CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AN Girraj and others Versus State of Haryana and others CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Present : Mr. For the petitioners. Mr. wit LAPITA BANERJI, J. Through Constitution of India, the petitioners of a writ of mandamus for carrying out the process of repartition under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1948 Act”), qua the land proposed 1964-65, amongst the reserved categories of proprietors of the village 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are members of the CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AN CHANDIGARH CWP NO.22 RESERVED ON: DATE OF DECISION:SEPTEMBER and others Versus State of Haryana and others HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Mr. Sanjeev Gupta, Advocate, For the petitioners. Mr. Ankur Mittal, Additional Advocate General, Haryana with Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana. LAPITA BANERJI, J. Through this petition, filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have, inter of a writ of mandamus for carrying out the process of repartition under East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1948 Act”), qua proposed to be distributed as per the Consolidation Scheme of amongst the reserved categories of of the village. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the are members of the Scheduled Caste and Backward Class IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CWP NO.22117 OF 2025 (O&M) RESERVED ON:AUGUST 12, 2025 DATE OF DECISION:SEPTEMBER 12, 2025 ...Petitioners ...Respondents HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK SIBAL HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Ankur Mittal, Additional Advocate General, Haryana Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana. filed under Articles 226/227 of the inter-alia, prayed for issuance of a writ of mandamus for carrying out the process of repartition under East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1948 Act”), qua as per the Consolidation Scheme of amongst the reserved categories of people who were the non- Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Scheduled Caste and Backward Class SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.12 18:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) Community and the land amongst them was never done houses belong to the belong to the mem was required to be distributed amongst the proprietors as well as the non proprietors, since it was imperative to provide land to all the sections of the society. 3. The entire land was recorded as “ Wa Digar Hakdaran Araji Khewat tinkered with the sche castes and did not invite any objection from the members of other communities. 4. Learned co grievance of the petitioners that the distribution was made to certain preferred communities as out of 9070 acres of land initially 4535 acres w approximately Gaushala and other common areas i.e well, johar, charand, cow farm etc. was kept for the benefit of all the villagers was again redistributed amongst 600 square yards each reserved communities were given plots yards each, arbitrarily and without any plausible justification discriminatory distribution was against the Scheme of 1964 CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) and the land which had been amongst them was never done. Out of 4000 houses in the village, 2400 houses belong to the general castes whereas approximately members of reserved category. As per the Scheme, the land was required to be distributed amongst the proprietors as well as the non proprietors, since it was imperative to provide land to all the sections of The entire land was recorded as “ Wa Digar Hakdaran Araji Khewat”. However, the consolidation officer d with the scheme and allotted the earmarked and did not invite any objection from the members of other Learned counsel for the petitioner grievance of the petitioners that the distribution was made certain preferred communities as out of 9070 acres of land initially 4535 acres were given to them and barren/uneven land admeasuring approximately 1300 acres of land being “shamlat deh Gaushala and other common areas i.e well, johar, charand, cow farm etc. for the benefit of all the villagers. distributed amongst some villagers 600 square yards each were given to them, whereas the communities were given plots admeasuring arbitrarily and without any plausible justification discriminatory distribution was against the Scheme of 1964 which had been reserved for distribution . Out of 4000 houses in the village, 2400 whereas approximately 1600 houses As per the Scheme, the land was required to be distributed amongst the proprietors as well as the non- proprietors, since it was imperative to provide land to all the sections of The entire land was recorded as “Jumla Mustarka Malkan ”. However, the consolidation officer the earmarked land only to upper and did not invite any objection from the members of other unsel for the petitioners submits that it is the grievance of the petitioners that the distribution was made unfairly only certain preferred communities as out of 9070 acres of land initially and barren/uneven land admeasuring shamlat deh” comprising of Gaushala and other common areas i.e well, johar, charand, cow farm etc. Thereafter, remaining land some villagers and plots admeasuring , whereas the members of the admeasuring only 150 square arbitrarily and without any plausible justification. Such discriminatory distribution was against the Scheme of 1964-65. SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.12 18:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) 5. Therefore, pray village land as per the Consolidation Scheme of 1964 Furthermore, it is prayed representations (Annexure P-1 Hon’ble Chief Minister respectively, representations 6. Mr. Mittal, learned counsel respondents No.1 to 4 on advance notice petition is hopelessly inaction on the part of authorities pursuant to the Consolidation Scheme finalised in 1964 on the issue of 60 years of delay 7. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on 8. The petitioners have approached this Court for relief under Articles 226/227 of the of 60 years since the is also not lost upon the mind of this Court that the land had been purportedly allotted unfairly and without complying with the provisions of the Scheme admittedly for present proceedings. CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) Therefore, prayer for repartitioning and redistribution of the village land as per the Consolidation Scheme of 1964 Furthermore, it is prayed that action should be taken in terms of the s dated May 02, 2024 (Annexure P 1) and February 10, 2025 (Annexure P Hon’ble Chief Minister, to the Collector and respectively, as no action has been taken till date representations. Mr. Mittal, learned counsel, respondents No.1 to 4 on advance notice, submits that the present writ hopelessly delayed as the petitioners are seeking to challenge inaction on the part of authorities pursuant to the Consolidation Scheme 1964-65 without any justifiable explanation on the issue of 60 years of delay in approaching this Court This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. The petitioners have approached this Court for relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, admittedly after since the time the scheme for consolidation was is also not lost upon the mind of this Court that the land had been purportedly allotted unfairly and without complying with the provisions of the Scheme, are in possession of for more than 60 years, but have not been made parties to the present proceedings. This Court finds that the for repartitioning and redistribution of the village land as per the Consolidation Scheme of 1964-65 is made. action should be taken in terms of the dated May 02, 2024 (Annexure P-2), July 01, 2024 bruary 10, 2025 (Annexure P-3) made to the to the Collector and to the Commissioner no action has been taken till date, despite the appearing on behalf of submits that the present writ he petitioners are seeking to challenge inaction on the part of authorities pursuant to the Consolidation Scheme 65 without any justifiable explanation being provided in approaching this Court. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and The petitioners have approached this Court for relief under Constitution of India, admittedly after the passage time the scheme for consolidation was finalised. It is also not lost upon the mind of this Court that the villagers to whom land had been purportedly allotted unfairly and without complying with are in possession of the disputed land have not been made parties to the the delay in approaching the SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.12 18:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) Court in the present case under the statute, within the reasonable time satisfactorily explained be condoned at the asking 9. This Court finds support for its view in the decision of Supreme Court in Consolidation approaching the Court for repartition under Section 42 of the 1948 had not been condoned. The relevant extract thereof is reproduced hereinafter: “xxx 3. and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949 prescribes that an application under Section 42 shall be made six months of the date of the order against which it is filed. Under the 2 the application after the period of limitation, which requires the applicant to satisfy the authorities that he has sufficie cause for not making the application within such period. The 2nd of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Jagtar Singh v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Jalandar, 1984 R 216. In this decision the High Court had held that the period prescribed under Rule 18 will apply only in respect of orders which are passed under the Act and will have no application to a scheme which is framed for rep effected 4. party which is aggrieved by the Scheme or by repartition to make an application under Section 42 after an unreasonably long lapse of time. Even where no prescribed, the party aggrieved is required to move the appropriate authority for relief within reasonable time. In fact this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat, village CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) present case is inordinate. Where no limitation is prescribed under the statute, an application for redressal of grievance must be made within the reasonable time. Any delay in approaching satisfactorily explained with sufficient cause and be condoned at the asking. This Court finds support for its view in the decision of Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat, Kakran v. Addl. Director of Consolidation, reported in (1997) 8 SCC 484, where delay of 40 years in approaching the Court for repartition under Section 42 of the 1948 not been condoned. The relevant extract thereof is reproduced “xxx 3. Rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949 prescribes that an application under Section 42 shall be made six months of the date of the order against which it is filed. Under the 2nd proviso to that Rule, there is a power to admit the application after the period of limitation, which requires the applicant to satisfy the authorities that he has sufficie cause for not making the application within such period. The nd respondent has relied upon a decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Jagtar Singh v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Jalandar, 1984 R.R.R 31: AIR 1984 Punjab and Haryana 216. In this decision the High Court had held that the period prescribed under Rule 18 will apply only in respect of orders which are passed under the Act and will have no application to a scheme which is framed for rep effected under the Act. 4. This, however, cannot be understood as enabling the party which is aggrieved by the Scheme or by repartition to make an application under Section 42 after an unreasonably long lapse of time. Even where no prescribed, the party aggrieved is required to move the appropriate authority for relief within reasonable time. In fact this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat, village here no limitation is prescribed an application for redressal of grievance must be made in approaching the Court has to be with sufficient cause and inordinate delay cannot This Court finds support for its view in the decision of Gram Panchayat, Kakran v. Addl. Director of , where delay of 40 years in approaching the Court for repartition under Section 42 of the 1948 Act, not been condoned. The relevant extract thereof is reproduced Rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949 prescribes that an application under Section 42 shall be made within six months of the date of the order against which it is filed. to that Rule, there is a power to admit the application after the period of limitation, which requires the applicant to satisfy the authorities that he has sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. The respondent has relied upon a decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Jagtar Singh v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, .R.R 31: AIR 1984 Punjab and Haryana 216. In this decision the High Court had held that the period prescribed under Rule 18 will apply only in respect of orders which are passed under the Act and will have no application to a scheme which is framed for repartition which has been This, however, cannot be understood as enabling the party which is aggrieved by the Scheme or by repartition to make an application under Section 42 after an unreasonably long lapse of time. Even where no period of limitation is prescribed, the party aggrieved is required to move the appropriate authority for relief within reasonable time. In fact this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat, village SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.12 18:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) Kanonda v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, 1989 Suppl. when no limitation is prescribed for an application under Section 42 dealing with confirmation of the Scheme, the application should be made within a reasonable time and this question will have to be decid case. In that case the delay of about 3 years and 8 months in filing an application under Section 42 by the Panchayat was held to be not unreasonable. In the present case, however, the delay is of 40 years. We have tried to ascertai 2nd unreasonable and inordinate delay. But no satisfactory explanation appears to be there for this inordinate delay in making the application under Section 42. The only contention which has No.2 relates to the application of Rule 18 and the period of limitation prescribed therein not being applicable where the challenge is to the consolidation scheme and repartition. But even if Rule 18 is not directly attra which is made after such inordinate delay ought not to have been entertained. It is also contended by the 2 that the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the order of the Additional Director of Consolidation i Petition because the land in question continued to remain in the name of the proprietary body. He drew our attention Rule 16(ii) of the said Rules. Rule 16(ii) clearly provides that the management of such land shall be done by the Pa behalf of the village shall have to utilise the income and the benefits of the state or estates concerned. Even before Additional Director, the appellants were made a party therefore, has no merit xxx 10. Reliance can also be placed upon the judgments of Apex Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujaral Industrial Development Corporation and another Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others General and others v. Living Media India Ltd and another CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) Kanonda v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, 1989 Suppl. (2) SCC 465 dealing with Rule 18 itself, said that when no limitation is prescribed for an application under Section 42 dealing with confirmation of the Scheme, the application should be made within a reasonable time and this question will have to be decid case. In that case the delay of about 3 years and 8 months in filing an application under Section 42 by the Panchayat was held to be not unreasonable. In the present case, however, the delay is of 40 years. We have tried to ascertai nd respondent whether there is any unreasonable and inordinate delay. But no satisfactory explanation appears to be there for this inordinate delay in making the application under Section 42. The only contention which has been urged before us by respondent No.2 relates to the application of Rule 18 and the period of limitation prescribed therein not being applicable where the challenge is to the consolidation scheme and repartition. But even if Rule 18 is not directly attra which is made after such inordinate delay ought not to have been entertained. It is also contended by the 2 that the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the order of the Additional Director of Consolidation i Petition because the land in question continued to remain in the name of the proprietary body. He drew our attention Rule 16(ii) of the said Rules. Rule 16(ii) clearly provides that the management of such land shall be done by the Panchayat of the estate or estates concerned on behalf of the village proprietary shall have to utilise the income and the benefits of the state or estates concerned. Even before Additional Director, the appellants were made a party-respondent. This contention, therefore, has no merit. xxx.” Reliance can also be placed upon the judgments of Apex Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujaral Industrial Development Corporation and another (2010) 5 SCC 459, Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649 and General and others v. Living Media India Ltd and another Kanonda v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, 1989 (2) SCC 465 dealing with Rule 18 itself, said that when no limitation is prescribed for an application under Section 42 dealing with confirmation of the Scheme, the application should be made within a reasonable time and this question will have to be decided on the facts of each case. In that case the delay of about 3 years and 8 months in filing an application under Section 42 by the Panchayat was held to be not unreasonable. In the present case, however, the delay is of 40 years. We have tried to ascertain from the respondent whether there is any explanation for this unreasonable and inordinate delay. But no satisfactory explanation appears to be there for this inordinate delay in making the application under Section 42. The only been urged before us by respondent No.2 relates to the application of Rule 18 and the period of limitation prescribed therein not being applicable where the challenge is to the consolidation scheme and repartition. But even if Rule 18 is not directly attracted, an application which is made after such inordinate delay ought not to have been entertained. It is also contended by the 2nd respondent that the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the order of the Additional Director of Consolidation in a Writ Petition because the land in question continued to remain in the name of the proprietary body. He drew our attention to Rule 16(ii) of the said Rules. Rule 16(ii), however, quite clearly provides that the management of such land shall be nchayat of the estate or estates concerned on proprietary party and the Panchayat shall have to utilise the income and the benefits of the state or estates concerned. Even before Additional Director, the espondent. This contention, Reliance can also be placed upon the judgments of Apex Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujaral Industrial (2010) 5 SCC 459, Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar and Office of the Post Master General and others v. Living Media India Ltd and another (2012) 3 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.12 18:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) SCC 563 for the proposition that delay is not liable to be condon asking. 11. In Others, SLP (Civil) No.6609 the petitioners challenged the awarded compensation under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after and 29 days. The High Court had refused to condone the delay in spite of the fact that the other land owners who had preferred the appeals in time were granted higher compensation. While dismissing the appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following observations: “xxx 7. Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, relied upon the writings of Mr Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 wherein it has been said that: operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable ground postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law. Xxx 11. person has taken a relief approaching the court just or immediately after the c persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person. 12. rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that he filed the CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) for the proposition that delay is not liable to be condon In Brijesh Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and SLP (Civil) No.6609-13 of 2014 reported in the petitioners challenged the awarded compensation under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after a period of 10 years, 02 Months and 29 days. The High Court had refused to condone the delay in spite of the fact that the other land owners who had preferred the appeals in time were granted higher compensation. While dismissing the appeal, the preme Court made the following observations: “xxx 7. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, relied upon the writings of Mr Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 wherein it has been said that: A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law. Xxx 11. It is also a well-settled principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person. 12. In State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya this court rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that he filed the for the proposition that delay is not liable to be condoned at the Brijesh Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351, the petitioners challenged the awarded compensation under Section 18 of a period of 10 years, 02 Months and 29 days. The High Court had refused to condone the delay in spite of the fact that the other land owners who had preferred the appeals in time were granted higher compensation. While dismissing the appeal, the preme Court made the following observations: The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, relied upon the writings of Mr Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, s, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not settled principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the court just or ause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some taka v. S.M. Kotrayya this court rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that he filed the SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.12 18:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the court in a similar case as the same explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches. Xxx” 12. In Haryana through the Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon in 1986 (4) SCC 151 Leave Petitions on the ground that the petitioners could not plead their own laches as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. the time stipulated for re under Section 28 the Courts would lead to disastrous consequences, not intended by the legislature. Therefore, the followin “xxx 7. these cases which are hopelessly barred by time and there is no justification for condonation of inordinate delay. 8. with costs.” 13. The waiver and acquiescence acquiescence and laches have been succinctly explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of in (2022) 2 SCC 24 hereinafter: “xxx Delay, laches and acquiescence CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the court in a similar case as the same explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches. Xxx” In Mewa Ram (deceased) by his LRs and others v. State of rough the Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon 1986 (4) SCC 151, the Hon’ble Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions on the ground that the petitioners could not plead their own laches as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. the time stipulated for re-determination of the awarded compensation under Section 28-A should be adhered to, as any other view taken by the Courts would lead to disastrous consequences, not intended by the legislature. Therefore, the following conclusion was arrived at: “xxx 7. There is no reason for us to grant special leave in these cases which are hopelessly barred by time and there is no justification for condonation of inordinate delay. 8. The special leave petitions are accordingly di with costs.” The instant writ petition is also waiver and acquiescence apart from delay acquiescence and laches have been succinctly explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. N. Murugesan (2022) 2 SCC 24. The relevant extract thereof is reproduced “xxx Delay, laches and acquiescence petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay and laches. Mewa Ram (deceased) by his LRs and others v. State of rough the Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon, reported , the Hon’ble Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions on the ground that the petitioners could not plead their own laches as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. It held that determination of the awarded compensation A should be adhered to, as any other view taken by the Courts would lead to disastrous consequences, not intended by the g conclusion was arrived at:- There is no reason for us to grant special leave in these cases which are hopelessly barred by time and there is no justification for condonation of inordinate delay. The special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed also hit by the principles of apart from delay. Concepts of delay, acquiescence and laches have been succinctly explained by the Hon’ble India v. N. Murugesan, reported . The relevant extract thereof is reproduced SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.12 18:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) 20 acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejud note of by the Court. Laches 21. language meaning “ involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it woul unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 23. no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have an fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be tak note of by the Court. Laches 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it woul unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The ice is also an important issue to be taken The word “laches” is derived from the French remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or rs to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said y application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.12 18:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defence available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. Acquiescence 24. acqu other. 25. acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence t knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and in and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the p the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may becom Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case Xxx” 14. In the light of aforesaid discussion, hesitation to hold that the 2025, is hit by the Furthermore, the affected parties who are admittedly in possession of the disputed land for more than 60 present proceedings CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defence available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. Acquiescence 24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other. 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may becom Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case Xxx” In the light of aforesaid discussion, hesitation to hold that the instant writ petition is hit by the principles of delay, acquiescence and laches Furthermore, the affected parties who are admittedly in possession of the disputed land for more than 60 years have not present proceedings. Consequently, the same is the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. We have already discussed the relationship between iescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. akes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and stead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, arty that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis. In the light of aforesaid discussion, this Court has no writ petition, being CWP No.22117 of of delay, acquiescence and laches. Furthermore, the affected parties who are admittedly in possession of the not been made parties in the Consequently, the same is dismissed. SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.12 18:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) 15. Connected applications, if any, are also stand disposed of accordingly. (DEEPAK SIBAL) JUDGE SEPTEMBER Shalini Whether speaking/reasoned: Whether reportable: CWP No.22117 of 2025 (O&M) Connected applications, if any, are also stand disposed of (DEEPAK SIBAL) (LAPITA BANERJI) JUDGE SEPTEMBER 12, 2025 Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes reportable: Yes/No Connected applications, if any, are also stand disposed of (LAPITA BANERJI) JUDGE SHALINI BHATIA 2025.09.12 18:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document