1 2025:CGHC:10984-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 155 of 2025 1. South Eastern Coalfield Limited Through The Chairman Cum Managing Director, Secl, Sipat Road, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 2. The Chief General Manager Secl Gevra Region, Post OfÏce - Gevra Project, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Anil Singh S/o Shri Durgvijay Singh Aged About 39 Years R/o B- 1/59, Urja Nagar Gevara Project, P.S. Deepka, Tah. Katghora, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. 2. The Collector District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. 3. The Sub-Divisional OfÏcer (Revenue) Gevra, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. 4. Additional Tahsildar Katghora, Up Tahsil Deepka, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. ...Respondent(s) For Appellants : Mr. Vaibhav Shukla, Advocate. For Respondent No. 1 : Mr. Deepak Jain, Advocate. For Respondents/State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Deputy Government Advocate. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.03.07 10:29:20 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 06 .03.2025 1. Heard Mr. Vaibhav Shukla, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. Deepak Jain, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 1 and Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the State. 2. The present intra Court appeal has been filed by the appellants against the order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 5029 of 2015 (Anil Singh vs. South Eastern Coalfield Ltd. & Others), whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner herein. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the respondent No.1/writ petitioner is the owner of the acquired land, which is identified by Khasra No. 630, measuring 0.66 acres. The land was acquired in 2004 for the Gevra Project under the CBA (A&D) Act of 1957 and an award was passed in 2012. It is an admitted fact that the respondent No. 1 being a minor without any legal representative fraudulently showing himself as person belonging to ab-original tribe, without permission of the Collector, contrary to the provisions of Section 165 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short, ‘Code of 1959’) purchased the subject land through registered sale-deed dated 24.12.1999 from one Jyoti 3 Bhushan Pratap Singh who also belonged to ab-original tribe. He would submit that respondent No. 1 uncle was ex-ofÏcer in SECL in general category. 4. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the subject land was acquired by SECL in the year 2004 for coal excavation under the provisions of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 (for short, ‘Act of 1957’) and accordingly, compensation of Rs. 5,27,805.60/- was given respondent No. 1/writ petitioner herein on recommendation of Revenue/State Authorities. He also submits that as per rehabilitation policy of the SECL, since, the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner herein was prima facie eligible for employment, for the purposes of granting employment, the appellants as per its SOP vide letters dated 18.12.2012, 25.12.2012 and 17.03.2013 directed the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner herein to submit caste certificate, explanation regarding his caste which was mentioned as Scheduled Tribe in the sale-deed so that, appropriate action of granting employment can be taken. 5. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner herein neither submitted any explanation regarding his caste nor did he submit any explanation with respect to purchasing of land from an ab-original tribal person without permission of Collector being a minor, therefore, his claim for grant of employment was rejected by the appellants on 11.04.2015. He also contended that from the above, it is evident that the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner herein has not only misrepresented, but has fraudulently entered into sale-deed with the person of an ab-original tribe showing 4 himself to be a person belonging to an ab-original tribe. Although, the compensation for land was granted to the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner, but the same would not create any estoppels against the appellants in granting employment to the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner when the transaction itself was transaction of purchase of land from an ab-original tribe, was null and void. Notwithstanding the above admitted position, the learned Single Judge has not only directed the appellants to give employment to the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner holding the denying of employment to the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner as mala fide action of the on the part of appellants, but has also granted consequential benefits with effect from 11.04.2015 which is completely illegal and unsustainable in the eyes of law. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants states that being instrumentality of State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India cannot ignore such illegality even though the transaction of purchasing of land by the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner as minor without any legal representative showing himself as person belonging to ab-original tribe. He further states as per Section 165 of the Code of 1959 a land belonging to ab-original tribe cannot be transferred to a non tribunal person. Despite repeated reminders, the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner has failed to submit the required caste certificate for employment purposes. As a result, the appellants have reasonable doubts regarding the respondent No. 1 acquisition of the land. Hence, the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 13.01.2025 is untenable in the eyes of law and deserves to be quashed. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel, appearing for respondent 5 No.1/writ petitioner submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner, in which no interference is called for. He further submits that once the respondent No.1 title has been acknowledged, land has been acquired and compensation has been paid to him for acquisition of his land, the validity of the sale deed cannot be disputed at subsequent stage that too by the third party to the sale deed i.e. SECL that too after acquisition and after payment of compensation to the respondent No. 1 and only in order to deprive him of his legitimate right of getting employment which the Rehabilitation Policy mandates and which has also been accepted by the SECL in its reply filed in the writ petition and the grant of employment has nothing to do with his caste whether he is a member of an aboriginal tribe or the General category and the denial of such employment is violative of his right guaranteed under the Rehabilitation Policy. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and materials available on record. 9. It is not in dispute that the respondent No. 1 land bearing Khasra No. 630 area 0.66 acre, situated at village Pondi has been subjected to acquisition by the competent authority for the benefit of SECL under the Act of 1957 for the Gevra project of the SECL in the year 2004 and against the subject land, compensation of Rs. 5,27,805.60/- has been paid to the petitioner on 17.07.2012. Admittedly, the land has been taken for the Gevra project and it has been vested with the Government free from all encumbrances. However, as per prevalent policy of the Coal India Limited, a person whose land has been acquired is also entitled for the 6 grant of employment, which the SECL has also admitted in its return/reply filed in the writ petition holding that, prima facie, respondent No. 1 appears to be eligible for grant of employment and his case was also considered, but since as per letter/order dated 11.04.2015, the respondent No. 1 did not submit his caste certificate being the member of an aboriginal tribe and he also did not offer his explanation as to why in the registered sale deed dated 24.12.1992 the fact of his being minor at that time has not been mentioned, employment has been denied to the respondent No. 1 as per the Rehabilitation Policy. 10. The title and ownership of the respondent No. 1 have already been admitted by the acquiring authority and the SECL and his land has already been acquired and compensation has also paid to him without raising any kind of dispute with regard to his title and ownership and the sale deed, even otherwise, has become final which cannot be questioned by the third party including the SECL and the validity of the sale deed can only be questioned before the jurisdictional Civil Court in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Satya Pal Anand vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, reported in AIR 2016 SC 4995, which states as under:- “34. The role of the Sub-Registrar (Registration) stands discharged, once the document is registered (see Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan [State of U.P. v. Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan, AIR 1961 SC 787] ). Section 17 of the 1908 Act deals with documents which require compulsory registration. Extinguishment deed is one such document referred to in Section 17(1)(b). 7 Section 18 of the same Act deals with documents, registration whereof is optional. Section 20 of the Act deals with documents containing interlineations, blanks, erasures or alterations. Section 21 provides for description of property and maps or plans and Section 22 deals with the description of houses and land by reference to government maps and surveys. There is no express provision in the 1908 Act which empowers the Registrar to recall such registration. The fact whether the document was properly presented for registration cannot be reopened by the Registrar after its registration. The power to cancel the registration is a substantive matter. In absence of any express provision in that behalf, it is not open to assume that the Sub- Registrar (Registration) would be competent to cancel the registration of the documents in question. Similarly, the power of the Inspector General is limited to do superintendence of Registration OfÏces and make rules in that behalf. Even the Inspector General has no power to cancel the registration of any document which has already been registered. 36. If the document is required to be compulsorily registered, but while doing so some irregularity creeps in, that, by itself, cannot result in a fraudulent action of the State Authority. Non-presence of the other party to the extinguishment deed presented by the Society 8 before the Registering OfÏcer by no standard can be said to be a fraudulent action per se. The fact whether that was done deceitfully to cause loss and harm to the other party to the deed, is a question of fact which must be pleaded and proved by the party making such allegation. That fact cannot be presumed. SufÏce it to observe that since the provisions in the 1908 Act enables the Registering OfÏcer to register the documents presented for registration by one party and execution thereof to be admitted or denied by the other party thereafter, it is unfathomable as to how the registration of the document by following procedure specified in the 1908 Act can be said to be fraudulent. As aforementioned, some irregularity in the procedure committed during the registration process would not lead to a fraudulent execution and registration of the document, but a case of mere irregularity. In either case, the party aggrieved by such registration of document is free to challenge its validity before the civil court.” 11. Not only this, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jamila Begum v. Shami Mohd., and Another, reported in AIR 2019 SC 72 has held that there is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed and a registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law and held in paragraph No. 16 as under:- “16. Sale deed dated 21-12-1970 in favour of Jamila 9 Begum is a registered document and the registration of the sale deed reinforces valid execution of the sale deed. A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to show that the transaction is not valid in law. In Prem Singh v. Birbal [Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353] , it was held as under: (SCC pp. 360-61, para 27) “27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.”” 12. Coming to the facts of the case in light of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Satya Pal Anand (supra) and Jamila Begum (supra), it is quite vivid that the SECL has travelled beyond its jurisdiction. The sale deed being a registered document which the SECL/State has already admitted as it is by acquiring his land and making payment of compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,27,805.60/- to the respondent No. 1 on 17.07.2012 and did not dispute while acquiring his land and making payment of compensation to him. Now, the other obligation as per the SECL is to provide employment to one member of the family, whose land has been acquired, which the respondent No. 1 claimed, but the SECL questioned the validity of the sale deed and came to the conclusion that the sale deed is not validly executed and suspected 10 that the respondent No. 1 did not belong to an aboriginal tribe or Schedule Tribe and further the respondent No. 1 was minor on the date of registration of the sale deed in his favour. 13. At the time of acquisition, the SECL has clearly promised to the respondent No. 1; firstly, that on acquisition of the land, compensation will be paid to him and secondly, that upon acquisition of his land, one member of his family will be given employment. The first promise i.e. payment of compensation has been fulfilled by the SECL, but the SECL has declined to grant employment to one member of respondent No. 1 family which is hit by the doctrine of “Promissory Estoppel”. The said doctrine states as under:- “where one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the party who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relationship as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced, even though it is not supported in point of law by any consideration, but only by his word.” 14. The concept of promissory estoppel relates to a representation of the future intention. If the promise is made with the intention that the other 11 party should act upon it then it may give rise to the person to whom it is made from the conduct of the person who has offered such promise. The alteration of position by the party is the only indispensable requirement of the doctrine of promissory estoppels and it is not necessary to prove further any damage, detriment or prejudice to the party asserting the estoppel. In the matter of Delhi Cloth and General Mill Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1987 SC 2414, it has been observed in paragraphs No.18 to 20 as under:- “18. Here the Railways Rates Tribunal apparently, appears to have gone off the track. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has not been correctly understood by the Tribunal. It is true, that in the formative period, it was generally said that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked by the promisee unless he has suffered “detriment” or “prejudice”. It was often said simply, that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. But this has now been explained in so many decisions all over. All that is now required is that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given to him. Must have relied upon the representation made to him. It means, the party has changed or altered the position by relying on the assurance or the representation. The alteration of position by the party is the only indispensable requirement of the doctrine. It is not necessary to prove further any damage, detriment or 12 prejudice to the party asserting the estoppel. The court, however, would compel the opposite party to adhere to the representation acted upon or abstained from acting. The entire doctrine proceeds on the premise that it is reliance based and nothing more. 19. This principle would be clear if we study the cases in which the doctrine has been applied ever since it burst out into sudden blaze in 1946. Lord Denning in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [1947 KB 130 : (1956) 1 All ER 256] , sitting as a trial Judge, asserted: A promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon, and in fact acted upon is binding. 20. The history of the High Trees [1947 KB 130 : (1956) 1 All ER 256] principle is too well known to bear repetition. It will be enough to make the following points. The promisor is bound because he led the promisee to commit himself to change the position. If the promisee has acted upon the promise, the promisor is precluded from receding (sic resiling from) his promise. No further detriment to the promisee upon his temporary interests need be established. This position has been made clear by Lord Denning himself in his article “Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Consideration” [ Modern Law Review, Vol. 15 at p. 5] : 13 “A man should keep his word. All the more so when the promise is not a bare promise but is made with the intention that the other party should act upon it. Just as contract is different from tort and from estoppel, so also in the sphere now under discussion promises may give rise to a different equity from other conduct. The difference may lie in the necessity of showing “detriment”. Where one party deliberately promises to waive, modify or discharge his strict legal rights, intending the other party to act on the faith of promise, and the other party actually does act on it, then it is contrary, not only to equity but also to good faith, to allow the promisor to go back on his promise. It should not be necessary for the other party to show that he acted to his detriment in reliance on the promise. It should be sufÏcient that he acted on it.” 15. As such, the SECL is bound by the promise which has been made at the time of acquisition of land of respondent No. 1 for making payment of the compensation and to provide employment to one member of his family by the doctrine of “Promissory Estoppel”. The first promise of making payment of compensation has already been made to the respondent No. 1, but the employment to one member of the family has not been granted which is against the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel. Even otherwise, validity of the sale deed cannot be questioned by the third party or by the stranger to the sale deed and it can be put to question before the jurisdictional Civil Court by person aggrieved. Even the sale 14 deed of the respondent No. 1 has not been declared null and void by the Collector under the provisions of Section 165 (6) of the Code of 1959. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mohan Mahto v. Central Coal Field Ltd. and others, reported in (2007) 8 SCC 549, which relates to Central Coalfields Ltd., which is also subsidiary company of the Coal India like the SECL frowned upon the Central Coalfields Limited and held that public sector undertaking is the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, it must act fairly and reasonably. It was observed as under:- “17. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the case for grant of compassionate appointment of a minor was required to be considered in terms of Sub-clause (iii) of Clause 9.5.0 of the N.C.W.A.V. In terms of the said provision, the name of the appellant was to be kept on a live roster. He was to remain on the live roster till he attained the age of 18 years. Respondents did not perform their duties cast on them thereunder. It took an unilateral stand that an application has been filed in the year 1999 in the prescribed form. For complying with the provisions of a settlement which is binding on the parties, bona fide or otherwise of the respondent must be judged from the fact as to whether it had discharged his duties thereunder or not. In this case, not only it failed and/ or neglected to do so, but as indicated hereinbefore it took an unholy stand that the elder brother of the appellant being employed, he was not 15 entitled to appointment on the compassionate ground. Thus, what really impelled the respondent in denying the benefit of compassionate appointment to the appellant is, therefore, open to guess. We expect a public sector undertaking which is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India not only to act fairly but also reasonably and bona fide. In this case, we are satisfied that the action of the respondent is neither fair nor reasonable nor bonafide.” 17. While passing the impugned judgment, in view of the aforesaid discussion, learned Single Judge held that the action of the appellants- SECL in denying employment after having made a promise, at the time of acquisition, is clearly illegal and arbitrary and smacks mala-fide. Consequently, the appellants-SECL is directed to consider and grant employment to one member of the family of the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner herein within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of copy of the order dated 13.01.2025 without insisting the compliance of twin conditions mentioned in order dated 11.04.2015 and case of respondent No. 1/writ petitioner will be considered as on 11.04.2015 i.e., the date on which he was first denied the employment by the SECL and he will be entitled for the consequential benefits w.e.f. 11.04.2015. 18. Considering the pleadings made in writ appeal, submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also considering the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed 16 any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court. 19. Accordingly, the present writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan