JUDGMENT : DEEPAK KUMAR TIWARI, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.02.2023, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge 4 th Fast Track Court, POCSO, District Durg (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case (POCSO) No.112/2019, by which the appellant herein has been convicted under Section 376 (2) (n) of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- in default of payment of fine, to further undergo additional RI for 1 year. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the victim ‘LC’ (PW-1) filed a typed written complaint (Ex-P/1) at Police Chowki Padmanabhpur, Durg stating that she is the resident of Village A and was residing as a paying guest at the house of one RB (not examined) in A Nagar for the purpose of preparing for the PAT Exam. During such period, she became acquainted with the appellant, who made a proposal of marriage to her. However, being a minor, she refused the proposal as she was wiling to continue with her studies. The appellant used to meet her several times and tried to allure her by saying lovey-dovey words. She specifically alleged that on 02.09.2018, the appellant entered her room and asked for water. When she went to bring it and returned, the appellant closed the door and forcibly committed rape with her. When she tried to shout, he slapped her on the cheek and threatened to kill her if she made any noise. He also told her that he had made a video in a naked condition and threatened to make it viral. By extending such threats, the appellant further committed rape with her two more times as a result of this relation, she became pregnant and informed the incident to her parents i.e. her father (PW-2) and mother (not examined). They called the appellant, though he initially agreed to marry her, but later on he fled away. 3. The victim delivered a girl child on 21.05.2019 as a premature child, so the baby and the mother/victim were both hospitalized for proper treatment. They called the appellant, though he initially agreed to marry her, but later on he fled away. 3. The victim delivered a girl child on 21.05.2019 as a premature child, so the baby and the mother/victim were both hospitalized for proper treatment. Based on such information, zero FIR has been registered vide Ex-P/2 on 24.06.2019 by mentioning that the incident happened during the period of 02.09.2018, evening at 5 pm, up till the month of November, 2018. 4. Crime details form and spot sketch map were prepared vide Ex-P/3 by Investigating Officer Shail Sharma (PW-10). She also seized the Birth Certificate vide Article A1(C) issued under the Births and Deaths Act and the Matriculation Certificate vide Article A2(C), wherein the date of birth of the victim was recorded as 24.04.2001 vide seizure memo Ex- P/4. Statement of the victim was recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. Spot map was prepared by Patwari- Rajesh Banjari (Pw-6) vide Ex-P/6. Underwear of the accused was seized vide Ex-P/8. The appellant was also medically examined by Dr. B.N. Dewangan (PW-3) vide Ex-P/10 and he was found capable of performing sexual intercourse and his underwear was also examined by the said doctor vide Ex-P/11. The victim was medically examined by Dr. Manju Rathore (PW-4) vide Ex- P/12, who opined that the hymen was old and torn and a vaginal slide was prepared. Statements of the witnesses were recorded. In the vaginal slide and in the underwear of the appellant, no stain of the semen or human sperm was found in the FSL vide Ex-P/25. After completion of the investigation, the charge sheet was filed before the jurisdictional Magistrate, who in turn committed the case to the Sessions Court for trial. 5. During the course of trial, the appellant/accused abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses and exhibited 25 documents vide Ex-P/1 to Ex- P/25 and D/1 to D/6 and Article A1(C) (birth certificate) and Article A2(C) (matriculation certificate). The appellant/accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case, however, he did not adduce any defence evidence. 6. The appellant/accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case, however, he did not adduce any defence evidence. 6. Learned trial Court, after evaluating the evidence available on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant for the aforesaid offence as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against which, the present Appeal has been preferred. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the finding recorded by the trial Court is perverse. He submits that there is an inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, though the alleged incident first occurred on 02.09.2018 and thereafter, it was alleged that two times the appellant again committed rape, however, the victim did not disclose the aforesaid incident to anyone and only after she became pregnant and delivered a baby she made a false allegation against the present appellant. He submits that the appellant has no relation with the victim. He further submits that no DNA test was conducted to connect the baby girl with the appellant. He would submit that no birth certificate or any cogent evidence regarding the delivery of the baby has been produced. He would further submit that the documents (Ex-D/1 to D/6) pertain only to the treatment of the victim herself. He also points out that the victim herself stated that she delivered the baby at home. Learned counsel further submit that the prosecution also failed to prove that the victim was below the age of 18 years and the document (Ex-P/15), the Municipal Birth Register, could not be relied upon, as no complete register has been produced, so the entries cannot be safely acted upon and the prosecution has also failed in this regard. He would further submit that even the father of the victim, by filing an affidavit (Ex-D/10) admitted that the name of the victim was changed in various certificates. He also submits that no independent witness from the PG hostel, wherein the alleged incident was committed by the appellant and the mother of the victim to whom the victim has narrated the incident has been examined. He would submit that non-examination of such important witnesses is fatal to the prosecution. Therefore, taking into consideration the aforesaid infirmities, he lastly prays that the Appeal be allowed and the appellant be acquitted of the aforesaid charge. He would submit that non-examination of such important witnesses is fatal to the prosecution. Therefore, taking into consideration the aforesaid infirmities, he lastly prays that the Appeal be allowed and the appellant be acquitted of the aforesaid charge. In support of his submission, he places reliance in the matter of Vijayan vs. State of Kerala , (2008) 14 SCC 763 in such case, when there is delay in lodging the FIR and DNA test was also not filed, appellant was given the benefit of acquittal. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/State would support the impugned judgment, which is well merited and does not call for any interference. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 10. The first question that arises before this Court is whether the victim (PW-1) was under 18 years of age on the date of the alleged incident i.e. 02.09.2018. In this regard, the prosecution has examined Vineet Verma (PW-9), Assistant Revenue Inspector, who on the date of the deposition, produced the original birth register and proved the document vide Ex-P/15, wherein the date of birth of the victim was recorded as 24.04.2001 and in column-6, it is noted that the victim was born at Dr. Gulati Nursing Home and her name was recorded as LC and the said information was provided by her father ‘DC’ to the Registrar of Births and Deaths on 14.03.2002. During the investigation, the Matriculation Certificate of the victim (Article- A2/C) and the Birth Certificate (Article- A1/C) were also collected. Both these documents recorded the same date of birth i.e. 24.04.2001. Regarding the date of birth recorded in the Birth Certificate Register under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969, which is a public document, when such a certificate is proved in terms of Section 17(2) of the said Act, it is admissible in evidence under Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, therefore, no formal proof is necessary. 11. Furthermore, Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, prescribes the procedure about the presumption and determination of age and has given the preference of the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available. 12. 11. Furthermore, Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, prescribes the procedure about the presumption and determination of age and has given the preference of the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available. 12. In the matter of Jarnail Singh vs. State of Haryana , (2013) 7 SCC 263 while considering the scope of Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 applicable at that time, at para 23 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically opined that even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis of determining age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. In our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, to determine the age of the prosecutrix. 13. Taking into consideration the evidence available on the record and also considering the statement of the victim and other evidence, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has successfully established that on the date of the incident the victim was less than 18 years of age. 14. In a catena of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court it is well established that there is no rule of law that testimony of a rape victim cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars because the victim is not an accomplice after the crime, so there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. In the matter of State of H.P. vs. Shree Kant Shekar , (2004) 8 SCC 153 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “ 21. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court on facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration, as understood in the context of an accomplice, would suffice.” 15. Similarly, the Hon’ble Suprme Court in Shivasharanappa and Others vs. State of Karnataka , (2013) 5 SCC 705 observed as follows: “17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful and is corroborated by other evidence brought on record. Needless to say as a rule of prudence, the court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from other reliable evidence placed on record. The principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is true and correct and is of quality and cannot be discarded solely on the ground of lack of corroboration, apply to a child witness who is competent and whose version is reliable.” 16. In cases under the POCSO Act, a ‘sterling’ witness refers to a witness whose testimony is of high quality on caliber to the extent that the Court can accept their version of events without requiring additional corroboration. The law is well settled in ‘n’ numbers of cases of the Supreme Court, wherein it has been observed that the testimony of a victim can be sufficient for conviction, if it is trustworthy and of sterling quality. 17. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep alias Deenu vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 held as under: “ 22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’ should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. 17. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep alias Deenu vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 held as under: “ 22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’ should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and everyone of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it can be held that such a witness can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it can be held that such a witness can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more recise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 18. In the matter of Sunil vs. State of M.P. (2017) 4 SCC 393 the following was observed at para 4: “ 4. From the provisions of Section 53-A of the Code and the decision of this Court in Krishan Kumar [Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 61] it does not follow that failure to conduct the DNA test of the samples taken from the accused or prove the report of DNA profiling as in the present case would necessarily result in the failure of the prosecution case. As held in Krishan Kumar [Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 61] (para 44), Section 53-A really “facilitates the prosecution to prove its case”. A positive result of the DNA test would constitute clinching evidence against the accused if, however, the result of the test is in the negative i.e. favouring the accused or if DNA profiling had not been done in a given case, the weight of the other materials and evidence on record will still have to be considered. It is to the other materials brought on record by the prosecution that we may now turn to.” 19. In the matter of Inayath Ali vs. State of Telangana , (2024) 7 SCC 822 the following was observed: “11. The substance of the complaint was not related to paternity of the children of Respondent 2 but the question was whether the offences under the aforesaid provisions of the 1860 Code were committed against her or not. In the matter of Inayath Ali vs. State of Telangana , (2024) 7 SCC 822 the following was observed: “11. The substance of the complaint was not related to paternity of the children of Respondent 2 but the question was whether the offences under the aforesaid provisions of the 1860 Code were committed against her or not. The paternity of the two daughters of Respondent 2 is a collateral factor to the allegations on which the criminal case is otherwise founded. On the basis of the available materials, in our opinion, the case out of which this proceeding arises could be decided without considering the DNA test report. This was the reasoning which was considered by the coordinate Bench in Ashok Kumar [Ashok Kumar v. Raj Gupta, (2022) 1 SCC 20 : (2022) 1 SCC], though that was a civil suit. Merely because something is permissible under the law cannot be directed as a matter of course to be performed particularly when a direction to that effect would be invasive to the physical autonomy of a person. The consequence thereof would not be confined to the question as to whether such an order would result in testimonial compulsion, but encompasses right to privacy as well. Such direction would violate the privacy right of the persons subjected to such tests and could be prejudicial to the future of the two children who were also sought to be brought within the ambit of the trial court's direction.” 20. In the matter of Dilesh Nishad vs. State of Chhattisgarh , MANU/CG/1664/2023 (17.08.2023- CGHC) the following was observed: “17. Such direction would violate the privacy right of the persons subjected to such tests and could be prejudicial to the future of the two children who were also sought to be brought within the ambit of the trial court's direction.” 20. In the matter of Dilesh Nishad vs. State of Chhattisgarh , MANU/CG/1664/2023 (17.08.2023- CGHC) the following was observed: “17. Bearing in mind, the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar (supra) and Inayath Ali (supra), it is quite vivid that the baby child of the victim is neither a party in the instant criminal appeals nor his (baby child) status/ paternity is required to be examined in these criminal appeals filed by the two appellants herein, as such, ascertaining the paternity of the victim's child is not at all required to be determined in these criminal appeals filed by the appellants and directing for DNA test of the baby child of the victim would violate the privacy right of the infant, which is a constitutionally protected right as declared by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1 ” 21. In view of the aforesaid dictum, it is explicit that with regard to the non-conduction of DNA profiling, it is well settled that the weight of other materials and evidence on record will still have to be considered and directing for DNA test of the baby child of the victim would violate the privacy right of the infant which is a constitutionally protected right to the infant. 22. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the victim (PW-1) categorically deposed that on 02.09.2018, while she was residing as a paying guest at the house of RB (not examined), the appellant entered her room and at that time she was minor. During such period, the appellant also made different types of talks to allure her and on such date, he forcefully committed rape with her and also extended the threat that he had made a private video and would make it viral and that she should continue the physical relation with him. In the month of November, 2018, the appellant entered her room one–two times and made physical relation. Due to fear that the appellant would make the video viral, she did not disclose the incident to anyone. In the month of November, 2018, the appellant entered her room one–two times and made physical relation. Due to fear that the appellant would make the video viral, she did not disclose the incident to anyone. In the month of December, 2018 she became pregnant and disclosed the same to the appellant and he agreed to marry her. 23. On 20.05.2019, at night, she delivered a girl child in her room. On the following day i.e. 21.05.2019, her parents came to her room and she narrated the entire incident to them. Thereafter, on the same day at around 6:30 p.m., the appellant was called and he promised to marry the victim and also to adopt the girl child. During such period, as the premature baby was delivered and her health condition was deteriorating, both the victim (PW-1) and the baby were got admitted to the Government Hospital, Rajnandgaon on 21.05.2019. During their hospitalization, the appellant was also present with them. 24. On 22.06.2019 at around 12 noon, the appellant left the hospital stating that he needed to collect his clothes and to return motorcycle to his friend. However, he never came back and switched off his phone. In such compelling circumstances, the victim lodged an FIR by submitting a written complaint (Ex-P/1). Based on this information, FIR (Ex-P/2) was registered. The father of the victim (PW-2) and her uncle (PW-7) also supported the version of the victim. 25. Dr. Manju Rathore (PW-4), who medically examined the victim on 24.06.2019 vide Ex-P/12, deposed that the victim informed her that she had delivered a girl child on 21.05.2019. Upon examination, she found that victim’s breast nipples were dark in colour, usual post-delivery stretch marks were present and milk was discharging from the breasts which normally comes after the maternity delivery. In her cross- examination, the witness admitted the fact that the presence of stretch marks and the milk was coming from the breast were not mentioned in her medical report. 26. Dr. Nilima Thakur (PW-8) also examined the victim and proved the documents related to the victim's hospitalisation vide Ex-D/1 to Ex-D/16. In her cross- examination, the witness admitted the fact that the presence of stretch marks and the milk was coming from the breast were not mentioned in her medical report. 26. Dr. Nilima Thakur (PW-8) also examined the victim and proved the documents related to the victim's hospitalisation vide Ex-D/1 to Ex-D/16. On perusal of the said documents, it is evident that the victim was admitted to the Government Medical College, Rajnandgaon, on 22.05.2019 at about 13:53 hours vide Ex-D/2, as she delivered a child at home on account of excessive bleeding as per the OPD slip Ex-D/11 and the discharge ticket Ex-D/13. 27. From scanning of the evidence available on the record, this Court does not find anything material to take a different view from that of the trial Court as nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination to disbelieve the version of the victim. Since the victim was found to be below the age of 18 years, consent is immaterial. Regarding the change in the name of the victim, her name is recorded as ‘LC’ in the Aadhar Card, but at the time of the admission to the Medical College, Rajnandgaon, it was wrongly recorded as ‘NC’, for which the father has filed an affidavit (Ex-D/10). 28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court reaches to the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the appellant. 29. As the appellant was charged for the offence under Section 376 (2) (n) of the IPC to commits rape repeatedly on the same women and the trial Court also found him guilty under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘the POCSO Act, 2012’), as Section 5 (l) of the POCSO Act, 2012 deals with offence of the penetrative sexual assault committed on the child more than once or repeatedly, Section 6 of the POCSO Act was attracted and prior to the amendment Act 25 of 2019, the minimum sentence was ten years and after the said amendment, the same has been extended to 20 years. 30. 30. The law is also well settled in the matter of State of U.P. vs. Sonu Kushwaha , (2023) 7 SCC 475 where minimum sentence has been prescribed, the same leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the trial Court in the instant case. 31. So on both the scores, the conviction and the sentence as awarded by the Special Judge is hereby upheld. The present Criminal Appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. 32. It stated at the Bar that the appellant is in jail. He shall serve out the sentence as ordered by the trial Court. 33. The Registry is directed to transmit the certified copy of this judgment along with record to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and compliance. 34. Registry is also directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail term, informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an Appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of either High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.