- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M.SHYAM PRASAD AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR WRIT PETITION NO. 105057 OF 2021 (S-KAT) BETWEEN: SMT. SHAKUNTALA D/O SIDDAPPA CHINNIWALA AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, R/A KANDYARVONI, NEAR KAMMAN KATTI, YALABURGA POST AND TALUK, KOPPAL DISTRICT-583 236. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. V. LAKSHMINARAYANA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. VEERESH R. BUDIHAL, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, VIKAS SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001. 2. THE COMMISSIONER FOR PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS NRUPATHUNGA ROAD, BENGALURU-560001. 3. THE DIRECTOR OF VOCATIONAL EDUCATION, NEW PUBLIC OFFICES, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD, Digitally signed by ANJALI M Location: High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 BENGALURU-560001. 4. THE SPECIAL OFFICER AND SELECTION COMMITTEE FOR RECRUITMENT TO THE POSTS OF TEACHERS, DEPT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS, K.G. ROAD, BENGALURU-560009. 5. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, KOPPAL DISTRICT, KOPPAL-583226. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. G.K. HIREGOUDAR, GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO, ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND QUASH THE ORDER BY KARNATAKA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT BELAGAVI DATED 23.12.2020 PASSED IN APPLICATION NO.7697/2015 (ANNEXURE-H) AS ARBITRARY, VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 READ WITH ARTICLE 16 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA & ETC., THIS WRIT PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M.SHYAM PRASAD AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 ORAL ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M.SHYAM PRASAD) The petitioner is the applicant in A. No.7697/2015 with the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Belagavi [Tribunal], and she has filed this application with the Tribunal calling in question the stipulation in the notification dated 17.07.2007 that those who have passed Job Oriented Diploma Course [JOC] will not be eligible for recruitment to the post of Special Teachers in Government Higher / Modern Primary Schools. The petitioner’s application, which is filed in the year 2015, is belated, and as such, the petitioner has filed an application [I.A. No.II] for condonation of delay1. 2. The Tribunal by its order dated 23.12.2020 has rejected the application [and the application for condonation of delay] opining that the petitioner has failed to justify the delay of over seven and a half years in availing her remedy. The Tribunal has considered certain circumstances, apart 1 The application is filed beyond one year and this application is filed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act,1985 - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 from certain precedential authorities, to arrive at its decision as aforesaid, and these circumstances are as follows. [i] The concerned Selection Committee for Recruitment has issued notification dated 01.02.2007 for the recruitment of Special Teachers. [ii] The petitioner has filed her application claiming reservation under category 3A for the post of a Physical Education Grade-II. [iii] The petitioner’s name is mentioned in the final selection list after verification of documents, but she is not called for counselling. [iv] On 17.07.2007, the Selection Committee has published a notification informing those who were in the final selection list but with JOC, that they will not be eligible for recruitment. [v] Resultantly, 30 candidates [including the petitioner] are excluded from the final selection list in the year 2007 and others appointed. The petitioner has filed her application in the year 2015 with the Tribunal. - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 3. The Tribunal has found that the petitioner cannot explain either delay or laches by simply averring that her ailing mother was bedridden for a very long time or that therefore she could not concentrate on the outcome of the selection notification and seek redressal of her grievance. The Tribunal, relying upon the decisions of the Apex Court in Prakash K. and others v. State of Karnataka and others2 and State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava3 on upsetting completed selection processes when there is laches and the similarly placed persons being extended the same benefit in matters of employment, has opined that the petitioner cannot draw support from the second proposition when there is delay and laches. 4. The petitioner has sought for parity contending that those who like her were excluded from the final selection list on the ground that candidates with JOC will not be qualified are given appointments after certain proceedings. In fact, Sri. V. Lakshminarayana, the learned 2 [1996] 11 SCC 563 3 [2015] 1 SCC 347 - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 senior counsel for the petitioner, relies upon the following circumstances to contend that this Court must intervene with the Tribunal’s impugned order on the ground that in matters of employment similarly placed persons must be treated equally, especially when there is a declaration in rem by Courts. The details of the proceedings relied upon are as follows. [a] Those who are excluded from the final list in the circumstances as stated first have filed their petitions before this Court [W.P. Nos.29919- 928/2009 and connected matters], after being unsuccessful in their applications with the Tribunal. These petitioners have relied upon a decision W.P. Nos.29048-29055/2002 and connected matters by a Division Bench of this Court way back in the year 2002, and it is declared in this decision that JOC would be equivalent to the Pre-University Course [PUC] and those with JOC cannot be excluded from the selection process when the prescribed educational qualification is PUC. - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 [b] These writ petitions in W.P. Nos.29919-928/2009 and connected matters have been allowed on 20.06.2011 once again reiterating that JOC is equivalent to PUC, and therefore, the Government cannot exclude those with JOC from recruitment process. These successful petitioners in the aforesaid writ petitions, consequent to the orders as aforesaid, have been issued with appointments. [c] Sri. Hanumesh H., another candidate who is excluded from the final list like the applicant, has been issued with the appointment order as a Physical Education Teacher on 13.01.2020 consequent to the orders in his application in Application No.2791/2012 with the Tribunal in the year 2012. This is during the pendency of the petitioner’s application with the Tribunal. 5. Sri. V. Lakshminarayana contends that the petitioner’s exclusion from the final selection list, at the first instance, was contrary to the declared position on - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 equivalence between JOC and PUC [a decision in rem] , and thereafter with the similarly placed candidates having been appointed because of the Court’s intervention, the petitioner cannot be denied the same benefit. The learned senior counsel relies upon the following decisions of the Apex Court to underscore his argument. B.C. Nagaraj and another v The State of Karnataka and others in Civil Appeal Nos.5529- 5530/20234: The Apex Court in this decision was examining the grievance as regards the extension of UGC pay scales to certain physical instructors in Government Grade Colleges in Karnataka. The Apex Court, while opining that similarly placed persons cannot be denied the same relief, has intervened directing the State Government to extend the benefit of a certain UGC pay scale. However, the question of delay in seeking vindication of a right to seek employment in a belatedly filed application / petition did not arise for consideration. 4 This Civil Appeal is disposed of on 13.09.2023 - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel v. Union of India and others in Civil Appeal No.1943/20225: This dispute relates to the concerned appellant’s grievance about being refused permission to take up departmental examination for permanent commission with the Army. In the case of others who had similar grievance, the Armed Forces Tribunal granted benefit, but the concerned appellant was denied. The appellant she contended that she could not join the others because she was in the advance stage of pregnancy. In this context, the Apex Court, while reiterating the settled law that where a citizen aggrieved by an action of the Government Department has approached the Court and obtained a declaration of law in his / her favour other similarly situate cannot be denied the benefit of such declaration, has opined that, in the special circumstances of the case, the concerned petitioner could not be non-suited on the ground of delay. 5 This Civil Appeal is disposed of on 09.12.2024 - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 Ram Autar Singh Yadav v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others in Civil Appeal No.13806/20246: The Apex Court, in the circumstances where a Sub- Inspector of Police denied the benefit of a medal for gallantry, has held it would be iniquitous and inappropriate to deny a relief for no better reason than that the relief has been belatedly claimed and the High Courts must not dismiss the Writ Petitions on the ground of delay and laches mechanically without considering all the relevant facts and circumstances. 6. At the outset, this Court must refer to the decision in State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava [supra] wherein it is held as follows: 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 6 This Civil Appeal is disposed of on 04.12.2024 - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well- recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, [1997] 6 SCC 721]. On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence. 7. Sri G.K. Hiregoudar, the learned Principal Government Advocate, is heard, and the petitioner’s grievance with the Tribunal’s order is examined in the circumstances peculiar to the case and the law declared that [i] the High Courts must not dismiss petitions mechanically on the ground of delay and laches without considering all the facts and circumstances and [ii] those, who did challenge the action but wake up late only because the others have succeeded, cannot be extended the benefit of equal treatment unless there is declaration in rem. - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 8. This Court must observe that those candidates with whom the petitioner claims parity approached the Tribunal immediately after the decisions to exclude and these persons grievances are redressed in the year 2011 when the State Government filed a Memo in W.P. Nos.29919-928/2009 and connected matters accepting that they would be accommodated but on conditions. This Court has referred to the conditions later part of this order. The petitioner who did not act after the exclusion from the final selection list has also not acted immediately after the orders of this Court in W.P. Nos.29919-928/2009 and connected matters in the year 2011, and she has filed her application only in the year 2015 after almost four years. 9. The petitioner, when she is seeking appointment which could block the vacancy for another, should bring out circumstances to justify the inability to take action between 2007 and 2011, and again, during the relevant period between 2011 and 2015. The petitioner, as against this requirement has only stated that her ailing mother’s health deteriorated and she was bedridden, and as such, she could - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 not immediately approach this Court. These assertions are too general and wholly unsubstantiated. Therefore, the petitioner also cannot draw support from the appointment of Sri. Hanumesh H in the year 2020. His application with the Tribunal is in the year in 2012 [Application No. 2791/2012]. 10. This Court, in these circumstances cannot but opine that the petitioner must take the consequence of laches and acquiescence unless she can establish that, as stated in State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava [supra], the orders in W.P. Nos.29919-928/2009 and connected matters are orders in rem. In this regard, this Court must also refer to the subsequent decision of the Apex Court in U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Ram Gopal7 where it is reiterated that the rule on delay and laches will not apply when a judgment is in rem. The relevant part reads as under: We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply to judgments which are delivered in rem. The State and its instrumentalities are expected in 7 (2021) 13 SCC 225 - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 such category of cases to themselves, extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts. This distinction between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered in rem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava. 11. The petitions in W.P. Nos.29919-928/2009 and connected matters are allowed on a Memo by the State Government stating that, in the case of those particular petitioners, it will issue appointment orders placing them at the bottom of the list without upsetting the others selected and appointed, and consequentially, the Tribunal’s order in A. No. 3428/2007 is set aside and a month is granted for issuance of appointment orders stipulating that the concerned petitioners will not be entitled to back wages or seniority. This Court must opine that the order in W.P. Nos.29919-928/2009 and connected matters is an order on consent in the case of specific persons, and hence, not a judgment in rem. As such, this Court is of the considered view that the Tribunal has rightly considered the petitioner’s - 16 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB WP No. 105057 of 2021 request for condonation of delay in rejecting both her application for condonation and the application. The writ petition is accordingly rejected. Sd/- (B.M.SHYAM PRASAD) JUDGE Sd/- (RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR) JUDGE RSH, CT:VP LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 21