Order : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. The short question involved in this appeal is, whether the death of the deceased can be said to be a death arising out of the use of motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ? 2. The aforesaid question of law arises on the following factual backdrop: - 3. Gurucharan Paikra – respondent No.4 herein, who is driver of the vehicle, which was owned by Rajesh Gupta – respondent No.5 herein and insured by the appellant herein, had parked the truck loaded with coal near Kotraliya siding at Raigarh besides the high tension electric wire of 11 KV. The deceased aged about 23 years who was working as khalasi/cleaner in the said truck earning Rs. 15,000/- per month was trying to climb the said vehicle to uncover the truck by a tarpaulin and in the meanwhile, respondent No.4 driver Gurucharan Paikra rashly and negligently reversed the vehicle by which the deceased came into contact with the live electric wire of 11 KV high tension and became seriously injured and died. FIR was lodged against the driver respondent No.4 for offence under Section 304A of the IPC and charge-sheet was filed against him. Respondents No.1 to 3 herein/claimants being legal representatives of the deceased filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) claiming compensation of Rs. 38,40,000/-. 4. The Insurance Company filed its plea stating inter alia that the claim petition under Section 166 of the Act is not maintainable, as the deceased died on account of coming into contact with the live 11 KV high tension electric wire and it is not arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, therefore, the Insurance Company is not responsible. The Claims Tribunal by its impugned award proceeded to determine the compensation and awarded Rs. 17,02,960/- along with interest holding that since the deceased was in the vehicle and trying to cover the vehicle loaded with coal by tarpaulin and during that course, he came into contact with the live 11 KV electric wire, therefore, it is arising out of the use of motor vehicle and as such, the claim is maintainable and thus fastened the liability against the Insurance Company. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the award impugned, the instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant Insurance Company. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the award impugned, the instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant Insurance Company. 5. Ms. Swati Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Insurance Company, would submit that the deceased died on account of electrocution and therefore it is not the case where the Insurance Company should be fastened with the liability as it is not arising out of the use of motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 165 of the Act and as such, the Insurance Company be exonerated from the liability to pay the amount of compensation. 6. None appeared on behalf of the respondents to support the impugned award. 7. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant Insurance Company and considered her submissions and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 8. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to notice Section 165 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 165 states as under:- “ 165. Claims Tribunals .—(1) A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression “claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles” includes claims for compensation under section 164.” 9. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would make it evidently clear that the Claims Tribunal can adjudicate the claims for compensation in respect of accidents arising out of use of motor vehicles. The principal requirement is that the accident should arise out of the use of the motor vehicle. 10.The answer to the question posed depends upon the interpretation of the word “use” in the expression “arising out of the use of motor vehicles“. The meaning of the word “use” has not been given in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 . The principal requirement is that the accident should arise out of the use of the motor vehicle. 10.The answer to the question posed depends upon the interpretation of the word “use” in the expression “arising out of the use of motor vehicles“. The meaning of the word “use” has not been given in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 . It has been defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary , Eighth Edition, as under: - “ use (yoos), n. 1. The application or employment of something; esp., a long-continued possession and employment of a thing for the purpose for which it is adapted, as distinguished from a possession and employment that is merely temporary or occasional 11.From the meaning of the word “use” taken from the Black’s Law Dictionary, it is clear that a motor vehicle which is in a state of being in employment for any purpose can be said to be a motor vehicle in use. While the motor vehicle is in a state of motion, it is employed in carrying passengers and while it is in a state of rest or stationary, it is still in the state of employment for enabling the passengers to alight from or board the bus or for loading and unloading luggage. Indeed, a motor vehicle which is put on the road is in a state of being in employment or constant use and, consequently, any accident involving such a motor vehicle causing death or bodily injury to any person is an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. 12. The term “motor vehicle” has been defined in sub-section (28) of Section 2 of the Act which states as under: - “(28) “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle having less than four wheels fitted with engine capacity of not exceeding twenty-five cubic centimetres;” 13. The Supreme Court in the matter of Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, (1991) 3 SCC 530 while considering the phrase “arising out of the use of motor vehicle” employed in Section 92-A(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 held that the expression “use” of motor vehicle covers a very wide field, a field more extensive than which might be called traffic use of the motor vehicle and that the use of a vehicle is not confined to the periods when it was in motion or was moving and that vehicle would still be in use even when it was stationary. 14.The Supreme Court in the matter of Kalim Khan and others v. Fimidabee and others, (2018) 7 SCC 687 (three-Judges Bench) considering the earlier decisions held that the expression “use of the vehicle” under certain circumstances can be attracted when the vehicle is stationary or static. Their Lordships observed as under: - “25. From the aforesaid authorities, it is limpid that the expression “use of the vehicle” under certain circumstances can be attracted when the vehicle is stationary or static. A Single Judge Bench of the High Court of Orissa in Kanhei Rana v. Gangadhar Swain, 1992 SCC OnLine Ori 30 : AIR 1993 Ori 89 while dealing with a situation where the deceased labourer after loading the truck with logs lost his life. The Tribunal had categorically found that death was on the account of fall of a log, when the truck was being loaded with logs. The learned Single Judge, in appeal, had concurred with the view of the Tribunal by opining that the fall of the log had no nexus with the use of the vehicle not even remotely, and there was no material to show that the fall of the log was occasioned due to use of the vehicle. He had further held that the careless handling of goods being loaded on or unloaded from a vehicle had no connection to the vehicle itself. Reversing the conclusion of the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench opined that the concept of movement being not intrinsically or inherently connected with the use and the term “use” having been connotatively expanded, there can be no doubt that the same can also be extended to the arena/sphere of a claim advanced under Section 110 of the 1939 Act. Reversing the conclusion of the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench opined that the concept of movement being not intrinsically or inherently connected with the use and the term “use” having been connotatively expanded, there can be no doubt that the same can also be extended to the arena/sphere of a claim advanced under Section 110 of the 1939 Act. Heavy onus is cast on the driver to avoid negligence while the vehicle is in use. If the term “use” in its conceptual sweep engulfs no motion or no movement or stationariness, then by logical corollary it is made essential that the driver or for that matter any agent of the owner should be careful and non-negligent. Negligence in driving is regarded as a fact that the vehicle is in motion. But the definition of “use” having been expanded in its broader canvas, it has to clothe in its sweep other categories of negligence. To elaborate, when a vehicle remains static, it cannot constitute that the driver is negligent because of his rash and negligent driving. On the contrary, it has to embody some other different types of negligence. Of course that would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Division Bench of the High Court went on to say that the Apex Court in Patil [ Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More , (1991) 3 SCC 530 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 865] was dealing with the negligence so far as it was concerned with Section 92 of the Act, but as the language of Section 92-A and Section 110 of the old Act used the same phraseology and there is absence of any etymological distinction, the same meaning should be given to the expression under Section 110 of the old Act. The appellate Bench held that there was causal relationship with the accident which had resulted in the death of the claimant.” 15. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that in the instant case, the offending vehicle loaded with coal was static and the deceased cleaner of the said vehicle had climbed the vehicle to uncover the vehicle by tarpaulin and in the meanwhile, the driver reversed the vehicle by which he came into contact with the live high tension 11 KV electric wire and died on account of electrocution. As such, though the vehicle was stationary, but the deceased was in the vehicle in the capacity of cleaner and was trying to uncover the goods of the truck i.e. coal and in the meanwhile, in rash and negligent manner, the driver, without informing the cleaner, reversed the truck/vehicle by which he came into contact with the live electric wire of 11 KV high tension and died on account of electrocution, which in my considered opinion would fall within the phrase “arising out of the use of motor vehicle”. Therefore, the claim of legal representatives of the deceased cleaner would definitely fall under Section 165 read with Section 166 of the Act and the finding recorded by the learned Claims Tribunal is well merited. I do not find any merit in the appeal, it deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost(s).