RSA-3276-2016 217 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA Suraj Bhan Dharmender and Others CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU Present: Mr. Sumit Sangwan, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Ajay Vijarania, Advocate for the respondent MANDEEP PANNU, J 1. The present Regular Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff Suraj Bhan, challenging the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2015 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhiwani, whereby the First Appellate C learned trial Court to the extent of the share of the minor defendant, and modified the decree accordingly. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2. The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 18.09.2006 regarding the suit land as detailed in the headnote of the plaint. 3. The case of the plaintiff was that defendants No. 1 to 3 were owners in possession of the suit property. They entered into the said agreement to sell total sale consideration of 2016 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA Reserved on Pronounced on VERSUS Dharmender and Others HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU Mr. Sumit Sangwan, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Ajay Vijarania, Advocate for the respondent PANNU, J The present Regular Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff Suraj Bhan, challenging the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2015 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhiwani, whereby the First Appellate Court partly allowed the appeal, reversed the findings of the ourt to the extent of the share of the minor defendant, and modified the decree accordingly. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 18.09.2006 regarding the suit land as detailed in the headnote of the plaint. The case of the plaintiff was that defendants No. 1 to 3 were owners in possession of the suit property. They entered into the said agreement to sell total sale consideration of ₹3,50,000, which was paid in full by the plaintiff. -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA-3276-2016 (O&M) Reserved on: 13.08.2025 Pronounced on:18.08.2025 .....Appellant .....Respondents HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU Mr. Sumit Sangwan, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Ajay Vijarania, Advocate for the respondents. The present Regular Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff Suraj Bhan, challenging the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2015 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhiwani, whereby the tly allowed the appeal, reversed the findings of the ourt to the extent of the share of the minor defendant, and modified The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 18.09.2006 regarding the suit land as detailed in the The case of the plaintiff was that defendants No. 1 to 3 were owners in possession of the suit property. They entered into the said agreement to sell for a ₹3,50,000, which was paid in full by the plaintiff. The present Regular Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff Suraj Bhan, challenging the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2015 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhiwani, whereby the tly allowed the appeal, reversed the findings of the ourt to the extent of the share of the minor defendant, and modified The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 18.09.2006 regarding the suit land as detailed in the The case of the plaintiff was that defendants No. 1 to 3 were owners for a ₹3,50,000, which was paid in full by the plaintiff. TRIPTI SAINI 2025.08.20 12:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-3276-2016 Defendant No. 3, Brijesh, was a minor at that time, and the consideration on his behalf was received by his father, defendant No. 4. 4. Defendant No. 1 was proceeded ex and 4 contested the suit, alleging that the agreement was false and fabricated. They further contended that defendant No. 4 was not competent to deal his minor son/defendant No.3. 5. From the pleadings of the learned trial Court: 1. an agreement to sell the suit land in favour of the plaintiff? OPP 2. specific enforcement of the agreement in question, as prayed for in the plaint? OPP 3. suit? OPD 4. 5. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 6. The learned trial to be a valid document, recording findings of readiness and willingness in favour of the plaintiff. on behalf of his minor son, and during the pendency of the suit, the said minor attained majority. Despite being aware of the litigation for several years, he neither repudiated the agreement nor initiated any legal proceedings to have it cance The trial court treated his conduct as ratification of his father’s act. 2016 (O&M) Defendant No. 3, Brijesh, was a minor at that time, and the consideration on his behalf was received by his father, defendant No. 4. Defendant No. 1 was proceeded ex and 4 contested the suit, alleging that the agreement was false and fabricated. They further contended that defendant No. 4 was not competent to deal his minor son/defendant No.3. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court:- Whether on 18.09.2006, the defendants No.1 to 3 had executed an agreement to sell the suit land in favour of the plaintiff? OPP If issue no.1 is proved, whether the plaintiff specific enforcement of the agreement in question, as prayed for in the plaint? OPP Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit? OPD Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD Relief. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT The learned trial Court decreed the suit, holding the agreement to sell to be a valid document, recording findings of readiness and willingness in favour It was observed that defendant No. 4 had executed th on behalf of his minor son, and during the pendency of the suit, the said minor attained majority. Despite being aware of the litigation for several years, he neither repudiated the agreement nor initiated any legal proceedings to have it cance The trial court treated his conduct as ratification of his father’s act. -2- Defendant No. 3, Brijesh, was a minor at that time, and the consideration on his behalf was received by his father, defendant No. 4. Defendant No. 1 was proceeded ex parte, whereas defendants No. 2 and 4 contested the suit, alleging that the agreement was false and fabricated. They further contended that defendant No. 4 was not competent to deal with the share of the parties, the following issues were framed by Whether on 18.09.2006, the defendants No.1 to 3 had executed an agreement to sell the suit land in favour of the plaintiff? OPP If issue no.1 is proved, whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific enforcement of the agreement in question, as prayed for in the Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD ourt decreed the suit, holding the agreement to sell to be a valid document, recording findings of readiness and willingness in favour It was observed that defendant No. 4 had executed the agreement on behalf of his minor son, and during the pendency of the suit, the said minor attained majority. Despite being aware of the litigation for several years, he neither repudiated the agreement nor initiated any legal proceedings to have it cancelled. The trial court treated his conduct as ratification of his father’s act. Defendant No. 3, Brijesh, was a minor at that time, and the consideration on his parte, whereas defendants No. 2 and 4 contested the suit, alleging that the agreement was false and fabricated. They with the share of the parties, the following issues were framed by Whether on 18.09.2006, the defendants No.1 to 3 had executed is entitled to specific enforcement of the agreement in question, as prayed for in the Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD ourt decreed the suit, holding the agreement to sell to be a valid document, recording findings of readiness and willingness in favour e agreement on behalf of his minor son, and during the pendency of the suit, the said minor attained majority. Despite being aware of the litigation for several years, he neither lled. TRIPTI SAINI 2025.08.20 12:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-3276-2016 FIRST APPELLATE COURT’S FINDINGS 7. In appeal by defendants No. 2 and 3, the learned held that it is a settled principle of law that a minor cannot enter and any such agreement has no sanctity or validity in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the appellate court held that the agreement could be specifically enforced only to the extent of the shares of the major defendants, namely Dharminder and and not against the share of the minor, Brijesh. The decree of the trial court was modified accordingly. SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES 8. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that t into on behalf of a minor is attaining majority, did not repudiate the agreement but elected to continue with the suit. A guardian’s contract on behalf of a minor, if for his benefit, can be binding, and in the present case, exe He has relied upon [2001(6) SCC 163]. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the father had no authority to execute minor’s share without prior permission of the court. initio as against the minor. specifically pleaded that the agreement was against his inter unenforceable against him. FINDINGS 10. I have considered the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record with the able assistance. 2016 (O&M) FIRST APPELLATE COURT’S FINDINGS In appeal by defendants No. 2 and 3, the learned held that it is a settled principle of law that a minor cannot enter and any such agreement has no sanctity or validity in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the appellate court held that the agreement could be specifically enforced only to the extent of the shares of the major defendants, namely Dharminder and and not against the share of the minor, Brijesh. The decree of the trial court was modified accordingly. SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES Learned counsel for the appellant argued that t into on behalf of a minor is not void ab initio but merely voidable. attaining majority, did not repudiate the agreement but elected to continue with the A guardian’s contract on behalf of a minor, if for his benefit, can be binding, and in the present case, execution and receipt of consideration were duly proved. He has relied upon Vishwambhar Vs. Laxminarayana (dead) through LRs. [2001(6) SCC 163]. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended he father had no authority to execute an agreement to sell in respect of the minor’s share without prior permission of the court. initio as against the minor. He has further contended that d specifically pleaded that the agreement was against his inter unenforceable against him. I have considered the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record with the able assistance. -3- In appeal by defendants No. 2 and 3, the learned First Appellate Court held that it is a settled principle of law that a minor cannot enter into a contract, and any such agreement has no sanctity or validity in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the appellate court held that the agreement could be specifically enforced only to the extent of the shares of the major defendants, namely Dharminder and Somveer, and not against the share of the minor, Brijesh. The decree of the trial court was Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the agreement entered not void ab initio but merely voidable. The minor, after attaining majority, did not repudiate the agreement but elected to continue with the A guardian’s contract on behalf of a minor, if for his benefit, can be binding, cution and receipt of consideration were duly proved. Vishwambhar Vs. Laxminarayana (dead) through LRs. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended an agreement to sell in respect of the minor’s share without prior permission of the court. The agreement was void ab He has further contended that defendant Brijesh specifically pleaded that the agreement was against his interest, hence I have considered the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record with the able assistance. First Appellate Court into a contract, and any such agreement has no sanctity or validity in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the appellate court held that the agreement could be specifically enforced only to Somveer, and not against the share of the minor, Brijesh. The decree of the trial court was he agreement entered he minor, after attaining majority, did not repudiate the agreement but elected to continue with the A guardian’s contract on behalf of a minor, if for his benefit, can be binding, cution and receipt of consideration were duly proved. Vishwambhar Vs. Laxminarayana (dead) through LRs. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended an agreement to sell in respect of the The agreement was void ab efendant Brijesh est, hence I have considered the respective contentions of the learned counsel for TRIPTI SAINI 2025.08.20 12:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-3276-2016 11. It is undisputed that Brijesh was minor at the time of agreement. The agreement itself stipulated that prior permission of the competent court was required before executing the sa admittedly never taken. 12. The law on this point is well Ghose, [(1903) 30 Cal 539 (PC) minor is void ab initio. 13. In the present case, the agreement to sell was executed by a minor through his father (claimed to be natural guardian). majority, did not institute a separate suit to set aside the agreement, but raised objections in the suit for specific performance filed by the purchaser. issue is whether such an agreement is void ab initio (as per Mohori Bib voidable at the instance of the minor (as suggested in Vishwambhar). 14. In Mohori Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 Cal 539 (PC) Privy Council held that a contract by a minor is void ab initio and cannot be ratified even after attaining by or on behalf of a min 15. In Supreme Court guardian without prior permission of the Court under Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act initio, but voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. The minor must file a suit to set aside the alienation if he seeks to avoid it and recover possession. 2016 (O&M) It is undisputed that Brijesh was minor at the time of agreement. The agreement itself stipulated that prior permission of the competent court was required before executing the sale deed on behalf of the minor, admittedly never taken. The law on this point is well-settled. In (1903) 30 Cal 539 (PC)], it was held that a contract entered into by a minor is void ab initio. In the present case, the agreement to sell was executed by a minor through his father (claimed to be natural guardian). majority, did not institute a separate suit to set aside the agreement, but raised objections in the suit for specific performance filed by the purchaser. issue is whether such an agreement is void ab initio (as per Mohori Bib voidable at the instance of the minor (as suggested in Vishwambhar). n Mohori Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 Cal 539 (PC) Privy Council held that a contract by a minor is void ab initio and cannot be ratified even after attaining majority. It is further held that a by or on behalf of a minor has no binding force in law qua minor. In Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan (2001) 6 SCC 163 was dealing with alienation of immovable property by a n guardian without prior permission of the Court under Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956. It was held that such alienation is not void ab initio, but voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. minor must file a suit to set aside the alienation if he seeks to avoid it and recover possession. -4- It is undisputed that Brijesh was minor at the time of execution of the agreement. The agreement itself stipulated that prior permission of the competent le deed on behalf of the minor, a step settled. In Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas , it was held that a contract entered into by a In the present case, the agreement to sell was executed by a minor through his father (claimed to be natural guardian). The minor, upon attaining majority, did not institute a separate suit to set aside the agreement, but raised objections in the suit for specific performance filed by the purchaser. The core issue is whether such an agreement is void ab initio (as per Mohori Bibi) or voidable at the instance of the minor (as suggested in Vishwambhar). Mohori Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903) 30 Cal 539 (PC), t Privy Council held that a contract by a minor is void ab initio and cannot be It is further held that any agreement executed or has no binding force in law qua minor. Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan (2001) 6 SCC 163, Hon’ble was dealing with alienation of immovable property by a natural guardian without prior permission of the Court under Section 8(2) of the Hindu It was held that such alienation is not void ab initio, but voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. minor must file a suit to set aside the alienation if he seeks to avoid it and execution of the agreement. The agreement itself stipulated that prior permission of the competent a step ri Bibee v. Dharmodas , it was held that a contract entered into by a In the present case, the agreement to sell was executed by a minor inor, upon attaining majority, did not institute a separate suit to set aside the agreement, but raised The core i) or , the Privy Council held that a contract by a minor is void ab initio and cannot be ny agreement executed Hon’ble atural guardian without prior permission of the Court under Section 8(2) of the Hindu It was held that such alienation is not void ab initio, but voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. minor must file a suit to set aside the alienation if he seeks to avoid it and TRIPTI SAINI 2025.08.20 12:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-3276-2016 16. There is distinction between the two in the nature per Mohori Bibi no lawful guardian) is void ab initio and n contrary, as per guardian in contravention of Section 8( it remains valid and enforceable. 17. Thus, a contract, squarely falls under unenforceable, whereas a the guardian without sanction under Section 8(2) falls under (supra) is valid until avoided by the minor. 18. In the case of a void contract (agreement to sell by minor), the minor need not file a separate suit; he can simply resist enforcement (e.g., in a specific performance suit). 19. In the case of a voidable alienation (sale deed by guardian), the minor must file a separate suit to set it aside, failing which the transaction stands. CONCLUSION 20. The agreement to sell in question, executed on behalf of the minor, is governed by Mohori Bibi entitled to resist its enforcement in the specific performance suit without filing a separate suit. 21. The ratio in completed alienations (sale deeds), not to mere executory contracts like agreements to sell. 2016 (O&M) There is distinction between the two in the nature Mohori Bibi’s case (supra) a contract executed directly by a minor (or through ful guardian) is void ab initio and no question of contrary, as per Vishwambhar’s case (supra) a guardian in contravention of Section 8(2) is not void, but voidable. Until set aside, it remains valid and enforceable. Thus, an agreement to sell executed on behalf of a minor, being a contract, squarely falls under Mohori Bibi’s case (supra) , whereas a sale deed/alienation of immovable property executed by the guardian without sanction under Section 8(2) falls under valid until avoided by the minor. In the case of a void contract (agreement to sell by minor), the minor not file a separate suit; he can simply resist enforcement (e.g., in a specific performance suit). In the case of a voidable alienation (sale deed by guardian), the minor must file a separate suit to set it aside, failing which the transaction stands. The agreement to sell in question, executed on behalf of the minor, is Mohori Bibi’s case (supra) and is void ab initio. The minor was entitled to resist its enforcement in the specific performance suit without filing a The ratio in Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan completed alienations (sale deeds), not to mere executory contracts like agreements to sell. -5- There is distinction between the two in the nature of transaction. As contract executed directly by a minor (or through o question of setting aside arises. On the an alienation executed by a natural 2) is not void, but voidable. Until set aside, n agreement to sell executed on behalf of a minor, being a ’s case (supra) and is void and deed/alienation of immovable property executed by the guardian without sanction under Section 8(2) falls under Vishwambhar’s case In the case of a void contract (agreement to sell by minor), the minor not file a separate suit; he can simply resist enforcement (e.g., in a specific In the case of a voidable alienation (sale deed by guardian), the minor must file a separate suit to set it aside, failing which the transaction stands. The agreement to sell in question, executed on behalf of the minor, is and is void ab initio. The minor was entitled to resist its enforcement in the specific performance suit without filing a Vishwambhar v. Laxminarayan (supra) applies to completed alienations (sale deeds), not to mere executory contracts like . As contract executed directly by a minor (or through On the n alienation executed by a natural 2) is not void, but voidable. Until set aside, n agreement to sell executed on behalf of a minor, being a void and deed/alienation of immovable property executed by Vishwambhar’s case In the case of a void contract (agreement to sell by minor), the minor not file a separate suit; he can simply resist enforcement (e.g., in a specific In the case of a voidable alienation (sale deed by guardian), the minor The agreement to sell in question, executed on behalf of the minor, is and is void ab initio. The minor was entitled to resist its enforcement in the specific performance suit without filing a applies to completed alienations (sale deeds), not to mere executory contracts like TRIPTI SAINI 2025.08.20 12:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-3276-2016 22. Thus, there is a clear distinction alienations by natural guardians without sanction are voidable 23. In view of judgment and decree Accordingly, the 24. Pending August 18, 2025 tripti Whether speaking/non Whether reportable 2016 (O&M) Thus, there is a clear distinction c natural guardians without sanction are voidable In view of the above, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree dated 16.11.2015 passed by he present Regular Second Appeal stands dism Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 2025 Whether speaking/non-speaking : Speaking Whether reportable : Yes/No -6- contracts by minors are void, while natural guardians without sanction are voidable I find no reason to interfere with the impugned dated 16.11.2015 passed by the First Appellate Court Regular Second Appeal stands dismissed. application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (MANDEEP PANNU) JUDGE speaking : Speaking : Yes/No ontracts by minors are void, while I find no reason to interfere with the impugned First Appellate Court. TRIPTI SAINI 2025.08.20 12:28 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document