1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. G. PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V.ARAVIND WRIT PETITION NO.15646/2020 (S-KSAT) BETWEEN: SRI N RAGHUMURTHY S/O T NINGAPPA AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS OCC: SPECIAL TAHSILDAR BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK KANDHAYA BHAVAN, K.G. ROAD BENGALURU-560 009. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI.K.B. MONESH KUMAR, ADV.) AND: 1. KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA M.S. BUILDING DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI BENGALURU-560 001 REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR. 2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT REVENUE DEPARTMENT 2 M.S. BUILDING BENGALURU-560001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. VENKATESH ARBATTI, ADV. FOR R1 SMT. B SUKANYA BALIGA, AGA FOR R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 02.09.2020 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL IN APPLICATION NO.3675/2019; QUASH THE ORDER DATED 03.07.2013 ISSUED BY THE R2 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE- D AND ETC. THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDER ON 01.09.2025 COMING ON THIS DAY, S.G.PANDIT J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.V. ARAVIND CAV ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT) The petitioner, a Special Tahsildar is before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 02.09.2020 in Application No.3675/2019 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) wherein the petitioner’s challenge to order of entrustment of enquiry to Lokayukta dated 3 03.07.2013 as well as nominating the Enquiry Officer under order dated 17.07.2013 is rejected. 2. Facts necessary to decide the lis are that, the allegations against the petitioner is that he demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.50,000/- on 02.09.2011 from the complainant Sri.R.Muniraju for making entries of the land in the revenue records. After investigation, the second respondent entrusted the enquiry to the first respondent by Government Order dated 03.07.2013 (Annexure-D). In pursuance of the said entrustment of enquiry to first respondent, the first respondent nominated the Enquiry Officer to conduct the enquiry and the nominated Enquiry Officer issued Articles of Charge dated 29.07.2013 (Annexure-E). On the same incident of demanding and accepting bribe to do official favouritism, charge sheet was filed under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for 4 short, ‘1988 Act’) in Special Case No.106/2012 on the file of the III Additional Sessions and Special Judge at Mysuru. The Sessions Court, by judgment dated 24.04.2017 in Special Case No.106/2012, after trial, convicted the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of 1988 Act. Against the said judgment and conviction, the petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No.750/2017 before this Court. This Court, by judgment dated 09.02.2018 acquitted the petitioner by setting aside the conviction passed by the Sessions Court. The first respondent filed Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Apex Court which came to be dismissed by order dated 27.08.2018. 3. The petitioner approached the Tribunal in Application No.3675/2019 questioning the Government Order dated 03.07.2013, entrustment of enquiry to first respondent as well as nomination of Enquiry Officer. The Tribunal, vide impugned order 5 rejected the petitioner’s application observing that the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are totally different and they operate in different fields with different objectives. Questioning the said order as well as entrustment of enquiry, petitioner is before this Court in this writ petition. 4. Heard learned counsel Sri.Monish Kumar for petitioner, learned counsel Sri.Venkatesh S. Arbatti for respondent No.1 and learned Additional Government Advocate Smt.B.Sukanya Baliga for respondent No.2. Perused the entire writ petition papers as well as the case laws cited by learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel Sri.Monish Kumar for petitioner would submit that the Tribunal committed a grave error in not appreciating the contention of the petitioner that when the petitioner is acquitted in 6 criminal proceedings, on the same set of facts, evidence, witnesses and material, the second respondent could not have entrusted departmental proceedings to 1st respondent. Learned counsel would invite attention of this Court to the witnesses and material placed on record before the Special Court and also invites attention of this Court to articles of charge to say that the same witnesses who are examined before the criminal Court are the witnesses before the departmental proceedings. It is submitted that the very same witnesses who had deposed in the criminal proceedings and whose evidence is appreciated by the criminal Court cannot be the basis for enquiry in departmental proceedings. 6. Further, learned counsel would submit that the first respondent challenged the acquittal of the petitioner before the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave 7 Petition filed by the first respondent confirming the acquittal of the petitioner. Thus, learned counsel would submit that the enquiry initiated on the same facts and material on which the petitioner is already acquitted would not be maintainable. Learned counsel referring to the judgment of this Court in criminal appeal would submit that this Court has given a categorical finding that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. 7. In support of the contention of the petitioner, learned counsel would place reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of G.M.TANK VS. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS1, CAPT. M. PAUL ANTHONY VS. BHARAT GOLD MINES LTD., AND ANOTHER2 and AEJAZ HUSSAIN 1 (2006) 5 SCC 446 2 (1999) 3 SCC 679 8 VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA3. Taking support from the above decisions, learned counsel for the petitioner would pray for allowing the writ petition. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 would support the order passed by the Tribunal by contending that the acquittal in criminal proceedings is not a bar to initiate departmental proceedings. It is their contention that in the departmental proceedings, strict rules of evidence is not applicable and charges are to be proved on the principles of preponderance of probabilities.Whereas, in criminal proceedings, strict rules of evidence is necessary to prove the charge. Therefore, referring to the judgment in criminal appeal, they would submit that, this Court has observed that there are reasonable doubts and the benefit of reasonable doubt will have to be given to 3 W.P.No.20329/2019 dated 29.05.2020 9 the accused. Further, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that there is no cause of action for the petitioner to challenge the charge memo itself. Unless the evidence is brought on record, the petitioner cannot contend that the evidence on record, both in criminal proceedings and departmental enquiry are one and the same. Further, learned counsel would submit that the decisions on which, the petitioner has placed reliance are matters arising out of departmental proceedings on completion of enquiry and none of the cases arise out of challenge to Articles of Charge itself. In the said background, learned counsel would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the entire writ petition papers, the only point which falls for our consideration is as to whether the impugned order passed by the Tribunal as well as entrustment of enquiry to the first 10 respondent under order dated 03.07.2013 (Annexure-D) requires interference at the hands of this Court? 10. Answer to the above point would be in the negative for the following reasons: As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court, acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power to conduct departmental proceedings in accordance with Service Rules and Regulations. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields with different objectives (Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited V/S C.Nagaraju ((2019) 10 SCC 367). Further it is also a settled position of law that acquittal in a criminal case ipso facto would not tantamount to closure or culmination of proceedings in departmental proceedings in favour of delinquent employee. 11 Acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise, and it is for the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding acquittal in the criminal case. As observed earlier, nature of the proceedings in both criminal and departmental proceedings are wholly separate and distinct. The degree of proof required to prove the charge in both the proceedings are entirely different. In the departmental proceedings, charges are to be proved on the principles of preponderance of probabilities. Whereas, in the criminal proceedings, charges are to be proved on the basis of strict rules of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. 11. In the case on hand, the petitioner is before the Tribunal as well as before this Court questioning the Government Order entrusting enquiry to the first respondent-Karnataka Lokayukta on the 12 ground that the facts, evidence, witnesses and material are one and the same in both criminal and departmental proceedings and as the petitioner is acquitted of the same charge in criminal proceedings, the departmental proceedings is not maintainable. The departmental proceedings is yet to commence and only Articles of Charge has been issued to the petitioner by the first respondent. As observed above, there is no bar for the Authorities to initiate departmental proceedings, though the petitioner is acquitted by a criminal court. Unless, evidence and material is placed before the Enquiry Officer for evaluation, it cannot be said that the evidence and material in both criminal and disciplinary proceedings are one and the same. Only after placing the evidence and material on record in the departmental proceedings it can be verified as to whether the evidence and material in both proceedings are one 13 and the same. At the initial stage of charge memo, it cannot be presumed that the evidence and material would be one and the same. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in G.M.TANK; CAPT. M. PAUL ANTHONY AND AEJAZ HUSSAIN (supra) in support of his contention that, once acquitted in a criminal case, departmental enquiry is not permissible. All the above decisions arise out of disciplinary proceedings culminating in imposition of penalty. In the disciplinary proceedings, evidence was placed on record and on evaluating evidence in both criminal and disciplinary proceedings, the Hon'ble Apex Court has come to the conclusion that the finding in the criminal proceedings would have a bearing on the disciplinary proceedings. In the case of PAUL ANTHONY, the delinquent official did not attend the enquiry on account of ill-health. 14 Though, by number of letters supported by Medical Certificates about the illness of the DGO, the Enquiry Officer rejected the request and recorded his finding holding the DGO guilty. Both the decisions arise after the DGO was found guilty by the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, the above decisions would not assist the petitioner in any manner, when he has challenged the charge memo, even before commencement of enquiry. 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in MAHARANA PRATHAP SINGH AND OTHERS v/s STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 890 has observed that while any acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings. However, it is further observed that it is well established that when the charges, evidence, 15 witnesses and circumstances in both departmental enquiry and criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. Whether the charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances in both disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar could be examined only after conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings where the evidence would be placed on record and witnesses would depose before the Enquiry Officer. Moreover, in MAHARANA PRATHAP SINGH case (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court observed at paragraph 51 that it is noteworthy that in the course of the enquiry, P.W.2 had also declined to identify the appellant/delinquent during cross-examination, and the informant was not called as a witness in the disciplinary proceedings. 14. The Tribunal rightly rejected petitioner’s challenge to the entrustment of enquiry order 16 observing that the criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are totally different and they are operating in different fields with different objectives. We do not find any error or illegality in the order passed by the Tribunal. 15. There is no merit in the writ petition and accordingly the writ petition stands rejected. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K.V.ARAVIND) JUDGE NC/MPK CT:bms