1 2025:CGHC:2734-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 247 of 2021 1 - Hasan @ Deepak Aditya S/o Munnaram Aditya, Aged About 23 Years, R/o Village Kahrapara Kikirada, Police Station Birra, District Janjgir-Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Birra, District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ For Appellant : Ms. Madhunisha Singh, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, Deputy Govt. Advocate --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. 16-01-2025 1. The present appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. has been filed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23-01-2021 passed by the learned Special Judge {Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act’)} Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa in Special S.T. No.29/2019 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner with a direction to run all the jail sentences concurrently: Conviction Sentence Under Section 376(3) of the IPC R.I. for twenty years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, further R.I. for one year. U/s 506 Part-2 of IPC R.I. for 3 years and fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine amount, further R.I. for 3 months Digitally signed by MOHAMMAD AADIL KHAN 2 Conviction of the appellant is also under Section 4 of POCSO Act. Since the appellant has been sentenced R.I. for twenty years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, further R.I. for one year for his conviction under Section 376(3) of the IPC, no separate sentence has been awarded to him under Section 4 of POCSO Act. 2. Brief facts of the case are that father of the victim PW-2, made a written complaint on 20-05-2019, Ex.-P/4, alleging in it that the appellant has committed rape upon his minor daughter in the month of October, 2018. At that time his parents were not in the house. After commission of rape upon his daughter, he threatened her not to disclose the incident to anyone, otherwise he would kill her. Thereafter, he pressurized her to talk to her regularly and wrote slogans in the wall at various places in the village showing relation between the victim and the appellant. It is also alleged in the written complaint that the appellant has got viral the photograph of his daughter in whatsapp of his mobile No.8823852311, 9981723858, 8826623803 and 8770331093 to the mobile of Ajay Kumar 7024700656 and in that photo the vermilion is shown to be applied on her head and by the said photo he is defamed and he felt offensive. The appellant pressurized his minor daughter to reside with him otherwise he will commit suicide. On the basis of written complaint, the FIR Ex.-P/5 was registered against the appellant for the offence under Section 376, 506B of the IPC and Section 4 and 6 of POCSO Act. The victim was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital Janjgir where PW-5, Doctor Shweta Lal has medically examined her and gave her report Ex.-P/11. During her examination the doctor has not noticed any external injuries on her body and opined that no definite opinion can be given regarding recent sexual assault. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to the police for its chemical examination. The spot map Ex.-P/3 was prepared by the police and Ex.-P/6 was prepared by the Patwari. One photograph of the victim has also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/7. With respect to the age and date of birth of the victim the police has seized the school register and admission and discharge certificate Ex.-P/17C and Ex.-P/18 from Gram Bharati Saraswati Shishu Mandir, Amoda vide seizure memo Ex.-P/16 and after retaining attested true copy of the 3 school register, the original register was returned back to the school. The appellant was arrested on 21-05-2019 and he too was sent for his medical examination to community health center Bahmnidih, where PW-8 Doctor B.S. Jagriti has medically examined him and gave report Ex.-P/14. After his medical examination the doctor has opined that the appellant is capable to perform intercourse. The vaginal slide of the victim was sent for its chemical examination to regional FSL, Bilaspur from where report Ex.-P/28 was received and in the vaginal slide of the victim no semen and sperms were found. One mobile phone has been seized from the appellant vide seizure memo Ex.-P/8. Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. as well as of the statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. have been recorded and after completion of usual investigation charge sheet was filed before the learned trial Court for the offence under Section 376, 506B of the IPC and Section 4 and 6 of POCSO Act. 3. The learned trial Court has framed charges against the appellant under Section 376(3) and 506 Part II of the IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act. The appellant abjured his guilt, pleaded innocence and claimed trial. 4. In order to bring home the charges the prosecution has examined as many as 12 witnesses. The statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was also recorded, in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him, pleaded innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated. 5. After appreciation of the evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the present appellant as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the appellant is innocent and he has been falsely implicated in the offence. No offence is made out against the appellant as alleged. There is no legally admissible evidence on record with regard to age of the victim that as on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years 4 of age. In absence of examination of author of the school admission and discharge register, the same cannot be taken into consideration for determination of the age of the prosecutrix. The school admission and discharge register is a weak type of evidence. There is no any Kotwari Register or ossification report produced by the prosecution to determine her actual age on the date of incident that she was below 18 years of age. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that statement of the victim, her parents, and Head Master of the school are inconclusive and not reliable. The Head Master of the school is not the author of the school admission and discharge register and therefore, the same is not admissible piece of evidence and cannot be taken into consideration. Learned counsel for the appellant would further argue that there was consensual relationship between the victim and the appellant and she has not made any complaint before the alleged incident. He would further argue that the FIR has been lodged belatedly and the delay has not been explained properly. The father of the victim has borrowed some amount from the father of the appellant and to avoid repayment of the same, false report has been lodged against the appellant. Therefore, the alleged offences of the IPC and the POCSO Act are not made out against the appellant, hence, he is entitled for acquittal. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the victim was minor and below 18 years of age at the time of incident, which is proved by the school admission and discharge register, which contains the date of birth of the victim as 29- 09-2005 and the the incident of forceful sexual intercourse made by the appellant with the victim is of 15-10-2018 and thereby on the date of first incident the victim was minor. It has been further argued that the school admission and discharge register is an admissible piece of evidence by which age of the victim can be determined. The entries made in the school admission and discharge register is further corroborated by the school admission and discharge certificate. The statement of the victim is corroborated by the statement of her parents as well as other witnesses and guilt of the appellant has properly been proved by the prosecution that he committed rape 5 upon the minor victim and also has given threatening to her. Therefore, conviction and sentence of the appellant needs no interference. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, and perused the record. 9. The first and foremost question arose for consideration would be age of the victim as to whether on the date of incident she was minor or not. 10. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school register Ex-P/17C and school admission and discharge certificate Ex.-P/18 which are sought to be proved by PW-9, who is Head Master of Sarswati Shishu Mandir Amoda. He deposed in his evidence that the police has seized school register with respect to the date of birth of the victim, vide seizure memo Ex.-P/16 and after retaining attested true copy of the school register Ex.-P/17C the original register was returned back to him. He also issued school admission and discharge certificate Ex.-P/18 on the basis of the entries in the school register. As per the school register the date of birth of the victim is 29-09- 2005. In cross-examination he admitted that at the time of her admission in the school he was not posted there. He further admitted that at the time of admission of the child in the school, they asked for the document relating to kotwari panji, birth certificate or transfer certificate if he comes from any other school and xerox copy of said document are being annexed with the record. He further admitted that if parents of the child are not able to furnish any document they record their date of birth on assumption. He further admitted that in the school record no kotwari panji or birth certificate of the victim is annexed. He further admitted that the admission and discharge certificate are issued on the basis of the entries of the school register. From evidence of this witness it is quite vivid that he is not author of the school register and the basis on which the entries have been made in the school register have not been produced by the prosecution. No any kotwari panji or birth certificate have been annexed with the school register. 6 11. The admissibility and evientiary value of the school register is considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2011 (2) SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 12. In paragraphs 40, and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of 7 determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 13. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion 8 but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 9 14. In case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate 10 given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 15. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the victim PW-1 has stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 29-09-2005. In cross-examination she stated that she born at Kikirda. She admitted that after her birth she was resided for about 3 years at Jammu. She studied at Saraswati Shishu Mandir Amoda for about 3 years in class Arun, Uday and class 1. She further stated that she did not know as to what date of 11 her birth has been written in her Adhar Card. She also did not know that her date of birth is written in Adhar Card as 01-01-2003. She also admitted that she was not medically examined for determination of her age. 16. PW-2 Father of the victim has stated in his evidence that the date of birth of his daughter is 29-09-2005. In his cross-examination he stated that his daughter has born at village Kikirda. He has not got her birth registered in the kotwari register. He has not got prepared her birth certificate. He further stated that after birth of his daughter they resided at Jammu for about 5 years. The victim was got admited in the school by her maternal grand parents. He denied that he has got recorded the date of birth of his daughter in Adhar Card as 01-01-2003. 17. PW-3, Mother of the victim has stated in her evidence that she did not know the age of her daughter. In cross-examination she admitted that she has got married since 20-22 years back. Her daughter has got admitted in the school by her family members. She has not got recorded her birth in kotwari register. 18. Except these oral evidence and the school record Ex.-P/17C and P/18 no other evidence produced by the prosecution to prove age of the victim. No any birth certificate or ossification report has been produced in the case. Since the age of the victim has not been proved by the cogent and clinching documentary evidence and the oral evidence adduced by the prosecution with respect to the age and date of birth of the victim is not of that sterling quality which is required to determine the age of the victim that she was minor, it is very difficult for this Court to hold that the victim was minor on the date of incident and less than 18 years of age only on the basis of oral evidence available in the present case. 19. So far as involvemment of the appellant in offence in question is concerned, we again examine the evidence of the vicim, PW-1. 20. The victim, PW-1, has stated in her evidence that on the date of incident, the appellant came to her house, dragged her inside the room and committed rape upon 12 her on the cot. He gave threatening to her that if she disclosed the incident to anyone he would kill her. The appellant followed her and asked her to talk to him and he wrote slogans in the wall, platform made in the market and wall of the others in the village showing relation between the victim and the appellant. He also got viral her photo in whatsapp of the mobile phone of others in which the vermilion is shown to be applied on her head and he pressurized her to reside with him with 4-5 years. When the appellant did not stop his activities her parents has lodged the report. In cross- examination she stated that she did not seen any person writing her name in the walls or platform of the village. She did not know as to who has written the said slogans. She denied in her cross-examination that her father has borrowed money from father of the appellant and the quarrel took place between them on the issue of the refund of the borrowed amount. Although she denied that the quarrel took place tween them on 19-05-2019, she admitted that on the next day, i.e., 20-05-2019 her father called her from village Amoda and thereafter they had gone police station for lodging of the report. They have got typed their complaint in photocopy shop and with the assistance of one Advocate they have got prepared their complaint. She denied that she was having relation with one Ajay and the reputation of her father in the village was getting down for which she was sent to village Amoda to her maternal uncle’s house and since they were defamed in the village they have lodged false report against the appellant. She admitted in her cross-examination that her house was adjoining to the house of the others in the vicinity and if any person would shout from her house then it will be heard by other persons of the vicinity. She also raised alarm on the date of incident, but no one has come to save her. 21. PW-2, father of the victim has stated in his evidence that when he was the slogan on the wall of the village at various places, he enquired about the same from his daughter and then she disclosed that in the ‘Kunwar’ month of 2018 the appellant committed rape upon her in her house and since he threatened her she has not disclosed the incident to anyone. She shown her wishes for lodging of the report and then they lodged the report. In cross-examination though he denied the relation 13 between Ajay and his daughter, but he admitted that in the month of April, 2019 the victim was resided in the house of his brother Dauva and Ajay is his son. His daughter was being called on 20-02-2019 from village Amoda from his matrimonial uncle’s house and had gone to police station for lodging of the report. He further stated that on 19th, they had gone to the house of the appellant to convince him. He also admitted that on that day they threatened the father of the appellant to convince his son. This witness has been cross-examined subsequent instances when they came to know about the slogans about the slogans written on the walls of the village and their strain relatio with family of the appellant. 22. The evidence of PW-3, mother of the victim is also relates with the evidence of her father PW-2 and she also stated in the same manner as PW-2 has stated. Though on some point she deviated from statement of PW-2, but that does not make any difference as they were not the witnesses to the incident, but deposed whatever disclosed by the victim before them. 23. PW-6 and PW-7 are the witnesses in whose mobile photograph was got viral, but they have turned hostile and only they are witnesses to the fact that in their mobile phone they received whatsapp message of photograph of the victim having vermilion on her head. 24. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home 14 the charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 25. From these evidence it appears that when father of the victim saw the slogans on the walls of the village he enquired about the incident from the victim and then she disclosed that in the month of October, 2018 the appellant committed rape upon her. The FIR has been lodged on 20-05-2019, i.e., after about 7 months of the incident. Had the appellant committed rape upon the victim and threatened her, there is no reason for her to disclose it to her parents. The way of threatening can be diluted by the efflux of time and she could very well disclose the incident to her parents that the appellant has commited rape upon her and given threatening to her. It is only when certain slogans were found in the walls of the village, although the same can be considered to be defamatory, but it cannot be said that by that slogans itself the appellant can be held guilty fo the offence of rape. Although delay in lodging the report does not dilute the offence of rape, but in the present case it does affect the credibility of the victim as to whether she actually suffered by the act of rape alegedly committed by the appellant or not. 26. From the evidence produced by the prosecution, we do not find any sufficient evidence to uphold conviction of the appellant in the offence in question. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment of conviction and order of sentence of the appellant dated 23-01-2021 passed by the learned trial Court is set aside, and the appellant stands acquitted from all the charges. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 21-05-2019. He is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 27. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the 15 aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. Registry is directed to transmit the trial Court record along with a copy of this order to the Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil