1 ( 2025:HHC:23200 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 186 of 2025. Reserved on: 09.07.2025 Date of Decision: 18.07.2025 Ravi Singh ...Petitioner Versus Nirbhaya Chambiyal & Anr. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the petitioner : Mr. Varun Chauhan, Advocate. For the respondent : NEMO Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of the proceedings filed under Section 125(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) for executing the order dated 12.04.2019 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nurpur, District Kangra (H.P). (learned Trial Court) 2. It has been asserted that the parties obtained a decree of divorce by way of mutual consent from the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Kangra, at Dharamshala, District Kangra. It 2 ( 2025:HHC:23200 ) was agreed that neither party would claim anything from each other. The petitioner had agreed to pay ₹11,00,000/- towards full and final settlement. The respondent No. 2, wife, also agreed to withdraw all the execution petitions filed by her and her minor children. The petitioner fulfilled all the terms and conditions; however, the respondent no. 2 continued with her petition for execution of the order dated 12.04.2019, passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the present petition. 3. I have heard Mr. Varun Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, who submitted that the parties had divorced each other by way of mutual consent. It was agreed that the wife would not seek the execution of the maintenance awarded in her favour; however, she continued with the petition. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned Courts below be quashed. 4. I have given considerable thought to his submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 5. Section 127 of Cr. P.C. provides that on proof of a change in the circumstances of any person, the learned Magistrate may make such alteration as he thinks fit. The learned Magistrate 3 ( 2025:HHC:23200 ) can also cancel or vary the order if it appears to him that, in consequence of any decision of the Competent Civil Court, the order should be varied or cancelled. Therefore, a jurisdiction is vested before the learned Magistrate to alter or cancel the order of maintenance granted by him. The petition is silent as to why the petitioner has not exhausted this remedy; rather, it was stated in Para No.8 of the petition, that the petitioner has no alternative or efficacious remedy except to approach the Court, which is factually incorrect. 6. It was held in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent jurisdiction should not be exercised when a specific remedy exists. It was observed: “At the outset, the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court, which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions: “(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.” 4 ( 2025:HHC:23200 ) 7. It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del 138 that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is vested in the Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This jurisdiction cannot be exercised when a specific remedy is available under the other provisions of the Code. It was observed: - “8. In order to determine the question under consideration, as to consider the scope of the inherent powers of the High Court becomes relevant. The inherent powers of the High Court inhere in it because of its being at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section 482 of the Code, are to be exercised in making orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482 envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court exercised by it with the object of achieving the above-mentioned three results. It is for this reason that section 482 does not prescribe the contours of the inherent powers of the High Court, which are wide enough to be exercised in suitable cases to afford relief to an aggrieved party. While exercising inherent powers, it has to be borne in mind that this power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C. 866) (1). This principle of law had been reiterated succinctly by the Supreme Court recently in Palanippa Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 5 ( 2025:HHC:23200 ) SCC 634: AIR 1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein examining the scope of section 482 it was observed that a provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision in the statute which saves that power. Putting it in another form, the Court observed that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject, there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern the particular subject matter.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. It was held in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 647 that jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and should not be exercised when a specific remedy has been provided under the Code. It was observed: “2. It appears that, unfortunately, the High Court, by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “the Code”), has prevented the flow of justice on the alleged contention of the convicted accused that it was polluted by the so-called misconduct of the judicial officer. It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court, and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law, including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where 6 ( 2025:HHC:23200 ) there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. In the present case, the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of the offence. The High Court has intervened at an uncalled-for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. xxxxx 9. In our view, the order passed by the High Court entertaining the petition of the convicted accused under Section 482 of the Code is, on the face of it, illegal, erroneous, and to say the least, unfortunate. It was known to the High Court that the trial court passed proceedings to the effect that a final judgment and order convicting the accused were pronounced by the trial court. It was also recorded by the trial court that, as the accused were absent, the Court had issued non-bailable warrants. In such a situation, instead of directing the accused to remain present before the Court for resorting to the steps contemplated by the law for passing the sentence, the High Court has stayed further proceedings, including the operation of the non-bailable warrants issued by the trial court. It is disquieting that the High Court has overlooked the important legal aspect that the accused has a right of appeal against the order of conviction purported to have been passed by the trial court. In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have entertained a petition under Section 482 of the Code and stonewalled the very efficacious alternative remedy of appeal as provided in the Code. Merely because the accused made certain allegations against the trial judge, the substantive law cannot be bypassed. 9 It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hamida v. Rashid (2008) 1 SCC 474 that the inherent jurisdiction under 7 ( 2025:HHC:23200 ) Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and should not be exercised when an alternative remedy is available. It was observed: “7. It is a well-established principle that inherent power conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases, and that too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and scope of power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in considerable detail in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1978 SC 47], and it was held as under : (SCC p. 555, para 8) The following principles may be stated in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court: (1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. 8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545], after a review of a large number of earlier decisions, it was held as under: (SCC p. 657, para 29) “29. … The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly, as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent 8 ( 2025:HHC:23200 ) jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment.” 9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076] the High Court had entertained a petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and before the sentence had been awarded and further proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal, this Court set aside the order of the High Court after reiterating the principle that it is well settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. It was further observed that the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of the offence and intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482 CrPC could not have been entertained as the accused had an alternative remedy of an appeal as provided in the Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other decisions of this Court, as the consistent view throughout has been that a petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be entertained if there is any other specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. 9 ( 2025:HHC:23200 ) 10. In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could apply for bail afresh after the offence had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not do so and filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC in order to circumvent the procedure whereunder they would have been required to surrender, as the bail application could be entertained and heard only if the accused were in custody. It is important to note that no order adverse to the respondents-accused had been passed by any court, nor was there any miscarriage of justice or any illegality. In such circumstances, the High Court committed a manifest error of law in entertaining a petition under Section 482 CrPC and issuing a direction to the subordinate court to accept the sureties and bail bonds for the offence under Section 304 IPC. The effect of the order passed by the High Court is that the accused after getting bail in an offence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 IPC on the very day on which they were taken into custody, got an order of bail in their favour even after the injured had succumbed to his injuries and the case had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC without any court examining the case on merits, as it stood after conversion of the offence. The procedure laid down for the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC, though available to the respondents-accused, having not been availed of, the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it has to be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied). 10. In the present case, the alternative remedy of seeking alteration/cancellation is available to the petitioner, and this Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction in such a situation. 11. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. The petitioner had the liberty to approach the 10 ( 2025:HHC:23200 ) learned Magistrate for cancellation/variation of the order of maintenance. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th July 2025 (Shamsh Tabrez)