- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B. WRIT PETITION NO. 106921 OF 2023 (S-KAT) BETWEEN: 1. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-560001. R/BY ITS REGISTRAR. 2. THE ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR ENQUIRES-8, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-560001. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. SRINIVAS B. NAIK, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SRI. A.H. MAJJAGI S/O HANUMAPPA AGE. 56 YEARS, OCC. GRAMA PANCHAYATH SECRETARY GR-I, BAGAVATHI GRAMA PANCHAYATH, TQ/DIST. BAGALKOT, R/O. NANDISHWARA NAGAR, BAGALKOT-587101. 2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, R/BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND PANCHAYATH RAJ DEPARTMENT, M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU-560001. 3. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ZILLA PANCHAYATH, BAGALKOT DISTRICT-587101. 4. THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TALUK PANCHAYATH, BAGALKOT-587101. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. G.K. HIREGOUDAR, PRL. GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR R2) RAKESH S HARIHAR Digitally signed by RAKESH S HARIHAR Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 22-08-2019 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BELAGAVI IN APPLICATION NO.2045/2017 IN SO FAR AS THE RESPONDENT NO.1 IS CONCERNED PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A; AND PERMIT THE PETITIONER FOR CONTINUATION OF THE DEPARTMENTAL ENQUIRY AGAINST THE RESPONDENT NO.1 IN THE ENDS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY & ETC. THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B. ORAL ORDER (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT) This writ petition by the Lokayukta represented by its Registrar/Addl. Registrar under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the order dated 22.08.2019 in Application No.2045/2017 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Belagavi1, by which the 1st respondent’s application questioning the order of entrustment of enquiry dated 6.9.2016 and articles of charge dated 13.03.2013 is allowed by quashing those orders. 1 For short ‘Tribunal’ - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 2. Heard learned counsel Sri. Srinivas B Naik for the petitioners and learned Govt. Advocate Sri.G.K. Hiregoudar for respondent No.2 and perused the writ petition papers. 3. Respondent No.1, who was working as Gram Panchayat Secretary Grade-I, approached the Tribunal questioning the order dated 6.9.2016 entrusting the enquiry to the petitioners under Rule 14A of Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 19572 and also articles of charge dated 13.03.2013. Accepting the contention of respondent No.1 that respondent No.2/government has not applied its mind while passing order dated 6.9.2016 entrusting the enquiry to the petitioners and also on the ground that respondent No.1 was not working at the relevant point of time in the place where alleged incident took place, allowed the application. Questioning the said order of the Tribunal, the petitioner/Lokayukta is before this Court. 2 For short ‘CCA Rules’ - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 4. Learned counsel Sri. Srinivas B Naik would submit that since the charges against respondent No.1 is very serious in nature, the Tribunal erred in quashing the order of entrustment as well as of articles of charge. Learned counsel would submit that the Tribunal while quashing the order of entrustment of enquiry as well as articles of charge on the ground that there is no application of mind by the respondent No.2/State, ought to have remitted the matter back to respondent No.2 directing to examine the material afresh and to pass appropriate orders. Thus, he would pray for allowing the writ petition. 5. Learned Government Advocate would support the contention raised by the petitioners and prays for allowing the writ petition. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Government Advocate, we are of the considered view that no ground is made out to interfere with the impugned order of the Tribunal. - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 7. The Tribunal on examination of material on record has recorded a definite finding that while passing the order dated 6.9.2016 entrusting the enquiry to the petitioners under Rule 14A of CCA Rules, the government has not examined the material on record as required under law and on the other hand, government is required to examine whether the matter is required to be entrusted to the petitioners/Lokayukta to hold an enquiry. When the Tribunal has recorded a finding that respondent No.2 has not applied its mind, it is for the State to establish that it had applied its mind to the material on record. Admittedly, no writ petition is filed by the State challenging the order passed by the Tribunal. In that light it is not open for the petitioner/Lokayukta to raise the said ground. 8. The Tribunal has also recorded a finding that respondent No.1 was not working during the period when the incident had taken place. It is submitted that the complaint in respect of the alleged incident was dated 18.1.2013, whereas respondent No.1 was posted to the said place on 18.02.2015, which is subsequent to the complaint. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 9. The impugned order is passed on 22.08.2019 by the Tribunal, whereas the present writ petition is filed on 9.6.2023. Nearly, there is four years delay in preferring the writ petition. No averment whatsoever is made in the writ petition with regard to delay. No explanation is forthcoming from the writ petition and the learned counsel for the petitioners is also not in a position to explain the delay in approaching this Court. When inordinate delay of four years is not explained, it is not a case for entertaining the writ petition. Though there is no time frame for filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, an aggrieved person shall approach the writ Court within a reasonable time. 10. It is relevant to note the law laid down by the Apex Court in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and Others3 on delay in filing the writ petition at paragraphs 9 to 12, which read thus: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words 3 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC-D:13874-DB WP No. 106921 of 2023 11. For the reasons recorded above, we find no merit in the writ petition. Accordingly, writ petition stands rejected. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of as not surviving for consideration. Sd/- (S G PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (GEETHA K.B.) JUDGE JTR, CT:VP LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 19