1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.541 OF 2025 (INJ) BETWEEN: SRI. R. HARISH BABU S/O LATE SRI. RAMA RAJU AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS R/AT. NO. 555, 4TH FLOOR AXIS PADEGAL 9TH CROSS ROAD JP NAGAR, 3RD PHASE BANGALORE-560078. ...APPELLANT (BY SRI. VIVEKANANDA H.S., ADVOCATE) AND: SMT. VIJAYALAKSHMI SRIDHAR (ALSO KNOWN AS VIJI SRIDHAR) AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS W/O SRI. SRIDHAR ORDINARILY RESIDING AT NO.608, JAMERSON ROAD CARY NC 27519 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ALSO RESIDING AT NO.506 9TH CROSS, VTC R 2 J.P. NAGAR BANGALORE-560078. …RESPONDENT (BY SRI. C.M. NAGABUSHANA, ADVOCATE) THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER ORDER 41 RULE 1 AND 2 R/W SEC.96(1) OF CPC., AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 24.01.2025 PASSED ON IA NO.II IN OS NO.4479/2023 ON THE FILE OF XXIV ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE CITY., ALLOWING THE IA NO.II FILED UNDER ORDER VII RULE 11(a) AND (d) R/W SEC.151 OF CPC., FOR REJECTION OF PLAINT. THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 09.07.2025, THIS DAY JUDGMENT WAS PRONOUNCED THEREIN, AS UNDER: CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM C.A.V. JUDGMENT This appeal is by the plaintiff assailing the order of the learned Judge on an application filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of CPC seeking rejection of plaint. The learned Judge has rejected the plaint on the ground that the suit is barred under Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 read with Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Therefore, by applying Order VII Rule 3 11(d), learned Judge has proceeded to reject the plaint, which is now impugned in the captioned appeal. 2. For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court. 3. The facts leading to the case are as under: The plaintiff instituted the present suit seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant, who is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property, from alienating or creating any third-party interests in respect of the said property, allegedly in violation of an oral contract entered into with the plaintiff, commencing from 09.05.2023. The plaintiff, who is the Managing Director of a company named Axis Concept Constructions Pvt. Ltd., asserts that he was actively in search of a suitable residential/commercial property in and around Bangalore. 4 Upon learning that the defendant, a resident of the United States of America, was intending to sell the suit schedule property, the plaintiff claims to have established contact with her through telephonic conversation. It is further alleged that during the said communication, the defendant unequivocally accepted the plaintiff’s offer to purchase the property. Relying on WhatsApp messages exchanged between the parties, the plaintiff contends that an oral agreement was concluded wherein the defendant not only agreed to sell the property but also instructed the plaintiff to initiate the process by procuring relevant documents required to effectuate the transaction. The plaintiff claims to have acted upon this assurance and incurred substantial expenses towards compliance. It is further alleged that the plaintiff shared a draft sale deed along with a calculation sheet, and that, at the instance of the defendant, modifications were made to the said draft. The plaintiff also 5 states that, upon his insistence, the defendant secured letters of consent from her siblings, indicating her continued willingness to proceed with the transaction. However, the plaintiff avers that upon the defendant’s arrival in India, she inexplicably ceased further communication and refrained from honoring the terms and conditions of the alleged oral agreement. According to the plaintiff, on 07.07.2023, he was informed by reliable sources that the defendant was in active negotiations with third parties and was attempting to alienate the suit schedule property. The plaintiff, while asserting his intention to file a comprehensive suit for enforcement of the oral contract, has instituted the present suit for injunction in view of the imminent threat of alienation. Upon service of summons, the defendant entered appearance and filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking 6 rejection of the plaint. The defendant contended that the suit is devoid of a cause of action and that the remedy, if any, available to the plaintiff lies in instituting a suit for specific performance of the alleged oral agreement. Hence, a suit for bare injunction, in the absence of a substantive relief of enforcement of contract, is not maintainable. The learned trial Judge, upon examination of the averments in the plaint and the relief sought, recorded a finding that the suit for bare injunction is not maintainable in law in view of the bar under Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Consequently, the plaint came to be rejected. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal memo has strenuously argued and contended that the learned Judge has erred in rejecting the plaint by applying Section 41(h). 7 In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the following judgments: 1) K.Thakshinamoorthy and Another vs. State Bank of India - AIR 2001 MAD 167; 2) Abha Tiwari & Another vs. A.S.Agarwal Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. & others - 2017-AHC-51511; 3) Ram Kumar & Another vs. Alok Nanda - (2025) 6 UK CK 0064; 4) Kasthuri and Others vs. Baskaran and Another - (2004) 4 ICC 147; 5) Yashwanth Vasanth Rao vs. Anuradha - 2015:BHC- AS:931; 6) Rajneet vs. Nandita Singh and Others - Civil Appeal No.3252/2025; 7) M/s. K.L.V. Builders and Developers and Another vs. Vinay Sethi and Others - 2024:PHHC:105962; 8) Shashi Dhawan vs. S.M.Khan and Another - (2011) 102 AIC 449; 9) Walchandnagar Industries Limited vs. Indraprastha Developers - (2015) 7 Bom Cr 1; 8 10) N. Srinivasa vs. M/s. Kuttukaran Machine Tools Ltd. - AIR 2009 SC 2217. 5. Relying on the above decisions, it is contended that the bar under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act cannot be a ground to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is further argued that the impugned order rejecting the plaint is perverse, contrary to settled legal principles, and overlooks the legal proposition that maintainability of the suit must be tested based on the averments in the plaint alone and not on the strength of the defence. It is thus submitted that the rejection of the plaint, at the threshold, without affording opportunity to the plaintiff to lead evidence, is wholly unsustainable in law. 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/defendant has supported the order of rejection by placing reliance on Section 54 of the Transfer of Property 9 Act and Order VII Rule 13 CPC. Referring specifically to paragraph 18 of the plaint, he submits that the plaintiff has categorically admitted that a comprehensive suit for specific performance is proposed to be filed and, therefore, the present suit for bare injunction, divorced from any prayer for enforcement of contract, is not maintainable. He further submits that in view of the statutory bar under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, when an equally efficacious remedy is available in the form of a suit for specific performance, the present suit is clearly not tenable. 7. It is further contended that where the principal relief itself is not maintainable, no interim protection can be granted, and hence, the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Section 41(h) was fully justified. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments: 10 1) IEEE Mumbai Section Welfare Association vs. Global IEEE Institute of Engineers - Civil Appeal No.7235/2025; 2) Balaram Singh vs. Kelo Devi - (2022) 7 SCR 226; 3) Hardesh Ores(P) Ltd. vs. SociedadeDe Fomento Industrial (P) Ltd. - (2007) 5 SCC 614; 4) The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution vs. B.Gunashekar & Another - Civil Appeal No.5200 of 2025; 5) Sayyed Ayaz Ali vs. Prakash G.Goyal & Others - (2021) 7 SCC 456. 8. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff and learned counsel appearing for the defendant. This Court has given its anxious consideration to the order under challenge. The following points would arise for consideration: (i) Whether the Trial court erred in rejecting the plaint by applying section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act? (ii) What Order? 11 Finding on Point No.1: 9. Before this Court delves into the matter, this Court deems it apt to cull out Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act for ready reference. The same reads as under: "41. Injunction when refused.— An injunction cannot be granted— (a) to restrain any person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit in which the injunction is sought, unless such restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings; (b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought; (c) to restrain any person from applying to any legislative body; (d) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a criminal matter; 12 (e) to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced; (f) to prevent, on the ground of nuisance, an act of which it is not reasonably clear that it will be a nuisance; (g) to prevent a continuing breach in which the plaintiff has acquiesced; (h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust; (i) when the conduct of the plaintiff or his agents has been such as to disentitle him to the assistance of the court; (j) when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter." (emphasis supplied by me) 10. Clause (h) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, enumerates one of the specific circumstances under which a Court shall refuse to grant an injunction. It 13 clearly provides that an injunction cannot be granted when "equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding," except in cases involving breach of trust. The bar contemplated under this provision is premised on the principle that equitable relief in the form of injunction must not be granted when an adequate, alternative, and equally efficacious legal remedy is available to the aggrieved party through ordinary legal process. The legislative intent behind this provision is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and discourage parties from bypassing the proper remedies available under law, particularly when such remedies are not only available but adequate to secure the relief sought. 11. It is also pertinent to note that Section 41(h) is a substantive bar rooted in equity and fairness, and it governs the discretion of the Court in deciding whether an injunction ought to be granted in a particular case. However, the application of this bar must be considered on 14 the merits of the case at the stage of adjudication, after examining evidence and the overall factual matrix. The bar is not automatic nor absolute, and cannot be mechanically applied at the threshold without affording the plaintiff an opportunity to substantiate the pleadings. 12. Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Court to reject a plaint where, from the statements made in the plaint itself, the suit appears to be barred by any law. The scope of this provision is limited to examining whether, on a meaningful reading of the entire plaint, without any reference to the defence, the suit is ex facie barred. The expression "from the statements in the plaint" is significant, and the Court is bound to confine its inquiry to the averments in the plaint alone, without embarking on any factual controversy or requiring evidence at that stage. 15 13. Therefore, unless the bar of law is apparent on the face of the plaint, the power under Order VII Rule 11(d) cannot be invoked. It is settled law that mere assertion by the defendant that the suit is barred by law is not sufficient; the plaint itself must disclose such a bar on its face. If any arguable or triable issue arises, particularly involving mixed questions of fact and law, the rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) is unwarranted. 14. When Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act is read harmoniously with Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, it becomes clear that while Section 41 prescribes the conditions under which a Court may refuse to grant an injunction, it does not ipso facto create a bar of law that can be invoked at the threshold to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d). The bar under Section 41(h) is not jurisdictional in nature nor does it extinguish the plaintiff’s right to institute a suit; rather, it goes to the question of whether the relief of injunction can ultimately be granted on 16 merits. Therefore, the question of whether equally efficacious relief is available is a matter that must be examined during trial and not at the stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11. 15. In this context, the crucial question that arises is whether the statutory bar contemplated under Section 41(h) can be treated as one attracting the consequence under Order VII Rule 11(d). This Court is of the firm view that it cannot. Section 41(h) operates at the stage of adjudicating the relief of injunction, while Order VII Rule 11(d) is applicable only when the suit is barred by any express provision of law discernible solely from the plaint. Hence, the invocation of Section 41(h) to justify rejection of plaint at the threshold is wholly misplaced. 16. The facts of the present case are peculiar and merit close examination. The plaintiff has filed the suit seeking a bare injunction restraining the defendant from 17 alienating the suit schedule property. A perusal of the plaint, particularly paragraph 18, reveals that the plaintiff has expressly stated his intention to file a comprehensive suit for enforcement of the oral agreement alleged to have been entered into with the defendant. The relevant portion of paragraph 18 reads as follows: "18. The plaintiff being aggrieved by the illegal actions of the Defendant and her intentional reneging from the terms that she had agreed with the Plaintiff with regard to the suit schedule property, the Plaintiff has no other option and remedy than to approach this Hon'ble Court seeking for suitable and appropriate reliefs. The Plaintiff is also consulting his legal team to explore the legal option of filing a comprehensive suit or a suit for recovery in due course of time. This suit is imminently necessary as the illegal action of selling suit schedule property to a third party by the Defendant, if materializes, the Plaintiff would be remediless and the situation may lead to multiplicity of suits and proceedings. Hence as an immediate step, the Plaintiff is filing this suit." 18 17. In light of the categorical stand taken by the plaintiff at paragraph 18 of the plaint, this Court is of the considered view that the ingredients of Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which empower the Court of first instance to reject a plaint where the suit appears from the statements made in the plaint itself to be barred by any law, cannot be extended to cover the contingencies contemplated under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The plaint in the present case discloses that the plaintiff has instituted a suit for permanent injunction simplicitor, alleging an imminent threat of alienation by the defendant in violation of an oral agreement. The suit has been brought with the avowed objective of preserving the subject matter of the agreement until such time that comprehensive relief can be sought by way of a suit for specific performance. 19 18. The plaintiff, while instituting the suit, has made it abundantly clear, particularly at paragraph 18 of the plaint, that he intends to initiate a substantive action to enforce the terms of the alleged oral contract. The very fact that the plaintiff has disclosed such intention is sufficient to demonstrate that the present suit is not devoid of substance or strategy, and is instead designed to prevent the suit property from being alienated pending formal adjudication of contractual claims. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the plaintiff, there is no legal impediment for a plaintiff who initially institutes a suit for bare injunction to later seek conversion of such suit into a comprehensive action for specific performance, subject to the provisions governing amendment of pleadings. Thus, even if a bar under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act may arguably operate at a later stage of the proceedings, it cannot be held to ex facie bar the institution of the suit 20 itself so as to attract rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. 19. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has rightly drawn the attention of this Court to several authoritative pronouncements rendered by various High Courts in support of the proposition that a plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) merely on the ground that the relief of injunction is allegedly barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act. The Allahabad High Court, in Abha Tiwari & Another v. A.S. Agarwal Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. & Others (supra), has categorically held that the bar under Section 41(h) does not constitute a statutory bar envisaged under Order VII Rule 11(d). A similar view has been taken by the Uttarakhand High Court in Ram Kumar & Another v. Alok Nanda (supra), where it was held that the issue of maintainability under Section 41(h) is to be determined by the trial court at the appropriate stage and not at the threshold by invoking Order VII Rule 11. 21 20. The Madras High Court in Kasthuri v. Bhaskaran (supra), has emphasized that the Court of first instance may not be in a position to conclusively determine the applicability of Section 41(h) at the preliminary stage, particularly when the plaintiff has reserved his right to file a suit for specific performance. This principle finds further reinforcement in the decision of the Bombay High Court in Yashwanth Vasanth Rao v. Anuradha (supra), where it was observed that unless the plaint is demonstrably barred by law on its face, it cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d). Most significantly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajneet v. Nandita Singh (supra), while interpreting the bar under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, has held that such statutory bars must be examined contextually during trial and cannot form the basis for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 at the preliminary stage. 22 21. In view of the consistent legal position enunciated in the judgments cited above, this Court finds itself in full agreement with the view that Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act merely acts as a discretionary limitation on the grant of equitable relief in the form of injunction and cannot be equated to a statutory bar that warrants rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d). Clause (h) of Section 41 is premised on the doctrine of alternative remedy, and operates as a discretionary check upon the exercise of equitable jurisdiction. It is well-settled that equitable relief such as injunction is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, and the provision merely guides the Court to deny relief when an equally efficacious remedy is available. It does not, however, prohibit the institution of a suit or render it legally untenable at the outset. 22. In the instant case, although the plaintiff has initially filed a suit seeking injunction simplicitor, the 23 pleadings at paragraph 18 of the plaint clearly indicate that the plaintiff intends to seek enforcement of the oral agreement in due course. The very object of the present suit appears to be the preservation of the suit property pending institution of appropriate proceedings for specific performance. The principle underlying Section 41(h) that injunction should not be granted where an equally efficacious remedy exists is evidently intended to prevent abuse of equitable jurisdiction and avoid multiplicity of proceedings. However, in the present factual matrix, the plaintiff has already acknowledged the existence of an alternative remedy and has expressed intention to invoke it. Hence, invoking Section 41(h) at this stage to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) would be legally unsustainable. The bar under Order VII Rule 11(d) must be confined to instances where the suit is expressly and unmistakably barred by law, leaving no scope for adjudication. In contrast, the bar under Section 41(h) is 24 not absolute and can be overcome by appropriate procedural recourse, including amendment of pleadings. 23. In this regard, it is also relevant to note that under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, plaintiff is vested with the right to amend the pleadings, including conversion of a suit for injunction into one for specific performance, provided the ingredients necessary for such amendment are satisfied. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu & Another1, has held that an amendment of the plaint cannot be refused merely on the ground that the plaintiff can file a separate suit. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further emphasized that allowing amendment may serve the cause of justice by avoiding multiplicity of proceedings. 24. In the above-cited decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has authoritatively held that to avoid unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings, Courts should lean 1 (2002) 7 SCC 559 25 in favour of permitting amendment of pleadings where a comprehensive adjudication of all disputes between the parties can be achieved in a single proceeding. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, it becomes evident that the plaintiff's assertion of his intention to seek amendment of the plaint negates the approach adopted by the trial Court in prematurely invoking Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC based on the bar under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act. 25. In view of the legal principles laid down in the judgments referred to above, and based on the discussion hereinbefore, this Court is of the considered view that the Court of first instance erred in entertaining and allowing the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC by relying upon the bar under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act. The bar contemplated under Section 41(h) does not render the suit itself as barred by law; rather, it pertains to the grant or refusal of equitable relief at the stage of merits. Hence, 26 the rejection of plaint on such ground is legally unsustainable and cannot be upheld. Accordingly, point No.1 formulated above is answered in the Affirmative. 26. Conclusions: a) The Trial Court committed a legal error in invoking Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act as a ground to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The bar under Section 41(h) is not jurisdictional or statutory in nature so as to render a suit ex facie barred by law. It merely regulates the discretion of the Court in granting an equitable remedy of injunction. b) The plaint discloses a cause of action and reveals the plaintiff's intention to preserve the subject matter of the agreement by seeking temporary injunctive relief in view of the alleged threat of alienation. At paragraph 18 of the plaint, the plaintiff has clearly indicated his intention to 27 pursue a comprehensive remedy by initiating appropriate proceedings for enforcement of the alleged oral agreement. c) The principle underlying Order VII Rule 11(d) is that the bar must be apparent from the plaint itself. In the present case, the existence of an equally efficacious remedy does not, in itself, make the suit barred by law. Whether or not the plaintiff is ultimately entitled to the equitable relief of injunction is a matter to be adjudicated upon full trial and cannot be summarily decided at the threshold. d) Multiple High Courts, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in analogous contexts, have categorically held that Section 41(h) cannot be invoked at the preliminary stage to reject a plaint. The law laid down in Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu & Another (supra) and other cited authorities supports the proposition that plaintiff can seek amendment of pleadings to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, and that 28 such procedural rights cannot be precluded by prematurely rejecting the plaint. e) The rejection of the plaint at the threshold has effectively foreclosed the plaintiff’s opportunity to substantiate his claim through evidence. Such an approach is contrary to settled legal principles governing Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which must be invoked sparingly and only in clear cases where the suit is manifestly barred. Finding on Point No.2: 27. For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds to pass the following: ORDER (i) The appeal is allowed; (ii) The order dated 24.01.2025 passed on I.A.No.II in O.S.No.4479/2023 on the file of the XXIV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore City is set aside. Consequently, plaint in restored; 29 (iii) Matter is remitted back to the trial Court for fresh consideration; (iv) Since parties are represented by their respective counsel, they are directed to appear before the learned Trial Judge on 18.08.2025 and receive further orders. Sd/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE CA