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2025 DAILYLAW 8632 (MAD)

S. Veerappan (died) v. Saraswathi (died)

2025-10-17

V Lakshminarayanan

body2025
JUDGMENT : V. LAKSHMINARAYANAN, J. 1. The present appeal arises out of the judgment and decree of the Court of the District Judge, South Arcot Vallalar District, Cuddalore, in A.S.No.21 of 1993 dated 28.02.1994, in reversing the judgment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge at Cuddalore, in O.S.No.158 of 1991 dated 17.12.1992. 2.The 1 st appellant is the 11 th defendant in the suit. The appeal pertains to the 7 th item of the suit schedule mentioned property. In all, 10 items were involved. The 11 th defendant is interested only with respect to the 7 th item. Even at the time of filing the appeal on 25.05.1994, the appeal was confined only to the 7 th item. 3.For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their ranks in the suit. 4.The plaintiff presented O.S.No.158 of 1991 seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction with respect to items 1 & 2 and for recovery of possession for item Nos.3 to 10. Her case was that the suit properties belonged to one Pichandi Padayachi. He executed a settlement deed on 06.10.1933, in favour of Ramalinga Padayachi and his wife Dhanakodi Ammal. The settlement deed was accepted and acted upon by the donors and the donees. They also took possession of the property. The second donee Dhanakodi Ammal predeceased her husband Ramalinga Padayachi. Ramalinga Padayachi passed away on 15.12.1990. The plaintiff claimed to be the only daughter of Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal. 5.Placing reliance upon the settlement deed dated 06.10.1933, she pleaded that Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal did not have the right to alienate the property, but had the right to enjoy the same during their lifetime. She pleaded that after their lifetime, the properties was to be enjoyed by their . As she was the only of the couple / donees, she pleaded that she is entitled to the suit properties as the vested remainder. 6.The first defendant is the second wife of Ramalinga Padayachi. Defendants 2 to 5 are the daughters of the first defendant. Ramalinga Padayachi and Chinnayal, the first defendant had another daughter by name Dhanavalli. She had passed away. Hence, her daughters were impleaded as defendants 6 & 7 to the suit. The 8 th defendant is the husband of Jayakodi, the 6 th defendant. Defendants 2 to 5 are the daughters of the first defendant. Ramalinga Padayachi and Chinnayal, the first defendant had another daughter by name Dhanavalli. She had passed away. Hence, her daughters were impleaded as defendants 6 & 7 to the suit. The 8 th defendant is the husband of Jayakodi, the 6 th defendant. During the lifetime of Ramalinga Padayachi, he had alienated the property in favour of one Appavu Gounder. His sons were impleaded as defendants 9 & 10. Similarly, Ramalinga Padayachi alienated the properties in favour of defendants 11 to 16 and they were in possession of the properties. The plaintiff claimed the relief of recovery of possession against them. She urged that the defendants 1 to 8 do not have any substantive right or title over the suit items 1 & 2. As they were threatening to trespass into the property, the plaintiff came forth with the relief of injunction with respect to item nos.1 & 2. 7.She pleaded that Ramalinga Padayachi sold an extent of 35 cents in R.S.No.416/1 and 416/3 to Appavu Gounder by way of a sale deed dated 21.03.1950. Out of the 35 cents, Appavu Gounder sold an extent of 13 cents in R.S.No.416/3 to Maharajan, the 12 th defendant. Appavu Gounder sold another extent of 6 cents in favour of Selvaraj, the 13 th defendant on 26.07.1986. Similarly, Appavu Gounder executed another sale deed in favour of Balasubramaniam and Amirdhavalli, the defendants 14 & 15, on 27.07.1986 in R.S.No.416/3 for an extent of 7 cents. Appavu Gounder had retained only 9 cents of land out of the 35 cents of land which he had purchased from Ramalinga Padayachi. On his death, the defendants 9 & 10 were in possession of the same. The plaintiff pleaded that the sale in favour of Appavu Gounder and defendants 12 to 15 will not enure beyond the lifetime of Ramalinga Padayachi. 8.She added that she presented a suit in O.S.No.388 of 1984 against the Appavu Gounder and Maharajan with respect to R.S.Nos.416/1 & 416/3 and the same had been decreed and it became final. 9.Insofar as the 11 th defendant is concerned, she pleaded Ramalinga Padayachi sold the 7 th item to one Muthumanicka Chettiyar, by way of a sale deed dated 27.02.1952. Muthumanicka Chettiyar in turn sold the same to Veerappan, the 11 th defendant on 16.07.1973. 9.Insofar as the 11 th defendant is concerned, she pleaded Ramalinga Padayachi sold the 7 th item to one Muthumanicka Chettiyar, by way of a sale deed dated 27.02.1952. Muthumanicka Chettiyar in turn sold the same to Veerappan, the 11 th defendant on 16.07.1973. Insofar as this document is concerned, she pleaded that it will not enure beyond the lifetime of Ramalinga Padayachi. With respect to suit items 8 to 10, she pleaded that Ramalinga Padayachi has leased the same to one Dhanabal, the father of the 16 th defendant. After the death of Dhanabal, the 16 th defendant attorned the tenancy in favour of Ramalinga Padayachi. After the death of Ramalinga Padayachi, the 16 th defendant promised to attorn the tenancy in favour of the plaintiff, but did not do so. As the possession of the defendants with respect to suit items 3 to 10 is illegal and unlawful, she came forward with the suit as aforesaid. 10.Summons were served on the defendants. The defendants 6 to 9 and 12 to 15 remained exparte. Defendants 1 to 5 & 11 filed a written statement. The plea of defendants 1 to 5 is as follows: (i)They admitted that the settlement deed was executed by Pichandi Padayachi in favour of Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal and that the same was accepted and acted upon. (ii)They admitted to the fact that Dhanakodi Ammal passed away and Ramalinga Padayachi continued to be in possession of the properties. However, they denied that the plaintiff is the exclusive (iii)They alleged that the plaintiff never took care of Ramalinga Padayachi and that after the death of Dhanakodi Ammal, Ramalinga Padayachi married the 1 st defendant and through her, the defendants 2 to 5 were born. (iv)According to them, after the death of Ramalinga Padayachi, the defendants 1 to 5 were also entitled to the properties. (v)They pleaded that during his lifetime, Ramalinga Padayachi was in possession of item nos.1 & 2 and after his death, the defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the same. (vi)They added that he had taken Dhanavalli as his third wife, through whom the defendants 6 & 7 were born. (vii)They pleaded that the children of the second wife would also have to be treated as and that these word will also cover the children through the third wife. (vi)They added that he had taken Dhanavalli as his third wife, through whom the defendants 6 & 7 were born. (vii)They pleaded that the children of the second wife would also have to be treated as and that these word will also cover the children through the third wife. (viii)They asserted that the plaintiff can only file a suit for partition as co-sharer and the suit for declaration and other reliefs is not sustainable. (ix)They also pleaded that the word only mean male issues and not the daughters. (x)They referred to the settlement deed and pointed out that certain religious activities have to be performed and that such activities cannot be performed by females as they were not covered under the definition. (xi)According to them, Pichandi Padayachi would have never thought about female issues of Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal and acquiring any interest in the properties. (xii)They agreed that Pichandi Padayachi wanted the heirs of Ramalinga Padayachi to succeed to the estate. Therefore, they took a stand that the plaintiff would be entitled to 1/8 th share along with defendants 1 to 7. 11.The 1 st appellant/11 th defendant contended that the settlement deed was executed. He took a plea that Pichandi Padayachi was heavily indebted and therefore, in order to secrete the properties away from creditors, the document came to be executed. He alleged that the original settlement deed was never handed over to the setlees and the settlement deed was never acted upon. He pleaded that possession continued with the settler and therefore, the settlement deed was void. It was further alleged that the deed was never came into force. Having taken these pleas, he also pleaded that Ramalinga Padayachi enjoyed the suit properties by mortgaging the same in his own right. He pleaded estoppel, as the plaintiff was well aware, of the execution of the mortgage deed by Ramalinga Padayachi in favour of Muthumanicka Chettiar and the subsequent sale made by him to the said Chettiar on 27.02.1952. 12.The 11thdefendant added that he purchased the suit property from the said Muthumanicka Chettiar by way of a registered sale deed for a sum of Rs.7,500/- on 16.07.1973 and had been in possession and enjoyment of the same. He further stated that he had made a lot of improvements over the property converting the land into fertile one. 12.The 11thdefendant added that he purchased the suit property from the said Muthumanicka Chettiar by way of a registered sale deed for a sum of Rs.7,500/- on 16.07.1973 and had been in possession and enjoyment of the same. He further stated that he had made a lot of improvements over the property converting the land into fertile one. 13.The plaintiff filed a reply statement stating that the term is a comprehensive term, which includes both the male and female heirs. She asserted that merely because some charities had to be performed, it cannot be construed that the word mean only the males. She stated by the settlement deed, Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal had to enjoy the property without alienation and as she is the sole she is entitled to the properties. 14.On the basis of these pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues and additional issues: 15.On the side of the plaintiff, she examined herself as PW1 and two other witnesses on her side. The plaintiff marked Exs.A1 to A13. On the side of the defendants, 3 rd defendant examined herself as D.W.1 and 11 th defendant as D.W.3. Apart from this, two other witnesses were examined on the side of the defendants. The defendants marked Exs.B1 to B26. 16.After consideration of both oral and documentary evidences, the learned Trial Judge came to a conclusion that the suit has to be dismissed with costs and accordingly dismissed it so. 17.Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred A.S.No.21 of 1993. The learned Appellate Judge reversed the findings of the Trial Court and decreed the suit as prayed for. The Appellate Court declared the plaintiff's title with respect to the suit items and granted the relief of injunction insofar as item Nos.1 & 2 are concerned and for recovery of possession insofar as item Nos.3 to 10. She relegated the parties to a separate proceedings, under Order XX Rule 12 of Code of Civil Procedure, insofar as mesne profits are concerned. 18.Aggrieved by the reversal of the decree, the 11 th defendant has preferred this second appeal. 19.This Court entertained the appeal on 07.06.1994 and framed the following substantial questions of law: “1.Whether the right of setting aside the sale deed is barred by limitation under Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963 ? 18.Aggrieved by the reversal of the decree, the 11 th defendant has preferred this second appeal. 19.This Court entertained the appeal on 07.06.1994 and framed the following substantial questions of law: “1.Whether the right of setting aside the sale deed is barred by limitation under Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963 ? 2.Whether the prior life estate in the property is barred to sue for setting aside the sale deed? 3.Whether the minor acquired vested interest in the property at the birth of the first respondent according to Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act and has all right to set aside the sale during the life estate being alive and executory? 4.Whether the settlement is valid or struck down by Section s 13 and 14 of the Transfer of Property Act as it did not confer vested interest on any of the family members of Ramalinga Padayachi? 5.Whether the title of this appellant over the suit property item No.7 of the plaint is perfected by adverse possession irrespective of its devloution?” 20.Pending the appeal, the contesting 1 st respondent passed away and his legal heirs were impleaded as respondents 17 to 24. The appellant too passed away. The appeal had been dismissed as abated on 08.10.2009 as no steps were taken for the appellant. Subsequently, applications were filed to restore the appeal and to bring on record the legal representatives of the sole appellant. These applications were allowed by this Court on 06.04.2022. The grand daughter of the sole appellant was brought on record as the 2 nd appellant. With all these house keeping work having been completed, this Court took up the appeal for final disposal today. As the questions of law are inextricably connected, they are answered together. 21.It is the plea of the 11 th defendant that the alienation of the property by Ramalinga Padayachi to Muthumanicka Chettiyar was well within the knowledge of the plaintiff. He pleaded that the First Appellate Court did not take into consideration the plaintiff had not taken any legal proceedings to set aside the sale deed dated 27.02.1952, executed by Ramalinga Padayachi in favour of Muthumanicka Chettiyar or the sale deed executed by Muthumanicka Chettiyar in favour of the appellant on 16.07.1973. He pleaded that the First Appellate Court did not take into consideration the plaintiff had not taken any legal proceedings to set aside the sale deed dated 27.02.1952, executed by Ramalinga Padayachi in favour of Muthumanicka Chettiyar or the sale deed executed by Muthumanicka Chettiyar in favour of the appellant on 16.07.1973. He pleaded that under Article 60 of the Limitation Act, a suit to set aside the sale deed has to be filed within a period of three years from its alienation and that having not been filed the suit as hopelessly barred by limitation. He urged that, if at all, the plaintiff would get a vested right it is on the date of her birth, in terms of Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore, she ought to have filed the suit during the donee's lifetime. He added that in any event, as the 11 th defendant had prescribed title by adverse possession. He urged the suit insofar as the 11 th defendant is concerned, ought to have been dismissed. 22.The learned counsel for the contesting respondent / plaintiff pleaded that as per the terms of settlement deed, the entire property, which was the subject matter of settlement, devolved upon the plaintiff on the death of her father and she had become the absolute owner of the property. Referring to the settlement deed, he pointed out that the settlement deed specifically directed that the donees Dhanakodi Ammal and Ramalinga Padayachi should not alienate the properties, but could enjoy the same during their lifetime. Therefore, the alienations, at best, would be valid during their lifetime and on their death, it automatically vests with the plaintiff. 23.He pleaded that the appellant has misconstrued the provisions of Article 60 of the Limitation Act, which is not at all applicable to the facts of the case. He added that as the alienation made by the plaintiff's father cannot go beyond his lifetime, there is no necessity on her part to seek setting aside the same. He pleaded that the Lower Appellate Court had properly appreciated the facts and had decreed the suit. Hence, he sought for dismissal of the suit with cost. 24.I have carefully considered the submissions on both sides and I have gone through the records. 25.It is not in dispute that the property originally belonged to Pichandi Padayachi. He pleaded that the Lower Appellate Court had properly appreciated the facts and had decreed the suit. Hence, he sought for dismissal of the suit with cost. 24.I have carefully considered the submissions on both sides and I have gone through the records. 25.It is not in dispute that the property originally belonged to Pichandi Padayachi. He had settled the properties in favour of Dhanakodi Ammal and Ramalinga Padayachi on 06.10.1933 by way of Ex.A1. Ramalinga Padayachi died on 15.12.1990 as is clear from Ex.A2. It is here that the terms of Ex.A1 become relevant. For ready reference, the relevant portions of the documents are extracted as hereunder: 26.Pichandi Padayachi had settled the properties, since he and his wife did not have any issues. The settlement deed called upon Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal, to take care of the donor and his wife during their life time. The crucial clause for the purpose of this being that the donees were not entitled to alienate their property. It is clear from the following terms: 27.This makes it clear that Dhanakodi Ammal and Ramalinga Padayachi were given the right to enjoy their property during their lifetime and after their death, it was to devolve on the of the couple. It also directed the settlees and the heirs born to them to perform the charities that were being performed by the donors. A casual glance of the document in Ex.A1 makes it clear that Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal had a right only to enjoy their property during their lifetime, with no right of alienation. The document also makes it clear that the properties were to be enjoyed by the heirs of the setlees. That being the position, the alienation made by Ramalinga Padayachi cannot be treated as alienations conferring absolute title on the purchasers. The latter got title pur autre vie or “for another's life”. 28.A life estate holder at law is entitled to alienate his life estate. On the death of the life estate holder, the right so transferred comes to an end. This is because of Section 6 of Transfer of Property Act. In terms of that provision, property of any kind can be transferred / alienated. An interest in a life estate does not fall within the list of non-transferable properties. It is also not intended to the life estate holder personally nor is it spes successionis. This is because of Section 6 of Transfer of Property Act. In terms of that provision, property of any kind can be transferred / alienated. An interest in a life estate does not fall within the list of non-transferable properties. It is also not intended to the life estate holder personally nor is it spes successionis. Hence, the right transferred under such alienations comes to an end with the death of the life estate holder. 29.Contrary to the restriction under the gift under Ex.A1, Ramalinga Padayachi had mortgaged the property originally to Muthumanicka Chettiar and thereafter, sold the same to him. Muthumanicka Chettiar in turn alienated the property in favour of the appellant. As long as Ramalinga Padayachi was alive, the alienees could have enjoyed the property. As pointed out, Ramalinga Padayachi died on 15.12.1990 and therefore, whatever right was transferred by him in favour of the third parties die with his death. 30.It is here I will address the plea on adverse possession that was raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. The property held by the 11 th defendant would have become adverse to the plaintiff had she kept quiet for a period of 12 years or more after the death of Ramalinga Padayachi. However, she presented the suit for declaration of her title and for recovery of possession on 10.06.1991, i.e., to say within six months of the death of Ramalinga Padayachi. Hence, the plea of adverse possession stands rejected. 31.Insofar as the plea that the defendants 1 to 10 also have a share in the property is concerned, a reading of Ex.A1 makes it clear that the settlor desired with the legal heirs of Dhanakodi Ammal and Ramalinga Padayachi should enjoy the properties and in case they do not have any legal heirs, only then, the properties were to be enjoyed by the heirs of Ramalinga Padayachi. A reading of the evidence of D.W.1 makes it clear that the plaintiff was the only child of Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal. The defendants 2 to 10 having been born to Ramalinga Padayachi and Chinnayal and to their predeceased daughter, they cannot be treated as legal heirs of Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal. A reading of the evidence of D.W.1 makes it clear that the plaintiff was the only child of Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal. The defendants 2 to 10 having been born to Ramalinga Padayachi and Chinnayal and to their predeceased daughter, they cannot be treated as legal heirs of Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal. 32.It will be useful to recollect the verdict of the Privy Council in Safdar Ali v. Mirza Maksudali Beg AIR 1930 PC 41 , where the Board held that the term “heirs” would include both male and female heirs, unless otherwise restricted. This view seems to have been approved by the Supreme Court in N.Krishnammal v. R. Ekambaram and Ors. AIR 1979 SC 1298. The Supreme Court held that legal terms such as “heirs” used in a “ WILL ”, must be construed in a legal sense, unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed by the testator. The word “heir” cannot normally be limited to male issues only. It must mean all persons who are entitled to the property of another under the law of inheritance. 33.Let us now discuss the term . “Santhathi”, a Tamil word, is derived from Sanskrit. It has several regional variations. The primary meaning granted to the term is ‘offspring’, ‘progeny’, or ‘lineage’. Relying upon Munier Williams Sanskrit dictionary, a Division Bench of this Court (Sankaran Nair and Spencer, JJ.) held that Santhathi means uninterrupted succession, descent, lineage, race progeny, offspring, a eon, as daughter, etc. (See, Balasubramania Pillai and Ors v. Petcha Pillai AIR 1917 Mad 837). 34.Interpreting the Sanskrit root “Sanathana”, the Privy Council in Buddha Singh v. Laltu Singh (1915) ILR 37 All 604 held that the word “Sanathana” means race, lineage, or posterity. A Division Bench consisting of Ramachandra Iyer, C.J., and Sadasivam, J. in C.S. Nagaraja Iyer and Anr. V. Seethalakshmi Ammal., (1962) 75 LW 67 held that the word “Santhathi” must be understood as descendants i.e., not merely the children, but children’s children, children’s children’s children, etc. 35.In Guruvajammah v Rangaswamy Mudaliar 27 M.L.J. 694 at page 718 , another Division Bench consisting of Sir John Edward Wallis, C.J., and Ramesam, J. held the term “Santhathi” itself involves an idea of series of descendants one after another, and not all the descendants taken collectively. 35.In Guruvajammah v Rangaswamy Mudaliar 27 M.L.J. 694 at page 718 , another Division Bench consisting of Sir John Edward Wallis, C.J., and Ramesam, J. held the term “Santhathi” itself involves an idea of series of descendants one after another, and not all the descendants taken collectively. Hence, the word “Santhathi” is much wider in connotation than the other terms which are found in legal documents, viz., “Putra- Putra” (See, Rajah Ravu Sri Krishnayya Rao v. Raja Saheb Meharban Dostan Sri Raja Ravu Venkata Kumara Mahipathi Surya Rao Bahadur Garu, (1928) 28 LW (Mad) (FB ) ). 36.The plea that refers only to male heir and not to a female heir cannot be countenanced. This position has been settled by a judgment of this Court holding that includes both male and female. [See, S.S.Rajalinga Raja and others Vs. S.Thiruvengadathammal and others, (1987) 100 LW 393 ]. 37.As the document contemplates only the of Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal were to enjoy the vested remainder, the plea that the legal heirs of Ramalinga Padayachi are entitled to succeed to the estate is a misreading of Ex.A1. This wrong interpretation of the term had rightly been interfered with by the Lower Appellate Court. 38.With respect to the plea that only male persons are entitled to perform charities, here too I am not in agreement with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. By virtue of Ex.A1, certain charities were called upon to perform by Ramalinga Padayachi and Dhanakodi Ammal and after their lifetime, by their legal heirs. By performance of charity, it does not mean that the beneficiary of the settlement should personally go into the Temple and perform the same. In fact, this becomes further clear because the settlor directed that in case such charities are not performed, it is open to the persons in charge of the Temple to spend for the charities and recover the amount so spent from the settlees or their descendants. 39.As I have concluded that Ramalinga Padayachi had no right to alienate the property absolutely and since he had a life estate, the alienations could be valid only during his lifetime. The pleas raised by the learned counsel for the appellant do not deserve any acceptance. None of the questions of law raised by the appellant arise for consideration in the appeal. 40.In the result, this Second Appeal is dismissed. The pleas raised by the learned counsel for the appellant do not deserve any acceptance. None of the questions of law raised by the appellant arise for consideration in the appeal. 40.In the result, this Second Appeal is dismissed. In fine, the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, South Arcot Vallalar District, Cuddalore, in A.S.No.21 of 1993, dated 28.02.1994, in reversing the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore, in O.S.No.158 of 1991, dated 17.12.1992 stands confirmed. Considering the fact that the appellant had purchased the property and therefore, cannot be treated as a trespasser, I am not inclined to impose any costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.