Judgment : Rajani Dubey, J. 1. The present appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.12.2007 passed by learned Special Judge under the Act and First Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 01/2005, whereby the trial Court has convicted the appellants and sentenced them as under:- 2. As per the prosecution, the complainant Lakhan Lal Sen (PW-3) had obtained a loan of Rs.60,000/- under the Pradhan Mantri Rozgar Yojana from Dena Bank, Lahoud Branch. Out of the sanctioned amount, the complainant had already received the first instalment of Rs. 30,000/-. At the relevant time, the accused was posted as the Branch Manager of the said bank. The accused, allegedly demanded a bribe of Rs.6,000/- for releasing the loan instalments. The complainant had already paid Rs.5,000/- and for the second instalment the accused allegedly demanded a further Rs.1,000/- stating that the instalment would not be released without payment. Unwilling to pay the bribe, the complainant submitted a written complaint (Ex.P/5) to the Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, Raipur on 29.01.2003. The complaint was endorsed to Inspector Vishwas Chandrakar (PW- 12) and a crime was registered vide Ex.P/69). Two panch witnesses, Ramanand Divya (PW-4) and Prasun Kumar Sharma, were summoned for trap proceedings scheduled for 30.01.2003. On 30.01.2003, after the panch witnesses assembled at the ACB office, a trap team comprising senior officers and staff proceeded to Baloda Bazar, where the complainant joined them. Ten currency notes of ?100/-, totalling ?1,000/- were treated with phenolphthalein powder, their numbers recorded, and preliminary demonstrations were conducted. A pre-trap panchnama (Ex.P/6) was prepared. The trap team reached the accused’s residence at about 19:10 hrs. The complainant entered the house and shortly thereafter, returned and gave the pre-determined signal. Inspector Khare and Ramanand Divya (PW-4) entered the house, apprehended the accused, and disclosed their identity. On being confronted, the accused became nervous and stated that the money could be taken from the bed where it had been placed. The accused’s hand-wash in sodium-carbonate solution turned pink, indicating contact with phenolphthalein. Ten treated currency notes were recovered from the bed, and their numbers matched those recorded in the pre-trap panchnama. The bed-sheet wash and note-wash also turned pink. The applicant’s hand-wash likewise tested positive. The solutions, currency notes, and other relevant articles were seized. The accused’s hand-wash in sodium-carbonate solution turned pink, indicating contact with phenolphthalein. Ten treated currency notes were recovered from the bed, and their numbers matched those recorded in the pre-trap panchnama. The bed-sheet wash and note-wash also turned pink. The applicant’s hand-wash likewise tested positive. The solutions, currency notes, and other relevant articles were seized. A site plan was prepared by Revenue Inspector Kanhaiya Lal Sahu (PW-5). Documents relating to the complainant’s loan file were seized from Dena Bank. The accused’s statement was recorded wherein he claimed that the amount received was margin money. He was arrested and released on bail at the spot. A post-trap panchnama (Ex.P/12) was prepared, and the seized articles were sent for chemical examination. The FSL report was received in positive form. Sanction for prosecution (Ex.P-4) was obtained, and after completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused. The learned trial Court framed charges for the offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to which the appellant abjured his guilt and prayed for trial. 3. To establish the guilt of the accused/appellant, the prosecution examined 13 witnesses. The statement of the accused/appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied all incriminating circumstances, asserting innocence and alleging false implication. However, he did not adduce any evidence in defence. 4. The learned trial Court upon due appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, found the prosecution case trustworthy and, by judgment dated 27.12.2007 convicted and sentenced the appellant as detailed in paragraph 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the findings, conviction, and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court are contrary to the settled principles of law and the material available on record, and therefore the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. It is further submitted that the findings of the learned trial Court are vitiated on account of misappreciation of evidence and incorrect consideration of the legal issues involved, resulting in grave miscarriage of justice. It is submitted that the conclusions drawn against the appellant are not supported by any legal, cogent, or reliable evidence on record, and are based merely on misappreciation of facts, unfounded suspicion, and conjectures. It is submitted that the conclusions drawn against the appellant are not supported by any legal, cogent, or reliable evidence on record, and are based merely on misappreciation of facts, unfounded suspicion, and conjectures. The appellant submits that the learned Trial Court has committed a serious error in holding him guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appellant further submits that the learned trial Court failed to appreciate that the explanation furnished by the appellant regarding the alleged receipt of the amount was only required to be proved on a preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt, and that the defence so raised stood reasonably established. Hence, the appellant was entitled to acquittal. He next added that irregularities in the framing of charge and errors in recording the appellant’s statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. have caused serious prejudice to the appellant, thereby resulting in miscarriage of justice. In view of the above facts and circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that the conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court is illegal, contrary to the weight of evidence, and inconsistent with the settled principles of law, and therefore the conviction and sentence deserve to be set aside. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court dated 28.06.2024 passed in CRA No. 3030 of 1998 (Binodanand Jha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, now Chhattisgarh) and on the judgment dated 21.07.2022 passed in CRA No. 2148 of 1999 ( Dattatry Maukhriwale v. State of M.P. ). 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and submits that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral, documentary, and scientific evidence on record. The prosecution has clearly proved both demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, duly corroborated by the trap proceedings, recovery of tainted notes, and positive FSL report. It is submitted that the defence put forth by the appellant regarding the alleged receipt of money as “margin money” is neither plausible nor supported by any material and has been rightly rejected. No prejudice has been caused to the appellant in framing of charge or in recording his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The findings of the Trial Court are well-reasoned, based on cogent evidence, and call for no interference. Hence, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. No prejudice has been caused to the appellant in framing of charge or in recording his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The findings of the Trial Court are well-reasoned, based on cogent evidence, and call for no interference. Hence, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. It is evident from the record of the learned trial Court that charges were framed against the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant for the said offences. 9. Complainant Lakhanlal Sen (P.W.-3) stated that he had filed a complaint against the accused before the Lokayukt Office alleging that the accused demanded Rs.5,000/- from him as margin money. He further stated that the accused, who was the Bank Manager, made this demand, and on the basis of his complaint, the accused was caught on the 30th. He filed the complaint vide Ex.P/5. In his examination-in-chief, he stated the entire procedure, including that he had given Rs.1,000/- to the Lokayukt officials. He further stated that the preliminary memo was prepared as per Ex.P/6 and admitted his signatures marked from point A to A on each page of the memo. In para 6, he stated that he reached the house of the accused along with officers of the Lokayukt Office and handed over Rs.1,000/- to the accused as margin money, which the accused accepted and kept with him. Thereafter, the trap party apprehended the accused. The prosecution declared him hostile and cross-examined him, during which he admitted the suggestion that he had correctly written in his application (Ex.P/5) that the accused, Arun Kumar Vishwakarma, the Bank Manager of Dena Bank, had demanded a bribe of ?6,000/- from him. In para 25, he stated that when he went to lodge the report, he was told that he would have to write the word “bribe” instead of “margin money,” and therefore he used the word “bribe.” Further in para 26, he stated that when he inquired about taking a loan, he was informed that for a loan of Rs.60,000/-, the required margin was around Rs.12,000/-, out of which the government would pay Rs.7,500/- and he would have to pay the remaining amount. In para 29, he stated that the accused had never demanded any bribe money and had only asked him for margin money. He further stated that his father had also taken a loan from Dena Bank, and that when he was about to submit the application for the said loan, his father had not repaid the earlier loan amount. 10. In the present case, the accused, in response to Question No. 98 of his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., admitted the recovery and the trap proceedings. He stated that the complainant had taken a loan of Rs.60,000/- and that the margin money was being paid in instalments. He further stated that he had retained Rs.2,000/- and issued a receipt for the said amount, and that on the date of the incident, the complainant had handed over Rs.1,000/- to him. The complainant also stated, both in his examination-in-chief and in cross-examination, that the accused had demanded margin money from him. Binodanand Jha (supra), the observations of this Court contained in paras 11 to 17 are particularly relevant and are extracted as under.:- “11. In the case of an illegal gratification, there are three essential ingredients to constitute the offence. They are (1) demand, (ii) acceptance and (ii) recovery. 12. In (2009) 3 SCC 779 (C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kerala), the Supreme Court held thus: "18. In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1979) 4 SCC 725 , this Court took the view that (at SCC p. 727, para 2) mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused. when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence. to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe." (2014) 13 SCC 55 ( B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh ), it was held by the Supreme Court as under: 7. to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe." (2014) 13 SCC 55 ( B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh ), it was held by the Supreme Court as under: 7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 . 8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the Initial complaint (Ext. P-11) before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent." 14. Further, in ( 2015) 10 SCC 152 (P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh), the Supreme Court held as follows: "22. In a recent enunciation by this Court to discern the Imperative prerequisites of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, it has been underlined in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 , in unequivocal terms, that mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as Sections 13(1)(d)(1) and (ii) of the Act. It has been propounded that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. It has been propounded that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand, thus, has been held to be an indispensable essentiality and of permeating mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the Act, which permits a presumption as envisaged therein, it has been held that while it is extendable only to an offence under Section 7 and not to those under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, it is contingent as well on the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Such proof of acceptance of illegal gratification, it was emphasised, could follow only if there was proof of demand. Axiomatically, it was held that in absence of proof of demand, such legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act would also not arise. 23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder." 15. In (2015) 11 SCC 314 ( C. Sukumaran v. State of Kerala ) , it was held by the Supreme Court as under: "13. With reference to the abovementioned rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties and the evidence on record, we have examined the concurrent finding of the fact on the charge made against the appellant. In (2015) 11 SCC 314 ( C. Sukumaran v. State of Kerala ) , it was held by the Supreme Court as under: "13. With reference to the abovementioned rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties and the evidence on record, we have examined the concurrent finding of the fact on the charge made against the appellant. It has been continuously held by this Court in a catena of cases after interpretation of the provisions of Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act that the demand of illegal gratification by the accused is the sine qua non for constituting an offence under the provisions of the Act. Thus, the burden to prove the accusation against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act with regard to the acceptance of illegal gratification from the complainant PW2, lies on the prosecution." B. Jayaraj case (supra) and P. Satyanarayana Murthy case (supra), again, in (2016) 3 SCC 108 ( Krishan Chander v. State of Delhi ) , it was held by the Supreme Court thus: "35. It is well-settled position of law that the demand for the bribe money is sine qua non to convict the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The same legal principle has been held by this Court in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 . A. Subair v. State of Kerala, (2009) 6 SCC 587 and P Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., ( 2015) 10 SCC 152 upon which reliance is rightly placed by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant." paragraph 39, it was further held by the Supreme Court thus: "39. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the approach of both the trial court and the High Court in the case is erroneous as both the courts have relied upon the evidence of the prosecution on the aspect of demand of illegal gratification from the complainant Jai Bhagwan (PW2) by the appellant though there is no substantive evidence in this regard and the appellant was erroneously convicted for the charges framed against him. The prosecution has failed to prove the factum of demand of bribe money made by the appellant from the complainant Jai Bhagwan (PW2), which is the sine qua non for convicting him for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Thus, the impugned judgment and order [ Krishan Chander v. State of Delhi , 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2312] of the High Court is not only erroneous but also suffers from error in law and therefore, liable to be set aside." 17. Recently, in (2021) 3 SCC 687 ( N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu ) , reiterating the judgment of C.M. Girish Babu case (supra) and B. Jayaraj case (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court as follows: “26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in C.M Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 and in B. Jayaraj v State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 . In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court. 27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 read as under: (SCC pp. 58-59) “7. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court. 27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 read as under: (SCC pp. 58-59) “7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 . 8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext.P-11) before LW9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent." The aforesaid view taken by this Court fully supports the case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a "possible view" as such the judgment [State of T.N. v. N Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7098] of the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. Before recording conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to evidence on record." 12. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the accused/appellant was serving as the Branch Manager of Dena Bank, Lahoud. On 30.01.2003, the complainant himself admitted that he had taken a loan from the Bank. He further stated that he had been paying the margin money from time to time as demanded by the accused/appellant. The complainant also admitted that his father had earlier taken a loan from Dena Bank, which had not been repaid. 13. Gajendra Mudliyar (P.W.–7) produced the loan documents of the complainant Lakhanlal Sen (P.W.–3), marked as Ex.P/66 and Ex.P/67. He admitted the suggestion of the defence that a loan of Rs. 60,000/- had been sanctioned, which required a margin money contribution of 20%, and included 5% subsidy within the margin money, subject to a maximum of Rs. 7,500/- (the permissible limit being 15%). He further admitted that the loanee is required to deposit margin money with every installment. 14. The record reflects that complainant- Lakhanlal Sen deposited Rs. 2,000/- on 18.01.2003, another Rs. 2,000/- on 20.01.2003, and Rs. 1,000/- on 25.01.2003. 15. This Court, in the matter of Dattatry Maukhriwale (supra), has made relevant observations in paras 18 and 19, which are reproduced as under:- “18. This is the case where appellant did not deny the acceptance of money but his defence is that he received this money from the complainant to deposit the same in his bank account on the very next day and complainant also admitted the fact that at the time of incident appellant told him to fill the pay-slip so he was filling the pay slip and at that time trap party arrived. Complainant also admitted his signature in the pay slip (Ex. P/8) hence, it is a plausible defence of appellant. 19. Complainant also admitted his signature in the pay slip (Ex. P/8) hence, it is a plausible defence of appellant. 19. In G.V. Nanjudiah V. State (Delhi Admn.) 1987 Supp SCC 266 it was laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the allegation of bribe taking should be considered along with other material circumstances. Demand has to be proved by adducing clinching evidence. When the fact indicating that the complainant was aware of the amount, was not withheld by the accused, this Court disbelieved that allegation of the complainant meeting the accused and presence of strangers at the time of giving bribe was held to be unnatural.” 16. In the present case also, the accused has admitted the receipt of money; however, his consistent defence is that the said amount was received from the complainant towards margin money. There is no cogent or reliable evidence on record to establish that any illegal gratification was ever demanded by the accused. The complainant himself has stated that he paid the amount as margin money and that the accused had demanded the same towards that purpose. In these circumstances, the defence put forth by the appellant appears to be a plausible and reasonable explanation. It is a well-settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that while the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt, the defence is only required to present a probable or plausible version. In the present case, the complainant’s own admissions in his examination-in-chief as well as in cross- examination support the defence version that the payments were made as margin money. Consequently, the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offence alleged, beyond reasonable doubt. 17. In view of the foregoing analysis and the failure of the prosecution to establish the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed . The impugned judgment and order dated 27.12.2007 passed by the learned trial Court are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. 18. The appellant is reported to be on bail, therefore, keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of BNSS 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish personal bonds for a sum of Rs. The impugned judgment and order dated 27.12.2007 passed by the learned trial Court are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. 18. The appellant is reported to be on bail, therefore, keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of BNSS 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish personal bonds for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned forthwith, which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. The record of the trial Court along with copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.