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High Court of Andhra Pradesh · body

2025 DAILYLAW 8227 (AP)

S.B. MOTOR CORPORATION, RAJAHMUNDRY. v. M. RAJAN BABU, RAJAHMUNDRY, & ANR.

CRLRC/857/2010 · 2025-08-31

T Mallikarjuna Rao

body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

APHC010086532010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3369] MONDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 857 OF 2010 Between: 1. S.B. MOTOR CORPORATION, RAJAHMUNDRY, REP. BY ITS ACCOUNTS OFFICER, AUTHORIZED DEALERS FOR MARUTHI UDYOG LIMITED, RAJAHMUNDRY. ...PETITIONER AND 1. M RAJAN BABU RAJAHMUNDRY ANR, S/O. NOT KNOWN TO THE PETITIONER HINDU C/O. KONASEEMA SHOE MART, D.NO. 23-17-25, LALITHA NAGAR, 2. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, HYDERABAD. ...RESPONDENT(S): Revision filed under Section 397/401 of CrPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the Criminal Revision Case, the High Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Criminal Revision Case to this Hon'ble Court against the order of the III Additional Judicial I Class Magistrate, Rajahmundry, dated 11-02-2010 made in Crl. M.P. No. 840 of 2009 in C.C.Sr. No. 5817 / 2009. IA NO: 1 OF 2010(CRLRCMP 1260 OF 2010 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to fix an early date for hearing the main case. Counsel for the Petitioner: 2 1. MUJTAHID HUSSAIN 2. LEGAL AID Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. B PARAMESEWARA RAO 2. - 3. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 4. LEGAL AID The Court made the following ORDER: 1. This Criminal Revision Case, filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.'), is preferred by the petitioner/accused challenging the order dated 11.02.2010 passed by the III Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Rajahmundry, (for short, ‘the Trial Court’) in Crl.M.P.No.840 of 2009. 2. The Trial Court, by its order, dated 11.02.2010 in Crl.M.P.No.840 of 2009, filed seeking condonation of one-day delay in filing the complaint under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C., for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, ‘N.I.Act’), dismissed the petition, holding that the delay explained by the complainant was not bona fide. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed the present Criminal Revision Case. 3. Heard learned legal aid counsel appearing for the petitioner, learned legal aid counsel appearing for the 1st respondent and learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the 2nd respondent-State. 4. Perused the entire material on record. 5. As evident from the grounds of revision, the petitioner has challenged the correctness of the judgment. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner explained that the delay in filing was due to the 3 inadvertent mixing of the case file with another bundle, which resulted in a one-day delay. Accordingly, he has requested that the delay be condoned. 6. In Bharat Hybrid Seeds and Agro Enterprises, Kurnool V. State1, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: (5) The Criminal Procedure Code does not contain any procedure for condoning the delay in filing the complaint and extending time of the period of limitation. Section 486 and other provisions prescribe the period of limitation for taking cognizance. In fact, section 468 imposes a bar on the Court in taking cognizance of offence which are brought to its notice after the prescribed period of limitation. However, section 473 enables the Court to extend that period if it is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained. It must be noted that once the period of limitation prescribed under the Code or any other law for launching a prosecution has expired, certain rights would accrue to the accused to the effect that there would be no prosecution thereafter. It is true that the Court is clothed with power to extend time if it so thinks fit on the basis of the evidence adduced by the complainant. When the Court extends that time, it means it is interfering with the rights of the accused, which have vested in him by virtue of the expiry of the period of limitation. Therefore, even though there is no rule of law requiring the Court to issue notice to the proposed accused and to give him an opportunity for meeting the case of the complainant in regard to the extension of time, interests of justice and principles of natural justice require that the condonation of the delay and extension of time can be done only after giving a reasonable opportunity to the proposed accused. It would be violating the very principles of natural justice and, in fact, the very spirit of the administration of justice, if a party is prosecuted in a court of law after the period prescribed for the launching of the prosecution has been over and without giving him an opportunity to explain his case as to why the delay should not be condoned. Absence of a rule of law shall not enable the Courts to extent time for filing prosecution without hearing the proposed accused. This rule of practice, which is necessarily a rule of justice, must always be followed. I am supported in this view by a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Krishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 1 1977 Supreme(AP) 224 4 7. In Pawan Kumar Ralli V. Maninder Singh Narula2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 20. However, when the issue of limitation has come up for the first time before the High Court, it ought to have dealt with the same on merits as per proviso to Section 142(b) of the Act. The said proviso appended to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act was inserted by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002 and the legislative intent was, no doubt, in order to overcome the technicality of limitation period. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Amendment Bill, 2002 suggests that the introduction of this proviso was to provide discretion to the Court to take cognizance of offence even after expiry of the period of limitation [See MSR Leathers Vs. S. Palaniappan (2013) 1 SCC 177]. Only with a view to obviate the difficulties on the part of the Complainant, Parliament inserted the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act in the year 2002. It confers a jurisdiction upon the Court to condone the delay [See Subodh S. Salaskar Vs. Jayprakash M. Shah (2008) 13 SCC 689]. 8. There is no doubt that, as per the second proviso to Section 142(b) of the Act, the Court is empowered to condone the delay, provided the complainant satisfies the Court regarding the reasons for such delay. This Court is of the view that, after duly considering the reasons advanced by the complainant, the question of delay must be examined, and only thereafter should an appropriate order be passed. 9. In Kasireddy Mahalakshmi V. State of A.P. and Ors3, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: 7. Undisputedly, the cause of action from its accrual, the complaint shall be filed within one month as per Section 142(b) of the Act. What the proviso speaks is the cognizance of the complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he has sufficient cause for not making the complaint within such period. 2 2014 Supreme(SC) 578 3 2018 Supreme(AP) 936 5 8. No doubt the wording is the complainant has to satisfy the Court the reason for not filing the complaint within one month. In fact, after one month, the taking of cognizance is not automatic, also from the use of the discretion and the word 'may', what the complainant has to give a cogent reason for not filing the complaint within one month is different from the condonation of delay. Once the complaint is not filed within the statutory period, certain rights are accrued to the accused. Once that right chosen to be interfered, notice is contemplated to the accused before condonation of delay as it is interfering with the accrued right of accused after expiry of one month from the expiry of the cause of action if at all to extend only after hearing. 10. The record shows that the Trial Court dismissed the petition without issuing notice to the accused or providing any reasons. It rejected the petitioner’s counsel’s contention without proper consideration and failed to assess any potential prejudice to the other side from condoning a one-day delay. 11. There is no reason to conclude that the reason assigned by the complainant for the delay is not bona fide. The complainant duly issued a notice to the accused regarding the dishonour of the cheque and took all necessary steps to initiate the complaint. Ordinarily, a complainant is expected to file the complaint within the prescribed time frame, unless a sufficient cause has prevented timely filing. 12. In the absence of any alternative reason, the delay in filing the complaint cannot reasonably be attributed to negligence or mala fide conduct. Accordingly, the delay, as asserted by the complainant, appears prima facie to be bona fide. It is noted that the Trial Court passed its order without adequately considering the reasons advanced by the complainant and without affording the accused an opportunity to contest the application. In view of the above, and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the complainant’s grounds, this Court deems it appropriate, in the interest of justice, to remit the matter to the Trial 6 Court. Since this revision petition has been disposed of after hearing legal aid counsel for both parties, the Trial Court is directed to dispose of the application afresh, after issuing notice to both parties and uninfluenced by any observations made by this Court. 13. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is partly allowed. The order dated 11.02.2010 passed by the learned III Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Rajahmundry, in Crl.M.P. No. 840 of 2009 is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted to the Trial Court with a direction to dispose of the application for condonation of delay in accordance with law, after issuing notice to both parties and affording the accused an opportunity to file objections, if he so chooses. Any interim orders granted, if any, shall stand vacated, and all pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. _____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 01.09.2025 TJN / SAK 7 46 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 857 OF 2010 Dated: 01.9.2025 TJN