__________________________ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 346 of 2025 Reserved on: 07.05.2025 Date of Decision: 28th May 2025. Dr. Vinod Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No For the Petitioners : Mr Vishwa Bhushan, Advocate. For the Respondents/State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 153 of 2019 dated 15.09.2019, registered at Police Station Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Section 354-A, 354-D 2 and Section 506 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and consequential proceedings pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant (name being withheld to protect her identity) made a complaint to the police, asserting that she was serving under the petitioner. The employees working together had formed a WhatsApp group. The petitioner used to ask the informant to send indecent SMS and WhatsApp pics. He used to call her without any reason on Sundays and gazetted holidays. He would ask her to do some work and thereafter talk to her indecently. In the case of the informant’s protest, the petitioner used to threaten her to spoil her ACR. He used to say that the informant’s husband was working in home town of the petitioner, and he (complainant’s husband) could be implicated in any false case. The petitioner told her on 29.08.2019 that he had to check the Dispensary. A Class-IV employee was present in the Dispensary, who was sent to the house of the Pardhan to bring some medicines. The petitioner asked the informant to show him the old files. He said that he had to talk her privately. He caught hold of the informant. The informant pushed the 3 petitioner and kicked her. She came out of the room. The petitioner told the informant that in case the incident was revealed to any person, her ACR would be spoiled, and her husband would be falsely implicated. The informant narrated the incident to her colleagues, who told her that the petitioner was also forcing her to send an SMS and talk to him. The petitioner called the informant to his office on 12.09.2019 and asked her to look after his work. She requested that the work be assigned to some senior person. She filed a complaint with her colleagues on 13.09.2019; however, the facts mentioned in the FIR were not disclosed. The police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. The police filed a charge sheet against the petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354-A, 354-D and 506 of the IPC. 3. Being aggrieved from registration of the F.I.R. and filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the F.I.R. and criminal proceedings are attended and instituted with mala fide and an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the petitioner due to a private and personal grudge between the parties. The informant has concealed the pre-existing departmental matters to falsely 4 frame the petitioner. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the law. The illegality was committed before and during the registration of the F.I.R., as well as during the investigation. Respondents No. 7, 8 and 9 had filed a complaint on 10.09.2019 before the Police Post Sandhol, District Mandi, H.P. The petitioner had also filed a complaint on 11.09.2019, but the F.I.R. and charge-sheet are silent regarding the complaint. The informant filed a complaint on 13.09.2019, in which the incidents dated 29.08.2019 and 08.09.2019 were not disclosed. The handwriting used in the complaint made on 10.01.2019 and 13.09.2019 is similar, which shows that these were written and drafted by the same person. The complaints were drafted by respondent No.7, and the signatures of the complainants are fake. The complaint dated 10.09.2019 was the first complaint made by respondents No. 7 to 9, but it was not treated as F.I.R. The allegations in the complaint dated 13.09.2019 were levelled in response to the office Memo dated 05.06.2018. Santosh Kumar is the relative of respondent No.8. The allegations levelled by respondent No.8 in her statement are in response to the Memos dated 20.08. 2019, 09.09.2019 and 11.09.2019. The police were in possession of 5 these documents but did not mention them in the charge sheet. The complaint was marked by the Minister as a ‘Special Case’, which is a political interference in criminal matters. The preliminary inquiry was not conducted by the police as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari vs. State of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1. The F.I.R. had various discrepancies, inconsistencies and illegalities. The statement of respondent No.7 was not recorded during the investigation. The statements of witnesses do not disclose the material fact for establishing the offences punishable under Sections 354, 354-A, 354-D and 506 of the IPC. There are various discrepancies in the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of Cr. P.C. The petitioner had filed the complaint against respondents Nos. 10 and 12, and he had no authority to carry out the investigation. This is a violation of the principle of natural justice. The report submitted by SFSL, Junga, is not as per the law. The Forensic Expert described himself as Assistant Director (Photographs & Documents) at SFSL, Junga, and he did not have the requisite experience to handle the electronic evidence. The Mobile phone was seized after 187 days of the registration of the F.I.R. There is no compliance with the requirement of Section 65 of the 6 Indian Evidence Act. There are various questionable material facts and the integrity of the electronic evidence is not established. There is no material to suggest that the informant’s husband was working, and it is highly improbable that the petitioner could have falsely implicated him. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. as well as consequential proceedings pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P., be quashed. 4. I have heard Mr. Vishwa Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State. 5. Mr Vishwa Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. are false. The informant had admittedly made the complaints against the petitioner before registration of the F.I.R., but they did not contain any allegations regarding outraging the informant’s modesty. This shows that the allegations are false. The police did not conduct a preliminary inquiry as required under Lalita Kumari’s case (supra). The investigation was not properly 7 conducted, and the expert of SFSL, Junga, was not competent to issue the report. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. as well as consequential proceedings pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P., be quashed. 6. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. show the commission of cognizable offences. This Court should not go into the authenticity of the allegations while deciding the petition under Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). The Court has to accept the allegations contained in the F.I.R. as correct. It is impermissible for the Court to conduct a mini-trial. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the 8 principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in 9 support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a 10 non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and 11 compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)” 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. It was specifically mentioned in the F.I.R. that the petitioner used to ask the informant to send her indecent SMS and WhatsApp messages. He used to call her and talk to her indecently. He threatened to spoil the ACR of the informant in case of any protest. The petitioner caught hold of the informant’s hand on 29.08.2019 and told her that he had to talk to her privately. These allegations prima facie show the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354, 354-A, 354-D, and 506 of the IPC. 12. It was submitted that there are variations in the statements of the witnesses, the informant did not make any complaint regarding the petitioner’s behaviour which shows the falsity of the testimonies and the FIR is liable to be quashed because of the falsity of its contents. This submission cannot be accepted. The Court exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., (corresponding to 528 of BNNS) does not conduct the mini-trial to determine the truthfulness or otherwise of the 12 allegations contained in the F.I.R. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed:- “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of 13 Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal 14 proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 14. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the power to quash a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly and not routinely and the Court should believe its averments on the F.I.R. to be true. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.” 15. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini trial by comparing the statements to determine the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 15 16. Detailed arguments were made in the petition, highlighting every discrepancy in the prosecution's case and the conduct of the informant. These arguments will be available to the petitioner at the conclusion of the trial. The matter is at the initial stage and the Court does not go over the material collected by the prosecution with a fine-tooth comb while exercising the inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR. 17. It was submitted that the police had committed various illegalities during the investigation, and the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed based on the same. This submission is not acceptable. The evidence collected during the investigation cannot be brushed aside because of the defective investigation. In substance, the argument is based on the theory of the fruits of a poisoned tree. This theory does not apply to India. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Investigation), (1974) 1 SCC 345: 1974 SCC (Tax) 114, that any evidence illegally obtained cannot be excluded from consideration. It was observed: “22. Dr Singhvi, who appeared on behalf of the appellants in the two appeals, frankly conceded that there was no specific Article of the Constitution prohibiting the admission of evidence obtained in an illegal search and 16 seizure. But he submitted that to admit such evidence is against the spirit of the Constitution, which has made our liberties inviolable. In this connection, he referred to some American cases which seem to recognise the validity of his submission. 23. As to the argument based on “the spirit of our Constitution”, we can do no better than quote from the judgment of Kania, C.J., in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950 SCC 228: AIR 1950 SC 27: 1950 SCR 88 at 120: 1950 SCJ 174]. “There is considerable authority for the statement that the Courts are not at liberty to declare an Act void because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution but not expressed in words. Where the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the Legislature, we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having discovered something in the spirit of the Constitution which is not even mentioned in the instrument. It is difficult upon any general principles to limit the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial interposition, except so far as the express words of a written Constitution give that authority.” Now, if the Evidence Act, 1872 which is a law consolidating, defining and amending the law of evidence, no provision of which is challenged as violating the Constitution — permits relevancy as the only test of admissibility of evidence (See Section 5 of the Act) and, secondly, that Act or any other similar law in force does not exclude relevant evidence on the ground, that it was obtained under an illegal search or seizure, it will be wrong to invoke the supposed spirit of our Constitution for excluding such evidence. Nor is it open to us to strain the language of the Constitution, because some American Judges of the American Supreme 17 Court have spelt out certain constitutional protections from the provisions of the American Constitution. In M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chander, already referred to, a search and seizure made under the Criminal Procedure Code was challenged as illegal on the ground of violation of the fundamental right under Article 20(3), the argument being that the evidence was no better than illegally compelled evidence. In support of that contention, reference was made to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the American Constitution and also to some American cases which seemed to hold that the obtaining of incriminating evidence by illegal seizure and search was tantamount to the violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does not place any embargo on reasonable searches and seizures. It provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. Thus, the privacy of a citizen's home was specifically safeguarded under the Constitution, although reasonable searches and seizures were not taboo. Repelling the submission, this Court observed at p. 1096: “A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security, and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it into a different fundamental right, by some process of strained construction. Nor is it legitimate to assume that the 18 constitutional protection under Article 20(3) would be defeated by the statutory provisions for searches.” It, therefore, follows that neither by invoking the spirit of our Constitution nor by a strained construction of any of the fundamental rights can we spell out the exclusion of evidence obtained on an illegal search. 24. So far as India is concerned, its law of evidence is modelled on the rules of evidence which prevailed in English Law, and Courts in India and England have consistently refused to exclude relevant evidence merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search or seizure. In Barindra Kumar Ghose v. Emperor [ILR 37 Cal 467: 7 1C 359], the learned Chief Justice Sir Lawrence Jenkins says at p. 500: “Mr Das has attacked the searches and has urged that, even if there was jurisdiction to direct the issue of search warrants, as I hold there was, still the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code have been completely disregarded. On this assumption, he has contended that the evidence discovered by the searches is not admissible, but to this view, I cannot accede. For, without in any way countenancing disregard of the provisions prescribed by the Code, I hold that what would otherwise be relevant does not become irrelevant because it was discovered in the course of a search in which those provisions were disregarded. As Jimutavahana with his shrewd common sense observes — “a fact cannot be altered by 100 texts,” and as his commentator quaintly remarks: “If a Brahmana be slain, the precept ‘slay not a Brahmana’ does not annul the murder”. But the absence of the precautions designed by the Legislature lends support to the argument that the alleged discovery should be carefully scrutinised.” 19 In Emperor v. Allahdad Khan [ILR 35 All 358: 19 1C 332], the Superintendent of Police and a Sub- Inspector searched the house of a person suspected of being in illicit possession of excisable articles and such articles were found in the house searched. It was held that the conviction of the owner of the house under Section 63 of the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910, was not rendered invalid by the fact that no warrant had been issued for the search, although it was presumably the intention of the Legislature that in a case under Section 63, where it was necessary to search a house, a search warrant should be obtained beforehand. In Kuruma v. Queen [1955 AC 197], where the Privy Council had to consider the English Law of Evidence in its application to Eastern Africa, Their Lordships propounded the rule thus: “The test to be applied, both in civil and in criminal cases, in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the Court is not concerned with how it was obtained.” Some American cases were also cited before the Privy Council. Their Lordships observed at p. 204 thus: “Certain decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America were also cited in the argument. Their Lordships do not think it necessary to examine them in detail. Suffice it to say that there appears to be considerable difference of opinion among the judges, both in the State and Federal Courts, as to whether, or not, the rejection of evidence obtained by illegal means depends on certain articles in the American Constitution. At any rate, in Olmstead v. United States (1828) 277 U.S. 20 438, the majority of the Supreme Court was clearly of the opinion that the common law did not reject relevant evidence on that ground.” In the Kuruma case, Kuruma was searched by two police officers who were not authorised under the law to carry out a search and, in the search, some ammunition was found in the unlawful possession of Kuruma. The question was whether the evidence with regard to the finding of the ammunition on the person of Kuruma could be shut out on the ground that the evidence had been obtained by an unlawful search. It was held that it could not be so shut out because the finding of ammunition was a relevant piece of evidence on a charge for unlawful possession. In a later case before the Privy Council in Herman King v. Queen [(1969) 1 AC 304] which came on appeal from a Court of Appeal of Jamaica, the law as laid down in the Kuruma case was applied although the Jamaican Constitution guaranteed the constitutional right against search and seizure in the following provision of the Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1962, Sch. 2, Section 19: “(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises. (2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this Section to the extent that the law in question makes provision which is reasonably required ....for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime....” In other words, search and seizure for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime reasonably enforced was not inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee against search and 21 seizure. It was held in that case that the search of the appellant by a Police Officer was not justified by the warrant, nor was it open to the Officer to search the person of the appellant without taking him before a Justice of the Peace. Nevertheless, it was held that the Court had the discretion to admit the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search, and the constitutional protection against the search of persons or property without consent did not take away the discretion of the Court. Following Kuruma v. Queen, the Court held that it was open to the Court not to admit the evidence against the accused if the Court was of the view that the evidence had been obtained by conduct of which the prosecution ought not to take advantage. But that was not a rule of evidence but a rule of prudence and fair play. It would thus be seen that in India, as in England, where the test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law, evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out. 25. In that view, even assuming, as was done by the High Court, that the search and seizure were in contravention of the provisions of Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, still the material seized was liable to be used subject to law before the Income-tax authorities against the person from whose custody it was seized and, therefore, no Writ of Prohibition in restraint of such use could be granted. It must be, therefore, held that the High Court was right in dismissing the two writ petitions. The appeals must also fail and are dismissed with costs.” 18. This position was reiterated in State v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate, (2004) 5 SCC 729: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1722: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 635, wherein it was observed: 22 14. The High Court, after holding that the order granting police custody is ex-facie illegal, has further held that the so-called confession and alleged recovery have no evidentiary value. It has also been held that the investigation conducted by P-1 and P-4 police with reference to the accused is not bona fide and false records have been created to implicate the accused. The question then arises whether the High Court was right in making the aforesaid observations, even if it is assumed that the order dated 6-11-2001 granting police custody was illegal (though we have held above that the aforesaid order being a purely interlocutory order, no revision lay against the same and the High Court committed a manifest error of law in entertaining the revision and setting aside the said order). The admissibility or otherwise of a piece of evidence has to be judged having regard to the provisions of the Evidence Act. The Evidence Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure, or, for that matter, any other law in India, does not exclude relevant evidence on the ground that it was obtained under an illegal search and seizure. A challenge to a search and seizure made under the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground of violation of fundamental rights under Article 20(3) of the Constitution was examined in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra [AIR 1954 SC 300: 1954 Cri LJ 865] by a Bench of eight Judges of this Court. The challenge was repelled and it was held as under: (AIR pp. 306-07, para 18) “A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security, and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution-makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it into a totally different fundamental right, by some process of strained construction. Nor is it 23 legitimate to assume that the constitutional protection under Article 20(3) would be defeated by the statutory provisions for searches.” 15. The law of evidence in our country is modelled on the rules of evidence which prevail in English law. In Kuruma v. R. [1955 AC 197 : (1955) 1 All ER 236 : (1955) 2 WLR 223 (PC)], an accused was found in unlawful possession of some ammunition in a search conducted by two police officers who were not authorised under the law to carry out the search. The question was whether the evidence with regard to the unlawful possession of ammunition could be excluded on the ground that the evidence had been obtained on an unlawful search. The Privy Council stated the principle as under: (All ER p. 239 B) The test to be applied, both in civil and in criminal cases, in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible, and the court is not concerned with how it was obtained. 15.1. This question has been examined threadbare by a Constitution Bench in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Investigation) [(1974) 1 SCC 345: 1974 SCC (Tax) 114] and the principle enunciated therein is as under: (SCC pp. 363-64 & 366, paras 23 & 24) If the Evidence Act, 1872 permits relevancy as the only test of admissibility of evidence, and, secondly, that Act or any other similar law in force does not exclude relevant evidence on the ground that it was obtained under an illegal search or seizure, it will be wrong to invoke the supposed spirit of our Constitution for excluding such evidence. Nor is it open to us to strain the language of the Constitution, because some American Judges of the American Supreme Court have spelt out certain constitutional protections from the provisions of the American Constitution. So, 24 neither by invoking the spirit of our Constitution nor by a strained construction of any of the fundamental rights can we spell out the exclusion of evidence obtained on an illegal search. So far as India is concerned, its law of evidence is modelled on the rules of evidence which prevailed in English law, and courts in India and England have consistently refused to exclude relevant evidence merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search or seizure. Where the test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law, evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out. 15.2. This being the law, Direction (b) given by the High Court that the confession and alleged recovery have no evidentiary value is clearly illegal and has to be set aside. The effect of the confession and also the recovery of the incriminating article at the pointing out of the accused has to be examined strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. 19. Therefore, even if illegalities have been committed during the investigation that will not invalidate the evidence collected by the prosecution. 20. It was submitted that the inquiry contemplated in Lalita Kumar’s case (supra) was not conducted, therefore, registration of the F.I.R. is bad. This judgment was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Nirankarnath versus State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 350, and it was held that there is no 25 prohibition in registering the FIR without conducting the inquiry. The inquiry is essential where the information does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. It was observed: “12. The scope of a preliminary inquiry, as clarified in the said judgment, is limited to situations where the information received does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However, in cases where the information discloses a cognizable offence, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR. The decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) does not create an absolute rule that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in every case before the registration of an FIR. Rather, it reaffirms the settled principle that the police authorities are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. 13. In the present case, the allegations against the appellant pertain to the abuse of official position and corrupt practices while holding public office. Such allegations fall squarely within the category of cognizable offences, and there exists no legal requirement for a preliminary inquiry before the registration of an FIR in such cases. The appellant's contention that successive FIRs have been registered against him with an ulterior motive is a matter that can be examined during the investigation and trial. The appellant has adequate remedies under the law, including the right to seek quashing of frivolous FIRs under Section 482 CrPC, the right to apply for bail, and the right to challenge any illegal actions of the investigating authorities before the appropriate forum.” 26 21. In the present case, the allegations in the F.I.R. clearly showed the commission of cognizable offences. Therefore, there was no requirement to conduct a preliminary inquiry, and the police could have registered the F.I.R. 22. Numerous documents were filed with the petition to show the filing of complaints by the petitioner and the pendency of the departmental proceedings etc. All these documents are photocopies. The authenticity of which is not established. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if, on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.” 23. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that 27 the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr. P.C.” 24. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held: “9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements of the witnesses, if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which were not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no 28 justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings". 25. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it was observed on page 142: “16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint, as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial.” 26. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it was held: 13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial, but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 29 27. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed: “63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae , i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This, too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied). 30 28. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the documents produced by the petitioner with the petition. 29. It was submitted that the allegations in the FI.R. are mala fide and even made with the intent to wreak vengeance upon the petitioner. A reference was made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahmood Ali & Ors vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (2023) SCC OnLine SC 950 and Salib @ Sahu @ Salim vs State of U.P. & Ors. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 947, in which it was held that the Court owes a duty to look into the F.I.R. with care and a little more closely. Even if F.I.R. is seen with utmost care and caution, it discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. 30. It was submitted that F.I.R. is liable to be quashed because it is filed as a counterblast to the proceedings against the informant. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh vs Amar Kumar Singh 2023(6) 559 that when an investigation was conducted and a charge sheet was filed, the question of mala fide would become meaningless. It was observed: “78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and 31 evidence led in court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To our mind, whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance. In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of some prima facie worth, they would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/complaint. 79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. We can say without fear of contradiction that it is not in all cases in our country that an individual, who is accused of acts of omission/commission punishable under the PC Act but has the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by the police and made to face prosecution. If, indeed, in such a case (where a prosecution should have been but has not been launched) the succeeding political dispensation initiates steps for launching prosecution against such an accused but he/she is allowed to go scot- free, despite there being materials against him/her, merely on the ground that the action initiated by the current regime is mala fide in the sense that it is either to settle scores with the earlier regime or to wreak vengeance against the individual, in such an eventuality we are constrained to observe that it is criminal justice that would be the casualty. This is because it is difficult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of reading a first information report that the public servant is either in or not in possession of property disproportionate to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is complete. Needless to observe, the first information report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of 32 necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence relating to “criminal misconduct” punishable under the PC Act and to embark upon an investigation.” 31. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of 33 retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 32. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground of mala fide. 33. It was submitted that the Forensic Expert was not competent to examine the mobile phone and the report prepared by him is liable to be rejected. This Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. (which corresponds to Section 528 of BNSS) does not go into the competence of a person giving the evidence. It is a matter to be determined during the trial. Further, there is no requirement that a person should have a specialised study to be called an ‘expert’ within the meaning of Section 45 of the Indian 34 Evidence Act (corresponding to Section 39(1) of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023)1. 34. The petitioner stated that F.I.R. was lodged under the political influence and Minister marked it as a special case. This will not help the petitioner. Merely, because the informant had approached the political representative for redressal of her grievances cannot lead to the quashing of FIR. 35. It was submitted that there is a delay in reporting the matter to the police and the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed on this consideration. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala (supra), that the F.I.R. cannot be quashed on the ground of delay. It was observed: 37. It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held, “The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a 1 State of H.P. vs. Jai Lal (1999) 7 SCC 280 35 ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents…..” 36 No other point was urged. 37. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same stands dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. 38. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. ( Rakesh Kainthla ) 28th May 2025 Judge (ravinder)