction Division No.3, Panipat. n filed under Articles 226/ 227 of the Constitution of India is for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to release the land of the petitioners pursuant to letters dated 15.05.1970 (Annexure P-5), 11.09.1996 order dated November 12, 2003 (Annexure P-16) State of Haryana and others v. Civil Appeal No.5143 of 1997. The prayed for directing the respondents to favourably legal notice dated November 06, 2022 10) and reminder dated April 08, 2024 (Annexure P-11), Brief facts of the case are as follows: and belonging to the petitioners and their predecessors-in- interest in village Bursham, Tehsil and District Panipat was acquired by the irrigation department of the State for the purpose of installation of a petitioners or their predecessors- interest did not receive any compensation as the Executive Engineer, that the excess land would be n of the project. The project, for setting kiln on the petitioners’ acquired land had come to an end ide letter dated May 15, 1970, the petitioners’ acquired surplus by the Executive Engineer, Construction SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 iii) Thereafter, Executive Engineer wrote to the Deputy Commissioner, Karnal steps for release installation of brick project. iv) Vide letter dated Karnal wrote to the Executive Engineer, Construction Division No.2, Sonipat regarding disposal of 61 Kanals 18 Marlas land in village Mehrana, District Panipat to be investigated on the aspect whether the land owners had rece been deposited by the authorities with the government treasury as the records pertaining to Award No.67 of 1967 90 was not available with his office. v) Vide office memo dated Sept Financial Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Haryana, Revenue Department to all the Deputy Commissioners in the State recommended that all the land acquired for departments of purpose is to be governed by of the F.C. Standing order No.28. reproduced hereinafter: “When agricultural or pastoral land has been perman acquired for public purpose of any department of Govt. and is no longer required for such purposes, the disposal of it shall be guided by the general consideration mentioned in paragraph 493 to 495 of the Land Administration Manual.” CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 Thereafter, vide letter dated February 01, 1973, the Executive Engineer wrote to the Deputy Commissioner, Karnal release of the surplus land that was acquired installation of brick-kiln, as the same was no longer required for the Vide letter dated July 07, 1988 the Deputy Commissioner, Karnal wrote to the Executive Engineer, Construction Division No.2, Sonipat regarding disposal of 61 Kanals 18 Marlas land in village Mehrana, District Panipat to be investigated on the aspect whether the land owners had received the compensation and whether the same has been deposited by the authorities with the government treasury as the records pertaining to Award No.67 of 1967-68 and Award No.2 of 1989 90 was not available with his office. Vide office memo dated September 11, 1996 issued by the Financial Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Haryana, Revenue Department to all the Deputy Commissioners in the State recommended that all the land acquired for departments of the government which was no longer required for such s to be governed by the instructions of the F.C. Standing order No.28. The relevant extract of the same is reproduced hereinafter: “When agricultural or pastoral land has been perman acquired for public purpose of any department of Govt. and is no longer required for such purposes, the disposal of it shall be guided by the general consideration mentioned in paragraph 493 to 495 of the Land Administration Manual.” letter dated February 01, 1973, the Executive Engineer wrote to the Deputy Commissioner, Karnal to take that was acquired in 1967-68 for the same was no longer required for the 1988 the Deputy Commissioner, Karnal wrote to the Executive Engineer, Construction Division No.2, Sonipat regarding disposal of 61 Kanals 18 Marlas land in village Mehrana, District Panipat to be investigated on the aspect whether the ived the compensation and whether the same has been deposited by the authorities with the government treasury as the 68 and Award No.2 of 1989- ember 11, 1996 issued by the Financial Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Haryana, Revenue Department to all the Deputy Commissioners in the State, it was recommended that all the land acquired for any public purpose by which was no longer required for such contained in paragraph 87 The relevant extract of the same is “When agricultural or pastoral land has been permanently acquired for public purpose of any department of Govt. and is no longer required for such purposes, the disposal of it shall be guided by the general consideration mentioned in paragraph 493 to 495 of the Land Administration Manual.” SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 vi) Paragraph 493 of the Punjab Land Administration Manual which is also relevant, “Section 493: Disposal of land no longer required Where land in the permanent occupation of any departments of the Punjab handed over to the Deputy Commissioner of the district, who becomes responsible for the disposal of it under the orders of the Commissioner. "It may not, however, be permanently alienated without the previous There is no legal bar to its being put up to auction. But as a matter of grace, Government is usually willing to restore agricultural and pastoral land to the persons from whom it acquired it or to their heirs on their refunding th paid as compensation less the 15 percent granted for compulsory acquisition. The price may be lowered, if necessary, on account of deterioration, or enhanced in the rare case of land having been improved by the use to which Government has put it. affecting the quality of the land. The fact that land which was un relinquished, be watered by a canal is not an improvement of this sort. Considering how great rise in the market v of land has been, the terms stated above are very liberal. It is not necessary to adopt them in their entirety where the persons concerned are remote descendants or relations of the original holders. And where the circumstances of the case are at all price, or merely a nominal price, was paid to the owners in the first neighborhood has been exceptionally large, these facts should be pointed out when referring so that Government may have sufficient material before it to decide whether to offer any special terms to the heirs of the persons from whom that land was acquired. rendition of land under kassies and abandoned water channels such as those in Multan and Shujabad Canal, divisions which came under the possession of the Irrigation Department free of cost, the land should be res original owners or their heirs free of charge.” vii) As per the land declared as surplus by various departments was to be disposed of in the following order of priority: CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 Paragraph 493 of the Punjab Land Administration Manual which is also relevant, is reproduced hereinafter for ready reference: Section 493: Disposal of land no longer required Where land in the permanent occupation of any departments of the Punjab Government is no longer required, it should be handed over to the Deputy Commissioner of the district, who becomes responsible for the disposal of it under the orders of the Commissioner. "It may not, however, be permanently alienated without the previous There is no legal bar to its being put up to auction. But as a matter of grace, Government is usually willing to restore agricultural and pastoral land to the persons from whom it acquired it or to their heirs on their refunding th paid as compensation less the 15 percent granted for compulsory acquisition. The price may be lowered, if necessary, on account of deterioration, or enhanced in the rare case of land having been improved by the use to which Government has put it. The improvement must be one affecting the quality of the land. The fact that land which was un-irrigated at the time of acquisition can, when relinquished, be watered by a canal is not an improvement of this sort. Considering how great rise in the market v of land has been, the terms stated above are very liberal. It is not necessary to adopt them in their entirety where the persons concerned are remote descendants or relations of the original holders. And where the circumstances of the case are at all out of the common, when for example, no price, or merely a nominal price, was paid to the owners in the first instance, or when the rise in the value of land in the neighborhood has been exceptionally large, these facts should be pointed out when referring so that Government may have sufficient material before it to decide whether to offer any special terms to the heirs of the persons from whom that land was acquired. rendition of land under kassies and abandoned water hannels such as those in Multan and Shujabad Canal, divisions which came under the possession of the Irrigation Department free of cost, the land should be res original owners or their heirs free of charge.” As per the aforesaid memo dated September 11, 1996 the land declared as surplus by various departments was to be disposed of in the following order of priority: Paragraph 493 of the Punjab Land Administration Manual is reproduced hereinafter for ready reference: Section 493: Disposal of land no longer required- Where land in the permanent occupation of any departments Government is no longer required, it should be handed over to the Deputy Commissioner of the district, who becomes responsible for the disposal of it under the orders of the Commissioner. "It may not, however, be permanently alienated without the previous sanction of Government". There is no legal bar to its being put up to auction. But as a matter of grace, Government is usually willing to restore agricultural and pastoral land to the persons from whom it acquired it or to their heirs on their refunding the amount paid as compensation less the 15 percent granted for compulsory acquisition. The price may be lowered, if necessary, on account of deterioration, or enhanced in the rare case of land having been improved by the use to which The improvement must be one affecting the quality of the land. The fact that land which irrigated at the time of acquisition can, when relinquished, be watered by a canal is not an improvement of this sort. Considering how great rise in the market value of land has been, the terms stated above are very liberal. It is not necessary to adopt them in their entirety where the persons concerned are remote descendants or relations of the original holders. And where the circumstances of the out of the common, when for example, no price, or merely a nominal price, was paid to the owners in instance, or when the rise in the value of land in the neighborhood has been exceptionally large, these facts should be pointed out when referring such cases for orders so that Government may have sufficient material before it to decide whether to offer any special terms to the heirs of the persons from whom that land was acquired. In the case of rendition of land under kassies and abandoned water hannels such as those in Multan and Shujabad Canal, divisions which came under the possession of the Irrigation Department free of cost, the land should be restored to the original owners or their heirs free of charge.” dated September 11, 1996 the land declared as surplus by various departments was to be disposed of in SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 a) b) c) viii) The petitioners/ civil suits in the year 2012 being Civil Suit RBT No.264 of 2012 Date of Institution 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘ Lrs and another v. State of of 2012 Date of Institution 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘ of Haryana and others Institution: 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘ Haryana and others 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘ others’, Civil Suit RBT No.268 of 2012 Date of Institution: 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘ others’, Civil Suit RBT No.269 of 2012 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 Civil Suit RBT No.270 of 2012 Date of Institution: 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘Krishan and others v. State Judge (Junior Division), Panipat ix) The learned Civil petitioners was undisputedly acquired by the defendants/respondents. After acquisition government and CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 a) Utilisation of surplus land for other public purposes by other Departments including the Forest Department for afforestation. b) Restoration of such land to the original land owners/their legal heirs. But the price of land to be charged from them would be the acquisition cost (less 15%) plus compound interest at the rate of 18% per annum. c) Selling of such land by public aucti The petitioners/their predecessors ts in the year 2012 being Civil Suit RBT No.264 of 2012 Date of 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘Mahabir (since deceased) through his Lrs and another v. State of Haryana and others of 2012 Date of Institution 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘ of Haryana and others’, Civil Suit RBT No.266 of 2012 Date of Institution: 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘Ishwar Singh and others nd others’, Civil Suit RBT No.267 of 2012 Date of Institution: 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘Sat Narain and another Civil Suit RBT No.268 of 2012 Date of Institution: 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘Om Parkash and others Civil Suit RBT No.269 of 2012 17.4.2012 ‘Kidara and another v. State of Haryana and others’ Civil Suit RBT No.270 of 2012 Date of Institution: 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 Krishan and others v. State of Haryana and others Judge (Junior Division), Panipat, for release of The learned Civil Judge observed that the petitioners was undisputedly acquired by the defendants/respondents. acquisition, the disputed land was mutated in the name of and no law could be relied upon by the plaintiffs to Utilisation of surplus land for other public purposes by other Departments including the Forest Department for e original land owners/their legal heirs. But the price of land to be charged from them would be the acquisition cost (less 15%) plus compound interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Selling of such land by public auction.” predecessors-in-interest instituted seven ts in the year 2012 being Civil Suit RBT No.264 of 2012 Date of Mahabir (since deceased) through his Haryana and others, Civil Suit RBT No.265 of 2012 Date of Institution 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 ‘Dalip and others v. State Civil Suit RBT No.266 of 2012 Date of Ishwar Singh and others v. State of Civil Suit RBT No.267 of 2012 Date of Institution: and another v. State of Haryana and Civil Suit RBT No.268 of 2012 Date of Institution: Om Parkash and others v. State of Haryana and Civil Suit RBT No.269 of 2012 Date of Institution: Kidara and another v. State of Haryana and others’, Civil Suit RBT No.270 of 2012 Date of Institution: 9.6.2010/17.4.2012 of Haryana and others’, in the Court of Civil , for release of their land. observed that the land of plaintiffs/ petitioners was undisputedly acquired by the defendants/respondents. , the disputed land was mutated in the name of could be relied upon by the plaintiffs to SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 corroborate the purpose, it was liable to be restored back to the land owners declared surplus after acquired. x) The l vested in the State government as per law, the State for any other purpose, apart from the purpose for which acquired as the object of utilising the land could not remain times. xi) The the plaintiffs over the suit land as the disputed land was mutated in favour of the when the plaintiffs/ was illegal, null or void xii) The First Appellate Court petitioners/predecessors filed by some of dismissed vide order dated November 01, 2017 passed by a of this Court. 4. Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, on behalf of the petitioners submits that a policy for release of the acquired land when the same the petitioners are eligible to claim relief under the said policy to the Standing Order No.28 CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 corroborate their contention that when land was acquired for one public purpose, it was liable to be restored back to the land owners surplus after its utilisation for the purpose for which it was The learned Civil Judge went on to hold that vested in the State government as per law, such for any other purpose, apart from the purpose for which acquired as the object of utilising the land could not remain The learned Civil Judge further held that the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land could not be termed to be legal possession as the disputed land was mutated in favour of the the plaintiffs/petitioners had failed to prove that the said mutation was illegal, null or void. Resultantly, the suits The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal /predecessors-in-interest and that the Regular Second Appeals some of the petitioners/their predecessors dismissed vide order dated November 01, 2017 passed by a Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, learned S on behalf of the petitioners submits that once the a policy for release of the acquired land when the same the petitioners are eligible to claim relief under the said policy to the Standing Order No.28 to submit that since the acquired agricultural when land was acquired for one public purpose, it was liable to be restored back to the land owners when it was for the purpose for which it was earned Civil Judge went on to hold that once the land such land could be utilised by for any other purpose, apart from the purpose for which it was acquired as the object of utilising the land could not remain static, at all held that the possession of termed to be legal possession as the disputed land was mutated in favour of the government especially failed to prove that the said mutation were dismissed with costs. dismissed the appeal of the he Regular Second Appeals the petitioners/their predecessors-in-interest were also dismissed vide order dated November 01, 2017 passed by a Single Bench learned Senior Advocate appearing the government had framed a policy for release of the acquired land when the same was in surplus, the petitioners are eligible to claim relief under the said policy. He refers to submit that since the acquired agricultural SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 land was not utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired, the same should be released. 5. Next India in Civil Appeal No. to submit that even Administrative Manual may to get back the possession of his land but when the government policy decision, the same should be implemented fairly and uniformly. It would not be open to the government to discriminate between similarly situated. Manual, set out hereinabove, t 6. Mr. Chahar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State-respondents petitioners cannot be granted since they have approached th Court after an inordinate petitioners’ “land” was by a Single Bench of this C not only is the petitioner principles of res judicata. 7. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 8. The petitioners are seeking to re put to rest, by a RSA No.2034 of 2015 others, RSA No.2035 of 2015 CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 not utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired, the same should be released. Next, he relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.5143 of 1997 Gurcharan Singh to submit that even if the Standing Order No.28 and paragraph 493 Administrative Manual may not create any right in favour of any person to get back the possession of his land but when the government policy decision, the same should be implemented fairly and uniformly. It would not be open to the government to discriminate between similarly situated. He also relies on paragraph 23 of the Administrative Manual, set out hereinabove, to corroborate his arguments. Mr. Chahar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on advance notice, submits that the prayer of the petitioners cannot be granted since they have approached th n inordinate delay of 08 years. The claim for rele petitioners’ “land” was concurrently rejected by the civil Courts and also a Single Bench of this Court in Regular S not only is the petitioners’ prayer hit by delay res judicata. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. The petitioners are seeking to re-open the issue that has been by a common judgment dated November 01, 2017 2034 of 2015 Kidara and another v. State of Haryana and , RSA No.2035 of 2015 Krishan and others v. State of Haryana not utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired, the same the judgment of the Supreme Court of Gurcharan Singh’s case (supra) rder No.28 and paragraph 493 of the not create any right in favour of any person to get back the possession of his land but when the government takes a policy decision, the same should be implemented fairly and uniformly. It would not be open to the government to discriminate between the persons He also relies on paragraph 23 of the Administrative o corroborate his arguments. Mr. Chahar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the submits that the prayer of the petitioners cannot be granted since they have approached the Hon’ble years. The claim for release of the rejected by the civil Courts and also Second Appeals. Therefore, hit by delay and laches but also by the This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and open the issue that has been judgment dated November 01, 2017 passed in Kidara and another v. State of Haryana and Krishan and others v. State of Haryana SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 and others, RSA No.3080 of 2015 another v. State of H through his LRs and others v. State of Haryana and others No.4328 of 2015 sending a legal notice dated November 06, 2022 reminder dated April 08, 2024 permitted to re parties. 9. The questions of law which were framed in the Regular Second Appeals are as follows: i) compensation and admittedly possession is not taken, is entitled to benefit of Section 24 of the Right to Fair and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013? ii) Whether t completion of brick lining of canal is liable to be reverted back to the land owners to avoid defragmentation of land, as per provisions of the Section 13 of East Punjab Holding (Consolidation & Prevention of Fragment iii) Whether the courts below are bound to follow the earlier judgement which have been upheld upto the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 9603 of 2011? 10. The learned Single Judge while deciding the regular second appeals held that the compensation was duly deposited with the Treasury by the competent authority and after acquisition, the mutation of the land in question was sanctioned in favour of the government. Therefore, the land stood vested in the government and to seek the return of the said land. CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 , RSA No.3080 of 2015 Sat Narain through his LR and another v. State of Haryana and others, RSA No.2780 of 2015 through his LRs and others v. State of Haryana and others No.4328 of 2015 Dalip and others v. State of Haryana and others sending a legal notice dated November 06, 2022 er dated April 08, 2024 (Annexure P-11), permitted to re-open an issue that has been finally The questions of law which were framed in the Regular Second Appeals are as follows: Whether a land owner who has not been paid the compensation and admittedly possession is not taken, is entitled to benefit of Section 24 of the Right to Fair and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013? ii) Whether the surplus land allegedly acquired for completion of brick lining of canal is liable to be reverted back to the land owners to avoid defragmentation of land, as per provisions of the Section 13 of East Punjab Holding (Consolidation & Prevention of Fragment iii) Whether the courts below are bound to follow the earlier judgement which have been upheld upto the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 9603 of 2011? The learned Single Judge while deciding the regular second ppeals held that the compensation was duly deposited with the Treasury by the competent authority and after acquisition, the mutation of the land in question was sanctioned in favour of the government. Therefore, the land stood vested in the government and the plaintiffs had no locus standi to seek the return of the said land. Page 8 of 23 Sat Narain through his LR and , RSA No.2780 of 2015 Mahabir through his LRs and others v. State of Haryana and others and RSA Dalip and others v. State of Haryana and others. By sending a legal notice dated November 06, 2022 (Annexure P-10) and a 11), the petitioners cannot be open an issue that has been finally settled inter-se the The questions of law which were framed in the Regular Whether a land owner who has not been paid the compensation and admittedly possession is not taken, is entitled to benefit of Section 24 of the Right to Fair and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and he surplus land allegedly acquired for completion of brick lining of canal is liable to be reverted back to the land owners to avoid defragmentation of land, as per provisions of the Section 13 of East Punjab Holding (Consolidation & Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948? iii) Whether the courts below are bound to follow the earlier judgement which have been upheld upto the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 9603 of 2011? The learned Single Judge while deciding the regular second ppeals held that the compensation was duly deposited with the Treasury by the competent authority and after acquisition, the mutation of the land in question was sanctioned in favour of the government. Therefore, the the plaintiffs had no locus standi SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 11. It was also recorded by the learned Single Bench that after the possession of said land was taken by the government, the plaintiffs/ petitioners illegally took re to be ejected pursuant to the decision of the High Court in of 2007, as upheld by the Apex Court in State of Haryana and others was held that the trial Court and the First Appellate Court were correct in their concurrent findings that the land already stood vested in the State of Haryana and the State was competent to utilise the same for any changed purpose as the ob be static in nature. It was also noted in the government is not duty bound to restore the possession of the acquired land to the owners after the purpose for which it acquired, ceases to exist and reliance on paragraph 493 of the Land Administrative Manual did not create any enforceable right in favour of the petitioners. It was concluded that reliance of the petitioners on the decision of Civil Suit No.240/91 Irrigation, Haryana and others’ Supreme Court in reported in (2004) 12 SCC 538 other cases as the same was passed considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of said case. 12. On the second question, the learned Single Judge, while deciding the Regular Second Appeals held that the land t government could be utilized for a different purpose after the fulfilment CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 It was also recorded by the learned Single Bench that after the possession of said land was taken by the government, the plaintiffs/ petitioners illegally took re-possession thereof and therefore, were liable to be ejected pursuant to the decision of the High Court in upheld by the Apex Court in ‘Smt. State of Haryana and others’ reported in (2012) 1 SCC 66 was held that the trial Court and the First Appellate Court were correct in their concurrent findings that the land already stood vested in the State of Haryana and the State was competent to utilise the same for any changed purpose as the object of utilisation of the land could not be presumed to be static in nature. It was also noted in Leela Wanti’s the government is not duty bound to restore the possession of the acquired land to the owners after the purpose for which it acquired, ceases to exist and reliance on paragraph 493 of the Land Administrative Manual did not create any enforceable right in favour of the petitioners. It was concluded that reliance of the petitioners on the Civil Suit No.240/91 ‘Surja and others v. Secretary, Irrigation, Haryana and others’, may have been upheld upto the ourt in ‘State of Haryana and another v. Suraj and others (2004) 12 SCC 538, but the same was not binding on all the other cases as the same was passed considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of said case. On the second question, the learned Single Judge, while deciding the Regular Second Appeals held that the land t government could be utilized for a different purpose after the fulfilment It was also recorded by the learned Single Bench that after the possession of said land was taken by the government, the plaintiffs/ reof and therefore, were liable to be ejected pursuant to the decision of the High Court in CWP No.9152 Smt. Leela Wanti and others v. (2012) 1 SCC 66. Therefore, it was held that the trial Court and the First Appellate Court were correct in their concurrent findings that the land already stood vested in the State of Haryana and the State was competent to utilise the same for any changed ject of utilisation of the land could not be presumed to Leela Wanti’s case (supra) that the government is not duty bound to restore the possession of the acquired land to the owners after the purpose for which it has been acquired, ceases to exist and reliance on paragraph 493 of the Land Administrative Manual did not create any enforceable right in favour of the petitioners. It was concluded that reliance of the petitioners on the ‘Surja and others v. Secretary, , may have been upheld upto the State of Haryana and another v. Suraj and others’ but the same was not binding on all the other cases as the same was passed considering the peculiar facts and On the second question, the learned Single Judge, while deciding the Regular Second Appeals held that the land that vested in the government could be utilized for a different purpose after the fulfilment SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 of the original purpose. For the aforesaid proposition, he relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Pillai, reported in 1997 reported in 2005(1) SCC 558 Panchayat Kararia and others, reported in 1996 AIR SC 523 Therefore, he opined that no law point worth cognizance was involved in the present ap of merits. 13. The instant writ petition is clearly hit by the principles of judicata/constructive res judicata may be made to the judgment of Apex The State of U.P and others extract thereof is reproduced hereinafter: “xxx point of view. If a j of unless it is reversed or modified by procedure prescribed by law. been pronounced by the by a party rejecti appropriate writ on the fundamental right as contravention of is justified bet procedure prescribed by the Constitution itself. The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis. As Halsbury has observed "subject to appeal and to being amended or set aside the parties and against all the consequences". Juris: CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 of the original purpose. For the aforesaid proposition, he relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai, reported in 1997(5) SCC 432, Government of A.P v. Syed Akbar, reported in 2005(1) SCC 558 and Laxmi Chand and others v. Gram Panchayat Kararia and others, reported in 1996 AIR SC 523 Therefore, he opined that no law point worth cognizance was involved in the present appeals and the appeals were dismissed, being totally bereft The instant writ petition is clearly hit by the principles of judicata/constructive res judicata. In this regard, a beneficial reference may be made to the judgment of Apex Court’s in The State of U.P and others, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 21 extract thereof is reproduced hereinafter: “xxx The same question can be considered from another point of view. If a judgment has been pronounced of competent jurisdiction it is binding bet unless it is reversed or modified by procedure prescribed by law. Therefore, if a judgment has been pronounced by the High Court in a writ petition filed by a party rejecting his prayer for the issue of an appropriate writ on the ground either that he had no fundamental right as pleaded by him or there has been no contravention of the right proved or that the contravention is justified by the Constitution its between the parties unless it is attacked by adopting the procedure prescribed by the Constitution itself. The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law obviously is the basis justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis. As Halsbury has observed "subject to appeal and to being amended or set aside a judgment is conclusive as between the parties and their privies, and is conclusive evidence against all the world of its existence, date and legal consequences". Similar is the statement of the law in Corpus Juris: "the doctrine of estoppel by judgment does not rest of the original purpose. For the aforesaid proposition, he relied on the State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran (5) SCC 432, Government of A.P v. Syed Akbar, Laxmi Chand and others v. Gram Panchayat Kararia and others, reported in 1996 AIR SC 523. Therefore, he opined that no law point worth cognizance was involved in peals and the appeals were dismissed, being totally bereft The instant writ petition is clearly hit by the principles of res In this regard, a beneficial reference Court’s in Daryao and others v. 1961 SCC OnLine SC 21. The relevant The same question can be considered from another gment has been pronounced by a court jurisdiction it is binding between the parties unless it is reversed or modified by appeal, revision or other Therefore, if a judgment has High Court in a writ petition filed his prayer for the issue of an ground either that he had no pleaded by him or there has been no the right proved or that the contravention by the Constitution itself, it must remain binding it is attacked by adopting the procedure prescribed by the Constitution itself. The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and aw obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis. As Halsbury has observed "subject to appeal and to being a judgment is conclusive as between ivies, and is conclusive evidence world of its existence, date and legal Similar is the statement of the law in Corpus "the doctrine of estoppel by judgment does not rest on SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 any superior authority of the court renderin and a judgment of one court is a bar to an the same parties for the same cause in the same co another court, whether the latter jurisdiction. This rule is subject to the limitation that the ju Court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction”. “It is, however, essential that there should have been a judicial determination of rights in controversy with a final thereon". In other words, under Art. 32 cannot take the place order passed by the High under Art. 226. of this are original cannot be confused or mistaken or used appel1 invoked for correcting errors in the decisions pronounced in writ petitions under general considerations of public reason why the rule of res inadmissible or' irrele under Art. 32 of rule can be inv the parties has been referred to a court of competent jurisdiction, there has been a contest between the parties before the court, a fair opportunity has been given to both of them to prove their case, and at the pronounced its judgment or decision. Such a decision pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction is binding between the parties unless it is modified or reversed by adopting a procedure prescribed by the Constitution. In our opinion, judicata should not be allowed to be invoked cannot be sustained xxx” 14. The petitioners/predecessors approached the civil Court in the year 2012 for implementation of recommendations made vide office memo dated May 15, 1970 (Annexure P-5) and dated September 11, 1996 (Annexure P petitioners vaguely pleaded discrimination without providing any details of the similarly situated persons whose land had been released. Therefore, on merits also the petitioners could CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 any superior authority of the court renderin and a judgment of one court is a bar to an the same parties for the same cause in the same co another court, whether the latter jurisdiction. This rule is subject to the limitation that the judgment in the former action must have been rendered by a Court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction”. “It is, however, essential that there should have been a judicial determination of rights in controversy with a final thereon". In other words, an original under Art. 32 cannot take the place order passed by the High Court in the petition filed before it under Art. 226. There can be little doubt that the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain applicati are original cannot be confused or mistaken or used appel1ate jurisdiction of this Court which alone invoked for correcting errors in the decisions pronounced in writ petitions under general considerations of public policy there seems to be no reason why the rule of res judicata should be tre inadmissible or' irrelevant in dealing with petitions filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution. rule can be invoked only in cases where a dispute between the parties has been referred to a court of competent jurisdiction, there has been a contest between the parties before the court, a fair opportunity has been given to both of them to prove their case, and at the pronounced its judgment or decision. Such a decision pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction is binding between the parties unless it is modified or reversed by adopting a procedure prescribed by the Constitution. In our opinion, therefore, the plea that the general rule of res judicata should not be allowed to be invoked cannot be sustained. xxx” The petitioners/predecessors-in-interest for the first time approached the civil Court in the year 2012 for implementation of recommendations made vide office memo dated May 15, 1970 5) and dated September 11, 1996 (Annexure P rs vaguely pleaded discrimination without providing any details of the similarly situated persons whose land had been released. Therefore, on merits also the petitioners could any superior authority of the court rendering the judgment, and a judgment of one court is a bar to an action between the same parties for the same cause in the same court or in another court, whether the latter has concurrent or other jurisdiction. This rule is subject to the limitation that the dgment in the former action must have been rendered by a Court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction”. “It is, however, essential that there should have been a judicial determination of rights in controversy with a final decision an original petition for a writ under Art. 32 cannot take the place of an appeal against the Court in the petition filed before it There can be little doubt that the jurisdiction Court to entertain applications under Art. 32 which are original cannot be confused or mistaken or used for the te jurisdiction of this Court which alone can be invoked for correcting errors in the decisions of High Courts pronounced in writ petitions under Art. 226. Thus, on policy there seems to be no judicata should be treated as vant in dealing with petitions filed the Constitution. It is true that the general oked only in cases where a dispute between the parties has been referred to a court of competent jurisdiction, there has been a contest between the parties before the court, a fair opportunity has been given to both of them to prove their case, and at the end the court has pronounced its judgment or decision. Such a decision pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction is binding between the parties unless it is modified or reversed by adopting a procedure prescribed by the Constitution. In our therefore, the plea that the general rule of res judicata should not be allowed to be invoked cannot be [emphasis supplied] interest for the first time approached the civil Court in the year 2012 for implementation of recommendations made vide office memo dated May 15, 1970 5) and dated September 11, 1996 (Annexure P-9). The rs vaguely pleaded discrimination vis-a-vis other persons without providing any details of the similarly situated persons whose land had been released. Therefore, on merits also the petitioners could SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 not establish discrimination against them by the respond Accordingly, the trial Court and the First Appellate Court rejected the petitioners’ suit/appeal. Finally, by a common judgement the regular second appeals of Haryana and others’, RSA No.2305 of State of Haryana and others’, RSA No.3080 of 2015 ‘Sat Narain through his LR and another v. State of Haryana and others’, RSA No.2780 of 2015 ‘Mahabir through his LRs and others v. State of Haryana and others’ and RSA No.4328 of and others’, filed by some of the petitioners/their predecessors was disposed of on November 01, 2017. Admittedly, the petitioners accepted the said judgment and did not further challenge the same. Th the issues determined therein attained finality 15. Therefore principles of delay, acquiescence and laches. laches and acquiescence has been succinctly explained Court in Union of India v. N. Murugesan The relevant extract thereof is reproduced hereinafter: “xxx Delay, laches and acquiescence 20 acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 not establish discrimination against them by the respond Accordingly, the trial Court and the First Appellate Court rejected the petitioners’ suit/appeal. Finally, by a common judgement the regular second appeals being RSA No.2034 of 2015 ‘Kidara and another v. State of Haryana and others’, RSA No.2305 of 2015 ‘Krishan and others v. State of Haryana and others’, RSA No.3080 of 2015 ‘Sat Narain through his LR and another v. State of Haryana and others’, RSA No.2780 of 2015 ‘Mahabir through his LRs and others v. State of Haryana and others’ and RSA No.4328 of 2015 ‘Dalip and others v. State of Haryana , filed by some of the petitioners/their predecessors was disposed of on November 01, 2017. Admittedly, the petitioners accepted the said judgment and did not further challenge the same. Th the issues determined therein attained finality inter Therefore, the lis of the petitioners is principles of delay, acquiescence and laches. laches and acquiescence has been succinctly explained Union of India v. N. Murugesan, reported in The relevant extract thereof is reproduced hereinafter: “xxx Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the not establish discrimination against them by the respondents. Accordingly, the trial Court and the First Appellate Court rejected the petitioners’ suit/appeal. Finally, by a common judgement the regular ‘Kidara and another v. State 2015 ‘Krishan and others v. State of Haryana and others’, RSA No.3080 of 2015 ‘Sat Narain through his LR and another v. State of Haryana and others’, RSA No.2780 of 2015 ‘Mahabir through his LRs and others v. State of Haryana and 2015 ‘Dalip and others v. State of Haryana , filed by some of the petitioners/their predecessors-in-interest was disposed of on November 01, 2017. Admittedly, the petitioners accepted the said judgment and did not further challenge the same. Thus, inter-se parties. of the petitioners is also hit by the principles of delay, acquiescence and laches. The concepts of delay, laches and acquiescence has been succinctly explained by the Apex , reported in (2022) 2 SCC 24. The relevant extract thereof is reproduced hereinafter: principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these place in various statutes which restrict the SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 period of limitation and create non condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. Th governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be tak note of by the Court. Laches 21. language meaning “ involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and th remedy. 22. delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 23. no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any applicatio fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. Acquiescence 24. acquiescence on other. CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 period of limitation and create non condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. Th governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be tak note of by the Court. Laches 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any applicatio fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are vailable to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. Acquiescence 24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other. Page 13 of 23 period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken The word “laches” is derived from the French remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and erefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are vailable to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. We have already discussed the relationship between the one hand and delay and laches on the SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 25. acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that ac the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. He acquiescence is to be seen on a case xxx” 16. The petitioners could not produce any document to show that their predecessors the filing of their 17. The case of to the aid of the petitioners by the land owners in th rights and filed a suit in the early 90s and the same was decreed on July 28, 1993. The appeal filed by the Government was allowed by the First Appellate Court on May 20, 1995 did not confer any right on a party to claim that possession. 18. Th Appellate Court decree passed by the appeal to the Supreme Court. CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case xx” The petitioners could not produce any document to show that their predecessors-in-interest even agitated for their rights prior to their suit in the year 2012. The case of Gurcharan Singh’s case to the aid of the petitioners since discrimination by the land owners in that case. The land owners filed a suit in the early 90s and the same was decreed on July 28, 1993. The appeal filed by the Government was allowed by the First Appellate Court on May 20, 1995, on the ground that the standing o not confer any right on a party to claim that possession. This Court had set aside the judgment passed by the Appellate Court in Gurcharan Singh’s case decree passed by the trial Court. The order of this appeal to the Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, quiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. re again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis. The petitioners could not produce any document to show agitated for their rights prior to case (supra) does not come since discrimination was alleged and proved land owners were vigilant of their filed a suit in the early 90s and the same was decreed on July 28, 1993. The appeal filed by the Government was allowed by the First n the ground that the standing order not confer any right on a party to claim that possession. had set aside the judgment passed by the First case (supra) and restored the The order of this Court was carried in The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 view that even though the Standing Order No. 28 and para the Land Administrative Manual did not create any right in favour of the land owners to get back the possessio decision had been taken by the Government, the said policy implemented fairly and uniformly to discriminate between the person facts of the case, it was recorded that the appellants were able to prove that the government acted in a discriminatory manner in releasing the lands belonging to similarly situated persons and nothing could be brought on record to show why the said the respondents/land lo of Haryana was dismissed. 19. As has been brought on record to show lands of which of the similarly persons have been released and release, had the petitioners second appeal petitioners/their Gurcharan Singh 20. There is to the delay of almost 08 years in filing the dismissal of the Regular Second Appeals reliance can be placed upon the judgments of Apex Court in Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and Others No.6609-13 of 2014 CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 view that even though the Standing Order No. 28 and para Administrative Manual did not create any right in favour of the land owners to get back the possession of their lan been taken by the Government, the said policy implemented fairly and uniformly and it was not open to the Government to discriminate between the persons who were similarly situated. facts of the case, it was recorded that the appellants were able to prove overnment acted in a discriminatory manner in releasing the lands belonging to similarly situated persons and nothing could be brought on record to show why the said policy would not be applic the respondents/land losers. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the State of Haryana was dismissed. As has been discussed herein above, nothing has been brought on record to show lands of which of the similarly persons have been released and after how long from had the petitioners approached this second appeals having been decided finally their predecessors-in-interest. Therefore, the judgment of Gurcharan Singh’s case (supra) is clearly distinguishable There is even no explanation at all to the delay of almost 08 years in filing of the present writ petition dismissal of the Regular Second Appeals by this Court eliance can be placed upon the judgments of Apex Court in Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and Others 13 of 2014 reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351 view that even though the Standing Order No. 28 and paragraph 493 of Administrative Manual did not create any right in favour of the n of their land but once a policy been taken by the Government, the said policy was to be t was not open to the Government s who were similarly situated. On the facts of the case, it was recorded that the appellants were able to prove overnment acted in a discriminatory manner in releasing the lands belonging to similarly situated persons and nothing could be policy would not be applicable to sers. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the State herein above, nothing has been brought on record to show lands of which of the similarly situated after how long from the date of the said approached this Court, despite the regular decided finally against some of the Therefore, the judgment of ) is clearly distinguishable on the facts. at all offered by the petitioners the present writ petition after by this Court. In this regard, eliance can be placed upon the judgments of Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and Others, SLP (Civil) (2014) 11 SCC 351, Mewa Ram SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 (deceased) by his LRs and others v. State of Haryana through the Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujaral Industrial Development Corporation and another Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649 condoned at the asking. 21. In Others, SLP (Civil) N the petitioners challenged the awarded compensation under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after a period of 10 years, 02 Months and 29 days. The High Court had refused to condone the delay in spite of the fact that the other land were granted higher compensation. While dismissing the appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations: “xxx 7. Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Janmahomed A upon the writings of Mr Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 wherein it has been said that: operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law. xxx 11. person has taken a relief approaching the court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 (deceased) by his LRs and others v. State of Haryana through the Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon, reported in 1986 (4) SCC 151 Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujaral Industrial Development Corporation and another (2010) 5 SCC 459 and Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649, for the proposition that delay is not liable to be condoned at the asking. In Brijesh Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and SLP (Civil) No.6609-13 of 2014 reported in the petitioners challenged the awarded compensation under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after a period of 10 years, 02 Months and 29 days. The High Court had refused to condone the delay in spite of the fact that the other land owners, who had preferred the appeals in time were granted higher compensation. While dismissing the appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations: “xxx 7. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Janmahomed A upon the writings of Mr Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 wherein it has been said that: A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law. xx 11. xx 11. It is also a well-settled principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court (deceased) by his LRs and others v. State of Haryana through the Land 1986 (4) SCC 151, Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujaral Industrial Development and Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others for the proposition that delay is not liable to be Brijesh Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351, the petitioners challenged the awarded compensation under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after a period of 10 years, 02 Months and 29 days. The High Court had refused to condone the delay in spite of had preferred the appeals in time, were granted higher compensation. While dismissing the appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations: The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, relied upon the writings of Mr Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not ed principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person. 12. rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any grou xxx” 22. In Haryana through the Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon in 1986 (4) SCC 151 Leave Petitions on the ground that the petitioners could not plead their own laches, as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. It held that the time stipulated for re under Section 28 the Courts would lead to disastrous consequences, not intended by the legislature. Therefore, the follo “xxx 7. these cases which are no justification for condonation of inordinate delay. 8. with costs.” 23. In the Apex Court was whether t entertaining a petition for condonation of delay of 2449 days preferred against an interim order dated February 25, 2004 passed by the learned CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person. 12. In State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya this court rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches xx” In Mewa Ram (deceased) by his LRs and others v. State of Haryana through the Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon 1986 (4) SCC 151, the Hon’ble Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions on the ground that the petitioners could not plead their as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. It held that the time stipulated for re-determination of the awarded compensation under Section 28-A should be adhered to, as any other view taken by the Courts would lead to disastrous consequences, not intended by the legislature. Therefore, the following conclusion was arrived at: “xxx 7. There is no reason for us to grant special leave in these cases which are hopelessly barred by time and there is no justification for condonation of inordinate delay. 8. The special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs.” In Esha Bhattacharjee’s case (supra) the Apex Court was whether the High Court was justified in entertaining a petition for condonation of delay of 2449 days preferred against an interim order dated February 25, 2004 passed by the learned at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the In State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya this court rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that he filed the petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any nd for ignoring delay and laches. [Emphasis supplied] Mewa Ram (deceased) by his LRs and others v. State of Haryana through the Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon, reported , the Hon’ble Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions on the ground that the petitioners could not plead their as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. It held that determination of the awarded compensation as any other view taken by the Courts would lead to disastrous consequences, not intended by the wing conclusion was arrived at: There is no reason for us to grant special leave in hopelessly barred by time and there is no justification for condonation of inordinate delay. The special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed (supra), the question before he High Court was justified in entertaining a petition for condonation of delay of 2449 days preferred against an interim order dated February 25, 2004 passed by the learned SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 Single Judge. Answering the question in the negative, certain principles were culled out by the Apex Court wh “xxx 21. broadly be culled out are: 21.1 (i)There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice oriented, non application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2 (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard bein had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation. 21.3 (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and unc 21.4 (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of del 21.6 (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is justice. 21.7 (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 (ix) The conduct relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 Single Judge. Answering the question in the negative, certain principles ed out by the Apex Court which are extracted herein after: “xxx 21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1 (i)There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2 (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard bein had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation. 21.3 (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4 (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6 (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is justice. 21.7 (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 (ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental Single Judge. Answering the question in the negative, certain principles ich are extracted herein after: From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can 21.1 (i)There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove 21.2 (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- 21.3 (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and 21.4 (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking ay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6 (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of 21.7 (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. , behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other s to face such a litigation. 21.11 (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12 (xii) The entire gamut of facts a scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13 (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective acceptable latitude. 22. guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1 (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern an harbouring the notion that courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2 (b) An application for condonation of delay sho be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3 (c ) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4 (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonc course, within legal parameters. xxx” 24. It was held that neither while one moves an application for condonation of delay of almost 07 CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other s to face such a litigation. 21.11 (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12 (xii) The entire gamut of facts a scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13 (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1 (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2 (b) An application for condonation of delay sho be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3 (c ) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4 (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. xx” It was held that neither leisure nor while one moves an application for condonation of delay of almost 07 principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal 21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily 21.11 (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12 (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13 (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity cause should be given some To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1 (a) An application for condonation of delay should be d not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2 (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3 (c ) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the 22.4 (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be halant manner requires to be curbed, of nor pleasure has any room while one moves an application for condonation of delay of almost 07 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 years on the ground of lack of knowledge or Accordingly, the appeals were allowed and the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, condoning the delay was set In the present case, no attempt was even made to explain the delay by filing of an application for c were filed for seeking condonation, the same had to be explained by providing sufficient cause. 25. In Court held that the High Court committed grave error by c delay of more than 04 years in filing the appeal and ignoring the judicially accepted parameters for exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the High Court was set delay filed by respondents was dismissed. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein below: “x 14. law of limitation is founded on public does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the right of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if remedy within the stipulated time. 15. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statute is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in Although, no hard CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 years on the ground of lack of knowledge or Accordingly, the appeals were allowed and the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, condoning the delay was set In the present case, no attempt was even made to explain the delay by filing of an application for condonation of the same even if applications were filed for seeking condonation, the same had to be explained by providing sufficient cause. In Oriental Aroma Chemical’s Court held that the High Court committed grave error by c delay of more than 04 years in filing the appeal and ignoring the judicially accepted parameters for exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the High Court was set-aside and the application for condonation of delay filed by respondents was dismissed. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein below: xxx 14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the right of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. 15. The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statute is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in dealing years on the ground of lack of knowledge or failure of justice. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed and the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, condoning the delay was set-aside. In the present case, no attempt was even made to explain the delay by ondonation of the same even if applications were filed for seeking condonation, the same had to be explained by Oriental Aroma Chemical’s case (supra), the Apex Court held that the High Court committed grave error by condoning the delay of more than 04 years in filing the appeal and ignoring the judicially accepted parameters for exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the impugned order passed by he application for condonation of delay filed by respondents was dismissed. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein below: We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the right of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression “sufficient cause” employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statute is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. fast rule can be laid down in dealing SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay approach where the delay is inordinate Katiji N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil. xxx” 26. In a recent judgment passed in v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 to condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days in filing of the restoration application before the High Court. The High Court had refused to entertain an application filed by the appellants for exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for condoning the delay of 12 years and 158 days, when the same was dismissed for non following findings: “xxx 24. that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of delay. 25. or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the laps prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024 date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate Katiji N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil. xx” In a recent judgment passed in Union of India and another gir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) SLP (Civil) No. 21096 of 2019 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 , the Hon’ble Apex Court refused to condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days in filing of the restoration application before the High Court. The High Court had fused to entertain an application filed by the appellants for exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for condoning the delay of 12 years and 158 days, when the same was dismissed for non-prosecution. The Apex Court cate following findings:- “xxx 24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the laps prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate – Collector (L.A) v. Katiji N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and Vedabai v. Union of India and another (D) SLP (Civil) No. 21096 of 2019 , the Hon’ble Apex Court refused to condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days in filing of the restoration application before the High Court. The High Court had fused to entertain an application filed by the appellants for exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for condoning the delay of 12 years and 158 days, when the same was prosecution. The Apex Court categorically made the In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been such a long and inordinate It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We . Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 respondent to undergo the rigmaro proceedings. 26. court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that th want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a lon deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. not merely a technical consideration. The rules are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the ap xxx” 27. Pursuant to the above mentioned no hesitation to hold that the present writ petition is a frivolous attempt to re-open the issues which have already been adjudicated upon by a competent Court of law and is an abuse of process of law. 28. Accordingly, the wr 2025 Raj Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others No.22459 of 2025 CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 respondent to undergo the rigmaro proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that th want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xx” Pursuant to the above mentioned no hesitation to hold that the present writ petition is a frivolous attempt to open the issues which have already been adjudicated upon by a competent Court of law and is an abuse of process of law. Accordingly, the writ petitions, being CWP No.22413 of Raj Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others 22459 of 2025 Chattar Singh and others v. State of Haryana and respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own g, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and Pursuant to the above mentioned discussion, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the present writ petition is a frivolous attempt to open the issues which have already been adjudicated upon by a competent Court of law and is an abuse of process of law. it petitions, being CWP No.22413 of Raj Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others and CWP r Singh and others v. State of Haryana and SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 others, are dismissed by the principles of delay, acquiescence and waiver. 29. Connected application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly. (DEEPAK SIBAL) JUDGE SEPTEMBER Shalini Whether speaking/reasoned: Whether reportable: CWP No.22413 of 2025 CWP No.22459 of 2025 dismissed, being hit by the principles of the principles of delay, acquiescence and waiver. Connected application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of (DEEPAK SIBAL) (LAPITA BANERJI) JUDGE SEPTEMBER 24, 2025 Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Whether reportable: Yes/No , being hit by the principles of res judicata and also the principles of delay, acquiescence and waiver. Connected application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of (LAPITA BANERJI) JUDGE SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.25 17:55 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document