ORDER : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The petitioners seek to challenge the order dated 07.02.2025 passed in Case No. A-20(1)/2024-25, whereby the representation/appeal preferred by the petitioners against the order of the Commissioner dated 30.10.2024 in Case No. 89/A- 20(1)/2023-24 has been rejected, thereby affirming the earlier decision of non-renewal of lease. The petitioners are entitled to renewal of lease as a matter of right under the terms and conditions of the original lease deed. Relying on such terms, the petitioners have altered their position to their detriment by investing substantial resources and constructing extensive infrastructure including a Hospital, Nursing school, Church, Christian community centre, and staff quarters. While applying for renewal, the petitioners unequivocally agreed to abide by each and every term and condition of the original lease. However, acting contrary to law and principles of natural justice, the application for renewal was arbitrarily rejected. Subsequently, without issuing any notice or providing the Petitioners an opportunity to respond to the report allegedly obtained by the Collector from the office of the Tahsildar, the lease was unilaterally cancelled on vague and unsubstantiated grounds of breach of lease terms. Pursuant thereto, the State authorities, without following due process of law, claimed possession over the subject land and commenced demolition of the petitioners’ structures. This series of arbitrary and unlawful actions has already led to multiple rounds of litigation before this Hon’ble Court. Ultimately, by order dated 06.11.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No. 5549/2024, this Hon’ble Court directed the State authorities to decide the Petitioners’ representation. The said representation was rejected vide the impugned order dated 07.02.2025, without any meaningful consideration of the factual matrix or the complex legal issues involved. Moreover, during the pendency of the legal proceedings, the respondents, with the apparent intent to render the pending litigation infructuous and frustrate the legal remedies available to the petitioners, proceeded with the demolition of the superstructures erected by the petitioners. The actions and omissions of the respondents, as delineated hereinabove, constitute gross violations of the petitioners’ fundamental, constitutional, and legal rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, and 30 of the Constitution of India, along with matters incidental and ancillary thereto. Through this writ petition, the petitioners seek the following reliefs : - “10.1. The actions and omissions of the respondents, as delineated hereinabove, constitute gross violations of the petitioners’ fundamental, constitutional, and legal rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, and 30 of the Constitution of India, along with matters incidental and ancillary thereto. Through this writ petition, the petitioners seek the following reliefs : - “10.1. A writ and/ or an order in the nature of appropriate writ do issue calling for the records from the respondent authorities pertaining to the petitioner's case for its perusal and to ascertain the fact of arbitrariness and acting against the principles of law and natural justice in the facts and circumstances of the case. 10.2. A writ and/or an order in the nature of writ of certiorari do issue quashing the impugned order dated 7.2.2025 (Annexure P-1) and in effect a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other nature do issue directing the respondent authorities not only to renew the lease of the petitioners for a further terms of 30 years, giving option to the respondent authorities to enhance the rent reasonably, with a condition of restoration of Superstructure as lying on the leasehold land demolished during the adjudication of right of the petitioners to hold the land with malice in law and malice in fact and in violation of petitioners' fundamental and constitutional rights. 10.3. A writ and/or an order in the nature of appropriate writ directing payment of compensation of petitioners as deem fit or reasonable for activities criminal trespass and demolition and taking away the right of the petitioners, be it leasehold right or ownership right under the relevant statute in the facts and circumstances of the case. 10.4. Cost of the proceedings. 10.5. Any other writs and directions that may be deemed fit and just in the facts & circumstances of case” 2. The brief facts of the case are that the present writ petition has been filed by a Minority Christian Religious and Charitable Association, Disciples of Christ, and its Director, aggrieved by the arbitrary and unconstitutional actions of the respondent-State authorities seeking to dispossess them from a leasehold property in Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, which they have lawfully occupied and developed for over a century for religious, educational, and charitable purposes. The Disciples of Christ began its mission in India in the year 1882 and has been continuously engaged in evangelism and public service through its affiliated body, the Christian Woman’s Board of Mission (CWBM), which established the Jackman Memorial Mission Hospital, a Nurses’ Training School, a Women’s and Children’s Hospital, and a Chapel on the subject land. The legal and institutional legacy of the association has been judicially recognized by the then Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeal No. 86/1980 (Padri E. Bhagirathi v. Bajrang Agrawal & Ors.), wherein the existence and role of the Disciples of Christ and CWBM were specifically acknowledged. The land in question was originally granted on lease by the then State of Madhya Pradesh in the year 1925, and the lease was regularly renewed up to 1994. Thereafter, although the formal renewal was pending, the petitioners continued in uninterrupted possession, paying municipal and statutory dues and carrying out public service activities without any objection from the authorities. In 1969, trusteeship was transferred to the United Church of North India Trust Association (UCNITA), a registered body, which has since managed the affairs of the mission. The lease was executed in Form-H under the Revenue Book Circular, which contains specific covenants including Clause 8, mandating renewal of lease for successive terms of thirty years at the request of the lessee, with permissible enhancement of rent or modification of conditions. Despite multiple applications, representations, and continued public service on the land, the petitioners’ requests for renewal were met with silence, evasion, or rejection on hyper- technical grounds. Notices issued to the petitioners were either undated or backdated and failed to provide adequate opportunity of hearing. Simultaneously, the local administration initiated steps to transfer the land to other State instrumentalities for purposes such as Smart City development, disregarding the historic nature of the property, its religious and charitable usage, and the rights of the petitioners under the Constitution and applicable laws. Attempts to deposit lease rent were deliberately obstructed by the authorities, and the petitioners were not only denied renewal but were also subjected to a coercive and discriminatory campaign of dispossession. Attempts to deposit lease rent were deliberately obstructed by the authorities, and the petitioners were not only denied renewal but were also subjected to a coercive and discriminatory campaign of dispossession. The situation escalated when, during the pendency of a statutory appeal and interim relief application filed by the petitioners before the Secretary, Department of Revenue, Government of Chhattisgarh, the local authorities, without awaiting a decision, mobilized bulldozers and demolition machinery and unlawfully razed nearly 80% of the standing structures on the premises on 08.01.2025. This action was carried out despite repeated representations and absence of any conclusive legal determination. Faced with imminent dispossession, the petitioners urgently approached this Hon’ble Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 142/2025. Vide order dated 09.01.2025, this Hon’ble Court took note of the pending appeal and interim application and directed that the same be decided within 15 days and that no further demolition be carried out until such decision. However, the State authorities flouted this direction, and the appeal was rejected only on 07.02.2025, beyond the prescribed timeline, without seeking any extension of time and in utter disregard of the judicial mandate. The impugned order passed by the appellate authority is vitiated by legal malice and non-application of mind. Although the petitioners had filed detailed written submissions on 16.01.2025, highlighting their leasehold rights, constitutional protection, historical occupation, and compliance with lease conditions, the appellate authority cursorily dismissed the appeal by relying solely on Sections 158(3), 158(4), and 165(7) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, without addressing the broader legal issues raised. The authority misapplied Section 182(2) of the Code, which deals with ejectment of a government lessee on limited grounds such as non-payment of rent, misuse, or expiration of lease. In the present case, the proceedings pertained to renewal and not ejectment, and thus, invocation of this provision was wholly inapposite. The respondents further alleged that the land had been misused for purposes other than religious activity, citing the operation of a hospital as a violation. This contention is factually incorrect and legally unsustainable. Clause 5 of the lease deed allows use of the land for lawful trades or businesses not regulated by municipal law, and there exists no specific clause prohibiting the operation of a hospital or nursing school. This contention is factually incorrect and legally unsustainable. Clause 5 of the lease deed allows use of the land for lawful trades or businesses not regulated by municipal law, and there exists no specific clause prohibiting the operation of a hospital or nursing school. Even if any such implied restriction is presumed, it would be void under Sections 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which prohibit absolute restraints on transfer or enjoyment of property. By virtue of Section 158(3) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, the petitioners are entitled to the status of bhumiswami, as they were in lawful possession under a State lease prior to the 1992 amendment (vide MP Act No. 17/1992). The proviso appended to Section 158(3), which restricts transfer within ten years of lease or allotment, has no applicability in the present case where the original lease was granted in 1925 and there has been no transfer violating the said proviso. The denial of bhumiswami status by misapplying this proviso reflects a prejudicial reading of the law aimed at frustrating the rights of the petitioners. The actions of the respondent authorities have, therefore, not only violated the express terms of the lease deed (especially Clause 8 mandating renewal) but have also resulted in infringement of the petitioners’ fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 25, 26, 29, and 30 of the Constitution of India. The destruction of religious and charitable infrastructure without authority of law, denial of natural justice, and deliberate flouting of the orders of this Hon’ble Court collectively demonstrate an arbitrary, discriminatory, and mala fide exercise of power. The petitioners, being members of a minority community running a historical mission and healthcare centre, have been targeted through hostile administrative action, which warrants immediate judicial scrutiny and intervention. The petitioners have no alternate efficacious remedy except to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the protection of their fundamental and legal rights and to prevent irreversible harm to their religious, educational, and charitable mission. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order rejecting their prayer for renewal of lease and the consequential coercive actions taken by the respondent authorities are arbitrary, perverse, and unsustainable in law. The entire action reflects a prejudiced and one-sided approach, ignoring both the factual matrix and binding legal principles applicable to the case at hand. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order rejecting their prayer for renewal of lease and the consequential coercive actions taken by the respondent authorities are arbitrary, perverse, and unsustainable in law. The entire action reflects a prejudiced and one-sided approach, ignoring both the factual matrix and binding legal principles applicable to the case at hand. It is submitted that the impugned order has been passed without proper consideration of the foundational facts and the long-standing historical possession of the petitioners over the land in question, which they have occupied and lawfully used since 1882 for religious, medical, and charitable purposes. The documents on record, including the lease deed executed in Form-H under the Revenue Book Circular (RBC), clearly establish the petitioners' status as lawful lessees, entitled to successive renewals of lease for 30-year terms as per Clause 8 of the lease. The clause mandates that upon request and payment of rent (even enhanced rent as determined by the State), the lessor is legally obligated to execute a renewed lease deed. The petitioners have at all times expressed readiness and willingness to comply with any revised terms and pay the enhanced lease rent, yet their request for renewal has been arbitrarily denied. The impugned order, passed with a complete disregard for the binding terms of the lease and without affording a meaningful opportunity of hearing, stands vitiated for breach of the principles of natural justice. No proper show-cause notice was issued to the petitioners, nor were they informed of any alleged legal infirmity or violation of lease conditions warranting rejection. The process followed was wholly perfunctory, mechanical, and in blatant violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The authorities have further failed to consider the constitutional protections available to the petitioners under Part III of the Constitution. The petitioners, being members of a Christian minority community, are entitled to enforce their rights under Articles 25, 26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution, which guarantee freedom of religion, the right to manage religious institutions, and protection of cultural and educational rights of minorities. The denial of lease renewal is a direct assault on these rights, especially considering the fact that the land in question houses a mission hospital, a chapel, a nursing school, and charitable facilities, all of which are operated by the petitioners in service to humanity, irrespective of caste, creed, or religion. The denial of lease renewal is a direct assault on these rights, especially considering the fact that the land in question houses a mission hospital, a chapel, a nursing school, and charitable facilities, all of which are operated by the petitioners in service to humanity, irrespective of caste, creed, or religion. It is further submitted that the impugned decision ignores the legal rights of the petitioners as lessees under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which grants enforceable rights of possession, quiet enjoyment, and assignment, unless expressly and lawfully restricted. Clauses 5, 6, and 7 of the lease deed reinforce these protections. Even assuming, without conceding, that there was some deviation in user, the lease terms do not permit eviction or re-entry without due process, but only contemplate penalties or fines. In any case, the authorities never initiated any formal proceedings to establish violation of lease terms, nor was any proof furnished of misuse of the land. The invocation of the ground of 'misuse', based on the establishment of a hospital, is both factually misconceived and legally untenable, as service to humanity is a central tenet of the Christian faith and squarely falls within the scope of permitted use. The entire approach of the respondents reflects a calculated effort to dispossess the petitioners under the pretext of Smart City development. This intention becomes apparent from the correspondence exchanged between the Municipal Corporation and Smart City Limited, revealing an attempt to allot the land to third parties unconnected with any religious or charitable work. The rejection of the petitioners’ lease renewal request is thus prompted not by legal considerations, but by the extraneous desire to appropriate a prime parcel of urban land in Bilaspur city, thereby revealing malice in fact and law. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the lease, by its very nature, is inheritable, renewable, and capable of extension. Clause 9 of the lease explicitly defines the 'lessee' to include successors, assigns, heirs, administrators, and representatives. As such, the continued possession and prayer for renewal by the petitioners, being successors-in-interest, is not only lawful but creates a legitimate expectation in their favour. The authorities have failed to discharge their legal and fiduciary duty to consider the petitioners' request in light of the legal regime and historical background of the property. As such, the continued possession and prayer for renewal by the petitioners, being successors-in-interest, is not only lawful but creates a legitimate expectation in their favour. The authorities have failed to discharge their legal and fiduciary duty to consider the petitioners' request in light of the legal regime and historical background of the property. Moreover, the denial of lease renewal and demolition of nearly 80% of the structures on the land, despite the pendency of the petitioners’ statutory appeal and interim application, and in contravention of order dated 09.01.2025 passed by this Court in WPC No. 142/2025, amounts to willful defiance and gross contempt of judicial authority. The order was passed after this Court was apprised of the fact that the appeal was pending and had directed that no further demolition shall take place until a final decision on the appeal. However, not only was the appeal decided beyond the 15-day timeline, but it was also done in a most perfunctory manner, without addressing the central legal issues raised in the appeal and the written submissions dated 16.01.2025. The authorities have also failed to consider that, by virtue of Section 158(3) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (as amended by MP Act No. 17/1992), the petitioners are entitled to the status of bhumiswami, being lessees in possession under a grant by the State prior to the said amendment. The proviso to Section 158(3), which prohibits transfer of such land within ten years of allotment, has no application in the present case, as the lease dates back to 1925. The legal fiction created by Section 158(3) has not been given its full effect, and the authorities have wrongfully relied on the proviso in isolation to defeat the petitioners’ claim to bhumiswami status. The non-renewal of the lease since 1994 has not only jeopardized the petitioners’ legal rights but has severely impaired the functioning of their institutions. In the absence of a renewed lease, the institutions have been denied permissions for repair, renovation, and development. Consequently, donations and funding have dried up, threatening the very survival of a 140-year- old religious and charitable legacy. The discrimination against the Christian community is evident from the targeted actions of the State, and the petitioners’ legitimate and constitutionally protected activities have been stifled solely because the land now sits in a prime location in the city. Consequently, donations and funding have dried up, threatening the very survival of a 140-year- old religious and charitable legacy. The discrimination against the Christian community is evident from the targeted actions of the State, and the petitioners’ legitimate and constitutionally protected activities have been stifled solely because the land now sits in a prime location in the city. It is thus submitted that the impugned order is perverse, violative of the principles of natural justice, contrary to the lease conditions and established law, and amounts to infringement of the petitioners’ fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 25, 26, 29, and 30 of the Constitution. 5. The action of State in this case amounts to hostile discrimination and an abuse of administrative power, carried out in disregard of due process and constitutional norms. 6. In light of the above, the petitioners pray that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order rejecting the renewal of lease; direct the respondent authorities to forthwith execute a renewed lease deed in favour of the petitioners in accordance with Clause 8 of the lease deed; restrain the respondents from taking any coercive action including demolition or dispossession; declare that the petitioners are entitled to protection of their fundamental rights as a minority institution and to consider taking cognizance of the wilful disobedience of the order dated 09.01.2025 passed by this Court. In support of the contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme in the matters of Sivayogeswara Cotton Press, Devangere and Others vs. M. Panchaksharappa and Another , reported in (1961) SCC Online SC 154 , R. Kempraj vs. Barton Son and Co. , reported in (1969) 2 SCC 594 State of U. P. and others vs. Lalji Tandon (dead) through Lrs. reported in (2004) 1 SCC 1 , Deccan Paper Mills Company Limited vs. Regency Mahavir Properties and Others , reported in (2021) 4 SCC 786 and decision of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Nagpur Diocesan Trust Association and another vs. State of M. P. and Others , passed in W. A. No. 1601 of 2017. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Prafulla N. Bharat, learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. Praveen Das, Dy. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Prafulla N. Bharat, learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. Praveen Das, Dy. Advocate General for the State / respondents No. 1 to 5 submit that the instant writ petition deserves to be dismissed in limine as being devoid of merit, misconceived in law, and not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No infringement of any fundamental or legal right of the petitioner institution has been demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this Hon’ble Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. The petitioner institution, while seeking renewal of lease, made a false declaration dated 19.05.2022 through its Director Dr. Raman Jogi, asserting that there had been no change in the purpose of the lease and that there were no violations of the lease terms. However, this claim stands falsified by the findings of a 6-Member Committee constituted by the Collector, the report of which (Annexure R-1) clearly establishes serious breaches of lease conditions and deviation from the original lease purpose. Moreover, the petitioner sold 92,096 sq. ft. of leasehold land via a registered sale deed dated 17.09.1971 to a third party without any intimation or approval of the competent authority, which is a flagrant violation of the lease deed, the Revenue Book Circular (RBC), and applicable government instructions. As per Para 26, Part I of the RBC, Nazul land allotted on concessional terms is subject to strict compliance of conditions, including mandatory adherence to the original purpose, prohibition of alienation without approval, and reversion of land upon diversion of use. The petitioner institution not only alienated part of the land but also changed its use, thus violating Clause 26(5)(4)(b) which empowers the Government to repossess the land and any construction thereupon. These proceedings were duly initiated and concluded under the said clause, culminating in the surrender of possession by the Director of petitioner on 22.08.2024 (Annexures R-3 and R-4). These actions have not been challenged by the petitioner and hence have attained finality. It is an admitted position that the original lease expired on 31.03.1994, and no application for renewal was made at that time. The first application for renewal was made nearly 27 years later, rendering it grossly belated and legally untenable. The petitioner had no subsisting right, title, or interest after expiry of the lease, and mere possession, unauthorized after 1994, does not create any equitable or enforceable right. The first application for renewal was made nearly 27 years later, rendering it grossly belated and legally untenable. The petitioner had no subsisting right, title, or interest after expiry of the lease, and mere possession, unauthorized after 1994, does not create any equitable or enforceable right. The original lease, granted to the Christian Women’s Board of Mission, was limited in duration and expressly subject to renewal at the discretion of the State, provided that the lessee complied with the terms and conditions. The petitioner failed to comply with such terms, including non- payment of dues, unauthorized alienation, and change in user.The renewal clause does not confer an automatic or vested right to extension, especially in absence of a timely application and continued compliance. It is further contended that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to enforce a right which does not exist. The petitioner has failed to establish infringement of any enforceable legal or constitutional right. The application for renewal was rejected on valid grounds supported by documentary evidence and in accordance with law. Hence, no ground for judicial review arises. The entire process, from the rejection of the renewal application to the proceedings under RBC and eventual surrender of possession, was undertaken after due notice and in adherence to law. The petitioner institution voluntarily handed over possession, thereby accepting the legality and correctness of decision of the Collector. Thus, the instant challenge is barred by principles of acquiescence and waiver. The petitioner has not come before this Hon’ble Court with clean hands. Having suppressed material facts, such as the sale of leasehold land and continuing in possession post-expiry without legal basis, the petitioner is not entitled to any equitable relief. It is trite law that one who seeks equity must do equity. The reliance placed by petitioner on the 1979 Deed of Trusteeship is misplaced as the same has already been declared void by a competent Civil Court in Civil Suit No. 19-A/2004. Further, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or Section 158 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code have no application to Nazul land, which is governed by special rules and policy instructions, including the RBC. The spot verification conducted by the authorities was in furtherance of the own application submitted by petitioner for renewal and did not culminate in any penal or adverse order at that stage. The spot verification conducted by the authorities was in furtherance of the own application submitted by petitioner for renewal and did not culminate in any penal or adverse order at that stage. Hence, the question of denial of hearing does not arise, and no procedural violation can be alleged. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned actions of the State authorities are legal, justified, and based on cogent material. The writ petition, being devoid of substance and filed with oblique motives, deserves outright dismissal with exemplary costs. The petitioner, having acted in breach of public trust and lease conditions, is not entitled to claim any right over public land. Learned State Counsel has also raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of both the application for renewal of lease as well as the present writ petition, on the ground that the petitioners lack the requisite locus standi to either seek renewal of the lease or to maintain the instant proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been contended that the petitioners, being a society which is not a juristic person in the eyes of law and therefore not competent to hold property in its own name, cannot claim any enforceable legal right over the subject land. Consequently, in the absence of any subsisting legal right or entitlement, the petitioners are precluded from seeking any discretionary or equitable relief from this Court. It is, therefore prayed for dismissal of writ petition, in the interest of justice. In support of the contentions, learned State counsel relied upon the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of R. V. Bhupal Prasad vs. State of A. P. and Others , reported in (1995) 5 SCC 698 , M. P. Ram Mohan Raja vs. State of T. N. and Others , reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78 , Saroj Screens Private Limited vs. Ghanshyam and Others , reported in (2012) 11 SCC 434, Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan vs. State of Maharashtra and Others , reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465 , decision of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Diwan Singh vs. State of M.P., reported in 2008 (3) M.P.L.J. and decision of this Court in the matter of Purshottam Sarin and others vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, reported in (2009) SCC OnLine Chh 63. 8. Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, Advocate along with Mr. 8. Mr. Ranbir Singh Marhas, Advocate along with Mr. Venketesh Pandey, Advocate for the respondent No. 6 submit that the instant writ petition, as framed and filed by the petitioners, is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. It is an admitted position that the lease granted to the petitioners has already been terminated upon expiry of its term, and their application for renewal has been duly considered and rejected by the competent authority in accordance with law. The land in question being Nazul land, is owned by the State, and it is well within the rights of the State or the Nazul authorities to decide whether or not to grant or renew leases of its properties. It is further submitted that the petitioners’ institution was found to have been misutilising the leasehold property by putting it to use for purposes other than those sanctioned under the original lease, thereby justifying the cancellation and subsequent rejection of their appeal / representation by both the competent and appellate authorities. The impugned decisions under challenge, therefore, suffer from no illegality, perversity, or procedural infirmity warranting interference by this Court. Moreover, the mere long and continuous possession of the petitioners over the said property does not create or confer any vested right in their favour to claim ownership or perpetual rights over public land. It is also pertinent to submit that the petitioner being a registered society, is not a juristic person capable of holding property in its name, as has been authoritatively laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Illachi Devi vs. Jain Society for Protection of Orphans India , reported in (2003) 8 SCC 413 . Therefore, the petitioners’ claim stands legally untenable. In light of the foregoing, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to dismiss the present writ petition. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and carefully perused the documents placed on record with utmost circumspection. 10. Upon careful examination of the case record and the documents annexed thereto by the petitioner, it is appropriate to first refer to the relevant provisions of law that will guide the determination of the issues raised in this matter. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines the lease which is as follows : “105. 10. Upon careful examination of the case record and the documents annexed thereto by the petitioner, it is appropriate to first refer to the relevant provisions of law that will guide the determination of the issues raised in this matter. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines the lease which is as follows : “105. Lease defined .- A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined.—The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent.” 11. Likewise, Section 106 is in respect of duration of certain lease : “ 106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage .- (1)In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice. (2)Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the period mentioned in sub- section (1) shall commence from the date of receipt of notice. (3)A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub- section. (3)A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub- section. (4)Every notice under sub-section (1) must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.” 12. Section 107 is related to the procedure regarding grant of lease and Section 108 is in respect of rights and liability, which are quoted below : “107. Leases how made . - A lease of immovable property for any term exceeding one year, and reserving a yearly rent, exceeding rupees fifty can be made only by a registered instrument. [All other leases of immoveable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession] [Where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the leasee :] Provided that the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immoveable property, other than leases from year to year or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession.” 108. Rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee.- In the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary, the lessor and the lessee of immoveable property, as against one another, respectively, possess the rights and are subject to the liabilities mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property leased:- (A) Rights and Liabilities of the Lessor (a)The lessor is bound to disclose to the lessee any material defect in the property, with reference to its intended use, of which the former is and the latter is not aware, and which the latter could not with ordinary care discover; (b)the lessor is bound on the lessee’s request to put him in possession of the property; (c)the lessor shall be deemed to contract with the lessee that, if the latter pays the rent reserved by the lease and performs the contracts binding on the lessee, he may hold the property during the time limited by the lease without interruption. The benefit of such contract shall be annexed to and go with the lessee’s interest as such, and may be enforced by every person in whom that interest is for the whole or any part thereof from time to time vested. The benefit of such contract shall be annexed to and go with the lessee’s interest as such, and may be enforced by every person in whom that interest is for the whole or any part thereof from time to time vested. (B)Rights and Liabilities of the Lessee (d)If during the continuance of the lease any accession is made to the property, such accession (subject to the law relating to alluvion for the time being in force) shall be deemed to be comprised in the lease; (e)if by fire, tempest or flood, or violence of an army or of a mob, or other irresistible force, any material part of the property be wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purposes for which it was let, the lease shall, at the option of the lessee, be void: Provided that, if the injury be occasioned by the wrongful act or default of the lessee, he shall not be entitled to avail himself of the benefit of this provision; (f)if the lessor neglects to make, within a reasonable time after notice, any repairs which he is bound to make to the property, the lessee may make the same himself, and deduct the expense of such repairs with interest from the rent, or otherwise recover it from the lessor; (g)if the lessor neglects to make any payment which he is bound to make, and which, if not made by him, is recoverable from the lessee or against the property, the lessee may make such payment himself, and deduct it with interest from the rent, or otherwise recover it from the lessor; (h)the lessee may even after the determination of the lease remove, at any time whilst he is in possession of the property leased but not afterwards all things which he has attached to the earth; provided he leaves the property in the state in which he received it; (i)when a lease of uncertain duration determines by any means except the fault of the lessee, he or his legal representative is entitled to all the crops planted or sown by the lessee and growing upon the property when the lease determines, and to free ingress and egress to gather and carry them; (j)the lessee may transfer absolutely or by way of mortgage or sub-lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property, and any transferee of such interest or part may again transfer it. The lessee shall not, by reason only of such transfer, cease to be subject to any of the liabilities attaching to the lease; Nothing in this clause shall be deemed to authorise a tenant having an untransferable right of occupancy, the farmer of an estate in respect of which default has been made in paying revenue, or the lessee of an estate under the management of a Court of Wards, to assign his interest as such tenant, farmer or lessee; (k)the lessee is bound to disclose to the lessor any fact as to the nature or extent of the interest which the lessee is about to take, of which the lessee is, and the lessor is not, aware, and which materially increases the value of such interest; (l)the lessee is bound to pay or tender, at the proper time and place, the premium or rent to the lessor or his agent in this behalf; (m)the lessee is bound to keep, and on the termination of the lease to restore, the property in as good condition as it was in at the time when he was put in possession, subject only to the changes caused by reasonable wear and tear or irresistible force, and to allow the lessor and his agents, at all reasonable times during the term, to enter upon the property and inspect the condition thereof and give or leave notice of any defect in such condition; and, when such defect has been caused by any act or default on the part of the lessee, his servants or agents, he is bound to make it good within three months after such notice has been given or left; (n)if the lessee becomes aware of any proceeding to recover the property or any part thereof, or of any encroachment made upon, or any interference with, the lessor’s rights concerning such property, he is bound to give, with reasonable diligence, notice thereof to the lessor; (o)the lessee may use the property and its products (if any) as a person of ordinary prudence would use them if they were his own; but he must not use, or permit another to use, the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased, or fell or sell timber, pull down or damage buildings belonging to the lessor, or work mines or quarries not open when the lease was granted, or commit any would use them if they were his own; but he must not use, or permit another to use, the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased, or fell or sell timber, pull down or damage buildings belonging to the lessor, or work mines or quarries not open when the lease was granted, or commit any other act which is destructive or permanently injurious thereto; (p)he must not, without the lessor’s consent, erect on the property any permanent structure, except for agricultural purposes; (q)on the determination of the lease, the lessee is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property.” 13. The land in question, admeasuring approximately 15 acres, was originally leased to the predecessors of the petitioners in 1925 by the then State of Madhya Pradesh for the establishment of religious and charitable institutions. The lease was renewed periodically in terms of the Revenue Book Circular (RBC) until 1994. Since then, although no formal renewal took place, the petitioners remained in possession. 14. The present case fundamentally arises from a document dated 11th May 1966, which pertains to the renewal of a lease in favor of the petitioner, Indian Women’s Board of Mission, Bilaspur. The said document represents a renewal of an earlier lease, the original term of which expired on 4th March 1965. The renewed lease extends the tenancy until 31st March 1994. Although the lease deed annexed as Annexure P/8 is not in pristine condition and certain portions are faint, it remains legible. For the purpose of adjudication, the petitioners have relied on a typed copy annexed thereto to aid in the interpretation of the document. Additionally, the State has also produced a legible counterpart marked as Annexure R/7. Utilizing these two documents, the relevant provisions cited by the respective counsels are reproduced herein for consideration. The material terms and conditions of the lease are set forth as follows: Term To hold the same for the term commencing from the date of this indenture and ending on the thirty-first day of March 1994 subject to the following conditions : Rent (1) The lessee shall pay the yearly rent of Rs 108.00 NP clear of all deductions on the first day of June in each year at the office of Tahsildar the first of such payments to be made on the first day of June next. Taxes etc. Taxes etc. (2) The lessee shall from time to time and at all during the said term pay and discharge all rates, taxes, charges and assessment of every description which are now or may at any time hereafter during the said term be assessed, charged or imposed upon the said land hereby demised or the building to be erected thereupon or upon the landlord or tenant in respect thereof. Regulation of building (3) In the matter of erection, re-erection or alteration of any building on the said land, the lessee shall be subject to the provisions of the law relating to municipalities and to the rules, bylaws and orders lawfully made thereunder and for the time being in force. (He shall also be bound to obtain the approval the Collector to all plans of buildings, alterations or extensions). Proper maintenance (4)The lessee shall during the said term keep the said land and the buildings erected thereon in a condition fit for habitation and use. Trade or (5)(a)The lessee shall not without the previous business permission of the Collector carry on or permit to be carried on, on the premises any trade, business or activity for the regulation of which provision has for the time being been made by or under the law relating to municipalities; provided that such permission shall not exempt the lessee from fulfilling any requirement under the said law to which he shall always remain subject. (b) The lessee may carry on or permit to be carried on, on the premises any trade, business or activity which has not been so regulated but he shall be bound to discontinue the same if the lessor, on being satisfied on the complaint of the neighbours that it is a source of annoyance or offence to them, requires the lessee to do so within such time as may be fixed in the requisition. Assignment (6) The lessee shall upon every assignment of the premises or any part thereof and within one calendar month thereafter deliver a notice of such assignment to the Collector setting forth the names and description of the parties to every such assignment and the particulars and effect thereof. Assignment (6) The lessee shall upon every assignment of the premises or any part thereof and within one calendar month thereafter deliver a notice of such assignment to the Collector setting forth the names and description of the parties to every such assignment and the particulars and effect thereof. Quiet enjoyment (7) The lessor covenants that the lessee paying the rent hereby reserved and performing and observing the conditions herein contained shall peaceably hold and enjoy the said land during the said term without any lawful interruption or disturbance by the lessor or any person lawfully claiming under him: Re-entry Provided that if the said rent or any part thereof shall at any time be in arrear and unpaid for one calendar month next after the date whereon the same shall have become due whether the same shall have been lawfully demanded or not, as also upon the breach of non-observance by the lessee of any of the said conditions the lessor may notwithstanding the waiver of any previous cause or right of re-entry enter upon the said land and repossess at as if this demise had not been made, the lessee in such case being entitled within three calendar months from the date of such re-entry to remove all buildings and fixtures which at any time during the currency of the demise shall have been erected or affixed by him upon the said land: Provided further that when any cause or right of re-entry arises under the foregoing proviso, It shall be lawful for the lessor, as the consideration for the non-exercise of the power of re-entry, to receive from the lessee a sum of money not exceeding Rs. 500 as the Collector may fix, and, if the lessee fails to pay such sum within the time fixed by the Collector’s order to recover the same as an arrear of land revenue or exercise the right of re-entry under the foregoing proviso. 500 as the Collector may fix, and, if the lessee fails to pay such sum within the time fixed by the Collector’s order to recover the same as an arrear of land revenue or exercise the right of re-entry under the foregoing proviso. Renewal (8) The lessor further covenants that he will at the end of the term hereby granted and so on from time to time thereafter at the end of each successive further term of years as shall be granted at the request and cost of the lessee execute to him a renewed lease of the said land for the term of thirty years : Provided that the rent may be enhanced for the grant of every renewed lease and that every shall contain such of the conditions herein contained, as shall be applicable Interpretation (9) It is agreed that the expression "the lessor" and "the lessee" herein used shall inconsistent with context, include in the case of the former his successory and assigns and in the case of the latter his heres, executors, administrators, representatives and assigns. 15. Now this Court shall consider the relevant case law which were cited during the course of argument by learned counsel for the both the parties. 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of U.P. and Others vs. Lalji Tandon (Dead) through Lrs ., reported in (2004) 1 SCC 1 has emphasize in paragraphs 15 and 16 that the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s ruling in Syed Jaleel Zane v. P. Venkata Murlidhar, which held that perpetual leases are not recognized in India without clear and unambiguous language, and lease renewal clauses must be interpreted in the context of the entire lease, usually limiting renewal rights to the original lease term unless expressly stated otherwise. It also cited the Calcutta High Court’s decision in Secy. of State for India in Council v. A.H. Forbes, which affirmed that renewal options belong to the lessee or their representatives, renewals are for the same terms and period as the original lease unless specified, there is no legal presumption favoring perpetual renewals, and renewal covenants run with the land and are enforceable in equity. Relevant paragraph 15 and 16 are quoted below for ready reference : "15. Relevant paragraph 15 and 16 are quoted below for ready reference : "15. A Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Syed Jaleel Zane v. P. Venkata Murlidhar [ AIR 1981 AP 328 ] wherein Jeevan Reddy, J., as His Lordship then was, spoke for the Division Bench makes almost an exhaustive discussion of the relevant English and Indian law available on the point and we express our respectful agreement with the exposition of law as made therein. We note with approval the following proposition of law laid down therein: (AIR pp. 332 & 334, paras 14 & 19) (i) In India, the law does not prohibit a perpetual lease; clear and unambiguous language would be required to infer such a lease. If the language is ambiguous the court would opt for an interpretation negating the plea of the perpetual lease; (ii) To find an answer to the question whether a covenant for renewal contained in the lease deed construed properly and in its real context, entitles the tenant to continue as long as he chooses by exercising the option of renewal at the end of each successive period of 5 years subject to the same terms and conditions depends on the deed of lease being read as a whole and an effort made to ascertain the intention of the parties while entering into the contract. No single clause or term should be read in isolation so as to defeat other clauses. The interpretation must be reasonable, harmonious and be deduced from the language of the document; (iii) The court always leans against a perpetual renewal and hence where there is a clause for renewal subject to the same terms and conditions, it would be construed as giving a right to renewal for the same period as the period of the original lease, but not a right to second or third renewal and so on unless, of course, the language is clear and unambiguous. 16. Another illuminating decision on the point is by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, J., speaking for the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Secy. of State for India in Council v. A.H. Forbes [(1912) 17 IC 180 : 16 CLJ 217 (Cal)] . 16. Another illuminating decision on the point is by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, J., speaking for the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Secy. of State for India in Council v. A.H. Forbes [(1912) 17 IC 180 : 16 CLJ 217 (Cal)] . The Division Bench on a review of several English decisions held: “(1) A lease, which creates a tenancy for a term of years, may yet confer on the lessee an option of renewal. (2) If the lease does not state by whom the option is exercisable, it is exercisable (as between the lessor and lessee) by the lessee only, that is to say, a covenant for renewal, if informally expressed, is enforced only in favour of the lessee. (3) The option is exercisable not merely by the lessee personally but also by his representative-in- interest. (4) If the option does not state the terms of renewal, the new lease will be for the same period and on the same terms as the original lease, in respect of all the essential conditions thereof, except as to the covenant for renewal itself. (5) There is no sort of legal presumption against a right of perpetual renewal. The burden of strict proof is imposed upon a person claiming such a right. It should not be inferred from any equivocal expressions which may fairly be capable of being otherwise interpreted. The intention in that behalf should be clearly shown; otherwise, the agreement is satisfied and exhausted by a single renewal. (6) A covenant for renewal runs with the land. (7) The position of a lessee, who has been always ready and willing to accept a renewal on proper terms, is the same in equity as if a proper lease had been granted. Where the covenant for renewal was still specifically enforceable at the commencement of a suit for ejectment against the lessee, the position of the lessee in equity is the same as if it had been specifically enforced.”.” 17. In the matter of Sivayogeswara Cotton Press, Devangere and Others vs. M. Panchaksharappa and Another , reported in AIR 1962 SC 413 , Hon’ble Supreme Court held that leases in India often lack uniformity and clear language, so the nature of the tenancy must be determined by interpreting the entire document to understand the true intention of the parties, focusing on substance over form and has held as under: “14. In this case, it has been found by the High Court that after the lapse of the first 20 years of the lease, the lease became one for an indefinite term which meant on the authority of the decision of the Bombay High Court in Babasaheb Walad Mansursaheb Korti v. West Patent Co. Ltd. [ILR (1954) Bom 448] to which one of us sitting in the Bombay High Court (Gajendragadkar, J.) was a party, a lease for the lifetime of the lessee. The facts of that case were similar to those of the present except insofar as there do not appear in the lease any such terms as are contained in clause 14 of the lease deed in the instant case. The Bombay High Court therefore had not to consider the terms of a lease which could be said to be in pari materia with those of the present. In that case, the court had to choose between two rival contentions, namely, (1) that the lease created a tenancy at will and (2) that the lease was a lease good enough for the lifetime of the grantee, if it was not indeed a permanent tenancy. We are in complete agreement with the following observations of the court made in that case which in our opinion apply to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand: “The forms in which tenancy rights are created in India are not uniform and they do not conform to precedents known to conveyaning; sometimes the words used are not precise and it is not easy to understand from the said words the intention of the parties in executing the documents. Leases are often executed without legal assistance; and the aid that the parties obtain from professional scribes does not always contribute to make the terms clear or precise. The nature of the tenancy created by any document must nevertheless be determined by construing the document as a whole. If the tenancy is for a building purpose, prima facie it may be arguable that it is intended for the lifetime of the lessee or may in certain cases be even a permanent lease. Prima facie such a lease is not intended to be tenancy at will. But whether it is a tenancy for life or a permanent tenancy must ultimately depend upon the terms of the contract itself. Prima facie such a lease is not intended to be tenancy at will. But whether it is a tenancy for life or a permanent tenancy must ultimately depend upon the terms of the contract itself. And in construing the terms of such contracts the courts must look at the substance of the matter and decide what the parties really intended to do.”.” 18. In the matter of R. Kempraj vs. Batron Son and Co. , reported in (1962) 2 SCC 594 , Hon’ble Supreme Court highlights that under English law, Courts uphold covenants for perpetual lease renewal if the intention is clear, without objecting to perpetuity. Such renewal covenants run with the land and are not considered void for perpetuity, as established in longstanding cases like Muller v. Trafford and Weg Motors Ltd. v. Hales and held as under : “7. Even under the English law the court would give effect to a covenant for perpetual renewal so long as the intention is clear and it will not be open to objection on the ground of perpetuity; See Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 23, p. 627. In Muller v. Trafford [(1901) 1 Ch 54] it was held that the covenant in a lease for renewal was not strictly a covenant for renewal. But Farwell J. proceeded to observe that a covenant to renew had been held for at least two centuries to be a covenant running with the land. If so, then no question of perpetuity would arise. It appears that in England whatever might have been the reason, the objection of perpetuity had never been taken to cases of covenants for renewal. The following observations of Farwell, J. which were quoted with approval by Lord Evershed M.R. in Weg Motors Ltd. v. Hales [ (1961) 3 WLR 558 : (1961) 3 AELR 181, 188] are noteworthy: “But now I will assume that this is a covenant for renewal running with the land; it is then in my opinion free from any taint of perpetuity because it is annexed to the land. See Rogers v. Hosegood, (1900) 2 Ch. 388.”.” 19. See Rogers v. Hosegood, (1900) 2 Ch. 388.”.” 19. In the matter of R. V. Bhupal Prasad vs. State of A. P. and Others , reported in (1995) 5 SCC 698 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a “tenant at sufferance” is one who lawfully possessed property but wrongfully remains after the lease ends without the landlord’s consent, similar to a trespasser. Such tenancy arises by law, not contract, and does not establish landlord-tenant relations unless the landlord consents, which then creates a new tenancy. Relevant Paragraph are quoted as under : “7. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act (for short, ‘the TP Act’) defines ‘lease’ of immovable property as “a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms”. Therefore, the lessor of immovable property by contract in writing or otherwise can transfer his property to the lessee to enjoy such property. It may be made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money etc. and the lessee accepts the transfer on such terms. Under Section 111 of the TP Act, a lease of immovable property determines, inter alia, by efflux of the time limited. Section 116 envisages the effect of holding over and provides that “if a lessee or under-lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or under-lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in Section 106.” Section 106 of the TP Act deals with the duration of certain leases in the absence of written contract or local usage with which we are not concerned in this case since the appellant and the landlady are governed by the written lease. Since the landlady had not accepted or asserted to the appellant's continuance in possession, he cannot be treated under Section 116 to be a tenant holding over. 8. Tenant at sufferance is one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, but who holds it by wrong after the termination of the term or expiry of the lease by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance is, therefore, one who wrongfully continues in possession after the extinction of a lawful title. There is little difference between him and a trespasser. In Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (7th Edn.) at page 633, the position of tenancy at sufferance has been stated thus: A tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction to avoid continuance in possession operating as a trespass. It has been described as the least and lowest interest which can subsist in reality. It, therefore, cannot be created by contract and arises only by implication of law when a person who has been in possession under a lawful title continues in possession after that title has been determined, without the consent of the person entitled. A tenancy at sufferance does not create the relationship of landlord and tenant. At page 769, it is stated regarding the right of a tenant holding over thus: The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not necessarily create a tenancy of any kind. If the lessee remains in possession after the determination of the term, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. The expression “holding over” is used in the sense of retaining possession. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the lease, without the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so with the landlord's consent. The former is called a tenant by sufferance in the language of the English law and the latter class of tenants is called a tenant holding over or a tenant at will. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor is in a better position than a mere tenant at will. The tenancy on sufferance is converted into a tenancy at will by the assent of the landlord, but the relationship of the landlord and tenant is not established until the rent was paid and accepted. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor is in a better position than a mere tenant at will. The tenancy on sufferance is converted into a tenancy at will by the assent of the landlord, but the relationship of the landlord and tenant is not established until the rent was paid and accepted. The assent of the landlord to the continuance of the tenancy after the determination of the tenancy would create a new tenancy. The possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, his possession is juridical.” 20. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of M. P. Ram Mohan Raja vs. State of T. N. and Others , reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78 has referred to State of Orissa v. Lochan Nayak, where a writ petition was dismissed due to inordinate delay in challenging land allotment cancellations. It held that delay in filing such petitions is fact-specific. The petitioner delayed challenging a 1996 order until 2003 without justification, and such undue delay disentitles them from relief and has held as under : “10. As against this, learned counsel for the respondents invited our attention to a decision in State of Orissa v. Lochan Nayak [ (2003) 10 SCC 678 ] . In this case, the question of allotment of land was involved and the Commissioner rejected the allotment made in 1984 against which the repondent filed writ petition in the High Court in 1992. The High Court remanded the matter back to the Revenue Officer for consideration of the matter afresh. Meanwhile, the allotment was further cancelled in 1992. This Court held that due to inordinate delay in filing the writ petition, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition and accordingly, set aside the order of the High Court. 11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8- 10-1996 an order was passed by the Collector in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8- 10-1996 an order was passed by the Collector in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit.” 21. In the matter of Purshottam Sarin Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2009) SCC OnLine Chh 63 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the petitioners have not produced any legal title or record of rights, and the claim of long permissive possession is a disputed factual issue that cannot be decided without proper evidence and has held as under : “34. The petitioners are claiming declaration that they are in lawful possession of the Nazul land in question and the respondents be restrained from undertaking demolition of the structure erected by the petitioners. Whereas, the respondents have averred that the petitioners have no legal right over the disputed land and they are encroachers of the public road. This Court has already held that the petitioners have not filed any record of right with respect to the disputed land on the basis of which it can be inferred that they have any semblance of legal right over the disputed land. Their contention that they are in permissive possession from decades is highly disputed question of fact and the same cannot be gone into in a proceeding of this nature, as the same requires recording of evidence.” 22. In the matter of Saroj Screens Private Limited vs. Ghanshyam and Others , reported in (2012) 11 SCC 434 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated that the lease granted in 1944 allowed a 30-year term with options to renew or retake the property. The appellant acquired renewal rights through a 1947 deed and exercised the renewal option in 1973. Although the trial court ordered specific performance, the High Court later dismissed the suit, finding the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness to perform. The appellant acquired renewal rights through a 1947 deed and exercised the renewal option in 1973. Although the trial court ordered specific performance, the High Court later dismissed the suit, finding the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness to perform. The appellant did not appeal further, making the High Court’s decision final, and thus cannot now claim mandatory renewal based on the 1947 lease terms and held as under : “28. A reading of the lease deed dated 28-10-1944 shows that the Committee had leased out the plot to Gopaldas Mohta for a period of 30 years commencing from 17-3-1944 with a clear stipulation that at the end of 30 years' period it will have an option to retake the structure by paying the prevailing market value or renew the lease on revised ground rent for a further term of 30 years by incorporating the covenants, provisions and conditions contained in the deed dated 28-10-1944 with a stipulation for further renewal of the lease. By lease deed dated 10-9-1947, Gopaldas Mohta transferred all the rights and interests vested in him including the one relating to renewal of the lease to the appellant, who was also given an option to pay to the lessor i.e. Gopaldas Mohta a sum of Rs 90,000 during the first five years of the lease and purchase all his rights from the Committee. An option was also given to the appellant to acquire the interest of the lessor on payment of the same price during the last year before expiry of the lease by efflux of time. 29. The appellant did exercise the option for renewal of lease by sending a letter dated 15-1-1973 to Parmanand Mundhada subject to the condition of renewal of lease by the Corporation. After some time, the appellant filed Special Civil Suit No. 96 of 1974 for specific performance, which was decreed by the trial court vide judgment dated 28-4-1980. However, the appellant's joy proved to be short-lived because in the appeals filed by the heirs of Parmanand Mundhada and Respondent 2 and the Corporation, the High Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the suit by observing that the appellant could not prove its readiness or willingness to implement the contract. The appellant did not challenge the judgment of the High Court by filing a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appellant did not challenge the judgment of the High Court by filing a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore, the finding recorded by the High Court on the tenability of the appellant's claim, which was primarily founded on Clause 5 of the lease deed dated 10-9-1947, will be deemed to have become final and the appellant cannot now rely upon the terms and conditions of the lease deed dated 10- 9-1947 for contending that the Corporation was bound to renew the lease in its favour for a period of 30 years.” 23. In the matter of Ayaaubkhan Noorkhqn Pathan Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has stated in paragraph 23 that generally, a third party without direct interest cannot raise grievances in court. However, in exceptional cases, where the truly aggrieved are unable to approach the Court due to ignorance, poverty, or other reasons, a well-intentioned third party may be allowed to raise the issue. Even if the third party’s bona fides are doubtful, the Court can still consider the matter suo motu if it deems the issue important. Relevant paragraph 23 is quoted hereunder for ready reference : “23. Thus, from the above it is evident that under ordinary circumstances, a third person, having no concern with the case at hand, cannot claim to have any locus standi to raise any grievance whatsoever. However, in exceptional circumstances as referred to above, if the actual persons aggrieved, because of ignorance, illiteracy, inarticulation or poverty, are unable to approach the court, and a person, who has no personal agenda, or object, in relation to which, he can grind his own axe, approaches the court, then the court may examine the issue and in exceptional circumstances, even if his bona fides are doubted, but the issue raised by him, in the opinion of the court, requires consideration, the court may proceed suo motu, in such respect.” 24. The case law cited by the learned counsel for the respective parties is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The entire matter hinges upon the lease deed executed between the parties. Both parties have relied upon the lease renewal deed dated 11.05.1966, either to challenge the refusal of renewal or to support the denial thereof. The case law cited by the learned counsel for the respective parties is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The entire matter hinges upon the lease deed executed between the parties. Both parties have relied upon the lease renewal deed dated 11.05.1966, either to challenge the refusal of renewal or to support the denial thereof. In all case law pertaining to covenants, it is unequivocally established that the conditions of the covenant hold paramount importance and must be complied with in both letter and spirit. 25. Upon a thorough perusal of the renewal of lease, it is an admitted fact that the lease was granted on the basis of an annual rent of Rs. 108.00 (One Hundred Eight Rupees) net payable, which the lessee was obligated to deposit on or before the first day of June of each year without any deduction or set-off. This rent payment schedule formed a crucial part of the lease agreement and was binding on the lessee throughout the term. Further, the lease contains explicit provisions regulating any construction activities on the leased premises. Specifically, the lessee was required to comply with all applicable Municipal laws, bylaws, rules, and orders that were in force at the relevant time, governing the erection, re-erection, or alteration of any building on the leased land. The lessee was also mandated to obtain prior approval from the Collector for all plans pertaining to construction, alteration, or extension of buildings on the premises. This condition was not only a statutory obligation but a fundamental covenant in the lease agreement intended to ensure that the lessee’s use of the premises remained lawful and within prescribed regulatory standards. Another significant condition stipulated that the lessee must, upon every assignment or transfer of the leased premises or any part thereof, serve a written notice to the Collector within one calendar month of such assignment. The notice was required to specify the names and descriptions of the parties involved in the assignment along with particulars detailing the nature and effect of the assignment. This requirement was intended to ensure transparency and oversight over the transfer of interests in the leased property. 26. It is pertinent to note that the original lease deed granted to the Christian Women’s Board of Missions, Bilaspur, was not produced before this Court by either party. This requirement was intended to ensure transparency and oversight over the transfer of interests in the leased property. 26. It is pertinent to note that the original lease deed granted to the Christian Women’s Board of Missions, Bilaspur, was not produced before this Court by either party. However, it is common ground that both parties rely upon the renewal lease dated 4th March 1965, valid until 31st March 1994, which governs the present dispute. The renewal lease reaffirms the annual rent of Rs. 108.00 and reiterates the obligation of lessee to adhere to Municipal laws and secure necessary permissions from the Collector before any construction or alteration activities are undertaken on the leased land. Additionally, the lease deed imposes a condition precedent requiring the lessee to obtain prior written permission from the Collector before carrying out or permitting any trade, business, or activity on the leased premises that is subject to Municipal regulation. Such permission, however, does not exempt the lessee from continuing to comply with all applicable statutory requirements under municipal laws. The lease further imposes the obligation on the lessee to notify the Collector of any assignment or transfer of the leasehold interest within one calendar month of the event. Failure to comply with this requirement constitutes a breach of the lease terms. A critical provision in the lease provides the lessor with the right of re-entry and repossession of the leased land in the event that the rent, or any part thereof, remains unpaid for a period of one calendar month after its due date, regardless of whether the rent has been formally demanded. Moreover, the lessor is entitled to exercise re- entry upon any breach or non-observance of the lease conditions by the lessee, notwithstanding any previous waiver of such rights. Upon such re-entry, the lessee is entitled to remove any buildings or fixtures erected by him within three calendar months from the date of re-entry. 27. The foregoing provisions unequivocally establish that the lease granted was for a fixed term and of a temporary nature, not a permanent or perpetual lease, contrary to the assertions made by the petitioner. Further, the lease contains other material conditions which the lessee was required to fulfill in order to maintain the leasehold rights. It is noteworthy that the lessee has failed to comply with several such conditions, resulting in clear breaches of the lease. Further, the lease contains other material conditions which the lessee was required to fulfill in order to maintain the leasehold rights. It is noteworthy that the lessee has failed to comply with several such conditions, resulting in clear breaches of the lease. This non-compliance is substantiated by a report submitted by a six-member committee which documented violations of the terms and conditions of the lease, as well as breaches of the purpose for which the lease was originally granted. For instance, the petitioner alienated approximately 92.096 square feet of the leased land by way of sale deed dated 17th September, 1971 to one Banwarilal, without prior permission or notice to the Collector, in direct contravention of the lease condition mandating notice of any assignment within one calendar month. This unauthorized transfer is a clear violation of the lease terms. Moreover, the lessee commenced trade and business activities on the leased premises without obtaining the prior approval of the Collector. These activities include the operation of a woolen market under the name and style of “Tibetan Woolen Market” and the establishment of a fast food shop, both of which were started in clear breach of lease conditions and without lawful sanction. Such unauthorized use and alienation of the leased land, including the sale to third parties, commencement of business activities without permission, and unauthorized construction, constitute blatant violations of the lease agreement and undermine the terms on which the lease was granted. 28. It appears that the petitioner, in contravention of the leasehold nature of the estate, has treated the leased premises as its absolute property, thereby disregarding the legal distinction between ownership and leasehold interest. While the petitioner claims to be the lawful lessee and has filed applications for renewal of the lease as well as a writ petition before this Court, the petitioner has failed to establish that such applications were duly made by a competent person authorized to act on behalf of the Christian Women’s Board of Mission. The status of petitioner No. 1 as a legal entity capable of holding the leasehold interest is questionable. It is well-settled that if petitioner No. 1 is not a legally entitled or competent entity under applicable law, it cannot hold or claim rights over the property in question. The status of petitioner No. 1 as a legal entity capable of holding the leasehold interest is questionable. It is well-settled that if petitioner No. 1 is not a legally entitled or competent entity under applicable law, it cannot hold or claim rights over the property in question. The mere establishment of a hospital, nursing training school, or women’s and children’s home or chapel on the premises does not confer any proprietary right or entitlement upon the petitioner to maintain possession or claim renewal of the lease. Furthermore, the claimed position of petitioner No. 2 as a director of petitioner No. 1 society is also disputed. There exists no documentary evidence to substantiate this claim. Although a power of attorney has been produced in favor of petitioner No. 2, the same was executed by an individual purporting to be the Secretary and constituted attorney of the Church of North India Trust Association (CNITA). It is pertinent to highlight that such joint power of attorney is not recognized under law and the CNITA lacks authority to execute any power of attorney on behalf of the Christian Women’s Board of Mission. Accordingly, the power of attorney in favor of petitioner No. 2 does not confer any valid rights upon him to act in relation to the leasehold property. 29. At the outset, it is pertinent to address the question of the maintainability of the present writ petition, particularly in light of the locus standi of the individuals who have instituted the present proceedings as well as those who have submitted an application for renewal of the lease in respect of the land in question. Upon a thorough perusal of the documents annexed to the writ petition and the material placed on record, it is evident that the petitioners have not been able to establish any cogent or lawful authority emanating from the Christian Woman’s Board of Mission, the original lessee, authorizing them to act on its behalf in relation to the land or leasehold rights. Despite having ample opportunity to produce appropriate authorization or resolution demonstrating that they have been empowered by the said organization to initiate these proceedings or to seek renewal of the lease, no such document has been furnished. Despite having ample opportunity to produce appropriate authorization or resolution demonstrating that they have been empowered by the said organization to initiate these proceedings or to seek renewal of the lease, no such document has been furnished. Mere assertions or self-serving averments, unsubstantiated by any official documentation such as a board resolution, power of attorney, or any valid authorization from the competent governing body of the organization, are insufficient to confer locus standi. Thus, their authority to maintain the present writ petition and to file an application for lease renewal is seriously in doubt and cannot be accepted by this Court. 30. Furthermore, reference may be made to Paragraph 26 of the Revenue Book Circular, Part I, which lays down the framework for the grant and renewal of leasehold rights in government land to societies or institutions. It mandates that such societies or bodies must strictly adhere to the terms and conditions upon which the lease was originally granted. Any renewal or continuation of such lease is subject to due compliance with those conditions, and any breach thereof entitles the State to take appropriate action, including resumption of possession of the land. Paragraph 26 of the Revenue Book Circular is quoted below for ready reference : 31. In the present case, the land in question was leased to the Christian Woman’s Board of Mission, an organization whose stated object was to provide charitable services to marginalized sections of society, particularly by establishing medical and healthcare facilities. The lease was not granted for the purpose of conducting any commercial activity, nor was it intended to create a revenue-generating asset for the lessee. The underlying object of the lease was philanthropic and was premised on the expectation that the land would be utilized exclusively for providing welfare services to the underprivileged. It is, however, not in dispute that after the expiry of the lease on 31.03.1994, no timely application for renewal was submitted by the lessee or by any authorized representative thereof. Instead, a series of blatant violations of the lease conditions ensued. The property was transferred, either by way of assignment or through sub-letting arrangements, to private individuals or entities who proceeded to undertake commercial operations on the leased land. Rental income was derived from these arrangements, which stands in complete contravention of the terms of the lease. Instead, a series of blatant violations of the lease conditions ensued. The property was transferred, either by way of assignment or through sub-letting arrangements, to private individuals or entities who proceeded to undertake commercial operations on the leased land. Rental income was derived from these arrangements, which stands in complete contravention of the terms of the lease. No prior permission or sanction was sought from the District Collector as mandated under the lease deed, particularly for altering the user of the land or for permitting any third-party occupation. 32. On 22.08.2024, a notice was duly issued to the occupants for removal of unauthorized constructions and for cessation of all illegal activities being carried out on the said land. Pursuant to the said notice, one Dr. Raman Jogi, who claimed to have authority over the property, voluntarily handed over possession of the land to the Government. Thereafter, the land has been lawfully repossessed by the State and remains in its possession as of now. Even assuming, arguendo, that the lessee intended to seek renewal at a belated stage, the long lapse of time, over 27 years, without any application being filed, and the persistent breach of lease conditions during this period, constitute clear grounds for the Government to decline any request for lease renewal. It is evident that not only did the lessee fail to seek timely renewal, but it also actively engaged in conduct that was antithetical to the purpose for which the lease was granted. 33. The contention that the authorities acted in an arbitrary or prejudicial manner is wholly without merit. Upon a detailed perusal of the lease deed and the renewal dated 04.03.1965 (valid until 31.03.1994), it is clear that the lease was granted subject to a series of binding covenants. These covenants imposed obligations upon the lessee, including but not limited to: (a) Timely payment of lease rent; (b) Prohibition on unauthorized construction; (c) Prohibition on assignment or sub- letting of the premises; and (d) Prohibition on use of the land for any commercial activity without express prior permission of the Collector. 34. Proviso (Re-entry) to Clause No. 7 of the lease deed is of particular relevance. 34. Proviso (Re-entry) to Clause No. 7 of the lease deed is of particular relevance. It expressly provides that in the event of non- payment of rent for a period of one calendar month after it becomes due, or upon any breach of the covenants contained in the deed, the lessor shall have the right to re-enter upon the leased land and take possession of the same, treating the lease as terminated. Furthermore, the lessee shall have a period of three months from the date of re-entry to remove any structures or fixtures erected during the term of the lease. 35. The legal implications of Clause No. 7 are unambiguous. The State Government, being the lessor, retained an overriding right to resume possession of the land upon breach of the lease terms. In the instant case, the continuous and unchecked violations of the lease conditions, ranging from commercial exploitation of the property to unauthorized constructions and sub-letting, clearly entitled the State to exercise its right of re-entry and refuse renewal of the lease. This right was exercised in accordance with the due process of law and after affording ample opportunity to the occupants to present their case. The record clearly shows that after the expiry of the lease in 1994, no step was taken to comply with the lease conditions or to seek regularization. The purpose for which the lease was originally granted has been completely frustrated by the lessee’s actions. Instead of serving the medical and welfare needs of the poor, the land was utilized as a source of income through rent from private tenants running commercial enterprises. 36. In the matter of State of Kerala & Ors. vs. Joseph & Company, reported in (2021)19 SCC 335 , in paragraphs 31 and 32, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that since the leased land belongs to the Government and lies in a notified reserve forest, any breach of lease conditions must be strictly viewed in the public interest. Unlike private lease disputes, the lessee here was granted rights through public auction for State revenue. The lessee’s act of transferring the land without prior permission, specifically by executing an absolute sale deed, violates a key lease term and cannot be excused. Unlike private lease disputes, the lessee here was granted rights through public auction for State revenue. The lessee’s act of transferring the land without prior permission, specifically by executing an absolute sale deed, violates a key lease term and cannot be excused. The lessee cannot seek protection under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act or equitable principles, as contractual terms govern and equity does not favor those who breach public trust. Paragraph 31 and 32 are quoted below for ready reference : “31. In contradistinction to the facts which arose for consideration in the cited cases where essentially the dispute was inter se between the private owners of the property and their lessees and the nature of transaction, in the instant case, the leased land is the property which belong to the Government and the leasehold right has been auctioned so as to earn revenue for the State, which is to the interest of its citizens and one citizen or a group is permitted to exploit the land to the exclusion of all others. Additionally, such government property is located in an area notified as reserve forest. In such circumstance, when the lessee is given the benefit of such property and the breach of the condition imposed is alleged, the strict construction of the forfeiture clause against the lessor in all circumstances would not arise as otherwise it would render the clause in the lease deed otiose. The principle contained in Section 111(g) of the TP Act though noticed, the parties are governed by the terms in the contract and as such the lessee cannot claim benefit under the said provision. Further, as already noted, the consideration under Section 111(g) is based on equitable principles which will have to be applied depending on the facts and circumstances obtained in each case. While applying the equitable principles, the maxim he who seeks equity must do equity cannot be lost sight of. It is said, a court will not assist a lessee in extricating himself or herself from the circumstances that he or she has created, in the name of equitable consideration. 32. While applying the equitable principles, the maxim he who seeks equity must do equity cannot be lost sight of. It is said, a court will not assist a lessee in extricating himself or herself from the circumstances that he or she has created, in the name of equitable consideration. 32. In the instant facts as already noted when public largesse is bestowed on certain terms and conditions, a term of the lease deed is to be strictly adhered to and when Clause 14 provides that the lessee shall not be entitled to sublet or assign his interest in the lease except with the previous permission in writing of the lessor, it does not matter as to whether the breach committed is by assigning a portion of the leased land or the whole when such interest of the lessee has been transferred without previous permission of the lessor. Further, in all the cases referred to by the learned Senior Counsel, the breach alleged was either of creating mortgage or subletting the property. In the instant case, despite being a lessee the respondent has executed an absolute sale deed in respect of the leased land which belongs to the Government and such breach cannot be condoned.” 37. The orders passed by the Collector, the Divisional Commissioner, and the State Government demonstrate a thorough and judicious examination of all relevant facts, documents, and legal provisions. These orders are not vitiated by any procedural irregularity, arbitrariness, or malice. Rather, they are consistent with the statutory scheme governing leases of government land and are based on well-settled principles of administrative law. It is settled law that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ jurisdiction of this Court is discretionary in nature. Relief under Article 226 may be denied where the petitioner has approached the Court with unclean hands, suppressed material facts, or violated statutory obligations. In the present case, the petitioner’s conduct, spanning over two decades of non-compliance, demonstrates a gross abuse of the lease, thereby disentitling it from equitable relief. No fundamental right of the petitioner has been shown to be infringed. The authorities acted well within their rights and jurisdiction in refusing to renew the lease and in taking steps to regain possession of the land. No fundamental right of the petitioner has been shown to be infringed. The authorities acted well within their rights and jurisdiction in refusing to renew the lease and in taking steps to regain possession of the land. There is no infirmity or illegality in their decision which would warrant interference by this Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. 38. For all the foregoing reasons as also the ruling of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Kerala (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petition is devoid of any merit and does not call for any interference in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioners have failed to establish any enforceable legal right or authority, and the actions taken by the State authorities are justified both in law and on facts. 39. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.