Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
CRM-M-40052-
239 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Jagpal alias Gandhi State of Haryana
CORAM:
Present:-
SUMEET GOEL
1. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No registered for the off Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of IPC later on), at Police Station
2. accused of being involved in FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving grams of charas Recovery of from the car of the petitioner. -2025 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA CHANDIGARH
Date of decision: Jagpal alias Gandhi versus Haryana HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Mr. Navkiran Singh, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Gurmeet Singh, AAG Haryana ***** SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL) Present fourth petition has been filed under Section Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No registered for the offences punishable under Section Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of IPC and Section at Police Station Bahalgarh, District Sonipat. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is accused of being involved in FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving charas allegedly recovered from the possession of the petitioner covery of charas weighing 1 kg 756 grams wa from the car of the petitioner. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-M-40052-2025 (O&M) Date of decision: July 31, 2025 ….Petitioner ….Respondent HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL for the petitioner. Gurmeet Singh, AAG Haryana. petition has been filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’) for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No.323 dated 21.10.2022, ences punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Act, 1985 (for short ‘NDPS Act’) and Section 29 of the NDPS Act added Bahalgarh, District Sonipat. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an accused of being involved in FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving 150 from the possession of the petitioner. weighing 1 kg 756 grams was also allegedly effected 1
2025 (O&M) , 2025 Petitioner ….Respondent 483 of the for grant of , Narcotic (for short ‘NDPS Act’) 29 of the NDPS Act added an 150 . effected MAHAVIR SINGH 2025.08.01 10:46 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/ judgment
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3.
is in custody since submitted that the mandatory provisions of the complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the liability thereof cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. has further iterated that the petitioner has than 02 years
4.
arguing that the allegations raised and, thus, he State counsel has further submitted that rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act dismissed. Lea dated 30.07.2025 in Court, which is taken on record.
5.
the available records of the case.
6.
investigation was carried out and challan was presented on 34 prosecution witnesses have been cited till date. The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, -2025 (O&M)
Learned counsel for the petitioner has is in custody since 21.10.2022. Learned counsel submitted that the mandatory provisions of the complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that thereof cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. has further iterated that the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more 02 years. Thus, regular bail is prayed for. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner he does not deserve the concession of the regular bail State counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is barred by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same ought to be Learned State counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate 2025 in Court, which is taken on record. I have heard counsel for the rival the available records of the case. The petitioner was arrested on investigation was carried out and challan was presented on prosecution witnesses have been cited and only The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, 2
Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner
Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not been complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the trial is delayed and thereof cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. Learned counsel suffered incarceration for more . Thus, regular bail is prayed for. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by against the petitioner are serious in nature does not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned the instant bail plea is barred by the , and thus, the same ought to be rned State counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate 2025 in Court, which is taken on record. rival parties and have gone through The petitioner was arrested on 21.10.2022 whereinafter investigation was carried out and challan was presented on 31.03.2023. Total and only 02 have been examined The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, 2
that the petitioner has further NDPS Act have not been complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects. and
Learned counsel suffered incarceration for more by serious in nature Learned the instant bail plea is barred by the , and thus, the same ought to be rned State counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate parties and have gone through whereinafter Total have been examined The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, MAHAVIR SINGH 2025.08.01 10:46 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/ judgment
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lest it may prejudice the trial. Not indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence. 6.1. petitioner to sec was dismissed on 06.03.2025. However, keeping in view further incarceration of the petitioner for a period of nearly 05 months and no progress in trial, this Court is inclined to favourably c for bail. A profitable this Court passed in Haryana and another principles emerge:
-2025 (O&M) lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence. Indubitably, the present petition is the fourth attempt by the petitioner to secure regular bail. The last bail plea preferred by the petitioner was dismissed on 06.03.2025. However, keeping in view further incarceration of the petitioner for a period of nearly 05 months and no progress in trial, this Court is inclined to favourably c A profitable reference, in this regard, can this Court passed in CRA-S-2332-2023 titled as Haryana and another; relevant whereof reads as under:
“10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles emerge: I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof. II. Such second/successive maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non or earlier petition was dismissed on merits. III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice.
The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential change in circumstances. IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down a what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Cour with such second/successive regular bail petition(s). V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently 3 hing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence. Indubitably, the present petition is the fourth attempt by the ure regular bail. The last bail plea preferred by the petitioner was dismissed on 06.03.2025. However, keeping in view further incarceration of the petitioner for a period of nearly 05 months and no progress in trial, this Court is inclined to favourably consider the instant plea , in this regard, can be made to a judgment of titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of reads as under: the above discussion, the following Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits. For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The aphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential change in circumstances. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its own unique facts/circumstance.
Making such an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail petition(s). In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently 3
hing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of Indubitably, the present petition is the fourth attempt by the ure regular bail. The last bail plea preferred by the petitioner was dismissed on 06.03.2025. However, keeping in view further incarceration of the petitioner for a period of nearly 05 months and no onsider the instant plea be made to a judgment of Rafiq Khan versus State of the above discussion, the following Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected regular bail petition(s) is maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as prosecution For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The aphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without
s to what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is t dealing In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently MAHAVIR SINGH 2025.08.01 10:46 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/ judgment
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6.2. saddled upon the petitioner. by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period of the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 6.3.
Punjab passed in upon the ratio Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal”; “Niti Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat”; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patr and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
-2025 (O&M) required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said order passed. Trial is indeed procrastinating and upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period of 02 years, 09 months and 03 days the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
This Court in a judgment titled as passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal”; “Niti Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) 2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat”; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus: 4 required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said order passed.” rastinating and folly thereof cannot be As per custody certificate dated 30.07.2025 filed by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration days. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal”; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) 2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat”; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated a @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR 4
required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being second/successive petition(s).
In other words, the cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly folly thereof cannot be .2025 filed by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration In this view of the matter, diluted in light Kulwinder versus State of (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta sh Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) 2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat”; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated a @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR MAHAVIR SINGH 2025.08.01 10:46 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/ judgment
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fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since pre jail prosecutor and after havi fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty process, particularly where such de -2025 (O&M)
“7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an es fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution.
The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedin consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non The overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the prosecution and the P entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed innocen otherwise, are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family. There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process, particularly where such de 5 The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right ctuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent inues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time.
It does not serve he criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal ts against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public ng satisfied itself of twin conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the 5
The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a ; to mitigate anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right ctuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of sential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent inues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since gs consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early of criminal jurisprudence. dockets, the heavy volume of work and the olice, indubitably keeps the entire criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve he criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs.
The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an dispatch. The guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal ts against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of t, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of life, usually under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of a bail petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public ng satisfied itself of twin conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial lay(s) is neither attributable to the MAHAVIR SINGH 2025.08.01 10:46 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/ judgment
CRM-M-40052-
frustrate this legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. principle of justice and equity. failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other
6.4. to be involved However, this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline the concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case is made out for grant of regular bail the facts/circu upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586 Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High C Sridhar Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 in CRM-M No.38822 -2025 (O&M) accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 The legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s eye to the protracted d frustrate this legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty that it does not become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute.
While dealing with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and ex incarceration, without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity. Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the t failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985.” Further, as per the said custody certificate involved in 02 more cases; and stands acquitted in 01 another case/FIR. However, this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline the concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case is made out for grant of regular bail qua the FIR in question by ratiocinating upon the facts/circumstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586 Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High C Sridhar Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 M No.38822-2022 titled as Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana 6 accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985.
The legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of A of the Act. However, this Court cannot to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. dealing with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the , the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty eated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 Further, as per the said custody certificate, the petitioner is stated stands acquitted in 01 another case/FIR. However, this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline the concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case is the FIR in question by ratiocinating upon mstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maulana Mohd. Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586; a Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in case of Sridhar Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 & judgments of this Court Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana, 6
accused nor justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons.
An individual cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by . The legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of A of the Act. However, this Court cannot elays and systematic inefficiency that bound to ensure that it does not become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights, notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. dealing with bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the peditious trial. Prolonged trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the rial has failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty eated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 the petitioner is stated stands acquitted in 01 another case/FIR. However, this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline the concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case is the FIR in question by ratiocinating upon mstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this regard can be placed Maulana Mohd. Amir ; a ourt in case of & judgments of this Court , MAHAVIR SINGH 2025.08.01 10:46 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/ judgment
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decided on 29.11.2021, and (Criminal) 191. undertrial is not warranted in the facts
7.
ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned in addition to conditions that may be Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:
-2025 (O&M) decided on 29.11.2021, and Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR (Criminal) 191. Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned /Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following
(i) The petitioner shall not mis (ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or documentary, during the trial. (iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial. (iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail. (v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial Court. (vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate. (vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try t trial. (viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall b merits thereof. 7 Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR to say, further detention of the petitioner as an and circumstances of the case. In view of above, the present petition is allowed.
Petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to trial Court/Duty Magistrate. However, imposed by the concerned trial /Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted. The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or during the trial. The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the ioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate. The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail. the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be ratiocinated upon 7
Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR to say, further detention of the petitioner as an In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to /Duty Magistrate. However, trial /Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the ioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station phone number without prior o delay the The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence after being released on bail.
the petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail e ratiocinated upon MAHAVIR SINGH 2025.08.01 10:46 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/ judgment
CRM-M-40052-
8. which may be imposed by concerned hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant petitioner. 9. 10. opinion on the merits of the case. 11. application, if any, shall also stands disposed off. July 31, 2025 mahavir
Whether speaking/reasoned:
Whether reportable:
-2025 (O&M) In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those which may be imposed by concerned trial Court hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the Ordered accordingly. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. Since the main case has been decided, pending mi application, if any, shall also stands disposed off. , 2025
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Whether reportable:
Yes/No 8 In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous application, if any, shall also stands disposed off. (SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE 8
In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those /Duty Magistrate as directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of scellaneous MAHAVIR SINGH 2025.08.01 10:46 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this order/ judgment