C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16985 of 2024 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16985 of 2024 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 2 of 2025 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16985 of 2024 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR AMENDMENT) NO. 3 of 2025 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16985 of 2024 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR AMENDMENT) NO. 4 of 2025 In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16985 of 2024 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL ========================================================== Approved for Reporting Yes No ✔ ========================================================== RELIANCE LIFE SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. Versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ========================================================== Appearance: MR RAHUL CHITNIS with MR ARJUN R SHETH(7589) with MS RHEA SEVAK for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2 MR NIKUNJ KANARA, ASST. GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the Respondent(s) No. 2 MR ANKIT SHAH(6371) for the Respondent(s) No. 1 MR UNMESH SHUKLA with MR AYAAN PATEL SINGHI & CO(2725) for the Respondent(s) No. 4 ========================================================== CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL Date : 09/01/2025 ORAL JUDGMENT 1. Heard learned Advocate Mr.Rahul Chitnis with learned C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 Advocate Mr.Arjun Sheth with learned Advocate Ms.Rhea Sevak on behalf of the petitioners, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.Nikunj Kanara on behalf of the respondents no.2 and 3 and learned Senior Advocate Mr.Unmesh Shukla with learned Advocate Mr.Ayaan Patel for Singhi and Company on behalf of respondent no.4. 2. Originally, by way of this petition, the petitioners had challenged an order passed by the Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Gujarat dated 02.02.2024 – dispatched on 26.04.2024 as well as order dated 10.06.2024 – dispatched on 14.10.2024. 2.1. The right of the petitioners as a respondents before the Council to file their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim had been forfeited and application setting aside / recall of the order dated 02.02.2024 had been rejected. 2.2. Later, petitioners have preferred application for amendment as well as application for stay of an award which has been passed by the Council on 04.01.2025 i.e. during pendency of the present petition. The application for amendment being Civil Application No.03/2025 is allowed. Page 2 of 65 C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 Appropriate amendment to be carried out by tomorrow. 3. Considering the nature of issue involved in the present petition, with the consent of parties, this Court has taken up the present petition for final disposal. The facts, in brief as much as are relevant for the purpose of deciding the present petition, are stated hereinbelow:- 3.1. The petitioners herein were respondents in arbitral proceedings before the Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, initiated by the respondent no.4 herein as the claimant. (The parties shall be addressed hereinafter as per their status in the petition, whereas the Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council Council will be addressed as the Council). 3.2. It appears that the respondent no.4 herein had approached the Council as regards a transaction between the respondent no.4 and the petitioners herein and whereas, the Council had passed an award dated 24.10.2019 in Arbitration Case No.15/2019 between the parties. It appears that the said arbitral award had been challenged by the petitioners herein before this Court by preferring Special Civil Application C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 No.324/2020 and whereas, Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 09.03.2021, while setting aside the award dated 24.10.2019 passed by the Arbitrator, had inter alia directed the Council to proceed afresh in accordance with the provisions contained in the 1996 Act and not only decide the Reference, but, also entertain the Counterclaim of the petitioners and decide the same while deciding the Reference, strictly in accordance with law. 3.3. Relevant here would be to mention that the Hon’ble Division Bench had inter alia directed that the Council shall endeavour to decide the matter afresh as early as possible and the leaned Counsels for the parties had made their statements that the parties would cooperate for expeditious disposal. It appears that thereafter, the proceedings had been listed before the Council for the first time on 04.03.2022 and whereas, while the petitioners had remained absent, the respondent no.4 herein had requested for time to submit pleading afresh and upon request of the respondent no.4, fifteen days’ time had been granted. 3.4. It appears that the respondent no.4 had thereafter preferred their Statement of Claim on 18.11.2022 and C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 whereas, the proceedings before the Council had been listed for the second time on 13.01.2023 when the respondent no.4 was not present and the petitioner was present had requested time to file Counterclaim. Time was granted for two weeks to file Counterclaim and whereas, it is stated that the petitioners herein were directed to prefer the Counterclaim and Statement of Defence before the next date, failing which, no further chances would given. It appears that the third meeting of the Council was held on 02.02.2024 and whereas, the petitioners who had till then not filed their Counterclaim and Statement of Defence, had requested for some time to file the same. It appears that the Council being of the opinion that ample time had been provided to the petitioners, more particularly, the Council having observed that the respondent prolonging the proceedings for two years and having failed to make any submissions during such period, had refused to grant any further opportunity and had forfeited the right of the respondent to file Statement of Defence and the Counterclaim vide order of the said date i.e. 02.02.2024, the same had been dispatched by the Council on 26.04.2024. It appears that originally, even without getting a copy of the order dated 02.02.2024, the petitioners herein preferred an C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 application on 29.02.2024 inter alia praying for the following:- “11. It is therefore prayed:- a. That that the delay in filing the Statement of Defendant and Counterclaim be condoned and the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim dated 28th February 2024, be taken on file of this Hon’ble Council. b. In the alternative to prayer (a), the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim dated 12th August 2019, be considered as the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the Respondent, and the matter be proceeded with on merits. c. For such further and other reliefs as the nature and circumstances of the case may require.” 3.5. It appears that thereafter, the petitioners, upon receiving a copy of the order dated 02.02.2024, had preferred another application which has not been produced on record and whereas, reference to the same is made on the basis of observations of the Council in later order which would be referred to hereinafter. The said application dated 23.05.2024 inter alia contained prayers for setting aside of the order dated 02.02.2024 and seeking Statement of Defence and Counterclaim dated 28.02.2024 being taken on file of the Council, or in the alternative, the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the petitioners which had been filed on 12.08.2019 i.e. prior to the first award which had been set C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 aside by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court be considered as the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the petitioners herein. 3.6. It appears that the said application had been taken up for hearing by the Council on 10.06.2024 and whereas, the Council had noted that the respondent was given ample opportunity for submitting their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and the same had been forfeited vide order dated 02.02.2024 and whereas, the Council also notes that in absence of any express provision for empowering the Council to recall its own order and therefore, vide an order of the said date i.e. 10.06.2024, the Council had disposed of the application as not maintainable. The said order had been dispatched on 14.10.2024. 3.7. It appears that after the said order had been received by the petitioners, they had approached this Court by preferring this petition which has been affirmed on 12.11.2024 and filed before this Court on 12.12.2024. It appears that the petition had been listed before a learned Coordinate Bench of this Court and whereas, vide an order dated 16.12.2024, the learned Coordinate Bench had recused from taking up the C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 said petition. It would appear that on the other hand, the proceeding before the Council was listed on 17.12.2024 and whereas, the Council was appraised about the fact that petition was pending before this Court and the Council, though having taken note of the fact, had on the ground that there was no stay granted by this Court, had taken up the hearing of the proceedings and had passed Award No.23/2024 on 17.12.2024 which had been dispatched on 04.01.2025. As noted hereinabove, the said award has also been challenged before this Court by an application for amendment. 3.8. The petitioners being aggrieved by the award passed by the Council as well as earlier orders by the Council dated 10.06.2024 and 02.02.2024, have approached this Court by way of this petition. 4. Learned Advocate Mr.Chitnis on behalf of the petitioners would assail order dated 02.02.2024 whereby the right of the petitioners had been forfeited by submitting that while the Council had inter alia observed at paragraph no.12 that the Council had provided ample opportunity entente to the respondents to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, yet, the facts would show otherwise. It is submitted by learned C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 Advocate that while the fact of the adjournments being of on or around twelve months could not be disputed, but, at the same time, it also requires to be noted that after decision of the High Court dated 09.03.2021, the proceedings had been listed only on two occasions i.e. on 04.03.2022 on which date the respondent no.4 had taken time for filing of fresh statement of fact and on 13.01.2023 when the petitioners had taken time to file Counterclaim and Statement of Defence whereafter, on 02.02.2024, the order forfeiting the right to file Defence Statement and Counterclaim had been passed. 4.1. 4.1. Learned Advocate would submit that while it is undoubtedly true that the petitioners had almost a year to file his Statement of Claim and the defence statement, yet, the fact of the claimant – respondent no.4 having filed the Statement of Claim in the month of November, 2022 was also a fact which ought not to have been overlooked by the Council. Learned Advocate would submit that the Council therefore was not right in observing vide order dated 02.02.2024 that the respondents therein i.e. petitioners herein had prolonged the proceedings for almost two years i.e. from 04.03.2022 till 02.02.2024. Page 9 of 65 C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 4.2. Learned Advocate Mr.Chitnis would further submit that insofar as the order dated 10.06.2024 is concerned, while the petitioners had tendered Statement of Defence and Counterclaim on 28.02.2024, there was also an alternative prayer which had been sought for by the petitioners being that the Statement of Defence and the Counterclaim which had been preferred by the petitioners in the month of August, 2019 i.e. even before the first award was passed, to be taken on record. It is submitted that the Council ought to have atleast considered the said prayer and had ought to have treated the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim preferred by the petitioners before the first award as their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. 4.3. Learned Advocate Mr.Chitnis, insofar as the Arbitral Award dated 17.12.2024, would submit that the award is nothing but a manifestation of the overreach of the Council more particularly, according to learned Advocate, the Council was informed about the fact that the petitioners had approached the High Court challenging orders dated 02.02.2024 and 10.06.2024 and whereas, the Council ought to have waited for some reasonable time before deciding the C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 dispute between the parties. 4.4. Learned Advocate would submit that as such, the order of the Council dated 02.02.2024 forfeiting the right of the parties had been dispatched on 26.04.2024 and whereas, while an application had been preferred even before the order had been received, later on, a further application had been preferred which had been decided vide order dated 10.06.2024 which again had been dispatched on 14.10.2024. Learned Advocate would submit that after the order dated 10.06.2024 which had been received by the petitioners after it was dispatched around 14.10.2024, the petitioners had immediately approached this Court and the matter had also been listed before this Court hearing on 16.12.2024. It is submitted that on the very next day, when the fact of the matter having been listed and pending before this Court being brought to the notice of the Council, the Council, according to learned Advocate, ought to have waited and ought not to have decided the proceedings finally. 4.5. Learned advocate would further submit that while the petitioners have an alternative remedy against the award dated 17.12.2024, but since the award was passed in a clear C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 overreach of the present petition and since the petitioners did not receive appropriate opportunity to defend the proceedings, this Court may intervene. 4.6. Learned Advocate Mr.Chitnis would refer to decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in case M/s. Maruti Enterprise Through Authorized Partner Jigneshbhai Bharatbhai Tarpara vs. State of Gujarat (Special Civil Application No.20307/2019 dated 22.01.2020) and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors., reported on (1998) 8 SCC 1, in support of his submissions. 4.7. Thus submitting, learned Advocate would request this Court to set aside the Arbitral Award dated 17.12.2024 as well as orders dated 10.06.2024 and 02.02.2024. 5. The present petition had been vehemently opposed by learned Senior Advocate Mr.Unmesh Shukla with learned advocate Mr.Ayaan Patel on behalf of the respondent no.4 herein. 5.1. Learned Senior Advocate, at the outset, would submit that the present petition may not be entertained by this Court C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 more particularly learned Senior Advocate relying upon a decision of the learned Coordinate Bench as upheld by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that learned Coordinate Bench in case of M/s. Ghankun Steels Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. (Special Civil Application No.4876/2024, dated 02.04.2024), where a similar issue had arisen, vide order dated 02.04.2024, relying upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of M/s. India Glycols Ltd. vs. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, reported in AIR 2024 SC 285 inter alia held that proceedings under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 would be governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and therefore, the remedy to challenge an award passed by the MSME Council under Section 18 would be under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. 5.2. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the decision of the learned Coordinate Bench had been affirmed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.545/2024 vide decision dated 11.06.2024 whereby the Hon’ble Division Bench had dismissed the Letters Patent C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 Appeal. Learned Senior Advocate would thus submit that the petition invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227, may not be entertained and whereas, the petitioners may be directed to avail of the alternative remedy which is available i.e. by filing an application under Section 34 before the Appellate Council. 5.3. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that as such, the conduct of the petitioners herein was to delay the proceedings and whereas, learned Senior Advocate would emphasize on the observations by the Council in order dated 02.02.2024 to show that the petitioners though having been granted time by the Council for more than a year, had not filed Counterclaim or Statement of Defence and whereas, it is submitted that the Council was well justified in forfeiting the right of the petitioners – respondents therein to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. Insofar as the order dated 10.06.2024 is concerned, it is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council was well justified in not entertaining the said application more particularly, according to learned Senior Counsel, the Act did not envisage the power available with the Council for review C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 or recall and hence, the Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council had rightly not acceded to the request made by the petitioners. 5.4. Learned Senior Advocate would emphasize on the decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench in the first round of litigation i.e. order dated 09.03.2021 in Special Civil Application No.324/2020 and would submit that the Hon’ble Division Bench having directed the Council to endeavour and decide the matter afresh as early as possible and having recorded the statement of the counsels that the parties would cooperate for expeditious disposal while setting aside the award dated 24.10.2019, yet, way the proceedings have moved ahead would show that the order of the Hon’ble Division Bench took almost four years to be complied with. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the respondent herein having filed its Statement of Claim well within time and the petitioners having been given more than sufficient time to file their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and the petitioners having not availed of such opportunity, no fault could be found with the Council in forfeiting the right of the petitioners herein and not recalling the order dated C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 02.02.2024. 5.5. Learned Senior Counsel would also submit that the Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council was also justified in not taking into consideration the submission made by learned Advocate for the petitioners as regards the matter pending before this Court. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that since there was an order of the Hon’ble Division Bench referred to hereinabove whereby the Hon’ble Division Bench had directed the Council to decide the matter expeditiously, the Council was justified in not waiting for the outcome of the present petition more particularly since there was no submission as regards any interim order made by this Court in the present petition. 5.6. Learned Counsel would further submit that Section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 inter alia envisages that any application for setting aside a decree made by the Council shall be entertained only upon the appellant having deposited 75% of the amount in terms of the decree or award, as the case may be. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the present petition is preferred only to avoid the petitioners being required to comply with the C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 provisions of the said section and whereas, learned Senior Advocate submitting that the Counterclaim being possible to be decided independently, therefore, there is no reason for this Court to entertain the present writ petition and whereas, the petitioners may be relegated to avail the alternative remedy which is available to it. 5.7. Learned Senior Advocate would also draw the attention of this Court to the averments made at paragraph no. hh of the writ petition at page-12 wherein it is mentioned that on hearing held on 13.01.2023, the Advocate for the petitioners themselves had made a statement that the petitioners would file a fresh Statement of Defence and Counterclaim within a period of two weeks, but, inadvertently, the petitioners could not do the same. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the petitioners themselves admitting that they had submitted to the Council on hearing dated 13.01.2023 as regards the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim being filed within a period of two weeks and having not complied with the same, no indulgence may be shown by this Court. 5.8. Learned Senior Advocate would, in conclusion, emphasize that the conduct of the petitioners being such that C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 no liberal view may be taken by this Court, therefore, it is emphasized that this Court may not intervene. 6. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.Nikunj Kanara on behalf of the respondents no.2 and 3 would submit that as regards the award etc. it would be for the parties to make submissions on merits and whereas, to a specific query raised by this Court as regards the reason for which the Council had not adjourned the matter on 17.12.2024, attention of this Court is drawn to observations made by the Council at paragraph no.24 of the award. 7. Having heard learned Counsels for the parties and perused the documents on record, the question that arises for consideration is whether this Court should entertain the writ petition more particularly in view of the alternative remedy which is available to the petitioners as per Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act or not and further, whether the award dated 17.12.2024 as well as orders dated 10.06.2024 and 02.02.2024 require any interference. 7.1. To this Court, it would appear that though an award has C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 been passed by the Council and though the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 more particularly Section 18 thereof which inter alia lays down that provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would apply i.e. arbitral award could be challenged in terms of Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, yet, to this Court, it would appear that the present is a case where the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would have to be exercised. 8. The reasons for coming to the above conclusion are as follows:- 8.1. At the outset, it requires to be mentioned that while the Council had passed an award on 24.10.2019, in the very proceedings, in the first round, the same had been interfered by Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 09.03.2021 more particularly directing the Council to decide the Reference by also entertaining the Counterclaim of the petitioners and the Council was also directed to decide the Reference strictly in accordance with law. 8.2. It would appear, more particularly as noted in order C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 dated 02.02.2024, that for the first time after order of this Court dated 09.03.2021, the hearing of the Council was scheduled on 04.03.2021. The claimant – respondent no.4 was present on the said date whereas, the respondent had remained absent and the Council had provided fifteen days’ time to the claimant to file a fresh Statement of Claim. As against the period of fifteen days, it would appear that the the respondent no.4 – claimant had filed their Statement of Claim on 18.11.2022. 8.3. It appears that thereafter, the second hearing of the Arbitration Case had been placed on 13.01.2023 when the claimant was absent and the respondent had requested for some time to file its Counterclaim and Statement of Defence and whereas, the petitioners were granted time till the next date for filing of the Counterclaim as well as the Statement of Defence. It appears that the third meeting was held on 02.02.2024, on which date, the request of the petitioners herein to provide some more time to file Counterclaim and the Statement of Defence had been rejected and the right of the petitioners to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim had been forfeited. It would appear that the Council vide the said C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 order has inter alia noted that ‘the Council is of the view that it has provided ample opportunities and time to the respondent to file a Statement of Defence / Counterclaim, and the respondent has been prolonging the proceedings for almost two years i.e. from 04.03.2022 till 02.02.2024 and failed to make the submissions within this period wherein the very objective of the respondent in approaching the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat was for adjudication of the Counterclaim.’ 8.4. To this Court, it would appear that there is an inherent fallacy in the above finding. As noted hereinabove, the first hearing was scheduled on 04.03.2022 after order of this Court dated 09.03.2021 on which date time had been granted at the request of respondent no.4 herein for filing a fresh Statement of Claim and as noted hereinabove, the fresh Statement of Claim had been filed by the respondent no.4 on 18.11.2022. The case had thereafter been listed for hearing on 13.01.2023 when time had been sought for by the petitioners herein – respondents before the Council to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and whereas, as a last chance, time had been granted till the next date of hearing. While the period C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 which had been elapsed in between i.e. from 13.01.2023 to 02.02.2024 would be around thirteen months, but, at the same time, in terms of adjournments, it was only the third adjournment after the matter had been remanded back by this Court to the Council to decide. 8.5. Again, it would also appear that the petitioners – respondents before the Council could not be saddled with the liability of prolonging the proceedings from 04.03.2022 till 18.11.2022. The later date being the date on which the respondent no.4 herein - claimant before the Council had filed its Statement of Claim. While it is true that sufficient time had been granted to the petitioners herein for filing of the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, but, at the same time, the fact of the respondent no.4 having taken eight months to file their reply and there being only one adjournment thereafter, are also issues which could not be ignored. The petitioners having sought for adjournment only once for filing of the reply and the same having been granted to them, to this Court, it would appear that the next date for listing being after around thirteen months ought not to be the only reason for having forfeited the right of the petitioners to C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. The petitioners thus were entitled for one more opportunity being granted to file its Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. 8.6. Again, it would appear that the Council had also erred while passing the order dated 02.02.2024 for another reason i.e. as found at paragraph no.12 of the said order. It would appear that in addition to seeking for some time to file its Counterclaim and Statement of Defence, a further request had been made on behalf of the petitioners herein that the old Counterclaim may be taken on record. It would appear that reference to the old Counterclaim being the Counterclaim which was preferred by the petitioners before the first Arbitral Award dated 24.10.2019 which had been set aside by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 09.03.2021. To this Court, it would appear that when the old Counterclaim was already there on record and while the petitioners had sought for some time to file a fresh Counterclaim and Statement of Defence and in alternative had sought for the old Counterclaim to be taken on record, while refusing to grant time, to balance the equities, the Counterclaim which was already there on record ought to C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 have been treated as the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the petitioners for the purpose of adjudicating the arbitral proceedings. The said request not being acceded to, to this Court, it would appear that the order dated 02.02.2024 was passed on absolutely erroneous consideration. 8.7. Insofar as the order dated 10.06.2024 is concerned, while the petitioners had sought for the order dated 02.02.2024 passed by the Council to be set aside in view of such prayers, this Court agrees with the findings of the Council that the same was a prayer which could not have been granted by the Council, yet, it would also appear to this Court that the prayer for recalling, as noted by the Council, not being expressly provided, the Council would not be entitled to maintain the said application, would be a finding which this Court will advert to little later. 9. Now coming to the award in question, to this Court, it would appear that the Council had gravely erred in not acceding to the request of the petitioners for adjourning the hearing of the arbitral proceedings in spite of being apprised about the fact of the present writ petition being filed and C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 pending before this Court. 9.1. As the record would indicate, while the writ petition had been filed on 12.12.2024, the same was listed on 16.12.2024 and as noted hereinabove, on the said date, it was not taken up by the learned Coordinate Bench. On the very next day i.e. 17.12.2024, in the hearing slated before the Council, the petitioners had informed the Council about the present petition having been preferred. The observations of the Council at paragraph no.29 notes in this regard being as under:- “29. The fourth arbitral hearing was held in the 264th MSEFC hearing dated 17.12.2024. Sr.Adv. Unmesh Shukla with Adv. Aayan Patel was present on behalf of the claimant and Adv. Rahul Chitnis was present through Video Conference and Adv. Rhea Sevak was present in person on behalf of the respondent before the council. The respondent submitted a purshis during the hearing which stated that the respondent has approached the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat challenging the Order dated 10.06.2024 passed by this council through a Writ petition being Special Civil Application No.16985 of 2024. The respondent further requested an adjournment in light of the pending writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court. On the other hand, the claimant strongly objected to the adjournment request of the respondent and submitted that the dues of the claimant have been pending for more than 14 years now and the respondent has been stalling its legal obligation to pay the outstanding dues through multiple litigation time and again. The C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 claimant further submitted that there is no stay from the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat on the present proceedings and the respondent must proceed with its final arguments as decided in the last hearing. The council unanimously decided not to grant any further adjournment and directed the respondent to furnish its final arguments. The respondent however submitted that the council may take on record the purshis and may decide as it deems fit. The claimant submitted that the council may proceed further based on the written submission made by the claimant. The Council, after careful consideration of the oral and written submissions of both parties, decided to pass an arbitral award on the merits of the case.” 9.2. To this Court, it would appear that when a writ petition had been preferred challenging orders passed by the Council and whereas, since the orders which were impugned before this Court touched upon the right of fair hearing and appropriate opportunity being granted to the petitioners, then the Council was expected to grant atleast some reasonable time so as to ensure that appropriate orders as regards the further proceedings of the Council could have been passed by this Court. 9.3. This Court is of the opinion that the present was not a case where time had been repeatedly sought for under the guise of writ petition having been preferred or in contemplation of being preferred rather, 17.12.2024 was the C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 next day of the petition having been listed before this Court and learned Coordinate Bench having recused. Furthermore, as could be seen at paragraph no.29, the fact of the number of the present petition being recorded by the Council shows that the Council was aware about the writ petition having been preferred and the matter being pending at large before this Court. 9.4. Under such circumstances, to this Court, it would appear that the Council ought to have waited for some reasonable time and ought to have granted some time to the petitioners to make appropriate request to this Court and whereas, to this Court, it would appear that passing of the arbitral award on the very date i.e. on 17.12.2024 would almost amount to the Council infructuating the powers of this Court to hear the present writ petition against orders dated 02.02.2024 and 10.06.2024 passed by the Council. 9.5. To this Court, it would appear that when any Court or Tribunal or Authority whose orders would be amenable to challenge before this Court is appraised about a petition / proceedings before this Court which petition/ proceedings are C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 closely connected to the proceedings pending before the Court, Tribunal or Authority concerned, then such Court, Tribunal or Authority was duty bound to have appropriate regard to the proceedings pending before this Court. The fact of a related petition / proceedings pending before the highest Court of the State ought not to be disregarded. More so, in the present case, where orders dated 02.02.2024 and 10.06.2024 were under challenge and interference with the same by this Court would have led the Council to afford opportunity to the petitioners to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. In the considered opinion of this Court, propriety demanded that when the fact of the writ petition having been filed being brought to the notice of the Council, the Council should have adjourned hearing of the arbitral proceedings for some reasonable time so as to ensure that appropriate opportunity could be availed of by the petitioners. 9.6. To this Court, it would appear that there was no irreversible situation which would have occurred if the matter had not been taken up for hearing on 17.12.2024. As noted hereinabove, after the order of the Hon’ble Division Bench dated 09.03.2021, the matter had been listed on 04.03.2022, C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 13.01.2023, 02.02.2024 and 10.06.2024 whereafter the matter had been listed on 17.12.2024. Thus, it would not appear that the case had been unnecessarily prolonged at the instance of the either parties and whereas, as noted hereinabove, while the period of adjournment was quite lengthy, it does not appear that the parties i.e. either of the parties had misused the time granted to them. As noted hereinabove, the claimant before the Tribunal itself taking around nine months to file their Statement of Claim, to this Court, a period beyond thirteen months being granted to the petitioners could not amount to the petitioners being treated as having misused the proceedings or having delayed the proceedings before the Council. 9.7. Thus, to this Court, it would appear that award dated 17.10.2024 requires interference on the very short issue of the Council not having afforded appropriate opportunity to the petitioners herein and the Council not having accorded due regard to the fact of the present writ petition pending before this Court challenging orders passed by the Council itself dated 02.02.2024 and 10.06.2024. 9.8. At this stage, it would further be relevant to observe that C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 while the Council has passed the first order forfeiting the right of the petitioners to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim on 02.02.2024, the same appears to be dispatched on 26.04.2024 as mentioned in the order itself. Again, as far as the order dated 10.06.2024 of the Council is concerned, the same appears to be dispatched on 14.10.2024 and whereas the petition had been affirmed on 12.11.2024 and has been presented before this Court on 12.12.2024. While it would be that the petitioners could have been slightly more vigilant in preferring the proceedings before this Court, but, at the same time, the chronology of dates would not show that the petitioners were the indolent litigant purposefully delaying the proceedings. 10. Insofar as the decisions relied upon by learned Counsel for the respondent no.4, it would appear that the learned Coordinate Bench as well as the Hon’ble Division Bench have relied upon decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of M/s India Glycols Limited (supra). While it would appear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had inter alia observed that the petition instituted by appellant to challenge award of the Facilitation Council was not maintainable in view of the C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, but, in the most humble opinion of this Court, it would appear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was in fact affirming a decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of the High Court of Telangana which is reproduced in the judgment itself where the Division Bench had inter alia come to a conclusion that the petition ought not to have been entertained. Paragraph no.5 of the decision is reproduced hereinbelow for benefit wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has affirmed order of the Division Bench:- “5. In an appeal by the second respondent, the Division Bench by its judgment dated 21 March 2023, reversed the view of the Single Judge. The Division Bench has come to the conclusion that the writ petition instituted by the appellant was not maintainable in view of the specific remedies which are provided under the special statute. The High Court held that the appellant ought to have taken recourse to the remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 19962 and having failed to do so, a writ petition could not be entertained. The observations of the High Court are set out in paragraph 38 of the impugned judgment which is extracted below: “38. Insofar maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, when respondents No.2 and 3 had an adequate, efficacious and “Act of 1996” alternate remedy under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained the writ petition. While maintainability of a writ petition is one aspect, entertainability is the relevant question. Considering the objective of the MSME Act and the provisions of Sections 15 to 23 thereof, learned Single Judge erred in entertaining the writ petition.” C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 A perusal of the above paragraph makes it clear that the Division Bench has clearly made a distinction between the maintainability of a writ petition and entertainability and has concluded that the learned Single Judge has erred in entertaining a writ petition. Thus, to this Court, it would appear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had while holding that the petition challenging award of the Facilitation Council was not maintainable, while affirming the decision of the Division Bench of the Telangana High Court. To this Court, it would appear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was affirming a decision whereby the entertainability was questioned and not the maintainability per se. 10.1. At this stage, this Court seeks to rely upon a decision in case of Narmada Clean–Tech vs. Indian Council of Arbitration reported in (2021) 1 GLR 847 whereby the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court (Coram: Hon’ble the Chief Justice Mr. Vikram Nath & Mr.J.B.Pardiwala, J., both their Lordships then were) have, after analyzing catena of judgments, inter alia held that an Arbitral Tribunal under the Arbitration Act, 1996 is a Tribunal within the meaning of Article 227 of the Constitution of India and thus would come C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 within the purview of the said article. The Hon’ble Division Bench has also distinguished the difference between the entertainability and the maintainability of a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and has observed that Courts have to be very circumspect in entertaining petitions against award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Paragraphs no.29 and 34 to 55 are reproduced hereinbelow for benefit:- “29. The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court or Tribunal assumes jurisdiction which it does not have or fails to exercise jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and leads to failure of justice, or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, then the High Court must step into exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. The High Court cannot convert itself into a Court of appeal and start reappreciating the evidence but can only interfere when there is an error of jurisdiction. The powers under Article 227 are very wide and can be used to secure the ends of justice and to ensure that people have faith in the judicial system. However, this power must be exercised sparingly to keep the subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors committed by them. With regard to the inferior tribunals, it has been held in a number of cases that the High Court can quash or set-aside the decision of an inferior tribunal in case the order has been passed without jurisdiction or is against the principles of natural C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 justice or the Tribunal fails to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law. Though every error is not to be corrected but if there is dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law then the High Court must exercise its jurisdiction. Therefore, when a Tribunal does not exercise jurisdiction or acts in a manner which will sully the image of the judicial process or gives findings which are perverse then the High Court can and must exercise its powers of superintendence. 35. The Supreme Court in Srei Infrastructure Finance Ltd. vs. Tuff Drilling (P) Ltd reported in (2018) 11 SCC 470 observed thus: "13. The law of Arbitration was earlier governed by the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Law Commission of India and several other organisations expressed opinion that the 1940 Act needs extensive amendments to make it more responsive to contemporary requirements. In the wake of rise in commercial litigation both at domestic and international level, a need was felt for a comprehensive law to deal the subject. The United Nations Organisation on International Trade Law (UNCILTRAL) adopted a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in the year 1985. Taking into consideration domestic arbitration as well as international commercial arbitration, Parliament enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Main objective for introducing the legislation was to make provision for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration. In Section 2 of the Act, arbitral tribunal has been defined to mean a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators. The arbitral tribunal was entrusted with various statutory functions, obligations by the enactment. 14. The arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding, equitable in nature or character which differs from a litigation in a Court. The power and functions of arbitral tribunal are statutorily C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 regulated. The tribunals are special arbitration with institutional mechanism brought into existence by or under statute to decide dispute arising with reference to that particular statute or to determine controversy referred to it. The tribunal may be a statutory tribunal or tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Constitution of India. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code vests into the Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain and determine any civil dispute. The constitution of tribunals has been with intent and purpose to take out different categories of litigation into the special tribunal for speedy and effective determination of disputes in the interest of the society. Whenever, by a legislative enactment jurisdiction exercised by ordinary civil court is transferred or entrusted to tribunals such tribunals are entrusted with statutory power. The arbitral tribunals in the statute of 1996 are no different, they decide the lis between the parties, follows Rules and procedure conforming to the principle of natural justice, the adjudication has finality subject to remedy provided under the 1996 Act. Section 8 of the 1996 Act obliges a judicial authority in a matter which is a subject of an agreement to refer the parties to arbitration. The reference to arbitral tribunal thus can be made by judicial authority or an arbitrator can be appointed in accordance with the arbitration agreement under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. 26. There cannot be a dispute that the power exercised by the arbitral tribunal is a quasi- judicial. In view of the provisions of the 1996 Act, which confers various statutory powers and obligations on the arbitral tribunal, we do not find any such distinction between the statutory tribunal constituted under the statutory provisions or Constitution in so far as the power of procedural review is concerned. We have already noticed that Section 19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the rules of procedure as contained in Civil Procedure C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 Code. Section 19 cannot be read to mean that arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing sustenance from any provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. This was clearly laid down in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited Vs. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, (2009) 8 SCC 646. In Paragraph 98(n), following was stated:- "(n) It is not bound by the procedure laid down under the Code. It may however be noticed in this regard that just because the Tribunal is not bound by the Code, it does not mean that it would not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a court as contained in the Code. "Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to observe the principles of natural justice." (See Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd. (1999) 4 SCC 710))" 36. The scope of powers of superintendence vested in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India again came up for consideration in Shalini Shyam Shetty and another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329. The Apex Court, after detailed exposition of the entire law on the subject, held as follows: "47. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other hand is not original nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226, High Court normally annuls or quashes an order or proceeding but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 tribunal should have made. {See Surya Dev Rai, SCC page 690, para 25 and also the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and others - [AIR 1955 SC 233, para 20 page 243]}. 48. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a Letters Patent Appeal or an intra Court Appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. Page 38 of 65 C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 37. We shall now look into the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of SBP and company (supra). In SBP and company (supra), the Supreme Court held that the Chief Justice or his delegatee, exercising powers under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996, exercises judicial powers and not administrative powers. The question whether the High Court can exercise power of superintendence under Article 227 or the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in case of C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 Arbitral Tribunal was also considered in this case. The Apex Court held as follows: "45. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating its grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the arbitral tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible. 46. The object of minimizing judicial intervention while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227 or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against every order made by the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that once the arbitration has commenced in the arbitral tribunal, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act even at an earlier stage." 38. The majority view in the SBP and company (supra) is that once the matter reaches the Arbitral Tribunal or the sole Arbitrator, the High Court should not interfere with the orders passed by the Arbitrator or the Arbitral Tribunal during the course of the arbitration proceedings and the parties should approach the Court only in the terms of Section 37 of the Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Act. In other words, where the Arbitral Tribunal holds that it has jurisdiction, it shall continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award. 39. Thus, our understanding of the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in SBP and company (supra) is that the High Court should not interfere with each and every order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal and judicial intervention should be minimal. We find it difficult to take the view interpreting the SBP and company (supra) that the High Court has no power at all to intervene either in exercise of its writ jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India with any of the orders that may be passed by the Arbitral Tribunal or the Arbitrator. 40. There is a fine distinction between the maintainability and entertainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution in arbitration matters. Maintainability is not synonymous to entertainability. This position of law has been well explained by the Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmed Ishaque reported in 1955 AIR 233. In the said case, the question that arose before the Supreme Court was, as to whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain a Writ Petition for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari against the order of Election Tribunal constituted under the Representation of People's Act, 1951, as it stood in 1955, deciding an election dispute. Placing reliance on Article 329 of the Constitution, it was contended before the Supreme Court that as an election to the C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 Parliament or State Legislature could be challenged only by means of an Election Petition, petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would not lie before the High Court for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari against the decision of the Election Tribunal also. The Supreme Court negatived the contention. In doing so, the Supreme Court pointed out that the bar created under Article 329 of the Constitution was against interfering in election matters and the said Article did not curtail the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue Writ of Certiorari to any Tribunal and the Election Tribunal was no exception. The relevant portion of the Judgment reads: "6. The first question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether High Courts have jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue Writs against decisions of Election Tribunals. That Article confers on High Courts power to issue appropriate writs to any person or authority within their territorial jurisdiction, in terms absolute and unqualified, and Election Tribunals functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts would fall within the sweep of that power. If we are to recognise or admit any limitation on this power, that must be founded on some provision in the Constitution itself." 41. In the aforenoted paragraph, the Supreme Court has emphatically laid down that any restriction on the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, can be recognised only if it is incorporated in any of the provisions of the Constitution itself. In view of the above decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, it is clear that unless the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution stands curtailed by any other provision of the Constitution, it cannot be said that a Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution does not lie or this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in arbitration matters. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court is that in respect of election matters, unless an extraordinary C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 case is made out in a given case, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained. This clearly means that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality of actions taken or orders made in the course of an election to a local authority or any other body on the ground of violation of law, is maintainable but should not be entertained by the High Court unless the violation of law made out is such as would justify the interference under Article 226 of the Constitution immediately to prevent abuse of power and waste of public time and money and the alternative remedy by way of Election Petition after the elections is not an efficacious remedy. The same principle of law should apply even to the arbitration matters. 42. In the Union of India v. Varindera Constructions Ltd., (2018) 7 SCC 794, the Supreme Court held:- "12. The primary object of the arbitration is to reach a final disposition in a speedy, effective, inexpensive and expeditious manner. In order to regulate the law regarding arbitration, legislature came up with legislation which is known as Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In order to make arbitration process more effective, the legislature restricted the role of courts in case where matter is subject to the arbitration. Section 5 of the Act specifically restricted the interference of the courts to some extent. In other words, it is only in exceptional circumstances, as provided by this Act, the court is entitled to intervene in the dispute which is the subject- matter of arbitration. Such intervention may be before, at or after the arbitration proceeding, as the case may be. In short, court shall not intervene with the subject-matter of arbitration unless injustice is caused to either of the parties." 43. The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court have been quoted with approval in a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. ICOMM Tele Ltd. vs. Punjab State Water Supply C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 and Sewarage Board and another [Civil Appeal No.2713 of 2019 decided on 11 th March 2019]. 44. However, the recent trend of case law is that the High Court should not interfere with any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. The same does not mean that the petition itself is not maintainable. We may refer to and rely upon a recent order passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Sterling Industries (supra). The same reads thus: "1. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length, we find that the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside on one ground alone. The High Court entertained a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order of the learned District Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar purportedly passed under Section 20 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, "the Arbitration Act") read with Section 19 of the Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (for short, "the MSME Act"). This application was made to the District Judge by respondent No. 1- Jayprakash Associates Ltd. against a partial award made under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act. Such an application was not tenable vide Section 16 (6) of the Arbitration Act. Since such an application was not tenable, we fail to understand how in a writ petition filed against an order made by the District Judge in an untenable application, the High Court could have set aside the partial award. This is clearly contrary to law. This court in the case of SBP & Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr., reported in (2005) 8 SCC 618 in Paragraph No. 45 held as follows. "45.It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the arbitral tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible." 2. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside. Ordered accordingly." 45. We shall now look into the four decisions, upon which, reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant. 46. In M/s. Deep Industries Limited (supra), the Supreme Court observed as under: "At the same time, we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitution provision which remains untouched by the non- obstane clause of section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances, what is important to note is that though petitions can be filed under Article 227 against the judgments allowing or dismissing first appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering with the same, taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated by us herein above so that C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 interference is restricted to orders that are passed which are patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction." 47. The bare reading of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court makes it clear that it was a case which had travelled right upto the stage of Section 37 of the Act. It is suggestive of the fact that an appeal was filed before the High Court against the order passed by the District Court under Section 34 of the Act. In such circumstances, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would definitely be maintainable with a rider that the High Court should be extremely circumspect in interfering with the same. In other words, the interference should be restricted to orders that are passed, which are patently lacking any inherent jurisdiction. However, the ratio, as propounded in M/ s. Deep Industries (supra) does not, in any manner, dilute the principles propounded by the Supreme Court in the SBP and company (supra). This decision, in our opinion, is not in any manner helpful to Mr. Trivedi, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant. 48. In Punjab Agro Industries Corporation (supra), the appellant had entered into a collaboration agreement with the respondent for setting up of a project through a company to be jointly promoted by them. Certain disputes arose between the parties and the appellant by notice appointed its Arbitrator and called upon the respondent to appoint his Arbitrator. As the respondent failed to comply, the appellant filed a petition under Section 11(4) of the Act, 1996 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Chandigarh (a designate of the Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court). The said designate, by order dated 16th February 2002, dismissed the petition holding that the appointment of Arbitrator was not called for, as the matter had already been decided by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (for short, "BIFR"). Being aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court for quashing the order of C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 the designate and for appointment of an Arbitrator in terms of the agreement. A Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the said writ petition by the following short order: "The Petitioner is aggrieved by rejection of application for appointment of arbitrator under Section 11(4) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Learned Counsel for the Respondent raises a preliminary objection that Writ Petition is not maintainable in view of judgment of Seven Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.B.P. & Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. - 2005 (8) SCC 618 wherein it has been held that power of deciding an application for appointment of an arbitrator is judicial power and is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the Writ Petition. It is made clear that this will not debar the Petitioner from taking such other remedy as may be available under the law." 49. The aforequoted order of the High Court was challenged in appeal by special leave, on the following grounds: "(a) The order of the High Court is a non speaking order and it upholds the preliminary objection of the respondent without assigning any reason. (b) A writ petition under Article 227 was maintainable against the order of the Civil Judge, Senior Division (designate of the Chief Justice) and the High Court was wrong in assuming that the writ petition was not maintainable in view of the decision of this Court in SBP." 50. The Supreme Court, while allowing the appeal, held as under: "8. We have already noticed that though the order under section 11(4) is a judicial order, C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 having regard to section 11(7) relating to finality of such orders, and the absence of any provision for appeal, the order of the Civil Judge was open to challenge in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The decision in SBP does not bar such a writ petition. The observations of this Court in SBP that against an order under section 11 of the Act, only an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution would lie, is with reference to orders made by the Chief Justice of a High Court or by the designate Judge of that High Court. The said observations do not apply to a subordinate court functioning as Designate of the Chief Justice. This Court has repeatedly stressed that Article 136 is not intended to permit direct access to this Court where other equally efficacious remedy is available and the question involved is not of any public importance; and that this Court will not ordinarily exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136, unless the appellant has exhausted all other remedies open to him. Therefore the contention that the order of the Civil Judge, Sr. Division rejecting a petition under section 11 of the Act could only be challenged, by recourse to Article 136 is untenable. The decision in SBP did not affect the maintainability of the writ petition filed by Appellant before the High Court. 9. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. As a consequence, Civil Writ Petition No.9889 of 2002 shall stand restored to the file, and the High Court is requested to dispose it of in accordance with law." 51. The aforesaid decision, in the case of Punjab Agro Industries (supra) has laid down the same principle of law as explained in the case of M/s. Deep Industries (supra). 52. KKR India Financial Services Limited (supra) is a Division Bench decision of this High Court to which one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.) is a party. In the said case, the subject matter of challenge was an C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 interim consent order passed by the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad in a Commercial Civil Suit instituted by the Axis Bank Limited against Sintex Company Limited. KKR India Financial Services Limited was not impleaded as one of the defendants in the suit. The consent order obtained by the parties to the suit was hurting the KKR India Financial Services Limited. KKR had two options available to it for the purpose of questioning the legality and validity of the consent order passed by the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad. The first option was to seek leave of the High Court to appeal against the consent order and the second option was to question the legality and validity of the consent order by coming to the High Court invoking its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Having regard to the gross facts of the case, the Division Bench of the High Court thought fit to entertain the application filed by the KKR India Financial Services Limited under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by overruling the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Axis Bank as regards the alternative remedy available with the KKR India Financial Services Limited of filing an appeal after seeking leave from the High Court. While deciding the matter, the Division Bench of this High Court considered various provisions of the law, more particularly, Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This Court took the view that a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was maintainable although the petitioner was not a party in the suit proceedings. The Division Bench took the view that to prevent serious miscarriage of justice, it was necessary to interfere with the consent order in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 53. At this stage, we once again go back to the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. At the cost of repetition, we once again incorporate para 12 of the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, which reads thus: C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 "In view of the foregoing reasons, the petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. It is, however, made clear that the petitions are dismissed without entering into merits of the matter, only on the ground that the order passed during course of arbitration proceedings cannot be challenged under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the constitution of India and it would be open for both the sides to raise all the contentions on merits before the appropriate forum in appropriate proceeding at appropriate time in accordance with law. Interim relief, if any stands vacated. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs." 54. It is apparent on plain reading of the para 12 quoted above that the learned Single Judge rejected the petition without entering into the merits of the matter only on the ground that the order passed during the course of the arbitration proceedings cannot be challenged under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and it would be open for both the sides to raise all the contentions on merits before appropriate forum in appropriate proceedings at an appropriate time in accordance with law. The learned Single Judge saying so held that the petitions were not maintainable in law. 55. To the aforesaid extent, we find it difficult to agree with the learned Single Judge. It would have been altogether a different matter if the learned Single Judge would have said that having regard to the nature of the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, no case is made out for interference. The learned Single Judge is very clear in his mind. The learned Single Judge says that His Lordship has not gone into the merits of the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal as no order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal can be questioned before the High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution as the petition itself is not maintainable.” From the above quoted paragraphs, while it would be C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 undoubtedly clear that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging an order under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be maintainable, whether to entertain the same or not, would be a different issue. The Hon’ble Division Bench has inter alia laid down that the High Court must step into and exercise its supervisory jurisdiction where Tribunals assume jurisdiction which they do not have or fails to exercise jurisdiction which leads to failure of justice or grave injustice. The Hon’ble Division Bench has further reiterated that petitions under Article 227 could be entertained against an order where an alternative remedy is available, where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted (paragraph no.36). 10.2. Furthermore, this Court also would rely upon observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra) whereby the Hon’ble Supreme Court has inter alia held that a writ petition would not be entertained by High Court if there is an effective and efficacious remedy available and whereas, the alternative remedy has not been considered to operate as a bar inter alia C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 where there has been violation of principles of natural justice. Paragraph no.15 of the said decision being relevant for the present purpose, is reproduced hereinbelow for benefit:- “15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of a case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court had imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.” 10.3. Reference is also made to decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of M/S Godrej Sara Lee Limited. vs. The Excise And Taxation Officer-Cum-Assessing Authority & Ors., reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 95. Paragraphs no.4 to 8 of the said decision are reproduced hereinbelow for benefit:- “4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper. 5. A little after the dawn of the Constitution, a Constitution Bench of this Court in its decision reported in 1958 SCR 595 (State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohd. Nooh) had the occasion to observe as follows: “10. In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 11, p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. ***” 6. At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15 of the its decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others) carved out the exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ Court would be justified in entertaining a writ petition despite the party approaching it not having availed the alternative remedy provided by the statute. The same read as under: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice; (iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged. 7. Not too long ago, this Court in its decision reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 884 (Assistant Commissioner of State Tax vs. M/s. Commercial Steel Limited) has reiterated the same principles in paragraph 11. 8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the decisions of this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of India vs. State of Haryana). What appears on a plain reading of the former decision is that whether a certain item falls within an entry in a sales tax statute, raises a pure question of law and if investigation into facts is C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 unnecessary, the high court could entertain a writ petition in its discretion even though the alternative remedy was not availed of; and, unless exercise of discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse, this Court would not interfere. In the latter decision, this Court found the issue raised by the appellant to be pristinely legal requiring determination by the high court without putting the appellant through the mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy. What follows from the said decisions is that where the controversy is a purely legal one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact but only questions of law, then it should be decided by the high court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being available.” After explaining the difference between entertainability and maintainability, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has inter alia reiterated the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Whirlpool Corporation as regards exercise of power by the High Court even if an alternative is available. 10.4. Having regard to the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court referred to hereinabove, it would appear to this Court that while a petition where the party has an alternative remedy would be maintainable, entertaining the same would be different issue. A writ petition where the party has an alternative remedy could be entertained subject to the self- imposed restrains on exercise of such powers within the C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 parameters as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Division Bench of this Court. In the instant case, it would appear that the Council has passed an order without following the principles of natural justice for which reason the present petition challenging the order of the Council could be entertained. Furthermore, this Court would also entertain the present petition under Article 227 to ensure that the Tribunal i.e. the Facilitation Council here is kept within the bounds of its jurisdiction. 10.5. Insofar as the issue of violation of principles of natural justice, to this Court, it would appear that while the petitioners herein were afforded an opportunity to file the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim vide order dated 13.01.2023 and whereas, while the petitioners did not file the same by the next date, yet, as would be clear from the order dated 02.02.2024, in addition to seeking additional time to file their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, the petitioners had also requested the Council to treat their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim before passing of the first award, as their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. As noted hereinabove, while rejecting the request for granting of C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 further time, the aspect of the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim which was already there on record to be taken as the stand of the petitioners, could have been considered which would have been in adherence to the principles of natural justice. The said aspect has completely escaped the attention of the Council vide order dated 02.02.2024. Again, while the petitioners had preferred recall application with regard to order dated 02.02.2024 forfeiting the right of the petitioners to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and whereas, even in the application a prayer had been sought for that the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim being on record may be treated as the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, yet, even the said application had not been considered. Thus, it would appear that the petitioners were denied an appropriate opportunity to present their stand before the Facilitation Council. 10.6. On the other hand, insofar as the Council being required to be kept within their bounds, to this Court, it would appear that when the fact of the present writ petition pending before this Court was brought to the notice of the Council, then the Council should have deferred the hearing so as to C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 afford appropriate opportunity to the petitioner more so to ensure that the petition which was pending before this Court would not be infructuated. To this Court, it would appear that when the fact of challenge to orders dated 02.02.2024 and 10.06.2024 by way of present petition was brought to the notice of the Tribunal and since setting aside of the said orders would have led an opportunity being granted to the petitioners to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, then ideally the Facilitation Council should have waited for some time to have the validity of the orders examined by this Court. 10.7. While it is not an intent of this Court to hold that whenever a subordinate Court or a Tribunal over which the High Court holds supervisory jurisdiction is informed about the pendency of a writ petition, which petition would have direct bearing on the case before the Court or Tribunal, then the Court or Tribunal should stay its hands rather the intent of this Court is to observe that in appropriate situations when orders of subordinate Courts, Tribunals or Authorities are under scrutiny by this Court, then unless there is an element of extraordinary urgency or an element of dilatory tactics C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 being adopted under the guise of pendency of the petition, the Courts or Tribunals or Authorities should normally wait till the High Court passes some interim or final order in the matter concerned. 10.8. Again, while learned Counsel for the petitioners has urged that the award is nothing but overreaching the due process of this Court, in view of the observations made hereinabove and considering that there are no malafides alleged, this Court restrains itself from observing any further in that regard. 11. Having observed as above, it would also be required to be mentioned here that the present is a case where equities are required to be balanced. The respondent no.4 having approached the Council somewhere in the year 2016 for the first time, had an award passed in his favour on 24.10.2019 which, as noted hereinabove, had been interfered by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 09.03.2021. It appears that thereafter, while the matter had been listed for the first time on 04.03.2022 and fifteen days’ time had been sought for by the claimant – respondent no.4 to file its Statement of Claim and while the same had been filed C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 on 18.11.2022, it was always open thereafter for the respondent herein to have filed its Statement of Defence and Counterclaim anytime thereafter. 11.1. Again, while the same is not specifically mentioned by the Council in order dated 02.02.2024, yet, it would appear that the petitioners have very fairly stated at paragraph no. hh of the petition as pointed out by learned Counsel for the respondent no.4 that on hearing dated 13.01.2023, the Advocate for the petitioners had made a statement that the petitioners would file a fresh Statement of Defence and Counterclaim within a period of two weeks. While the next date, as noted hereinabove, had come after a period of thirteen months, the petitioners could not be heard to contend that they were not provided enough opportunity more particularly as noted hereinabove, it was always open for the petitioners to after November, 2022 to have filed their Counterclaim and Statement of Defence. 11.2. Furthermore, it would appear, as noted hereinabove that while the petitioners may not be termed as an indolent litigant, yet, the fact of the petitioners having taken things a bit too lightly, cannot be but observed more particularly C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 looking to the fact that the petitioners, having got more than thirteen months, did not file their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and on 02.02.2024 had again requested for time. Again, after order dated 10.06.2024 having been received by them, had approached this Court after near about two months from the date of dispatch i.e. 14.10.2024. Further, while the matter had been filed on 12.12.2024, it was listed only a day earlier then the matter which was fixed before the Council on 17.12.2024 and whereas, the petitioners, to this Court, could have always requested the appropriate Court or have resorted to appropriate procedure to ensure that the petition could have been heard as expeditiously as possible. It would also appear that the Court, for no fault of the claimant – respondent no.4 herein, would be required to interfere with a arbitral award which has held in favour of the original claimant – respondent no.4 whereby the Council has inter alia directed the respondent to pay large sums to the petitioners which would in total come to around Rs.11 Crores. 11.3. Thus, to this Court, it would appear that while the orders dated 02.02.2024 and 10.06.2024 and award dated 17.12.2024 are required to be interfered with, but, at the C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 same time, appropriate cost also is required to be imposed upon the petitioners, to be paid to the respondent no.4 herein and whereas, this Court would also deem it appropriate to lay down an appropriate timeline for the Council to decide the arbitral proceedings once again. 12. Having regard to the above discussion, observations and conclusions, to this Court, the following directions would meet with the ends of justice:- (i) The order dated 02.02.2024, 10.06.2024 passed by the Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council are hereby quashed and set aside. Furthermore, the Arbitral Award dated 17.10.2024 is also hereby quashed and set aside. (ii) Costs calculated of Rs.11,00,000/- (Rupees Eleven Lakhs Only) is imposed upon the petitioners to be paid to the respondent no.4 herein within a period of six (06) weeks from the date the present order is uploaded on the portal of the Gujarat High Court. (iii) The State Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Gujarat is directed to take the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the petitioners dated 12.08.2019 i.e. filed C/SCA/16985/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025 prior to the Arbitration Award dated 24.10.2019 on record and treat it as the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the petitioners herein and whereas, the arbitration proceedings shall be completed positively by the Council within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of this order albeit after affording appropriate opportunity to both the parties. 13. With the above observations and directions, the present petition stands disposed of as allowed. Civil Applications which are not allowed, are treated as disposed of as having become infructuous. (NIKHIL S. KARIEL,J) Bhoomi Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge. Digitally signed by: BHOOMI YOGESHBHAI MISTRY(HC01557), PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 17/01/2025 18:22:11