Page 1 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} 2025:CGHC:19569-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 1078 of 2022 Order reserved on: 11-3-2025 Order delivered on: 30-4- 2025 1. Chandan Lal Anant, S/o Shri Sudheram Anant, Aged about 48 years, R/o Village Khudiyadih, Post Office Dhandhan, Via Takhatpur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 2. Tushar Manu, S/o Shri Shivdas Manu, Aged about 44 years, R/o Behind Amar Gas Godam, Samta Colony, Magarpara, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 3. Vijay Singh Marko, S/o Ganpat Singh Marko, Aged about 43 years, R/o Nutan Colony, Room No.H/1/9, Sarkanda, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 4. Prem Lal Netam, S/o Jagdish Prasad Netam, Aged about 43 years, R/o House No.G-5, Irrigation Colony, Ward No.11, Naya Baradwar, Tahsil Baradwar, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 5. Sukhnandan Prasad Dhruv, S/o Kumaru Ram Dhruv, Aged about 45 years, R/o House No.H-5, Irrigation Colony, Ward No.3, Jaijaipur, Tahsil Jaijaipur, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) 6. Phoolchand Dhruv, S/o Johit Ram Dhruv, Aged about 40 years, R/o Village Lormi, Via Lormi, District Mungeli (C.G.) 7. Ajay Kumar Paikra, S/o Lalman Singh Paikra, Aged about 39 years, R/o Village Jatadevri, Post Office Aamadand, Tahsil Pendra, District Gourela-Pendra-Marwahi (C.G.) SISTA SOMAYAJULU Digitally signed by SISTA SOMAYAJULU Date: 2025.05.02 18:32:32 +0530 Page 2 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} 8. Hemant Kumar Kushram, S/o Basant Singh Kushram, Aged about 43 years, R/o Village Nagwahi, Post Office Silpahri, District Gourela-Pendra-Marwahi (C.G.) 9. Kailash Singh Marko, S/o Shri Khilawan Ram Marko, Aged about 41 years, R/o House No.H-10, Arpa Sichai Colony, Ramnagar, Kota, Tahsil Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.) --- Petitioners Versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, Through Secretary, General Administrative Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Village Rakhi, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 2. Secretary, Department of Water Resources, Mahanadi Bhawan, Vill. Rakhi, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 3. Engineer-in-Chief, Department of Water Resources, Shivnath Bhawan, North Block, Sector 19, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) --- Respondents AND WPC No. 3476 of 2023 Santosh Kumar Ratre, S/o Shri Bhikhu Ratre, Aged about 38 years, R/o Village Khamhariya, Tahsil & District Mungeli (C.G.) Current Posting Water Resources Department, Kota, Sub-Division Takhatpur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) --- Petitioner Versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, Through Secretary, General Administrative Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Village Rakhi, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 2. Secretary, Department of Water Resources, Mahanadi Bhavan, Vill. Rakhi, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, Distt. Raipur (C.G.) Page 3 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} 3. Engineer-in-Chief, Department of Water Resources, Shivnath Bhawan, North Block, Sector-19, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) --- Respondents For Petitioners :- Mrs. Fouzia Mirza, Senior Advocate with Ms. Rashmi Tandon, Advocate. For Respondents/State :- Mr. Arvind Dubey, Government Advocate. Division Bench: - Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, JJ. C.A.V. Order Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Since common question of law and fact is involved in both the above writ petitions, they were clubbed together and heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioners herein, who are presently working as Amin, have challenged the constitutional validity of the eligibility qualification for appointment to the post of Amin laid down in Schedule-III, Class-III (Executive) Abhiyana, Serial No.1 of the Chhattisgarh Water Resources (Non-Gazetted Technical) Service Recruitment Rules, 2016 (for short, ‘the Rules of 2016’) on the ground that such a rule is constitutionally invalid, arbitrary and violative of the petitioners’ right guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. Page 4 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} 3. The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual backdrop: - 4. The petitioners are presently working and posted as Amin and have challenged the Rules of 2106 on the ground that such rules do not prescribe Patwari training as an essential qualification for appointment to the post of Amin which would render all Amins with and without Patwari training as one. It is the further case of the petitioners that those Amins who are not Patwari trained would also become eligible for promotion to the post of Irrigation Inspector along with the petitioners. Furthermore, Irrigation Inspector being the feeder cadre for Canal Deputy Collector, which requires Patwari training, would also get extinguished for the Irrigation Inspectors and thus, the petitioners’ chance for being considered for promotion gets extinguished. The Madhya Pradesh (Chhattisgarh) Irrigation Department (Extra- ordinary) Service Appointment Rules, 1969, framed on 23-8- 1969, the educational qualification for being appointed on the post of Amin was 8th pass and preference would be given to those persons who are having Patwari training which has been amended on 12-1-1990 and the educational qualification Page 5 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} prescribed was the candidate must have passed 10+2 examination and must have Patwari training and thereafter, the petitioners were appointed on 12-12-2007. In the impugned Rules of 2016 which came into force from 24-2-2016, the qualification with respect to Patwari training has been done away which is unconstitutional, arbitrary and violative of the petitioners’ right guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. 5. The respondents have filed return stating inter alia that the petitions are based on pure apprehension and even the apprehension is misconceived and misplaced as well. It is the case of the respondents that the petitioners are Patwari trained Amins, who were appointed in the year 2007 and those who shall be appointed under the Rules of 2016 will in any case be juniors to the petitioners and therefore the new appointees shall not in any manner interfere with the chance of promotion of the petitioners. Therefore, the petitioners are not affected by the Rules of 2016 particularly, the change in the qualification for appointment of Amin. Even otherwise, prescription of qualification is the prerogative of the Government and scope of interference is quite limited. It was Page 6 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} further pleaded that those Irrigation Inspectors who are Patwari trained will get further promoted to the post of Canal Deputy Collector and promotion to the post of Canal Deputy Collector is governed by the Chhattisgarh Water Resource Engineering and Geological (Gazetted) Services Recruitment Rules, 2014, which prescribe that only those Irrigation Inspectors shall be promoted who are Higher Secondary or High School Examination under (10+2) system passed and who are Patwari training qualified. As such, the petitioners challenge is absolutely misconceived and based on calculative risk of change in chance of promotion and therefore the writ petition has no merit, as it is wholly misplaced and without any cause of action. 6. Mrs. Fouzia Mirza, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, would submit that the impugned Rules of 2016 to the extent of challenge to the deletion of eligibility qualification of Patwari training are vitiated on account of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as unequals are being treated as equals. She would further submit that the Rules of 2016 have attempted to equate, unequals by making all Amins with or without Patwari training to be merged into a Page 7 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} common zone who would be eligible to be promoted to the post of Irrigation Inspectors, making Amin with Patwari training at par with Amin not having Patwari training thereby throwing open the avenues of promotion of Irrigation Inspector and Canal Deputy Collectors to all the Amins with or without Patwari training, who at present are in large numbers in comparison with Amins having Patwari training with comparatively small, numerical strength. She would also submit that the petitioners who are having Patwari training and who could further be promoted to the post of Irrigation Inspector and Canal Deputy Collector on account of having completed the qualifying period of service of 10 years would be losing their prospects of promotion to the post of Irrigation Inspector and thereafter the Canal Deputy Collector and their promotion avenues would be completely blocked, and the chances of promotion would be slender or even no chances during their service tenure, causing hardship and resulting in gross violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Though prescription of qualification and prescription of conditions of service are all within the spheres of executive or legislature, but it is unreasonable to treat Amin with or without training equal and promote them by deleting the Page 8 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} qualification of Patwari training to the post of Irrigation Inspector, which is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. She would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Ajay Kumar Shukla and others v. Arvind Rai and others1 and that of the Bombay High Court in the matter of Joaquim I.M. Dias v. R.S. Revonkar and others2 to buttress her submissions. 7. Mr. Arvind Dubey, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State/respondents, would submit that prescription of qualification is the prerogative of the Government and change in the Rules is also the complete prerogative of the Government, merely because some qualification has caused hardship to the petitioners, if any, only on the ground that it does not suit their interest, the Rules cannot be declared ultra vires, and as such, the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the record with utmost circumspection. 1 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1195 2 1989 SCC OnLine Bom 248 Page 9 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} Principles for Examining Constitutional Validity: - 9. A Statute is construed so as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”. Therefore, a presumption that the Legislature does not exceed its jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing that the Act is not within the competence of the Legislature, or that it has transgressed other constitutional mandates, such as those relating to fundamental rights, is always on the person who challenges its vires. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edition, page 592.) 10. It is a settled principle of law that the Statute enacted by the Parliament or State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. The Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provisions under challenge cannot stand. 11. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others (Ministry of Women and Child Development Secretary and others)3 held that legislation can be struck down if it is manifestly arbitrary 3 (2017) 9 SCC 1 Page 10 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} and manifest arbitrariness is the ground to negate legislation as well under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It has been observed by their Lordships as under: - “101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India4 stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.” 12. Furthermore, in the matter of Dental Council of India v. Biyani Shikshan Samiti and another5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that there is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show 4 (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121 5 (2022) 6 SCC 65 Page 11 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} that it is invalid. B.R. Gavai, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, held in paragraphs 27 & 28 of the report as under: - “27. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. Though it may also be questioned on the ground of unreasonableness, such unreasonableness should not be in the sense of not being reasonable, but should be in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. 28.It has further been held by this Court in the said case that for challenging the subordinate legislation on the ground of arbitrariness, it can only be done when it is found that it is not in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution. It has further been held that it cannot be done merely on the ground that it is not reasonable or that it has not taken into account relevant circumstances which the Court considers relevant.” 13. Very recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and Others 6 followed the decision of the rendered in the matter of State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Krishnamurthy 7 in which six grounds have been laid down for challenging the constitutionality of a subordinate legislation. In P. Krishnamurthy (supra) it has been held as under:- 6 2024 SCC OnLine SC 114 7 (2006) 4 SCC 517 Page 12 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} 15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognized that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds: (a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation. (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India. (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act. (e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment. (f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules). (emphasis supplied) Challenge 14. The petitioners herein have called in question the constitutional validity of deletion of Patwari training from the eligibility qualification for the post of Amin prescribed vide Schedule-III, Class-III (Executive) Abhiyana, Serial No.1 of the Rules of 2016 by which the following eligibility qualification has been prescribed: - Page 13 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} SCHEDULE - III (See Rule 8) S.No. Name of Service Minimum Age Limit Maximum Age Limit Educational Qualification Selection Committee (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Class III (Executive) Abhiyana 1 Amin 18 years 30 years (1) Passed (10+2) Examination from any recognised Board, (2) After selection, preference will be given to the candidates on the basis of marks obtained in six months training. 15. 15. Prior to the Rules of 2016, the Chhattisgarh Irrigation Department (Extra-ordinary) Service Appointment Rules, 1969 were in force in which qualification for the post of Amin was 8th pass and priority would be given to those who are Patwari trained, which has been amended on 12-1-1990 prescribing qualification for the post of Amin to be Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination (10+2) and Patwari training, which has been repealed and the Rules of 2016 have been notified on 24-2-2016 in which qualification for the post of Amin has been prescribed as pass in (10+2) Examination from any recognised Board and it has also been prescribed that after Page 14 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} selection, preference will be given to the candidates on the basis of marks obtained in six months training. However, the petitioners who are working on the post of Amin are aggrieved by the fact that the impugned rule has done away with the qualification of Patwari training as essential qualification for appointment on the post of Amin under the Rules of 2016 on the ground that treating all the Amins with or without Patwari training as one would reduce their chance of promotion to further post and those Amins who are not Patwari trained would also become eligible for promotion to the post of Irrigation Inspector and furthermore, Irrigation Inspector being the feeder cadre for Canal Deputy Collector, which requires Patwari training, would also get extinguished for the Irrigation Inspectors and thus, the petitioners' chance for being considered for promotion gets extinguished. Chances of promotion, whether fundamental right:- 16. Whether an employee has a right to be promoted or not depends on the statutory rules governing his service or the terms of the contract of service or executive instructions as the case may be. If the rules or the contract of service etc. provide or indicate that promotion is to be made on an assessment of Page 15 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} the merits of the candidate, then the candidate has only a right to be considered for promotion as distinguished from the right to be promoted. 17. It is well settled that while promotion is a normal incidence of service and not a fundamental right, but an employee has a right to be considered for promotion. In the matter of Union of India and others v. Krishna Kumar and others 8, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that there is no vested right to promotion, but a right be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules which prevail on the date on which consideration for promotion takes place, and observed in paragraphs 10, 11 & 12 as under: - “10. In considering the rival submissions, it must, at the outset, be noted that it is well settled that there is no vested right to promotion, but a right be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules which prevail on the date on which consideration for promotion takes place. This Court has held that there is no rule of universal application to the effect that vacancies must necessarily be filled in on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose. The decision of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao9 has been construed in subsequent decisions as a case where the applicable Rules required the process of promotion or selection to be completed within a stipulated time-frame. 8 (2019) 4 SCC 319 9 (1983) 3 SCC 284 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 382 Page 16 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} Hence, it has been held in H.S. Grewal v. Union of India10 that the creation of an intermediate post would not amount to an interference with the vested right to promotion. A two-Judge Bench of this Court held thus: (H.S. Grewal case, SCC p. 769, para 13) “13. … Such an introduction of an intermediate post does not, in our opinion, amount to interfering with any vested rights cannot be interfered with, is to be accepted as correct. What all has happened here is that an intermediate post has been created prospectively for future promotions from Group B Class II to Group A Class I. If, before these Rules of 1981 came into force, these officers were eligible to be directly promoted as Commandants under the 1974 Rules but before they got any such promotions, the 1981 Rules came in obliging them to go through an intermediate post, this does not amount to interfering with any vested rights.” 11.In Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P.11, this Court observed thus: (SCC p. 735, paras 26-27) “26. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the “Rules in force” on the date the consideration took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiah case10 lays down any particular time-frame, within 10 (1997) 11 SCC 758 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 420 11 (2011) 6 SCC 725 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 175 Page 17 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appellants has been taken away by the amendment. 27. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellants, namely, B.L. Gupta v. MCD12, P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of A.P.13 and N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission14 are reiterations of a principle laid down in Y.V. Rangaiah case10.” 12.Recently, in State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty15, another two-Judge Bench of this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 650-51, para 9) “9. The law is thus clear that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, namely, “rules in force on the date” the consideration takes place and that there is no rule of absolute application that vacancies must invariably be filled by the law existing on the date when they arose. As against the case of total exclusion and absolute deprivation of a chance to be considered as in Deepak Agarwal12, in the instant case certain additional posts have been included in the feeder cadre, thereby expanding the zone of consideration. It is not as if the writ petitioners or similarly situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now had to compete with some more candidates. In any case, since there was no accrued right nor was there any mandate that vacancies must be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arose, the State was well within its rights to stipulate that the vacancies be filled in accordance with the Rules as amended. Secondly, the process to amend the 12 (1998) 9 SCC 223 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 532 13 1988 Supp SCC 740 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 123 14 (1990) 3 SCC 157 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 446 15 (2017) 3 SCC 646 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 718 Page 18 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} Rules had also begun well before the Notification dated 24-11-2011.”” 18. As such, the petitioners have no fundamental right to be promoted, but they have only a right to be considered fairly for promotion as per the prevalent rules at the time of consideration, but no right of promotion. However, in the matter of State of Maharashtra and another v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and others16, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service, and the fact that there was reduction in the chances of promotion did not tantamount to a change in the conditions of service. It has been further held that a right to be considered for promotion is a term of service, but mere chances of promotion are not. 19. Therefore, reduction in chances of promotion, if any, on account of change or amendment in the rules would not affect his fundamental right, as the Government servant has only a right to be considered for promotion in accordance with the relevant rules. 16 (1981) 4 SCC 130 Page 19 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} 20. In the matter of Dilip Kumar Garg and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others17, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the administrative authorities are in the best position to decide the prescription of requisite qualifications for promotion from Junior Engineer to Assistant Engineer and the decision of the Government to treat all Junior Engineers, whether degree-holders or diploma-holders, as equals for the purpose of promotion is a policy decision, which the Court should not ordinarily interfere, and observed as under in paragraphs 15 & 16: - “15. In our opinion Article 14 should not be stretched too far, otherwise it will make the functioning of the administration impossible. The administrative authorities are in the best position to decide the requisite qualifications for promotion from Junior Engineer to Assistant Engineer, and it is not for this Court to sit over their decision like a court of appeal. The administrative authorities have experience in administration, and the Court must respect this, and should not interfere readily with administrative decisions. (See Union of India v. Pushpa Rani18 and Official Liquidator v. Dayanand19.) 16.The decision to treat all Junior Engineers, whether degree-holders or diploma-holders, as equals for the purpose of promotion is a policy decision, and it is well settled that this Court should not ordinarily interfere in policy decisions unless there is clear 17 (2009) 4 SCC 753 18 (2008) 9 SCC 242 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 851 19 (2008) 10 SCC 1 Page 20 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} violation of some constitutional provision or the statute. We find no such violation in this case.” 21. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that what the petitioners have sought to challenge is, by not prescribing the essential qualification of Patwari training for appointment to the post of Amin under the Rules of 2016 {Schedule-III, Class-III (Executive) Abhiyana, Serial No.1}, their further chance of promotion would be considerably reduced or would be extinguished. As such, their only case, in sum and substance is, their chances of promotion are reduced by introduction of the new Rules in which Amins having Patwari training and not having Patwari training, both, would be treated alike. 22. This argument ignores the fact that the petitioners, who are Patwari trained Amins, were already appointed in the year 2007 and working for fairly long time and new Amins, who shall be appointed to the post, would in any case be juniors to them and therefore the new appointees shall not in any manner interfere with the chance of promotion of the petitioners. The petitioners, therefore, would not be affected by the Rules of 2016, particularly the change in the qualification for appointment of Amin and more particularly, Page 21 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} prescription of qualification for a post is the prerogative of the Government and it would be a considered policy decision of the Government or the employer/competent authority. Even otherwise, mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service and the petitioners have only a right to be considered fairly and objectively for promotion as per the prevalent rules at the time of consideration, but no right of promotion. Hardship of the petitioners on account of prescribing new qualification deleting Patwari training from the essential qualification for appointment on the post of Amin under the Rules of 2016 did not tantamount to a change in the conditions of service. A right to be considered for promotion is a term of service, but mere chances of promotion are not. Therefore, constitutional validity of a rule cannot be struck down merely because it causes hardship to the petitioners (see Prafulla Kumar Das and others v. State of Orissa and others20, paragraph 45). In view of the above, the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in Ajay Kumar Shukla (supra) and Joaquim I.M. Dias (supra) are clearly distinguishable to the facts of the present case and would not be applicable. 20 (2003) 11 SCC 614 Page 22 {W.P.(C)Nos.1078/2022 & 3476/2023} 23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that Schedule-III, Class-III (Executive) Abhiyana, Serial No.1 of the Rules of 2016 is constitutionally valid and does not suffer any vice of arbitrariness, illegality or discriminatory. Challenge made to the said Rules is hereby declined. Consequently, both the writ petitions deserve to be and are accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Judge Soma/Ankit