2025:JHHC:25679-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No.1343 of 2018 ------ Pradip Kumar Sahu, aged about 48 years, son of Madusudan Sahu, resident of Ward No.2, Chandkop, P.O. & P.S.-Lohardaga, District- Lohardaga (Jharkhand). …. …. Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand through the Mines Commissioner, Department of Mines & Geology, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Nepal House, Doranda, P.O. & P.S.-Doranda, District-Ranchi. 2. The Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga, P.O. & P.S. & District- Lohardaga. 3. The District Mining Officer, Lohardaga, P.O. & P.S. & District- Lohardaga. 4. The Assistant Mining Officer, Lohardaga, P.O. & P.S. & District- Lohardaga. 5. Sri Rakesh Kumar Yadav, son of Late Krishna Gope, resident of Village-Kutmu, P.O. & P.S. & District-Lohardaga, at present resident at New Area, Kurchery More, Lohardaga, P.O. & P.S. & District-Lohardaga. .... .... Respondents CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI ------ For the Petitioner : Mr. Rahul Kumar, Advocate For the State : Mr. Jai Prakash, AAG-IA Mr. Yogesh Modi, AC to AAG-IA ------ C.A.V. on 07.08.2025 Pronounced on 26/08/2025 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking for the following reliefs: - (i) For issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the order dated 29.12.2017 (Annexure-9) passed in Revision Case No. 89/2016 by the learned Court of Mines Commissioner, Ranchi (Respondent No. 1); whereby and whereunder the 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 2 revision preferred by the petitioner and private respondent no. 5 has been disallowed in purported exercise of power under Rule 9(1)(d) r/w 9(1)(e) and 9(12) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the JMMC (Amendment) Rules (Annexure-8), although the same is not applicable with respect to the leasehold area of less than 05 Hectares; (ii) The petitioner further prays for a direction upon the respondent authorities to consider its application for grant of mining lease of stone over an area of 3.5 acres of land pertaining to Khata No. 125, Plot No. 215 and 218 located in Mouza Patratu Mahuatoli in the District of Lohardaga as necessary environmental clearance, mining plan, Environment Impact Assessment Report etc. have been submitted by the petitioner before the respondent authorities. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, required to be enumerated, which read as under: - (i) It is the case of the writ petitioner that he has submitted an application on 01.11.2014 for grant of mining lease of stone over an area of 3.05 Acres of land appertaining to Khata No.125, Plot No.215 and 2017, located in Mouza-Patratu Mahuatoli within the District of Lohardaga. (ii) Upon the application for grant of mining lease, the respondent no.4, the Assistant Mining Officer, Lohardaga, vide letter no.525(M) dated 05.11.2014 directed the petitioner to submit the environmental clearance report approved by the Ministry of Environment & Forest. (iii) The petitioner has already obtained no objection certificate 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 3 issued by the Circle Officer; Kisko vide letter as contained in memo no.562 dated 24.12.2014. Thereafter, the Assistant Mining Officer, Lohardaga vide letter dated 13.07.2015 approved the mining plan. (iv) The State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority, Jharkhand vide letter no.620 dated 30.09.2015 has also approved the environmental clearance to the petitioner for the project of stone deposit of plot no.215 and 218 under Khata No.125, measuring an area of 3.05 Acres situated at Mouza-Patratu Mahuatoli within the District of Lohardaga. (v) It is the case of the writ petitioner that in spite of entire efforts made by the petitioner in relation to submission of NOC and environmental clearance certificate, no order in relation to grant of mining lease was communicated to the petitioner. (vi) In the meanwhile, the private respondent no.5 has applied for grant of mining lease of stone in mouza Patratu under Khata No.125, Pot No. 215/P over an area of 01 Acre. (vii) Thereafter, the District Mining Officer, Lohardaga, instead of taking a decision on the application submitted by the writ petitioner, had asked the petitioner to submit another application for grant of mining lease of stone over the same area. (viii) It is the further case of the writ petitioner that the private respondent no.5 did not meet with the legal requirement 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 4 and his application dated 01.12.2015 for grant of mining leased was not fit for consideration. Against the deemed rejection of the application dated 01.12.2015, the private respondent no.5 had moved a revision application under Rule 62 of the JMMC Rules, 2004 for setting aside the non- communicated order of deemed rejection and for not settling the said piece of land under Khata No.125, Plot No.215/P over an area of 01 Acre with anyone, which was numbered as Revision Case No.89 of 2016. (ix) Although, the private respondent no.5 had filed revision application and prayed for non-settlement of the overlapping area, but, has not arrayed the petitioner as a party respondent in the revision application. (x) The writ petitioner came to know about the revision application filed by the private respondent no.5, has filed an intervention application in Revision Case No.89 of 2016 so that he may apprise the learned court of the Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand, Ranchi regarding the factual position and suppression and concealment made by the private respondent no.5. Thereafter, the intervention application filed by the petitioner has been allowed. (xi) It is the case of the petitioner the Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand, Ranchi in a most mechanical and casual manner without appreciating and considering the fact that the requirement of Letter of Intent has been in relation to 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 5 mining leasehold of more than 05 hectares, has rejected the revision application preferred by the private respondent no.5, in which, the petitioner has intervened and allowed to put his stand. (xii) The petitioner has complied with the statutory requirements hence, the order impugned dated 29.12.2017 is illegal and arbitrary and as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law, which is under challenge in this writ petition. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner 3. Mr. Rahul Kumar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that the revisional authority while passing the impugned order dated 29.12.2017 has not appreciated the existing statute in correct prospective. 4. It has been contended that no adverse order has ever been communicated to the petitioner regrading rejection of his application and he has complied with the statutory requirements for grant of mining lease. 5. It has further been submitted that the applied lease hold area has been less than 05 hectares and the petitioner has submitted entire requisites and in spite of that, no decision has been taken by the authority concerned. 6. The submission, therefore, has been made that the order dated 29.12.2017 passed by the authority concerned is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent-State 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 6 7. Per Contra, Mr. Jai Prakash, AAG-IA appearing for the respondent-State has submitted by taking aid of the provision of Rule 9 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 and 2019, wherein, it has been provided that the mining licenses are to be granted only by virtue of auction. 8. It has been contended that the petitioner has not challenged the deemed rejection of his application made on 08.01.2016 for the grant of lease and straight away had come before this Court. 9. It has further been contended that in terms of Rule 9 (1) (d), Rule 9 (1) (e) and Rule 9 (12) of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017 which prescribe that if any LOI has not been granted prior to the notification by which the amendment has been carried out, all applications for grant of lease will become ineligible and is equally applicable for the area which is less than 5 Hectares and as such, the claim of the Petitioner is not maintainable. 10. It has been contended that the authority concerned, on consideration of legal implication of the aforesaid provision, since, has passed an order, hence, the same does not require any interference. Analysis 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition and the documents available on record. 12. It is evident from the record that the petitioner has made an 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 7 application for a grant of a lease for stone-mining in Mouza Patratu, Thana No. 146, Khata No. 125 and Plot No. 215 (P) and 2018 (P) District- Lohardaga on 01.11.2014 but there was an overlap of an area to the extent of 0.60 Acre in Plot No. 216 (P) with one Manoj Kumar Sahu who has also made an application on 13-10-2014 and also, there was overlapping of an area to the extent of 0.35 Acre in Plot No. 215 (P) with one Rakesh Kumar Yadav and as such the application of the Petitioner has not been considered. 13. It is further submitted that the Petitioner again applied for the grant of stone lease on 08-01-2016 in Mauza: Patratu, Khata No.125, Plot No.: 215 (P) and 2018 (P) admeasuring an area of 3.00 Acres which was also found to be overlapped with the area mentioned with the other applicants, namely, Rakesh Kumar Yadav and Manoj Kumar Sahu and as such, the application could not be considered and was deemed rejected in terms of Rule 11 (ग) of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004. 14. In the background of the aforesaid fact, the seminal issue which requires consideration herein that whether the learned Court of Mines Commissioner, Ranchi (Respondent No. 1) while dismissing the revision preferred by the petitioner and private respondent no. 5, has correctly applied the implication of Rule 9(1)(d) r/w 9(1)(e) and 9(12) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the JMMC (Amendment) Rules. 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 8 15. This Court, before dealing with the aforesaid issue deems it fit and proper to refer the provision of Rule 9(घ), 9(ङ), Rule 9(च), Rule 9(छ) and Rule 9(12) and 11(क) and 11 (ख) and (ग) of the JMMC Rules for the purpose of consideration of lis. “9(घ) इस अधिसूचना के धनगगत होने की धतधि से पूर्ग में सरकारी क्षेत्र एर्ं 05.00 हे क्षेत्र से अधिक के रैयती क्षेत्र पर खनन पट्टे हेतु प्राप्त आर्ेदन पत्र स्वतः अयोग्य हो जाएं गे । 9(ङ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एर्ं 05.00 हे0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रैयती क्षेत्र पर प्राप्त र्ैसे आर्ेदन पत्र धजसमें इस अधिसूचना धनगगत होने की धतधि से पूर्ग झारखण्ड लघु खधनज समनुदान धनयमार्ली, 2004 के धनयम 11 अंतगगत Letter of Intent (आशय का पत्र) धनगगत हो चुका है, उसे इस अधिसूचना के धनगगत होने की धतधि से 180 धदनों के अंदर पयागर्रण स्वीकृ धत एर्ं खनन योजन अधनर्ायग रूप से समधपगत करना होगा, अन्यिा उनका आर्ेदन स्वतः अस्वीकृ त हो जाएगा। 9(च) सरकारी क्षेत्र एर्ं 05.00 हे0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रैयती क्षेत्र पर प्राप्त खनन पटे को जो करकामेर् र् एर्ं पयागर्रणीय स्वीकृ धत खनन योजना प्राप्त नही राहत र्ैसे खर कालधतरोधहत हो गये हो, उन‌के पट्टे की अर्धि पट्टा स्वीकृ धत/नर्ीनीकरण की धतधि से 31 माचग, 2022तक के धलए अर्धि धर्स्ताररत मानी जाएगी, बशते धक अधिसूचना की धतधि के पूर्ग खनन पट्टा की अस्वीकृ धत/रद्द/व्ययगत होने का आदेश, नहीं पाररत धकया गया है, परन्तु र्ैसे खानन पट्टे पर कोई खनन तब तक नहीं धकया जा सके गा, जब तक खनन हेतु आर्श्यक पयागर्रणीय स्वीकृ धत/र्न एर्ं पयागर्रण धर्भाग की स्वीकृ धत/खनन योजना स्वीकृ धत प्राप्त नहीं हो जाता है। आर्ेदक को सभी र्ांधित अनापत्ती 180 धदनों के अंदर समधपगत कना होगा। 9(छ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एर्ं 05.00 हे0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रैयती क्षेत्र पर स्वीकृ त/नर्ीकृ त खनन पट्टे की अर्धि यधद उनकी स्वीकृ धत/नर्ीकरण की अर्धि 3[31 माचग, 2022 के बाद की धतधि हो, तो उनकी अर्धि उनकी स्वीकृ धत/नर्ीकरण की अर्धि तक धर्धिमान्य रहेगी। 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 9 9(12) धनयम-9 (1) (घ), 9(1)(ङ), 9(1)(च), 9 (1) (ि) तिा 9 (10) पूर्ग से स्वीकृ त/आर्धदत लघु खधनज के 5.00 हेक्टेयर क्षेत्र से कम क्षेत्र पर भी लागू होंगें। 11(क) खनन प‌ट्टा की स्वीकृ धत के धलए दाखखल प्रत्येक आर्ेदन के धलए उसकी प्राखप्त को तारीख के 120 धदनों के भीतर आशय का पत्र धनगगत धकया जायेगा। (ख) खनन प‌ट्टा के प्रत्येक आर्ेदन की स्वीकृ धत सक्षम प्राधिकार से प्रतरणीय स्वच्छता प्रमाण पत्र दाखखल करने के 30 धदनों के भीतर कर धदया जायेगा। (ग) खनन प‌ट्टा की स्वीकृ धत के धलए दाखखल आर्ेदन पत्र पर 120 धदनों के अंदर आशय का पत्र (एलओआई) धनगगत नहीं होने की खिधत में आर्ेदन पत्र स्वतः कालधतरोधहत होकर अस्वीकृ त माना जायेगा। “ 16. It is evident from Rule 9 particularly Rule 9 (ङ) and (च), wherein, the issue of renewal of lease/license has been dealt with initially for the period of 90 days, thereafter, it was extended upto the period of 180 which is to be renewed on the basis of making proper application by the applicant. The provision of Rule 9(च) provides that in any case, ever after renewal of the lease, initially, the same is not to be extended beyond the period of 31.03.2020 by virtue of amendment incorporated w.e.f. 2018, the period has been extended upto the period of 31.03.2022. 17. The specific stipulation has been made that even if the license has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2020, the force of the lease will be upto 31.03.2022. 18. It is evident from the provision as contained under Rule 9(ि) as 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 10 referred above that the license if renewed or extended the validity of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will remain there upto the period of lease but there cannot be any extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the provision of Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of auction. 19. It is further evident from the provision of Rule 9 (12) as quoted and referred hereinabove that the mandate of Rule 9(च) will be applicable even if the area of land is less than 5 hectares. 20. It is evident from the aforesaid Rule particularly Rule (ग) of rule 11 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 that the application submitted for grant of mining lease and consequent to that if LOI has not been issued within 120 days, it will be deemed to be rejected. 21. Here, in the instant case, the petitioner had applied second time on 08.01.2016 i.e., prior to issuance of Amended Rule, for grant of mining lease on aforesaid land. 22. It is further evident from record that the application of Rakesh Kumar Yadav, private Respondent No. 5 which was made on 01- 12-2015 was also deemed rejected on 31-03-2016 and the said private respondent, namely, Rakesh Kumar Yadav had filed the Revision Case No. 89 of 2016 on 02-05-2016 challenging the deemed rejection and for grant of sufficient time. 23. It is submitted that the Petitioner intervened in that application 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 11 and objected the claim of the applicant, namely, Rakesh Kumar Yadav but the Petitioner has never challenged the deemed rejection of his own application and has never been issued LOI for the said lease. 24. In the meantime, the Government of Jharkhand promulgated the Jharkhand Minor Minerals Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017 with effect from 22-02-2017 and as per Rule 9 (1)(घ) of the said rules, it has been brought that if any LOI has not been granted prior to this notification, all the applications would become ineligible. Moreover, Rule 9 (12) of the said Rules also mentioned that Rule 9 (1)(घ) is also applicable to area which is less than 5 Hectares and as such, taking note of the above-mentioned facts and rules, the revision preferred by the Private Respondent, namely, Rakesh Kumar Yadav had been dismissed and the application of the Petitioner deemed rejected and was never been challenged. Therefore, it is considered view of this Court that the prayer of the Petitioner is not fit to be allowed. 25. It needs to refer herein that the application preferred by the writ petitioner for grant of mining lease in the year, 2016 remained pending and ultimately, the amendment has come in the year 2017 in the provisions of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules wherein as per Rule 9(1)(d) r/w Rules 9(1)(e) and 9(12), it has been envisaged that all pending applications for grant of mining lease shall be automatically cancelled except those wherein the letter of intent 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 12 had been issued before notifying the said Rules. 26. Admittedly, no letter of intent was issued in favour of the petitioner and his application for lease was kept pending and therefore, in view of the amended provisions of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules as noted above, the writ petitioner does not have a vested right for making consideration with respect to his application for mining lease. 27. It needs to refer herein that the protection is to be given to a person concerned only where the right will be said to be vested on the principle of accrued right. It requires to refer the definition/meaning of vested/accrued right. 28. Rights are ‘vested’ when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute vested rights. 29. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at page1397, the word ‘vested’ is defined as a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right, vested interest. 30. The word ‘vested’ is normally used where an immediate fixed right in present or future enjoyment in respect of a property is created. With the long usage the said word ‘vest’ has also acquired a meaning as “an absolute or indefeasible right”. It 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 13 had a ‘legitimate’ or “settled expectation” to obtain right to enjoy the property etc. Such “settled expectation” can be rendered impossible of fulfilment due to change in law by the legislature. Besides this, such a “settled expectation” or the so- called “vested right” cannot be countenanced against public interest and convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the law. 31. Thus, “vested right” is a right independent of any contingency. Such a right can arise from a contract, statute or by operation of law. A vested right can be taken away only if the law specifically or by necessary implication provide for such a course. 32. In the light of the definition of the “vested right”, it is evident that right accrues to person or persons attached to an institution or building or anything whatsoever, meaning thereby, if an incumbent is claiming a vested right, he is to substantiate before the court of law that the right has been created in his favour by an order passed by the competent authority in accordance with law. 33. It is evident from the definition of the vested right that right would be said to be vested right, permanent and continuous in nature and if that be so, the question of prejudice or following of principles of natural justice will arise. 34. The settled position of law is that once the right has been 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 14 accrued, the subsequent rule framed carving out the eligibility criteria will not be considered to be a reason to recall the benefit already granted due to the reason that a vested right has been created. Here, it is relevant to refer the definition of vested right as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh, [(2014) 13 SCC 583] at paragraphs 11, 12 and 13, which read hereunder as:— “11. The word “vested” is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.) at p. 1563, as: “Vested.—fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given in the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are ‘vested' when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest inproperty founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute ‘vested rights’.” 12. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at p. 1397, “vested” is defined as law held by a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right; vested interest. 13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any contingency and it cannot be taken away without consent of the person concerned. Vested right can arise from contract, statute or by operation of law. Unless an accrued or vested right has been derived by a party, the policy decision/scheme could be changed.” 35. Further, so far as the question of taking away the vested right is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition in the case of Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah, (1997) 6 SCC 623 at paragraph 24 which 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 15 reads hereunder as:— “24. In many of these decisions the expressions “vested rights” or “accrued rights” have been used while striking down the impugned provisions which had been given retrospective operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority, substantive appointment, etc., of the employees. The said expressions have been used in the context of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a benefit already available to the employee under the existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We are unable to hold that these decisions are not in consonance with the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon [AIR 1967 SC 1889], B.S. Vedera [AIR 1969 SC 118] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [(1983) 2 SCC 33].” 36. This Court is now to examine that merely keeping the application pending will be said to create a right said to be vested right. 37. The answer of this Court will be in negative, reason being that, merely making an application cannot be said to be accrual of right and hence, in absence of any right having been accrued in favour of the petitioner, no relief can be granted contrary to the statutory provision. 38. Based upon the discussion made hereinabove, it is considered view of this Court that the revisional court has correctly appreciated the relevant amended provisions in the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules and also has 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 16 taken into consideration the aforesaid statutory restrictions and therefore, rejected the claim of the writ petitioner. 39. It needs to refer herein that the writ petition has been filed for issuance of Writ of Certiorari for interfering with the order dated 29.12.2017 passed by Mines Commissioner. 40. We are aware with the settled position of law of issuance of Writ of Certiorari, which can only be issued if there is any error apparent on record or there is gross miscarriage of justice, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477, wherein, at paragraph-7 it has been held as under: “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 17 the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” 41. Similarly, in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph-21 as hereunder: - “21. With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 18 fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” 42. In the case of Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868, their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on 2025:JHHC:25679-DB 19 evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 43. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court to issue Writ of Certiorari and basing upon the reason assigned hereinabove, is of the view that the order passed by the authority concerned, cannot be said to suffer from an error, hence, the same is not fit to be interfered with. 44. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed. 45. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) I Agree (Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.) Rohit/-A.F.R.