- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27407 WP No. 33868 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV WRIT PETITION NO. 33868 OF 2024 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: 1. HOTEL KAMADHENU REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY SRI SATHYAPRASAD D HAVING ITS OFFICE AT: 226 NEW SAYYAJI RAO ROAD, MYSURU - 570 001 2. SUHANA S ALVA W/O SATHYAPRASAD D AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS 3. SHARADA S. R. W/O LATE DAYANANDA S R AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS 4. SATHYAPRASAD D S/O LATE DAYANANDA S R AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS ALL ARE R/AT: 114B VIVEKANANDA ROAD, YADAVAGIRI, MYSURU - 570 020 … PETITIONERS (BY SRI. VENKATACHALAPATHI S K., ADVOCATE) Digitally signed by PRAKASH N Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27407 WP No. 33868 of 2024 AND: 1. HDB FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY SRI MOHAN HG REGISTERED OFFICE AT: RADHIKA 2ND FLOOR, LAW GARDEN ROAD, NAVRANGPURA, AHMEDABAD GUJARAT - 380 009 ALSO AT: NO.1078, 2ND FLOOR, 11TH MAIN, 9TH CROSS, MAHALAKSHMI LAYOUT, BENGALURU - 560 086 … RESPONDENT (BY SRI. B.C. AVINASH, ADVOCATE FOR C/R) *** THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE POSSESSION NOTICE DTD 08.06.2023 ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT WHICH IS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-C AND FURTHER MAY BE PLEASED TO QUASH THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED CJM, MYSORE VIDE ORDER DTD 03.05.2024 CRL. MISC NO. 6/2024 FOUND AT ANNEXURE-D AND ETC. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27407 WP No. 33868 of 2024 ORAL ORDER The petitioners have called in question the order at Annexure-'D1' dated 03.05.2024 passed in Crl.Misc.No.6/2024 by the Court of I Addl. Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Mysuru under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. Various contentions have been raised by the petitioners, including that there were procedural irregularities. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the interim order passed by this Court has been complied with. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that as against the order passed, the petitioners are required to avail of the substantive remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 4. In light of the contentions raised, it is relevant to take note of the observations of the Apex Court in the case of United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27407 WP No. 33868 of 2024 and Others - (2010) 8 SCC 110 that the appropriate remedy would be to relegate the petitioners to seek for substantive remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are as follows: "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi- judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27407 WP No. 33868 of 2024 exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27407 WP No. 33868 of 2024 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the Sarfaesi Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." 5. In light of the observations made by the Apex Court, it can be noticed that several factual contentions raised by the petitioners are the matters that cannot be adjudicated in the present proceedings. 6. Accordingly, the petition is disposed off relegating the petitioners to avail of the substantive remedy as regards the impugned proceedings. All contentions of both the sides are kept open. 7. In light of disposal of writ petition, it would meet the ends of justice by directing the respondent- Bank - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:27407 WP No. 33868 of 2024 not to take any precipitative steps for a period of four weeks from today. 8. The interim protection granted under this order is only to enable the petitioners to avail of his substantive remedy and must not be considered to be an order passed on the basis of adjudication on merits. Upon the lapse of the time stipulated, the protection granted would cease to operate and the authorities before whom petitioners may approach are to look at the matter afresh uninfluenced by the observations made herein. 9. Needless to state that while considering the aspect of limitation, in the event the proceedings are instituted before the DRT, time spent before this Court may be taken note of appropriately. Sd/- (S SUNIL DUTT YADAV) JUDGE VGR