- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 11544 OF 2022 C/W CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 293 OF 2023 IN CRL.P No. 11544/2022 BETWEEN: 1. SMT GEETHA Y B AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS W/O ROHIT C.S. PRESENTLY VILLAGE ACCOUNTANT SAKLESHPUR TALUK OFFICE SAKLESHPUR - 573 134 (EARLIER WORKING AS VILLAGE ACCOUNTANT, MUDIGERE, BHOOMI BRANCH (FROM 19.03.2010 T 03.03.2021) MUDIGERE TALUK - 575 501 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. P.P. HEGDE, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI. AKSHAY KUMAR JAIN, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER MUDIGERE POLICE STATION CHIKMAGALUR DISTRICT - 577 501 Digitally signed by NAGAVENI Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 2. THE TAHSILDAR MUDIGERE TALUK - 575 501 BOTH ARE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU - 560 001 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, ADDL SPP) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C. BY THE ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER PRAYING THAT THIS HONOURABLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO QUASH THE ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN C.C.NO.984/2022 (AIRISNG OUT OF CR.NO.91/2022 OF MUDIGERE P.S.,) PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE PRL. CIVIL JUDGE (JR.DN.) AND JMFC, MUDIGERE AGAINST THE PETITIONER FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 420, 409 R/W 34 OF IPC. IN CRL.P NO. 293/2023 BETWEEN: 1. SRI. MAHESH H C S/O LATE H N CHIKKEGOWDA AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS FIRST DIVISION ASSISTANT N R PURA TALUK CHIKMAGALURU-577134 ...PETITIONER (BY SRI. P.P. HEGDE, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI. VENKATESH SOMAREDDI, ADVOCATE) - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER MUDIGERE POLICE STATION CHIKMAGALUR DISTRICT-577501 2. THE TAHSILDAR MUDIGERE TALUK - 575 501 BOTH R1 AND R2 ARE REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU - 560 001 ...RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC BY THE ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER PRAYING THAT THIS HONOURABLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO QUASH ALL THE FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN C.C.NO.984/2022 (ARISING OUT OF CR.NO.91/2022 OF MUDIGERE P.S.) PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE PRL.CIVIL (JR.DN) JUDGE AND J.M.F.C, MUDIGERE AGAINST THE PETITIONER FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 409, 420 R/W 34 OF IPC. THESE PETITIONS, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioners - public servants in both these petitions are at the doors of this Court calling in question the proceedings in C.C.No.984/2022 registered for offences punishable under Sections 409 and 420 r/w. 34 of the IPC. 2. Heard the learned senior counsel, Sri. P.P. Hegde, appearing for the petitioners and the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor, Sri. B.N. Jagadeesha, appearing for the respondents. 3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: A complaint comes to be registered by respondent No.2 - Tahsildar, a public servant, against several persons including these petitioners. While registering the complaint, the offences alleged were the ones punishable under Sections 192A and 192B of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 ('the Act' for short) and Sections 409 and 420 r/w. 34 of the IPC. The police conduct investigation and drop the offences punishable under Sections 192A and 192B of the Act and sustain the offences - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 punishable under Sections 409 and 420 r/w. 34 of the IPC. The petitioners are before this Court seeking quashment of the proceedings in C.C.NO.984/2022. 4. Sri. P.P. Hegde, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that a sanction as obtaining under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., is not obtained and thus, the cognizance taken of the alleged offences is not in compliance with the law. He would place reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of A. SRINIVASULU VS. STATE reported in (2023) 13 SCC 705 and submits that the issue in the lis would cut at the root of the matter as sanction is sine qua non, for prosecuting against the petitioners – public servants. Therefore, he would seek quashment of the proceedings. 5. Per contra, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for the respondents would submit that the plea of sanction can be taken at any time during the course of the proceedings is what is the law as held by the Apex Court in the case of STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI / ACB / BENGALURU VS. B.A.SRINIVASAN reported in (2020) 2 - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 SCC 153. He submits that interference must not be made at this juncture, as the petitioners have allegedly issued Saguvali chits without verification and have committed gross misconduct. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents and have perused the material on record. 7. In furtherance whereof, the issue that falls for consideration at the outset is, whether the concerned Court was right in taking cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 409 and 420 r/w. 34 of the IPC, without a sanction being placed before it. 8. The facts narrated hereinabove are beyond contest. The position of these petitioners as public servants is a matter of record. In the course of discharge of their official duties, the petitioners are alleged to have issued Saguvali chits to several persons without verification of the records. Therefore, it cannot - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 but, be said that these petitioners, while discharging their official duties, have indulged in the aforesaid allegations. 9. I deem it appropriate to notice the summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in column No.17, which reads as follows: "17. Brief facts of the case Section Of Law:- IPC 1860 U/s: 409,420,34 : ಾಂಕ: 12-02-2019 ಂದ 02-06-2021 ರ ಮಧದ ಅವಯ ಮೂೆೆ ಮೂೆೆ ಾಲೂಕು ಮೂೆೆ ೕ ಾಾ ಸರಹ!ನ ಮೂೆೆ ಾಲೂಕು ಕ#ೇಯ ಕಟ%ಡದ ಒಂದೇ ಮಹ ಯರುವ ಕಂಪ)ಟ* +ೊಠ (ಭೂ./ಾ0ೆ) ಯ ಅಪಾದ ನ1ೆದು! ಸದ ಪ2ಕರಣದ ಈ 5ೋ6ಾೋಪಾ ಪತ2ದ +ಾಲನಂಬ*-12 ರ ಕಂಡ ಆೋ:-01 ಮ;ೇ< ;ೆ=.> ಾಜಸ@ AೕBಕರು, CಾಳEರು ;ೋಬF ಮೂೆೆ ಾಲೂಕು ;ಾ. ಎH ಆ* ಪIರ ಾಲೂಕು ಕ#ೇಯ ಎJ..ಎ ಇವರು CಾಳEರು ಾ2ಮದ ಸLೆM ನಂ: 168 +ೆN ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟ%ಂೆ ಸ+ಾM ಜ.ೕನನುO ಈ ಪ2ಕರಣದ ಕಂಡ ಫQಾನುಭRಗTಾದ ಾUV25ೇR W R, ಪ)ಣMಮX, V2ಭುವH ಪYೇZ, : ಎ [ಾರV, ಪವH ಎಂ \, ರ]^ ಪYೇZ WH ಾಮಚಂ5ೆ2ೕೌಡ ರವರುಗಳa, bಾರಂ ನಂಬ*, 50 ಮತುc bಾರಂ ನಂಬ*, 53 ರ, dಾವI5ೇ ಅeMಯನುO ಾಡಕ#ೇಯ ಆಗ ಅಥLಾ ಾಲೂಕು ಕ#ೇಯQಾಗ ಸ>+ೊಳgದ!ರೂ ಸಹ ;ಾಗೂ ಸದ ಫQಾನುಭRಗFೆ ಜ.ೕನನುO ಮಂಜೂರು hಾಡಲು dಾವI5ೇ ಪ)ರಕ 5ಾಖQಾVಗಳa ಲಭRಲದ!ರು ಸಹ ಆೋ:-01 ಮ;ೇ<, ;ೆ=.> ರವರು ತನO ಸ+ಾ ಕತMವದ ಅವಯ 5ಾಖQಾVಗTಾದ ಬಗ* ಹುಕುಂ jಾಗುವF ಸಕ2ಮ ಸ.V ನಡವF+ೆಗಳa, jಾಗುವF kೕ\, ನ+ಾ/ೆಗFರುವ 5ಾಖQಾVಗಳನುO ಸೃm%> ಪ2ಕರಣದ ಆೋ:-02 nೕಾ W.Lೈ ಾ2ಮ QೆpNಗರು ಭೂ. /ಾ0ೆ ರವರ ಕಂಪ)ಟ* +ೊಠಯ ಕತMವ AವMqಸುVcರುವ ಆೋ:-02nೕಾ W.Lೈ, ರವರ ಬF ಬಂದು ¸ÀzÀj zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼ÀÄ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ ¨Á»gÀªÁVgÀĪÀÅzÁV w½zÀÝgÀÆ ¸ÀºÀ CPÀæªÀÄ ¯Á¨sÀUÀ½¸ÀĪÀ GzÉÝñÀ¢AzÀ DgÉÆæ -02 VÃvÁ ©.ªÉÊ gÀªÀgÀÄ ಉಪsೕnಸುವ ಕಂಪ)ಟ* ನ¯Éètೕ ಆೋ:-02 nೕಾ W.Lೈ ರವೆ ಾಲೂಕು ಕ#ೇUಂದ ಅಕೃತLಾn Aೕರುವ ಯೂಸ* ೇu ಮತುc vಾ ವwM ಮು0ೇನ (THUMB IMPRESSION) Cೆರಳaಮು5ೆ2 Aೕ QಾnH ಆn ಆೋ:-01 ರವೊಂೆ jೇ+ೊಂಡು ಆೋ: -01 ರವರ (THUMB IMPRESSION) Cೆರಳa ಮು5ೆ2 Aೕದ!ನುO - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 ಭೂ. /ಾ0ೆಯ ಕಂಪ)ಟ* +ೊಠಯ, ಪ1ೆದು+ೊಂಡು ತಂಾ2ಂಶದ +ಾನೂನು CಾqೕರLಾn ದಾcಂಶಗಳನುO ಅಳವ> ಎಂ ಆ* ನಂಬ* ;ೆ= 24/2019-2020, ಎಂ ಆ* ನಂಬ* ;ೆ= 28/2019-2020, ಎಂ ಆ* ನಂಬ* ;ೆ= 29/2019-2020, ಎಂ ಆ* ನಂಬ* ;ೆ= 12/2020-2021, ಎಂ ಆ* ನಂಬ* ;ೆ= 14/2020-2021, ಎಂ ಆ* ನಂಬ* ;ೆ= 16/2020-2021 UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¸ÀÈf¹ ¸ÀzÀj ¥sÀ¯Á£ÀĨsÀ«UÀ½UÉ ¨Á¼ÀÆgÀÄ UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸ÀªÉð £ÀA:168 ರ ಸ+ಾMರ ಜ.ೕAನನುO +ಾನೂನು CಾqರLಾn ತQಾ 4-38 ಎಕೆ ಜ.ೕನನುO ಮಂಜೂರು hಾ ಸ+ಾMರ+ೆN zೕಸ hಾ ತಮX ಆದ ಕತMವದ, ನಂW+ೆ5ೊ2ೕಹವನುOಂಟು hಾ ಸ+ಾM ಅ+ಾರವನುO ದುರುಪsೕಗಪ>+ೊಂರುಾcೆ. ಸದ ಸದ ಸದ ಸದ ಆೋ:ಗಳa ಆೋ:ಗಳa ಆೋ:ಗಳa ಆೋ:ಗಳa ಸ+ಾM ಸ+ಾM ಸ+ಾM ಸ+ಾM ೌಕರಾn ೌಕರಾn ೌಕರಾn ೌಕರಾnದು! ದು! ದು! ದು! ತಮX ತಮX ತಮX ತಮX ಆದ ಆದ ಆದ ಆದ ಕತMವವನುO ಕತMವವನುO ಕತMವವನುO ಕತMವವನುO ದುರುಪsೕಗಪ>+ೊಂಡು ದುರುಪsೕಗಪ>+ೊಂಡು ದುರುಪsೕಗಪ>+ೊಂಡು ದುರುಪsೕಗಪ>+ೊಂಡು ಸ+ಾM ಸ+ಾM ಸ+ಾM ಸ+ಾM ಜ.ೕನನುO ಜ.ೕನನುO ಜ.ೕನನುO ಜ.ೕನನುO +ಾನೂನು +ಾನೂನು +ಾನೂನು +ಾನೂನು ¨ÁqೕರLಾn qೕರLಾn qೕರLಾn qೕರLಾn {ೕಲNಂಡ {ೕಲNಂಡ {ೕಲNಂಡ {ೕಲNಂಡ ಫQಾನುಭRಗFೆ ಫQಾನುಭRಗFೆ ಫQಾನುಭRಗFೆ ಫQಾನುಭRಗFೆ ಮಂಜೂರು ಮಂಜೂರು ಮಂಜೂರು ಮಂಜೂರು hಾ hಾ hಾ hಾ ಅಪಾಕ ಅಪಾಕ ಅಪಾಕ ಅಪಾಕ ನಂW+ೆ ನಂW+ೆ ನಂW+ೆ ನಂW+ೆ 5ೊ2ೕಹ 5ೊ2ೕಹ 5ೊ2ೕಹ 5ೊ2ೕಹ hಾರುವIದು hಾರುವIದು hಾರುವIದು hಾರುವIದು ಇದುವೆRಗೂ ಇದುವೆRಗೂ ಇದುವೆRಗೂ ಇದುವೆRಗೂ +ೈೊಂಡ +ೈೊಂಡ +ೈೊಂಡ +ೈೊಂಡ ತA0ೆಯನ ತA0ೆಯನ ತA0ೆಯನ ತA0ೆಯನ ಸ|ಳದ ಸ|ಳದ ಸ|ಳದ ಸ|ಳದ R5ಾhಾನಗFಂದ R5ಾhಾನಗFಂದ R5ಾhಾನಗFಂದ R5ಾhಾನಗFಂದ 5ಾಖQಾVಗಳ 5ಾಖQಾVಗಳ 5ಾಖQಾVಗಳ 5ಾಖQಾVಗಳ ಪ}ೕಲೆUಂದ ಪ}ೕಲೆUಂದ ಪ}ೕಲೆUಂದ ಪ}ೕಲೆUಂದ ;ಾಗೂ ;ಾಗೂ ;ಾಗೂ ;ಾಗೂ jಾ]5ಾರರ jಾ]5ಾರರ jಾ]5ಾರರ jಾ]5ಾರರ ;ೇF+ೆಗFಂದ ;ೇF+ೆಗFಂದ ;ೇF+ೆಗFಂದ ;ೇF+ೆಗFಂದ ದೃಡಪ\% ದೃಡಪ\% ದೃಡಪ\% ದೃಡಪ\%ರುತc5ೆ ರುತc5ೆ ರುತc5ೆ ರುತc5ೆ. ಆದ!ಂದ ಆದ!ಂದ ಆದ!ಂದ ಆದ!ಂದ ಸದ ಸದ ಸದ ಸದ ಆೋ:ಗಳ ಆೋ:ಗಳ ಆೋ:ಗಳ ಆೋ:ಗಳ Rರುದ~ Rರುದ~ Rರುದ~ Rರುದ~ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ: 409,420 ೆೆೆೆ/RRRR 34 ಐ:> ಐ:> ಐ:> ಐ:>. ೕಾ ೕಾ ೕಾ ೕಾ ಆೋಪ ಆೋಪ ಆೋಪ ಆೋಪ jಾWೕಾnದ!ಂದ jಾWೕಾnದ!ಂದ jಾWೕಾnದ!ಂದ jಾWೕಾnದ!ಂದ ಸದ ಸದ ಸದ ಸದ ಆೋ:ತರ ಆೋ:ತರ ಆೋ:ತರ ಆೋ:ತರ Rರುದ~ Rರುದ~ Rರುದ~ Rರುದ~ ಘನ ಘನ ಘನ ಘನ ಾdಾಲಯ+ೆN ಾdಾಲಯ+ೆN ಾdಾಲಯ+ೆN ಾdಾಲಯ+ೆN ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ 5ೋ6ಾೋಪಾ 5ೋ6ಾೋಪಾ 5ೋ6ಾೋಪಾ 5ೋ6ಾೋಪಾ ಪತ2 ಪತ2 ಪತ2 ಪತ2 ಸ>ರುೆc ಸ>ರುೆc ಸ>ರುೆc ಸ>ರುೆc. ತA0ಾ+ಾಗಳ \ಪ•‚:- ಸದ ಪ2ಕರಣದ, ಆೋ: nೕಾ W.Lೈ ರವರು ತQೆ ಮೆ>+ೊಂದು! ಪೆc hಾ ವಶ+ೆN ಪ1ೆದು+ೊಳgಲು, ಸದ ಪ2ಕರಣದ ಅಕ2ಮLಾn ಾಲೂಕು ಕ#ೇUಂದ jಾಗುವF kೕ\ ;ಾಗೂ ಇತೆ 5ಾಖQಾVಗಳನುO ಪ1ೆದು+ೊಂಡ ಬೆƒ ಇನೂO +ೆಲವI ಫQಾನುಭRಗFಂದ 5ಾಖQಾVಗಳನುO ಪ1ೆದು ಪ}ೕಸಲು, ಸದ ಪ2ಕರಣದ ಅಕ2ಮ ಸಕ2ಮ ಸ.Vಯ ಅಧBರು ಮತುc ಸದಸರುಗಳನುO R„ಾರೆ hಾ ;ೇF+ೆಗಳನುO ಪ1ೆದು+ೊಳgಲು, ಸದ ಪ2ಕರಣದ, CಾಳEರು ಾ2ಮದ ಸLೆM ನಂ: 168 +ೆN ಸಂಬಂ>ದಂೆ ಆೋ:ತರು +ಾನೂನು CಾqೕರLಾn 5ಾಖQಾVಗಳನುO ಸೃm%> ಎಂ.ಆ* ಮತುc ಪಹ‚ 5ಾಖQೆಗಳನುO ಕಂಪ)ಟ* ನ ಅಳ>ರುವ ಬೆƒ, ಸ•ಷ%Lಾn hಾqVಯನುO ಮತುc ಈ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಪ2ಕರಣದ ಆೋ:ತರು ಪೆcdಾದ ನಂತರ 5ಾಖQಾVಗಳನುO ಪ1ೆದು ತA0ೆ +ೈೊಳgಲು, ಸದ ಪ2ಕರಣದ.. ಈ ಮಲNಂಡ ಎQಾ, ಎಂ.ಆ* ಮತುc ಪಹ‚ ಸೃeಸಲು +ಾರಣಾದ ಅಂನ ತಹ>Qಾ!* ;ೆ=.ಎಂ. ರ{ೕಶ, ಮತುc. Rಷಯ ALಾMಹಕಾದ vಾಲಯ ರವರು vಾತ2ದ ಬೆƒ, hಾqV/ 5ಾಖQಾVಗಳನುO ಸಂಗ2qಸಲು, ಆೋ:ತರು eಟZ ತಂಾ2ಂಶವನುO ಉಪsೕn> ಕೃತ Lೆಸnದ!ಂದ ಸದ hಾqVಯನುO ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟ% vಾ2+ಾರಂದ ಪ1ೆಯುವ ಸಂಬಂಧ ;ಾಗೂ (ಆೋ:) - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 ಅeM5ಾರಾದ- nೕ< ಎH.ಎH ರವರು ಘನ ಉಚ† ಾdಾಲಯ ಕಾMಟಕ ಾಜ CೆಂಗಳEರು ರವರ p2.ನZ vೆ\ಷH ನಂಬ* :7458/2022 ಾಂಕ: 18-08-2022 ರ, ಘನ ಾdಾಲಯವI (ಆೋ:) ಅeM5ಾರಾದ-nೕಶ ರವರ Rರುದ~ ತA0ೆ +ೈೊಳgದಂೆ ವ‡ಾೊF> ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟ% vಾ2+ಾರ+ೆN ಘನ ಉಚ† ಾdಾಲಯವI ಸದ ಆ5ೇಶದ, ಸುೊcೕQೆಯನ ಅಂಶಗಳ ಬೆƒ, ಕ2ಮವq> R„ಾರೆ +ೈೊಂಡು ನಂತರ ಅeM5ಾರಾದ-nೕ< ಎH.ಎH ರವರ Rರುದ~ ಕ2ಮ ಜರುnಸಲು ಆ5ೇ}>ದ!ಂದ ಸದ ಪ2ಕರಣದ ತA0ೆಯನುO Cಾp ಇ>+ೊಂಡು ಕಲಂ: 173(8) >.ಆ*.:.> ೕಾ ;ೆಚು†ವ 5ೋ6ಾೋಪಾ ಪತ2ವನುO ಸ>+ೊಳg QಾಗುವIದು." (Emphasis added) Pursuant to the charge sheet being placed before the concerned Court, the concerned Court takes cognizance of the offences and issue summons to these petitioners. The order of taking of cognizance reads as follows: "Submitted: Dated: 13.10.2022 The PSI of Mudigere P.S. has submitted charge sheet against the accused persons for the offences punishable under section 409, 420 R/w 34 of IPC in crime No.91/2022 of Mudigere P.S. along with relevant papers. Perused the Charge Sheet and other relevant papers. It is found correct. FIR & complaint are kept with this file. Accused No.1 is in judicial custody and accused No.2 is absconded. Hence, submitted: ORDER Perused the charge sheet, FIR, complaint and other materials made available on records. It is found that, there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused persons. Hence, cognizance under section 190(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. is taken for the offences punishable under section 409, 420 R/w 34 of IPC against the accused persons and office is - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 directed to register the case as C.C. in Criminal Register No.III. Issue summons to accused No.2. Call on: 17/10/22 Prl. Civil Judge & JMFC., Mudigere" (Emphasis added) What is discernable from the afore-quoted summary of the charge sheet and the order of the concerned Court taking cognizance is that, there is no sanction granted to prosecute these petitioners. Therefore, delving deep into the subject lis is not necessary as the Apex Court in the case of A. SRINIVASULU VS. STATE reported in (2023) 13 SCC 705 has considered the entire spectrum of law with regard to obtaining of sanction before prosecuting a public servant. The Apex Court has held as follows: “32. There is no dispute about the fact that A-1 to A- 4, being officers of a company coming within the description contained in the Twelfth item of Section 21IPC, were “public servants” within the definition of the said expression under Section 21IPC. A-1 to A-4 were also public servants within the meaning of the expression under Section 2(c)(iii) of the PC Act. Therefore, there is a requirement of previous sanction both under Section 197(1) of the Code and under Section 19(1) of the PC Act, for prosecuting A-1 to A-4 for the offences punishable under IPC and the PC Act. - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 33. Until the amendment to the PC Act under the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (Act 16 of 2018), with effect from 26-7-2018, the requirement of a previous sanction under Section 19(1)(a) was confined only to a person “who is employed”. On the contrary, Section 197(1) made the requirement of previous sanction necessary, both in respect of “any person who is” and in respect of “any person who was” employed. By the amendment under Act 16 of 2018, Section 19(1)(a) of the PC Act was suitably amended so that previous sanction became necessary even in respect of a person who “was employed at the time of commission of the offence”. 34. The case on hand arose before the coming into force of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (Act 16 of 2018). Therefore, no previous sanction under Section 19(1) of the PC Act was necessary insofar as A-1 was concerned, as he had retired by the time a final report was filed. He actually retired on 31-8-1997, after 7 months of registration of the FIR (31-1-1997) and 5 years before the filing of the final report (16-7-2002) and 6 years before the Special Court took cognizance (4-7-2003). But previous sanction under Section 19(1) of the PC Act was required in respect of A-3 and A-4, as they were in service at the time of the Special Court taking cognizance. Therefore, the Agency sought sanction, but the Management of BHEL refused to grant sanction not once but twice, insofar as A-3 and A-4 are concerned. 35. It is by a quirk of fate or the unfortunate circumstances of having been born at a time (and consequently retiring at a particular time) that the benevolence derived by A-3 and A-4 from their employer, was not available to A-1. Had he continued in service, he could not have been prosecuted for the offences punishable under the PC Act, in view of the stand taken by BHEL. 36. It appears that BHEL refused to accord sanction by a letter dated 24-11-2000, providing reasons, but the CVC insisted, vide a letter dated 8-2-2001. In response to the same, a fresh look was taken by the CMD of BHEL. Thereafter, by a decision dated 2-5-2001, he refused to accord sanction on the ground that it will not be in the commercial interest of the Company nor in the public - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 interest of an efficient, quick and disciplined working in PSU. 37. The argument revolving around the necessity for previous sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code, has to be considered keeping in view the above facts. It is true that the refusal to grant sanction for prosecution under the PC Act in respect of A-3 and A-4 may not have a direct bearing upon the prosecution of A-1. But it would certainly provide the context in which the culpability of A-1 for the offences both under IPC and under the PC Act has to be determined. 38. It is admitted by the respondent State that no previous sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code was sought for prosecuting A-1. The stand of the prosecution is that the previous sanction under Section 197(1) may be necessary only when the offence is allegedly committed “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”. Almost all judicial precedents on Section 197(1) have turned on these words. Therefore, we may now take a quick but brief look at some of the decisions. 39.Hori Ram Singh v. Crown [Hori Ram Singh v. Crown, 1939 SCC OnLine FC 2] is a decision of the Federal Court, cited with approval by this Court in several decisions. It arose out of the decision of the Lahore High Court against the decision of the Sessions Court which acquitted the appellant of the charges under Sections 409 and 477-AIPC for want of consent of the Governor Sir S. Varadachariar, with whose opinion Gwyer, C.J. concurred, examined the words, “any act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty” appearing in Section 270(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which required the consent of the Governor. The Federal Court observed at the outset that this question is substantially one of fact, to be determined with reference to the act complained of and the attendant circumstances. 40. The Federal Court then referred by way of analogy to a number of rulings under Section 197 of the - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 Code and held as follows : (Hori Ram Singh case [Hori Ram Singh v. Crown, 1939 SCC OnLine FC 2] , SCC OnLine FC) “The reported decisions on the application of Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code are not by any means uniform. In most of them, the actual conclusion will probably be found to be unexceptionable, in view of the facts of each ease; but, in some, the test has been laid down in terms which it is difficult to accept as exhaustive or correct. Much the same may be said even of decisions pronounced in England, on the language, of similar statutory provisions (see observations in Booth v. Clive [Booth v. Clive, 10 CB 827 (1851)] ). It does not seem to me necessary to review in detail the decisions given under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code which may roughly be classified as falling into three groups, so far as they attempted to state something in the nature of a test. In one group of cases, it is insisted that there must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it : cf.Sk. Abdul Khadir Saheb, In re [Sk. Abdul Khadir Saheb, In re, 1916 SCC OnLine Mad 419] ; Kamisetty Raja Rao v. T. Ramaswamy [Kamisetty Raja Rao v. T. Ramaswamy, 1927 SCC OnLine Mad 9] , Amanat Ali v. King Emperor [Amanat Ali v. King Emperor, 1929 SCC OnLine Cal 113] , King Emperor v. Maung Bo Maung [King Emperor v. Maung Bo Maung, 1935 SCC OnLine Rang 38] and GurushidayyaShantvirayya Kulkarni v. Emperor [GurushidayyaShantvirayya Kulkarni v. Emperor, 1938 SCC OnLine Bom 51] . In another group, more stress has been laid on the circumstance that the official character or status of the accused gave him the opportunity to commit the offence. It seems to me that the first is the correct view. In the third group of cases, stress is laid almost exclusively on the fact that it was at a time when the accused was engaged in his official duty that the alleged offence was said to have been committed [seeJujjavarapuGangaraju v. Kandiboyina Venki [JujjavarapuGangaraju v. Kandiboyina Venki, 1929 SCC OnLine Mad 34] ], quoting from Mitra's Commentary on the (Criminal Procedure Code). The use of the expression “while acting”, etc. in Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (particularly its introduction by way of - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 amendment in 1923) has been held to lend some support to this view. While I do not wish to ignore the significance of the time factor, it does not seem to me right to make it the test. To take an illustration suggested in the course of the argument, if a medical officer, while on duty in the hospital, is alleged to have committed rape on one of the patients or to have stolen a jewel from the patient's person, it is difficult to believe that it was the intention of the Legislature that he could not be prosecuted for such offences except with the previous sanction of the Local Government.” (emphasis supplied) 41. It is seen from the portion of the decision extracted above that the Federal Court categorised in Hori Ram Singh [Hori Ram Singh v. Crown, 1939 SCC OnLine FC 2] , the decisions given under Section 197 of the Code into three groups, namely, (i) cases where it was held that there must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it; (ii) cases where more stress has been laid on the circumstance that the official character or status of the accused gave him the opportunity to commit the offence; and (iii) cases where stress is laid almost exclusively on the fact that it was at a time when the accused was engaged in his official duty that the alleged offence was said to have been committed. While preferring the test laid down in the first category of cases, the Federal Court rejected the test given in the third category of cases by providing the illustration of a medical officer committing rape on one of his patients or committing theft of a jewel from the patient's person. 42. In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, (1955) 28 ITR 941 : 1955 SCC OnLine SC 44 : (1955) 2 SCR 925 : AIR 1956 SC 44] a Constitution Bench of this Court was concerned with the interpretation to be given to the words, “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” in Section 197 of the Code. After referring to the decision in Hori Ram Singh [Hori Ram Singh v. Crown, 1939 - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 SCC OnLine FC 2] , the Constitution Bench summed up the result of the discussion, in para 19 by holding : (Matajog Dobey case [Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, (1955) 28 ITR 941 : 1955 SCC OnLine SC 44 : (1955) 2 SCR 925 : AIR 1956 SC 44] , AIR p. 49) “There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.” (emphasis supplied) 43. In State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew [State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC 40 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2104] , a two-Member Bench of this Court explained that the protection under Section 197 has certain limits and that it is available only when the alleged act is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. The Court also explained that if in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection. 44. The above decision in Ganesh Chandra Jew [State of Orissa v. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8 SCC 40 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2104] was followed (incidentally by the very same author) in K. Kalimuthu v. State of T.N. [K. Kalimuthu v. State of T.N., (2005) 4 SCC 512 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1291] and Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar [Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar, (2006) 1 SCC 557 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 432] . 45. In Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2016) 12 SCC 87 : (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 15 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 346] , this Court took note of almost all the decisions on the point and summarised the principles emerging therefrom, in para 39 as follows : (SCC pp. 116-17) - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 “39. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions are summarised hereunder: 39.1. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further public duty. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. 39.2. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent Section 197CrPC has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. 39.3. Even in facts of a case when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection it will not deprive him of protection under Section 197CrPC. There cannot be a universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable nexus between the act done and official duty nor is it possible to lay down such rule. 39.4. In case the assault made is intrinsically connected with or related to performance of official duties, sanction would be necessary under Section 197CrPC, but such relation to duty should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be directly and reasonably connected with official duty to require sanction. It is no part of official duty to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving the official act, ordinarily the provisions of Section 197CrPC would apply.” (emphasis supplied) 46. In D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain [D. Devaraja v. Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 442] , this Court explained that sanction is required not only for acts done in the discharge of official duty but also required for any act purported to be done in the discharge of official duty and/or act done under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority. This Court also held that to decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether there is a reasonable connection with the official duty. - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 47. Keeping in mind the above principles, if we get back to the facts of the case, it may be seen that the primary charge against A-1 is that with a view to confer an unfair and undue advantage upon A-5, he directed PW 16 to go for limited tenders by dictating the names of four bogus companies, along with the name of the chosen one and eventually awarded the contract to the chosen one. It was admitted by the prosecution that at the relevant point of time, the Works Policy of BHEL marked as Ext. P-11, provided for three types of tenders, namely, (i) Open Tender; (ii) Limited/Restricted Tender; and (iii) Single Tender. 48. Para 4.2.1 of the Works Policy filed as Ext. P-11 and relied upon by the prosecution laid down that as a rule, only works up to Rs 1,00,000 should be awarded by restricted tender. However, Para 4.2.1 also contained a rider which reads as follows: “4.2.1. … However even in cases involving more than Rs 1,00,000 if it is felt necessary to resort to restricted tender due to urgency or any other reasons it would be open to the General Managers or other officers authorised for this purpose to do so after recording reasons therefor.” 49. Two things are clear from the portion of the Works Policy extracted above. One is that a deviation from the rule was permissible. The second is that even General Managers were authorised to take a call, to deviate from the normal rule and resort to restricted tender. 50. Admittedly, A-1 was occupying the position of Executive Director, which was above the rank of a General Manager. According to him he had taken a call to go for restricted tender, after discussing with the Chairman and Managing Director. The Chairman and Managing Director, in his evidence as PW 28, denied having had any discussion in this regard. 51. For the purpose of finding out whether A-1 acted or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty, it is enough for us to see whether he could take cover, rightly or wrongly, under any existing policy. Para 4.2.1 of the existing policy - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 extracted above shows that A-1 at least had an arguable case, in defence of the decision he took to go in for restricted tender. Once this is clear, his act, even if alleged to be lacking in bona fides or in pursuance of a conspiracy, would be an act in the discharge of his official duty, making the case come within the parameters of Section 197(1) of the Code. Therefore, the prosecution ought to have obtained previous sanction. The Special Court as well as the High Court did not apply their mind to this aspect. 52. Shri Padmesh Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent placed strong reliance upon the observation contained in para 50 of the decision of this Court in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab [Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] . It reads as follows : (SCC pp. 37-38, para 50) “50. The offence of cheating under Section 420 or for that matter offences relatable to Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B can by no stretch of imagination by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty. In such cases, official status only provides an opportunity for commission of the offence.” (emphasis supplied) 53. On the basis of the above observation, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that any act done by a public servant, which constitutes an offence of cheating, cannot be taken to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. 54. But the above contention in our opinion is far- fetched. The observations contained in para 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal [Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] are too general in nature and cannot be regarded as the ratio flowing out of the said case. If by their very nature, the offences under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B cannot be regarded as having been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty, the same logic would apply with much more vigour in the case of offences under the PC Act. - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 Section 197 of the Code does not carve out any group of offences that will fall outside its purview. Therefore, the observations contained in para 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal [Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] cannot be taken as carving out an exception judicially, to a statutory prescription. In fact, Parkash Singh Badal [Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] cites with approval the other decisions (authored by the very same learned Judge) where this Court made a distinction between an act, though in excess of the duty, was reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty and an act which was merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. Interestingly, the proposition laid down in Rakesh Kumar Mishra [Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar, (2006) 1 SCC 557 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 432] was distinguished in para 49 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal [Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] , before the Court made the observations in para 50 extracted above. 55. No public servant is appointed with a mandate or authority to commit an offence. Therefore, if the observations contained in para 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal [Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] are applied, any act which constitutes an offence under any statute will go out of the purview of an act in the discharge of official duty. The requirement of a previous sanction will thus be rendered redundant by such an interpretation. 56. It must be remembered that in this particular case, the FIR actually implicated only four persons, namely, PW 16, A-3, A-4 and A-5. A-1 was not implicated in the FIR. It was only after a confessional statement was made by PW 16 in the year 1998 that A-1 was roped in. The allegations against A-1 were that he got into a criminal conspiracy with the others to commit these offences. But the Management of BHEL refused to grant sanction for prosecuting A-3 and A-4, twice, on the ground that the decisions taken were in the realm of commercial wisdom of the Company. If according to the Management of the Company, the very same act of the co-conspirators fell in the realm of commercial wisdom, it is inconceivable that - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 the act of A-1, as part of the criminal conspiracy, fell outside the discharge of his public duty, so as to disentitle him for protection under Section 197(1) of the Code. 57. In view of the above, we uphold the contention advanced on behalf of A-1 that the prosecution ought to have taken previous sanction in terms of Section 197(1) of the Code, for prosecuting A-1, for the offences under IPC. (Emphasis supplied) If the issue in the subject lis is pitted to the law as laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment, what would unmistakably emerge is, the unsustainability of continuance of the trial against the petitioners, for the reason that the police, after investigation, dropped Sections 192A and 192B of the Act and filed a charge sheet only for offences punishable under Sections 409 and 420 r/w. 34 of the IPC, without obtaining sanction from the competent authority. If regard is had to the fact that they are alleged of offences while discharging their official duties, it becomes imperative for the concerned Court to continue the trial only on a sanction being placed before it, to prosecute these public servants. In that light, the concerned Court shall not be permitted to proceed against these petitioners for the afore-quoted offences, unless - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:49672 CRL.P No. 11544 of 2022 C/W CRL.P No. 293 of 2023 a valid sanction is obtained from the hands of the competent authority and placed before the concerned Court. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Criminal petitions are allowed. (ii) The proceedings in C.C.No.984/2022 pending before the Principal Civil (Jr.Dn.) Judge and JMFC, Mudigere, stand quashed qua the petitioners. (iii) However, liberty is reserved to the concerned Court to revive the proceedings once the sanction is obtained and placed before it, by the State. (iv) All other contentions except the one considered in the course of the order shall remain open to be urged at the appropriate stage before the appropriate fora at the appropriate time. Ordered accordingly. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE SJK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 11 CT:SG