RSA No. 2450 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Gurnam Singh The Municipal Corporation Panchkula & Ors. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Present:- DEEPAK GUPTA, J. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure assailing the concurrent judgments and decrees passed affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Panchkula, whereby his suit for permanent injunction has been dismissed. 2. injunction restraining the respondents from interfering in his alleged possession over land measuring 696 square yards comprised in Khasra No.19 situated within the pleaded case was that the property had dev and forefathers; that he had remained in uninterrupted possession for decades; and that the Municipal Corporation, at the instance of respondents No.3 and 4, was threatening to dispossess him forcibly. 3. the suit property vested in the Gram Panchayat and thereafter in the Municipal Corporation; that the plaintiff was neither owner nor in possession; that construction of a community hall had already commenced ove RSA No. 2450 of 2025 Page N: 1 of 5 Pages IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Singh Versus The Municipal Corporation Panchkula & Ors. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Mr. Balwinder Singh, Advocate For the appellant. ***** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. The plaintiff has filed the present Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure assailing the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Panchkula and affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Panchkula, whereby his suit for permanent injunction has been dismissed. The appellant instituted a suit seeking a decree of permanent tion restraining the respondents from interfering in his alleged possession over land measuring 696 square yards comprised in Khasra No.19 situated within the abadi deh of Village Fatehpur, District Panchkula. His pleaded case was that the property had dev and forefathers; that he had remained in uninterrupted possession for decades; and that the Municipal Corporation, at the instance of respondents No.3 and 4, was threatening to dispossess him forcibly. The Municipal Corporation contested the suit by asserting that the suit property vested in the Gram Panchayat and thereafter in the Municipal Corporation; that the plaintiff was neither owner nor in possession; that construction of a community hall had already commenced ove Pages IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA No. 2450 of 2025 (O&M) Decided on: 21.07.2026 …Appellant The Municipal Corporation Panchkula & Ors. …Respondents CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA The plaintiff has filed the present Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure assailing the concurrent judgments by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Panchkula and affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Panchkula, whereby his suit The appellant instituted a suit seeking a decree of permanent tion restraining the respondents from interfering in his alleged possession over land measuring 696 square yards comprised in Khasra No.19 of Village Fatehpur, District Panchkula. His pleaded case was that the property had devolved upon him from his father and forefathers; that he had remained in uninterrupted possession for decades; and that the Municipal Corporation, at the instance of respondents No.3 and 4, was threatening to dispossess him forcibly. oration contested the suit by asserting that the suit property vested in the Gram Panchayat and thereafter in the Municipal Corporation; that the plaintiff was neither owner nor in possession; that construction of a community hall had already commenced over the land; (O&M) Decided on: 21.07.2026 Appellant s The plaintiff has filed the present Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure assailing the concurrent judgments by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Panchkula and affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Panchkula, whereby his suit The appellant instituted a suit seeking a decree of permanent tion restraining the respondents from interfering in his alleged possession over land measuring 696 square yards comprised in Khasra No.19 of Village Fatehpur, District Panchkula. His olved upon him from his father and forefathers; that he had remained in uninterrupted possession for decades; and that the Municipal Corporation, at the instance of respondents oration contested the suit by asserting that the suit property vested in the Gram Panchayat and thereafter in the Municipal Corporation; that the plaintiff was neither owner nor in possession; r the land; JITEN SHARMA 2026.07.23 09:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 2450 of 2025 and that the plaintiff had been repeatedly litigating over the same property without success. 4. that the plaintiff failed to establish either ownership or possession over the suit property and consequently dismissed the suit on 01.03.2021. The First Appellate Court, after independently re affirmed the said findings on 31.01.2025. 5. the appellant submits that both the Courts below have ignored the fact that the property falls within the records are unavailable; that the demarcation conducted by the revenue authorities supported the plain failed to prove its own title; and therefore the concurrent judgments suffer from illegality warranting interference under Section 100 CPC. 6. examined the judgments of both the Courts below. 7. substantial question of law. 8. this Court under Section 100 CPC is confined o law. Concurrent findings of fact cannot be reopened merely because another view on appreciation of evidence is possible. Interference is permissible only when the findings recorded are shown to be perverse, based upon no evidence, founded upon misreading of material evidence or arrived at by applying an incorrect legal principle. 9. findings suffer from any of the aforesaid infirmities. 10. inherited ownership from his forefathers. The defendants, however, categorically disputed such title and pleaded that the property vested in the RSA No. 2450 of 2025 Page N: 2 of 5 Pages and that the plaintiff had been repeatedly litigating over the same property without success. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned Trial Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish either ownership or possession over the it property and consequently dismissed the suit on 01.03.2021. The First Appellate Court, after independently re-appreciating the entire evidence, affirmed the said findings on 31.01.2025. Assailing the concurrent findings, learned counsel appearing f the appellant submits that both the Courts below have ignored the fact that the property falls within the abadi deh (lal lakir), records are unavailable; that the demarcation conducted by the revenue authorities supported the plaintiff's case; that the Municipal Corporation failed to prove its own title; and therefore the concurrent judgments suffer from illegality warranting interference under Section 100 CPC. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and carefully ed the judgments of both the Courts below. In my considered opinion, the appeal does not give rise to any substantial question of law. It is by now settled beyond controversy that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 CPC is confined o law. Concurrent findings of fact cannot be reopened merely because another view on appreciation of evidence is possible. Interference is permissible only when the findings recorded are shown to be perverse, based upon no dence, founded upon misreading of material evidence or arrived at by applying an incorrect legal principle. The appellant has been unable to show that the concurrent findings suffer from any of the aforesaid infirmities. The entire suit proceeds on the assertion that the plaintiff inherited ownership from his forefathers. The defendants, however, categorically disputed such title and pleaded that the property vested in the Pages and that the plaintiff had been repeatedly litigating over the same property Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned Trial Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish either ownership or possession over the it property and consequently dismissed the suit on 01.03.2021. The First appreciating the entire evidence, Assailing the concurrent findings, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that both the Courts below have ignored the fact that abadi deh (lal lakir), where regular revenue records are unavailable; that the demarcation conducted by the revenue tiff's case; that the Municipal Corporation failed to prove its own title; and therefore the concurrent judgments suffer from illegality warranting interference under Section 100 CPC. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and carefully ed the judgments of both the Courts below. In my considered opinion, the appeal does not give rise to any It is by now settled beyond controversy that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 CPC is confined only to substantial questions of law. Concurrent findings of fact cannot be reopened merely because another view on appreciation of evidence is possible. Interference is permissible only when the findings recorded are shown to be perverse, based upon no dence, founded upon misreading of material evidence or arrived at by The appellant has been unable to show that the concurrent findings suffer from any of the aforesaid infirmities. on the assertion that the plaintiff inherited ownership from his forefathers. The defendants, however, categorically disputed such title and pleaded that the property vested in the and that the plaintiff had been repeatedly litigating over the same property Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned Trial Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish either ownership or possession over the it property and consequently dismissed the suit on 01.03.2021. The First appreciating the entire evidence, or the appellant submits that both the Courts below have ignored the fact that where regular revenue records are unavailable; that the demarcation conducted by the revenue tiff's case; that the Municipal Corporation failed to prove its own title; and therefore the concurrent judgments suffer I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and carefully In my considered opinion, the appeal does not give rise to any It is by now settled beyond controversy that the jurisdiction of nly to substantial questions of law. Concurrent findings of fact cannot be reopened merely because another view on appreciation of evidence is possible. Interference is permissible only when the findings recorded are shown to be perverse, based upon no dence, founded upon misreading of material evidence or arrived at by The appellant has been unable to show that the concurrent on the assertion that the plaintiff inherited ownership from his forefathers. The defendants, however, categorically disputed such title and pleaded that the property vested in the JITEN SHARMA 2026.07.23 09:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 2450 of 2025 Gram Panchayat and thereafter in the Municipal Corporation. Thus, the dispute was not merely regarding interference with possession but involved a serious and substantial dispute regarding title. 11. seek a declaration of title and confined the relief only to pe injunction. The legal position is authoritatively settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 4 SCC 594, wherein it has been held that where title is under a cloud or seriously disputed, a mere remedy is to seek declaration of title with consequential relief. 12. asserted ownership of the Municipal Corporation, the plaintiff c obtain an injunction merely by asserting long possession. 13. discretionary equitable relief. 14. plaintiff. The plea that the dispense with the requirement of proving ownership. Neither any mutation, nor any sanctioned record, nor any revenue entry, nor any adjudication by a competent authority recognising his title has been produced. The merely asserted inheritance from admissible evidence. The burden of proving title rested entirely upon the plaintiff. 15. settled, lawfu injunction. The evidence produced falls far short of satisfying this requirement. The principal reliance of the plaintiff is upon a certificate allegedly issued by the Numberdar. 16. Numberdar happens to be the real brother of the plaintiff. More importantly, a Numberdar possesses no statutory authority either to confer title or certify RSA No. 2450 of 2025 Page N: 3 of 5 Pages Gram Panchayat and thereafter in the Municipal Corporation. Thus, the ute was not merely regarding interference with possession but involved a serious and substantial dispute regarding title. The plaintiff, despite asserting ownership, consciously omitted to seek a declaration of title and confined the relief only to pe injunction. The legal position is authoritatively settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 4 SCC , wherein it has been held that where title is under a cloud or seriously disputed, a mere suit for injunction is not maintainable and the proper remedy is to seek declaration of title with consequential relief. Once the defendants specifically denied the plaintiff's title and asserted ownership of the Municipal Corporation, the plaintiff c obtain an injunction merely by asserting long possession. Both the Courts below have, therefore, rightly declined discretionary equitable relief. Admittedly, no title document whatsoever was produced by the plaintiff. The plea that the property forms part of dispense with the requirement of proving ownership. Neither any mutation, nor any sanctioned record, nor any revenue entry, nor any adjudication by a competent authority recognising his title has been produced. The merely asserted inheritance from his forefathers without any legally admissible evidence. The burden of proving title rested entirely upon the Even if title is ignored, the plaintiff was still required to establish settled, lawful and continuous possession so as to seek protection by way of injunction. The evidence produced falls far short of satisfying this requirement. The principal reliance of the plaintiff is upon a certificate allegedly issued by the Numberdar. Both the Courts below have concurrently noticed that the said Numberdar happens to be the real brother of the plaintiff. More importantly, a Numberdar possesses no statutory authority either to confer title or certify Pages Gram Panchayat and thereafter in the Municipal Corporation. Thus, the ute was not merely regarding interference with possession but involved a serious and substantial dispute regarding title. The plaintiff, despite asserting ownership, consciously omitted to seek a declaration of title and confined the relief only to permanent injunction. The legal position is authoritatively settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 4 SCC , wherein it has been held that where title is under a cloud or seriously suit for injunction is not maintainable and the proper remedy is to seek declaration of title with consequential relief. Once the defendants specifically denied the plaintiff's title and asserted ownership of the Municipal Corporation, the plaintiff could not obtain an injunction merely by asserting long possession. Both the Courts below have, therefore, rightly declined Admittedly, no title document whatsoever was produced by the property forms part of abadi deh does not dispense with the requirement of proving ownership. Neither any mutation, nor any sanctioned record, nor any revenue entry, nor any adjudication by a competent authority recognising his title has been produced. The plaintiff forefathers without any legally admissible evidence. The burden of proving title rested entirely upon the Even if title is ignored, the plaintiff was still required to establish l and continuous possession so as to seek protection by way of injunction. The evidence produced falls far short of satisfying this requirement. The principal reliance of the plaintiff is upon a certificate have concurrently noticed that the said Numberdar happens to be the real brother of the plaintiff. More importantly, a Numberdar possesses no statutory authority either to confer title or certify Gram Panchayat and thereafter in the Municipal Corporation. Thus, the ute was not merely regarding interference with possession but involved a The plaintiff, despite asserting ownership, consciously omitted to rmanent injunction. The legal position is authoritatively settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 4 SCC , wherein it has been held that where title is under a cloud or seriously suit for injunction is not maintainable and the proper Once the defendants specifically denied the plaintiff's title and ould not Both the Courts below have, therefore, rightly declined Admittedly, no title document whatsoever was produced by the does not dispense with the requirement of proving ownership. Neither any mutation, nor any sanctioned record, nor any revenue entry, nor any adjudication by a plaintiff forefathers without any legally admissible evidence. The burden of proving title rested entirely upon the Even if title is ignored, the plaintiff was still required to establish l and continuous possession so as to seek protection by way of injunction. The evidence produced falls far short of satisfying this requirement. The principal reliance of the plaintiff is upon a certificate have concurrently noticed that the said Numberdar happens to be the real brother of the plaintiff. More importantly, a Numberdar possesses no statutory authority either to confer title or certify JITEN SHARMA 2026.07.23 09:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 2450 of 2025 lawful possession over immovable property. Suc nor recognises proprietary rights. The Courts below have rightly discarded its evidentiary value. 17. the Municipal Corporation had already constructed a commun disputed property. This admission completely destroys the plea that the plaintiff continued to remain in settled possession. Protection by way of injunction can only be granted in favour of a person shown to be in actual settled possessi admission negatives such possession. 18. Corporation failed to produce complete title documents. The submission deserves rejection. It is strength of his own case and not upon the weakness of the defence. The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that the burden never shifts merely because the defendant's evidence is weak. Both the Courts applied this settled principle while dismissing the suit. 19. the certified copies of earlier litigation relating to the same property were produced by the defendants. The proceedings related to different property but produced no evidence whatsoever to establish such distinction. Neither any rebuttal evidence was led nor was any application for additional evidence moved before the First Appellate Court. The adverse inference drawn by the Courts below cannot therefore be faulted. 20. material evidence ignored by either Court. No admissible evidence has been shown to have been exclude No statutory provision has been misconstrued. The findings are based upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and are pure findings of fact. Merely because another view is hypothetically possible substantial question of law. RSA No. 2450 of 2025 Page N: 4 of 5 Pages lawful possession over immovable property. Suc nor recognises proprietary rights. The Courts below have rightly discarded its evidentiary value. Further, the plaintiff admitted during his cross the Municipal Corporation had already constructed a commun disputed property. This admission completely destroys the plea that the plaintiff continued to remain in settled possession. Protection by way of injunction can only be granted in favour of a person shown to be in actual settled possession on the date of institution of the suit. The plaintiff's own admission negatives such possession. Learned counsel repeatedly argued that the Municipal Corporation failed to produce complete title documents. The submission deserves rejection. It is elementary that the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and not upon the weakness of the defence. The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that the burden never shifts merely because the defendant's evidence is weak. Both the Courts applied this settled principle while dismissing the suit. Another circumstance noticed by both the Courts below is that certified copies of earlier litigation relating to the same property were produced by the defendants. The plaintiff merely argued that those proceedings related to different property but produced no evidence whatsoever to establish such distinction. Neither any rebuttal evidence was led nor was any application for additional evidence moved before the First ellate Court. The adverse inference drawn by the Courts below cannot therefore be faulted. Learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any material evidence ignored by either Court. No admissible evidence has been shown to have been excluded. No inadmissible evidence has been relied upon. No statutory provision has been misconstrued. The findings are based upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and are pure findings of fact. Merely because another view is hypothetically possible substantial question of law. Pages lawful possession over immovable property. Such a document neither creates nor recognises proprietary rights. The Courts below have rightly discarded its Further, the plaintiff admitted during his cross-examination that the Municipal Corporation had already constructed a community hall over the disputed property. This admission completely destroys the plea that the plaintiff continued to remain in settled possession. Protection by way of injunction can only be granted in favour of a person shown to be in actual on on the date of institution of the suit. The plaintiff's own Learned counsel repeatedly argued that the Municipal Corporation failed to produce complete title documents. The submission elementary that the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and not upon the weakness of the defence. The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that the burden never shifts merely because the defendant's evidence is weak. Both the Courts below have rightly applied this settled principle while dismissing the suit. Another circumstance noticed by both the Courts below is that certified copies of earlier litigation relating to the same property were plaintiff merely argued that those proceedings related to different property but produced no evidence whatsoever to establish such distinction. Neither any rebuttal evidence was led nor was any application for additional evidence moved before the First ellate Court. The adverse inference drawn by the Courts below cannot Learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any material evidence ignored by either Court. No admissible evidence has been d. No inadmissible evidence has been relied upon. No statutory provision has been misconstrued. The findings are based upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and are pure findings of fact. Merely because another view is hypothetically possible cannot furnish a h a document neither creates nor recognises proprietary rights. The Courts below have rightly discarded its examination that ity hall over the disputed property. This admission completely destroys the plea that the plaintiff continued to remain in settled possession. Protection by way of injunction can only be granted in favour of a person shown to be in actual on on the date of institution of the suit. The plaintiff's own Learned counsel repeatedly argued that the Municipal Corporation failed to produce complete title documents. The submission elementary that the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and not upon the weakness of the defence. The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that the burden never shifts merely have rightly Another circumstance noticed by both the Courts below is that certified copies of earlier litigation relating to the same property were plaintiff merely argued that those proceedings related to different property but produced no evidence whatsoever to establish such distinction. Neither any rebuttal evidence was led nor was any application for additional evidence moved before the First ellate Court. The adverse inference drawn by the Courts below cannot Learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any material evidence ignored by either Court. No admissible evidence has been d. No inadmissible evidence has been relied upon. No statutory provision has been misconstrued. The findings are based upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and are pure findings of fact. cannot furnish a JITEN SHARMA 2026.07.23 09:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA No. 2450 of 2025 21. neither suffer from perversity nor from any patent illegality. The plaintiff has failed to establish title, failed to establish settled possession, simpliciter suit for injunction despite serious dispute regarding title, and has been unable to point out any substantial question of law arising for consideration under Section 100 CPC. 22. is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. 21.07.2026 Jiten RSA No. 2450 of 2025 Page N: 5 of 5 Pages The concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below neither suffer from perversity nor from any patent illegality. The plaintiff has failed to establish title, failed to establish settled possession, simpliciter suit for injunction despite serious dispute regarding title, and has been unable to point out any substantial question of law arising for consideration under Section 100 CPC. Consequently, no substantial question of law is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand Whether speaking/reasoned : Whether reportable : Pages The concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below neither suffer from perversity nor from any patent illegality. The plaintiff has failed to establish title, failed to establish settled possession, instituted only a simpliciter suit for injunction despite serious dispute regarding title, and has been unable to point out any substantial question of law arising for Consequently, no substantial question of law arises. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE Yes/No Yes/No The concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below neither suffer from perversity nor from any patent illegality. The plaintiff has instituted only a simpliciter suit for injunction despite serious dispute regarding title, and has been unable to point out any substantial question of law arising for arises. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand JITEN SHARMA 2026.07.23 09:57 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document