ORDER : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. Heard Mr. Praveen Dhurandhar, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Hariom Rai, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondents. 2. Aggrieved by the order dated 04.11.2022 passed by the respondent authority, namely the Secretary, School Education Department, Chhattisgarh, whereby the departmental appeal filed by the petitioner challenging the termination order dated 31.07.2018 has been rejected and the said termination has been affirmed, the petitioner submits that the appellate authority has proceeded on wholly erroneous and extraneous considerations. 3. The appellate authority has held that the petitioner was in the habit of remaining on unauthorized leave and that on earlier occasions notices were issued to him and a punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect was imposed. It has further been observed that thereafter the petitioner again remained unauthorizedly absent and allegedly committed misconduct with co-employees and superior officers, including coming to office in an intoxicated condition and indulging in inappropriate behaviour. On the basis of the alleged acceptance of charges by the petitioner, the appellate authority concluded that the petitioner, being a Peon, was liable to be inflicted with a major penalty of removal from service under Rule 10 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short, ‘CCA Rules, 1966’). However, while deciding the appeal, the appellate authority failed to consider the legality and procedural infirmities of the departmental enquiry as well as the proportionality of the punishment imposed, and instead summarily rejected the appeal solely on the ground that it was filed beyond the prescribed period of 45 days. The appellate authority overlooked the fact that the appeal was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay and was preferred after the lapse of about two years due to bona fide reasons, yet no finding was recorded thereon. Thus, the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation without consideration of the case on merits, rendering the impugned order arbitrary and unsustainable in law. 4. By filing the instant petition, the petitioner has sought for following relief(s) :- “10.1 That, the Hon’ble Court be pleased to set-aside order of termination dated 31.07.2018 (Annexure P-5) and also the order dated 04.11.2022 (Annexure P-1). 10.2 That, the Hon’ble Court be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to reinstate the petitioner in the service with all consequential benefits. By filing the instant petition, the petitioner has sought for following relief(s) :- “10.1 That, the Hon’ble Court be pleased to set-aside order of termination dated 31.07.2018 (Annexure P-5) and also the order dated 04.11.2022 (Annexure P-1). 10.2 That, the Hon’ble Court be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to reinstate the petitioner in the service with all consequential benefits. 10.3 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief, as it may deems fit and appropriate.” 5. Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Peon in the year 1989 on a temporary basis and his services were subsequently regularized vide order dated 25.03.1996. Since then, he continuously served the Chhattisgarh Pathya Pustak Corporation with sincerity and honesty. A departmental enquiry under Rule 10 of the CCA Rules, 1966 was initiated against the petitioner on 30.01.2018 and a charge-sheet containing four charges relating mainly to alleged unauthorized absence was served upon him. The petitioner submitted detailed replies explaining his medical condition and family circumstances and expressed remorse, assuring that such lapses would not recur. 6. Thereafter, an enquiry was conducted in which all the charges were held proved; however, the enquiry report was never supplied to the petitioner and the proceedings were conducted in an arbitrary manner, in violation of the principles of natural justice. On the basis of the said enquiry, the respondent authority passed an order dated 31.07.2018 terminating the services of the petitioner. 7. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal under Rule 23 read with Rule 24 of the CCA Rules, 1966 along with an application for condonation of delay. As the appeal was not decided, the petitioner approached this Hon’ble Court by filing WPS No.5588/2020, wherein a direction was issued for disposal of the appeal within a stipulated time. Despite the said direction, no decision was taken, compelling the petitioner to file a contempt petition, whereafter the appellate authority rejected the appeal vide impugned order dated 04.11.2022 in a summary manner, without examining the merits of the case and without recording findings as required under Rule 27 of the CCA Rules, 1966. 8. The petitioner, therefore, challenges both the termination order dated 31.07.2018 as well as the appellate order dated 04.11.2022 as being illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the statutory rules and settled principles of law. 9. Mr. 8. The petitioner, therefore, challenges both the termination order dated 31.07.2018 as well as the appellate order dated 04.11.2022 as being illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the statutory rules and settled principles of law. 9. Mr. Praveen Dhurandhar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of termination dated 31.07.2018 (Annexure P-5) as well as the appellate order dated 04.11.2022 (Annexure P- 1) are illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in the eyes of law and, therefore, are liable to be set aside. It is submitted that the termination order passed by the respondent authority is vitiated in law and the departmental appeal decided by respondent No.1 is also illegal, as the same has not been decided in consonance with Rule 27 of the CCA Rules, 1966. While deciding the appeal, the appellate authority has summarily rejected the same without consideration of the case on merits and without recording any finding as mandated under the Rules. In a similar situation, in WPS No.1089/2009, vide order dated 24.06.2021, where the departmental appeal was not decided in accordance with Rule 27, the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication. 10. Mr. Dhurandhar further submits that the impugned termination order dated 31.07.2018 is illegal and the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate and shockingly harsh. The petitioner had remained absent due to bona fide medical reasons after due intimation to the department and the total alleged period of absence was only about 13 days. Despite this, the petitioner has been inflicted with the major penalty of termination, which is highly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Industrial Security Force & Others v. Abrar Ali, AIR 2017 SC 200 , wherein the order of dismissal was converted into compulsory retirement, and in Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India & Another, (2012) 3 SCC 178 , wherein it has been held that unless the absence is willful, the same cannot be treated as misconduct. 11. It is further submitted by Mr. Dhurandhar that the absence of the petitioner was not willful but occasioned due to medical exigencies. The petitioner had submitted leave applications supported by medical certificates, which were not properly considered by the authorities. The allegation of unauthorized absence for a short duration has been exaggerated to impose the extreme penalty of termination, which is impermissible in law. Dhurandhar that the absence of the petitioner was not willful but occasioned due to medical exigencies. The petitioner had submitted leave applications supported by medical certificates, which were not properly considered by the authorities. The allegation of unauthorized absence for a short duration has been exaggerated to impose the extreme penalty of termination, which is impermissible in law. He further submits that the departmental enquiry itself is vitiated, as no list of witnesses was supplied to the petitioner, no witnesses were examined in support of the charges and, most importantly, the enquiry report was never furnished to the petitioner before passing the order of termination. Thus, the entire enquiry stands vitiated being in violation of the principles of natural justice. 12. It is lastly contended by Mr. Dhurandhar that in both the termination proceedings as well as the appellate proceedings, the petitioner was not afforded a proper and effective opportunity of hearing. Despite the petitioner placing on record valid explanations and medical documents, the same were not appreciated in their proper perspective and the authorities acted with a predetermined mind to impose a major penalty upon the petitioner. As such, the instant petition be allowed and the impugned orders dated 31.07.2018 and 04.11.2022 are liable to be set aside. 13. Reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered by Division Bench of this Court in WPS No.1617/2024 decided on 23.08.2024 as well as the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda , 1963 SCC OnLine SC 50, Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India and another , (2012) 3 SCC 178 and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891 to buttress his submissions. 14. On the other hand, Mr. Hariom Rai, learned Panel Lawyer appearing on behalf of the State/respondents, vehemently opposed the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner has been rightly inflicted with the punishment of removal from service, keeping in view his past service record, habitual misconduct and repeated acts of indiscipline. It is submitted that the petitioner had a history of unauthorized absence and misconduct and, on earlier occasions also, disciplinary action had been taken against him, including imposition of punishment. It is submitted that the petitioner had a history of unauthorized absence and misconduct and, on earlier occasions also, disciplinary action had been taken against him, including imposition of punishment. Despite being granted leniency earlier, the petitioner continued to indulge in unauthorized absence and other acts of misconduct, thereby demonstrating incorrigible conduct and complete disregard for service discipline. The learned Panel Lawyer submits that the previous conduct of the petitioner is a relevant consideration while awarding punishment and the same has rightly been taken into account by the disciplinary authority. 15. Mr. Rai further submits that the conduct of the petitioner was doubtful and unbecoming of a government servant and squarely falls within the mischief of the applicable service conduct rules. The acts and omissions committed by the petitioner attract the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 (for short, ‘Rules of 1965’), and therefore, the disciplinary authority was fully justified in invoking Rule 4 of the Rules of 1965 and imposing the penalty of removal from service. It is further contended that the departmental enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with the prescribed procedure and after affording due opportunity to the petitioner to submit his explanation. The petitioner had admitted the charges during the course of enquiry and sought indulgence on sympathetic grounds, which itself establishes the misconduct. In such circumstances, the punishment imposed cannot be said to be arbitrary or disproportionate. 16. Mr. Rai lastly submits that the appellate authority has rightly rejected the departmental appeal, taking into consideration the delay in filing the appeal and the merits of the case. According to the State, no procedural illegality or violation of principles of natural justice has been committed and the orders passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities are just, proper and in accordance with law, warranting no interference by this Hon’ble Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. 17. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the pleadings, documents, and material available on record. 18. From a careful perusal of the order dated 02.02.2018, whereby the charges have been framed and dealt with, it transpires that four articles of charge were levelled against the petitioner, all primarily relating to alleged unauthorized absence and alleged misconduct connected therewith. 18. From a careful perusal of the order dated 02.02.2018, whereby the charges have been framed and dealt with, it transpires that four articles of charge were levelled against the petitioner, all primarily relating to alleged unauthorized absence and alleged misconduct connected therewith. So far as Charge No.1 is concerned, it has been alleged that during the calendar year 2017, between 01.01.2017 to 07.05.2017, the petitioner availed a total of 17 days of casual leave, whereas under Clause 03 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 2010 (for short, ‘Rules of 2010’), he was entitled to only 13 days of casual leave in a calendar year. It has further been alleged that casual leave cannot be combined with any other kind of leave in terms of Clause 10 of Chapter-II of the said Rules. In this regard, a warning letter dated 09.05.2017 was issued to the petitioner, intimating that the excess leave would be deducted from his salary. However, it is also borne out from the charge itself that the additional 5 days of leave were subsequently adjusted by the Corporation administration against earned leave on sympathetic consideration. Despite the said adjustment, the petitioner has been alleged to be repeatedly absent unauthorizedly, which, according to the respondents, amounts to negligence and indiscipline in violation of Rules (1), (2) and (3) of the Rules of 1965. 19. With regard to Charge No.2, it has been alleged that the petitioner applied for short leave for a period of 09 days from 28.08.2017 to 05.09.2017, which was duly sanctioned by the Corporation administration. It has further been alleged that the petitioner remained absent on 26.08.2017 and 27.08.2017 as well, which were subsequently adjusted against earned leave after approval. In this context, a final warning letter dated 26.09.2017 was issued to the petitioner, reiterating that casual leave cannot be combined with other kinds of leave and cautioning him to obtain prior approval in future. Despite the adjustment of leave and issuance of warning, the petitioner has been alleged to be habitually absent, thereby committing misconduct under Rules (1), (2) and (3) of the Rules of 1965. 20. Despite the adjustment of leave and issuance of warning, the petitioner has been alleged to be habitually absent, thereby committing misconduct under Rules (1), (2) and (3) of the Rules of 1965. 20. As regards Charge No.3, it has been alleged that the petitioner remained absent from duty from 07.11.2017 to 12.11.2017 without prior intimation and submitted a leave application only on 13.11.2017, stating that his daughter had met with an injury and that due to his own ill-health he could not submit the application earlier. It is alleged that the leave application did not mention the exact period of absence and was not supported by a medical unfitness certificate. On this basis, it has been alleged that the petitioner remained unauthorizedly absent from 07.11.2017 to 23.01.2018. A show-cause notice dated 17.01.2018 was issued to him, calling upon him to submit his reply within three days, failing which unilateral action was threatened. Reference has also been made to earlier departmental proceedings wherein punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect had been imposed upon the petitioner for similar allegations. The repetition of such conduct has been treated as gross negligence and indiscipline, allegedly violating Rules (1), (2) and (3) of the Rules of 1965 and lastly, with respect to Charge No.4, it has been alleged that the petitioner submitted medical unfitness and fitness certificates issued by different doctors for different periods, some of which were not in the prescribed Forms No.3 and 4. It has further been alleged that submission of certificates from different doctors for different ailments creates suspicion, particularly when in the leave application dated 13.11.2017 the petitioner had mentioned injury to his daughter and not to himself. On this basis, the medical certificates submitted by the petitioner have been termed as doubtful and false, and it has been alleged that the petitioner attempted to justify his absence by submitting incorrect medical documents, thereby committing misconduct under Rules (1), (2) and (3) of the Rules of 1965. 21. On this basis, the medical certificates submitted by the petitioner have been termed as doubtful and false, and it has been alleged that the petitioner attempted to justify his absence by submitting incorrect medical documents, thereby committing misconduct under Rules (1), (2) and (3) of the Rules of 1965. 21. It transpires from the termination order dated 31.07.2018 that in pursuance of order No.F 3-1/2014/1-3 of the Chhattisgarh General Administration Department, Raipur, dated 10.02.2015, treating absence from duty for more than one month without permission as an interruption in service for the purposes of Rule 27 of the Pension Rules, 1976, consolidated with the Fundamental Rules, had instituted a departmental enquiry against Shri Sujeet Kumar Sahu, Peon, Chhattisgarh Pathya Pustak Corporation, Raipur, for imposition of major penalty under Rule 10 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, vide Office Order No.171/Papuni./Estha/5-12/2018, Raipur, dated 30.01.2018. 22. The departmental enquiry was instituted on the basis of four charges: “1. That the delinquent employee availed 18 days of casual leave in excess of the eligible 13 days under Clause 03 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 2010. 2. That the delinquent employee remained absent on 26.08.2017 and 27.08.2017, prior to sanctioned short leave from 28.08.2017 to 05.09.2017, for which warning letter No. 2152 dated 26.09.2017 was issued. 3. That the delinquent employee was on leave without intimation from 07.11.2017 to 12.11.2017, and did not respond to the final show-cause notice issued via official letter No. 4326 dated 17.01.2018. 4. That the delinquent employee submitted medical leave certificates from different doctors for the period 08.11.2017 to 23.01.2018, which were found to be doubtful and inconsistent with his earlier statements regarding his daughter’s injury, thereby rendering the certificates false in the departmental enquiry.” 23. It is recorded that all the four charges were found proved by the departmental enquiry officer. Further, the enquiry report noted previous disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent employee, including withholding of two annual increments with cumulative effect, and highlighted repeated negligence, indiscipline, and inappropriate conduct, including appearing in office under the influence of liquor and behaving indecently with colleagues and superiors. It is further recorded that the delinquent employee had admitted all the charges in writing (letter dated 15.02.2018), thereby rendering himself liable for major punishment. Considering the repeated negligence and gross indiscipline, the competent authority held that the charges were extremely serious. It is further recorded that the delinquent employee had admitted all the charges in writing (letter dated 15.02.2018), thereby rendering himself liable for major punishment. Considering the repeated negligence and gross indiscipline, the competent authority held that the charges were extremely serious. Consequently, in the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Corporation (Meeting No. 53 dated 09.07.2018, Agenda No. 07), it was resolved to impose the punishment of removal from service under Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1966, with immediate effect from the afternoon of 31.07.2018. The order further clarified that such removal shall not disqualify the delinquent employee from future employment under the Government. 24. Aggrieved by such termination, the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority stating therein that the petitioner, being a Class-IV employee, was not fully aware of the legal remedies available to him and, therefore, could not file the appeal within the prescribed period. It was categorically pleaded in the memorandum of appeal that the petitioner was not afforded a proper and effective opportunity of hearing and that the departmental enquiry had been conducted in a wholly arbitrary manner, influenced by a predetermined and biased mind to punish him. His medical certificates were wrongly rejected and treated with suspicion, and relevant documents were never supplied to him during the enquiry. Along with the appeal memorandum, the petitioner also filed an application for condonation of delay, relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balkrishna v. Sidheshwar Sikshan Sanstha , (2019) 9 SCC 446 , contending that his inability to file the appeal within time was on account of his status as a Class-IV employee and lack of legal awareness. 25. The Appellate Authority, vide its order dated 04.11.2022, dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay and laches, holding that the departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of termination dated 31.07.2018 was filed after a lapse of approximately two years, well beyond the prescribed period of 45 days under Rule 25 of the CCA Rules, 1966. The Appellate Authority noted that a departmental inquiry had been instituted against the appellant earlier, resulting in the withholding of two annual increments with cumulative effect. In the present enquiry, all four charges levelled against the appellant were found to be proved, and the appellant had admitted the allegations in his letter dated 15.02.2018. The Appellate Authority noted that a departmental inquiry had been instituted against the appellant earlier, resulting in the withholding of two annual increments with cumulative effect. In the present enquiry, all four charges levelled against the appellant were found to be proved, and the appellant had admitted the allegations in his letter dated 15.02.2018. During the appeal proceedings, the appellant contended that the punishment imposed was excessive and requested leniency; however, no additional facts or documents were presented by him during the personal hearing conducted on 18.08.2022 before the Secretary, School Education Department, Chhattisgarh. Having regard to the above, and considering the appeal to be wholly time-barred, the Appellate Authority dismissed the representation filed by the petitioner holding that it was barred by limitation and could not be entertained. 26. Upon careful consideration of the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, the pleadings on record, and the material documents, it is evident that the termination order dated 31.07.2018 and the appellate order dated 04.11.2022 suffer from serious procedural and legal infirmities. The departmental enquiry, which formed the basis of the termination, was conducted in a manner that is wholly arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was neither supplied with the enquiry report nor informed of the witnesses to be examined, and the charges were determined in a summary manner without affording him an effective opportunity to defend himself. The enquiry officer arbitrarily rejected the petitioner’s medical certificates, demonstrating clear bias, and treated minor absences as habitual misconduct without proper appreciation of the circumstances. These factors render the enquiry and subsequent orders arbitrary, unsustainable, and vitiated by procedural impropriety. 27. Further, the appellate authority has summarily rejected the departmental appeal on the ground of delay and laches, without considering the bona fide reasons advanced for the delay, including the petitioner’s status as a Class-IV employee and his lack of awareness of legal remedies. The appeal was filed along with an application for condonation of delay and, in terms of settled law, the Appellate Authority was under an obligation to consider the appeal on merits and record a reasoned finding before rejecting the same on technical grounds. The failure to do so constitutes a clear violation of Rule 27 of the CCA Rules, 1966 and established principles of natural justice. 28. The failure to do so constitutes a clear violation of Rule 27 of the CCA Rules, 1966 and established principles of natural justice. 28. In terms of proportionality, it is also apparent that the punishment of termination is grossly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. The petitioner’s absence, as per the material on record, was largely on account of medical exigencies and not willful neglect of duty. The rejection of valid medical certificates and the imposition of the major penalty of removal demonstrates extreme harshness and an arbitrary exercise of discretion. The total period of absence, when considered in the larger context of the petitioner’s long service spanning over three decades, does not justify the extreme penalty of termination, particularly when leniency had been extended earlier and the petitioner had expressed remorse and assured non-recurrence. Reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Industrial Security Force (supra) and Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra), supports the proposition that absence not attended with willful misconduct cannot attract a major penalty of termination. 29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Manche Gowda (supra), has held as follows :- “7. Under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court, a government servant must have a reasonable opportunity not only to prove that he is not guilty of the charges levelled against him, but also to establish that the punishment proposed to be imposed is either not called for or excessive. The said opportunity is to be a reasonable opportunity and, therefore, it is necessary that the government servant must be told of the grounds on which it is proposed to take such action see the decision of this Court in the State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandits. If the grounds are not given in the notice, It would be well nigh Impossible for him to predicate what is operating on the mind of the authority concerned in proposing a particular punishment: he would not be in a position to explain why he does not deserve any punishment at all or that the punishment proposed is excessive. If the proposed punishment was mainly based upon the previous record of a government servant and that was not disclosed in the notice, it would mean that the main reason for the proposed punishment was withheld from the knowledge of the government servant. If the proposed punishment was mainly based upon the previous record of a government servant and that was not disclosed in the notice, it would mean that the main reason for the proposed punishment was withheld from the knowledge of the government servant. It would be no answer to suggest that every government servant must have had knowledge of the fact that his past record would necessarily be taken into consideration by the Government in inflicting punishment on him; nor would it be an adequate answer to say that he knew as a matter of fact that the eariler punishments were imposed on him or that he knew of his past record. This contention misses the real point, namely, that what the government servant is entitled to is not the knowledge of certain facts but the fact that those facts will be taken into consideration by the Government in inflicting punishment on him. It is not possible for him to know what period of his past record or what acts or omissions of his in a particular period would be considered. If that fact was brought to hie notice, he might explain that he had no knowledge of the remark of his superior officers, that he had adequate explanation to offer for the alleged remarks or that his conduct subsequent to the remarks had been exempliry or at any rate approved by the superior officers. Even if the authority concerned took into consideration only the facts for which he was punished, It would be open to him to put forward before the said authority many mitigating circumstances or some other explanation why those punishments were given to him or that subsequent to the punishments he had served to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned till the time of the present enquiry. He may have many other explanations. The point is not whether his explanation would be acceptable, but whether he has been given an opportunity to give his explanation. We cannot accept the doctrine of "presumptive knowledge or that of "purposeless enquiry", as their acceptance will be subversive of the principle of "reasonable opportunity". He may have many other explanations. The point is not whether his explanation would be acceptable, but whether he has been given an opportunity to give his explanation. We cannot accept the doctrine of "presumptive knowledge or that of "purposeless enquiry", as their acceptance will be subversive of the principle of "reasonable opportunity". We, therefore, hold that it is Incumbent upon the authority to give the government servant at the second stage reasonable opportunity to show-cause against the proposed punishment and if the proposed punishment is also based on his previous punishments or his previous bad record, this should be included in the second notice so that he may be able to give an explanation. 8. Before we close, it would be necessary to make one point clear. It is suggested that the past record of a government servant, if it is Intended to be relied upon for Imposing a punishment, should be made specific charge in the first stage of the enquiry itself and, if it is not so done, It cannot be relied upon after the enquiry is closed and the report is submitted to the authority entitled to impose the punishment. An enquiry against a government servant is one continuous process. though for convenience it is done in two stages. The report submitted by the Enquiry Officer Is only recommendatory in nature and the final authority which scrutinizes it and imposes punishment is the authority empowered to Impose the same. Whether a particular person has a reasonable opportunity or not depends, to some extent, upon the nature of the subject- matter of the enquiry. But it is not necessary in this case to decide whether such previous record can be made the subject matter of charge at the first stage of the enquiry. But, nothing In law prevents the punishing authority from taking that fact into consideration during the second stage of the enquiry, for essentially it relates more to the domain of punishment rather than to that of gullt. But what is essential is that the government servant shall be given a reasonable opportunity to know that fact and meet the same.” 30. In Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “15. But what is essential is that the government servant shall be given a reasonable opportunity to know that fact and meet the same.” 30. In Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “15. Rules 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, relates to all time maintaining integrity, devotion to duty and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant and reads as follows: "3-General.- (1) Every Government servant shall at all times- (i) maintain absolute integrity; (ii) maintain devotion to duty; and (iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant." 16. In the case of the appellant referring to unauthorised absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to maintain devotion to duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a Government servant. The question whether “unauthorised absence from duty” amounts to failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a Government servant cannot be decided without deciding the question whether absence is willful or because of compelling circumstances. 17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence can not be held to be willful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean willful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant. 18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is willful, in absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct. 19. In the present case the inquiry officer on appreciation of evidence though held that the appellant was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold that the absence was willful; the disciplinary authority as also the Appellate Authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant guilty. 20. 19. In the present case the inquiry officer on appreciation of evidence though held that the appellant was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold that the absence was willful; the disciplinary authority as also the Appellate Authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant guilty. 20. The question relating to jurisdiction of the Court in judicial review in a Departmental proceeding fell for consideration before this Court in M.B. Bijlani v. Union of India reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88 wherein this Court held: (SCC p. 95, para 25) "25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi- criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi- judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with." x x x x 24. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of dismissal passed by disciplinary authority, affirmed by the Appellate Authority, Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court are set aside. The appellant stands reinstated. 25. Taking into consideration the fact that the Charged Officer has suffered a lot since the proceeding was drawn in 1996 for absence from duty for a certain period, we are not remitting the proceeding to the disciplinary authority for any further action. Further, keeping in view the fact that the appellant has not worked for a long time we direct that the appellant be paid 50% of the back wages but there shall be no order as to costs.” 31. Further, keeping in view the fact that the appellant has not worked for a long time we direct that the appellant be paid 50% of the back wages but there shall be no order as to costs.” 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi and others , (2004) 4 SCC 560 while dealing with the similar issued, has held as follows:- “13. In B.C.Chaturvedi vs. Union of India [ AIR 1996 SC 484 , (three Judges Bench) ] the question posed for consideration was as to whether the High Court/Tribunal can direct the authorities to reconsider punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof or reconsider themselves to shorten the litigation. In this case, at para 18, this Court has observed as under:- "18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact- finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 14. Thus, the present one is a case wherein we are satisfied that the punishment of removal from service imposed on the appellant is not only highly excessive and disproportionate but is also one which was not permissible to be imposed as per the Service Rules. Ordinarily we would have set aside the punishment and sent the matter back to the disciplinary authority for passing the order of punishment afresh in accordance with law and consistently with the principles laid down in the judgment. However, that would further lengthen the life of litigation. Ordinarily we would have set aside the punishment and sent the matter back to the disciplinary authority for passing the order of punishment afresh in accordance with law and consistently with the principles laid down in the judgment. However, that would further lengthen the life of litigation. In view of the time already lost, we deem it proper to set aside the punishment of removal from service and instead direct the appellant to be reinstated in service subject to the condition that the period during which the appellant remained absent from duty and the period calculated upto the date on which the appellant reports back to duty pursuant to this judgment shall not be counted as a period spend on duty. The appellant shall not be entitled to any service benefits for this period. Looking at the nature of partial relief allowed hereby to the appellant, it is now not necessary to pass any order of punishment in the departmental proceedings in lieu of the punishment of removal from service which has been set aside. The appellant must report on duty within a period of six weeks from today to take benefit of this judgment.” 32. Further, in Ram Prakash Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows :- “10. We are at loss to comprehend as to how, after the first round of litigation before the Tribunal leading to quashing of the order of dismissal dated 27th July, 2010, the same mistake could be repeated by the Enquiry officer by not calling for witnesses to record their oral statements as well as to prove the documents generated in course of the preliminary enquiry. The procedure followed is plainly indefensible and, therefore, we hold that the respondent has been punished by the disciplinary authority without due process being followed in taking disciplinary action against him. xxx 20. Multiple decisions have been rendered by different Benches of this Court where, considering B Karunakar (supra), views have been expressed placing the burden of proof on the delinquent employee to demonstrate the 'prejudice' that he has suffered owing to non- furnishing of the report of enquiry as a pre- requisite to succeed in his challenge to the order of punishment on the ground of violation of natural justice, with which we find ourselves in respectful disagreement. We may be mistaken; but our reading suggests that the articulation of law in B. Karunakar (supra) has been subject to varying interpretations, and in some cases the key ruling has been overlooked so much so that in the process its core principle stands overshadowed. Though judicial discipline, propriety and decorum demand that we follow the precedents bearing in mind the rule of stare decisis, or formulate the issue(s) on which we disagree and refer the same for consideration by a larger Bench, we propose not to walk that way since, on other fronts, the violations/breaches in this case are so obtrusive, as already found, that the respondent is entitled to grant of relief irrespective of the legal position on the point, and what we express hereafter on the effect and impact of non-furnishing of the report of enquiry. xxx 40. In the decisions of this Court, referred to at the beginning of the discussion, it is revealed that some of the Benches of this Court have not invalidated the employers' acts of withholding the reports of enquiry on the ground that the delinquent employees have not been able to demonstrate how they suffered 'prejudice' by reason of the reports not being furnished, notwithstanding that such decisions of the employers clearly violated the precedential significance of the Constitution Bench decision in B. Karunakar (supra) while answering question (i). xxx 71. This, in this case, would mean reverting to the stage of production of witnesses on behalf of the department. When not a single witness could be produced for examination in 2010 and 2014, we do not think that witnesses would now be available to support the charges. Even otherwise, these proceedings have certain incidents of 2004-05 as the origin. Having regard to the lapse of time since then coupled with the retirement of the respondent from service in 2010 and, more particularly, when the appellant despite an earlier opportunity granted by the Tribunal has failed to avail the same by continuing the enquiry in accordance with law, it would be highly unfair and unjust to subject the respondent to face the enquiry once again. Gravity of the offence alleged to have been committed is certainly a vital consideration; however, repeated opportunities cannot be claimed without there being overwhelming public interest warranting such opportunity. Gravity of the offence alleged to have been committed is certainly a vital consideration; however, repeated opportunities cannot be claimed without there being overwhelming public interest warranting such opportunity. No doubt, the respondent was charged with involvement in a financial scam but a line has to be drawn. Or else, it could be an unending affair till such time based on a legal and valid report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority passes an appropriate order. On facts, we are satisfied that second opportunity was not required to be given. Also, we have noticed from the materials on record that two of the respondent’s colleagues (one of them a senior officer) who were also proceeded against have been practically let off with no punishment or punishment of stoppage of increments. Thus, we are satisfied that no useful purpose will be served by reviving the disciplinary proceedings and in remitting the case to the appellant. On the contrary, the issue must be given a quietus because the Tribunal or the High Court did not commit any illegality. We hold that the Tribunal and the High Court were correct and justified in not granting one more opportunity to the appellant to resume proceedings from the stage invalidity in the proceedings was detected. The impugned order of the High Court, not suffering from any legal infirmity, does not warrant any interference and deserves to be upheld.” 33. Very recently, in State of Punjab and others v. Ex. C. Satpal Singh , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1848 , while considering the similar issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under :- “19. This Court, in K. Manche Gowda’s case (supra), has held that if the past conduct of an employee is the basis for imposing punishment, the department is obliged to disclose that his past record will also be taken into consideration while inflicting punishment. Now, the question arises for consideration is whether the disciplinary authority had taken into consideration the past conduct of the respondent while passing the dismissal order. From careful reading of the dismissal order reproduced hereinabove, it appears that the disciplinary authority had clearly observed that it had perused the report of enquiry and conclusion thoroughly, whereby the respondent was held guilty for the unauthorized absence and agreed with the conclusion of the enquiry officer. From careful reading of the dismissal order reproduced hereinabove, it appears that the disciplinary authority had clearly observed that it had perused the report of enquiry and conclusion thoroughly, whereby the respondent was held guilty for the unauthorized absence and agreed with the conclusion of the enquiry officer. The disciplinary authority had further mentioned regarding the issuance of show cause notice to the respondent and had observed that despite the receipt of the show cause notice, the respondent did not submit his reply, which shows that the respondent accepted the allegation against him. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority had noted that 17 years of service of the respondent were forfeited as a result of his absence for 224 days and for which he was punished accordingly. 20. To properly understand the controversy in the light of question framed, it is necessary to examine the relevant judicial precedents, as discussed below. This Court in the case of India Marine Services Private Ltd. (supra), dealt with the case of punishment awarded to an employee in a similar situation, as follows: - “7. It is true that the last sentence suggests that the past record of Bose has also been taken into consideration. But it does not follow from this that that was the effective reason for dismissing him. The Managing Director having arrived at the conclusion that Bose's services must be terminated in the interest of discipline, he added one sentence to give additional weight to the decision already arrived at. Upon this view it would follow that the Tribunal was not competent to go behind the finding of the Managing Director and consider for itself the evidence adduced before him. The order of the Tribunal quashing the dismissal of Bose and directing his re-instatement is, therefore, set aside as being contrary to law.” 21. In the case of Director General, RPF & Ors. vs. Ch. Sai Babu, this Court in appeal while setting aside the order of Division Bench of High Court, which had affirmed the order of Single Bench setting aside the order of removal of respondent, observed in para 6 as under: - “6. ... In the case of Director General, RPF & Ors. vs. Ch. Sai Babu, this Court in appeal while setting aside the order of Division Bench of High Court, which had affirmed the order of Single Bench setting aside the order of removal of respondent, observed in para 6 as under: - “6. ... Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and discipline required to be maintained, and the department/establishment in which the delinquent person concerned works.” 22. Similarly, in Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate, wherein the respondent employee was dismissed from service on account of misconduct having been found fast asleep on an iron plate during working hours and had also been earlier imposed with minor punishment on three occasions, this Court observed as under: - “32. ... In the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the past conduct of the respondent as also his conduct during the domestic enquiry proceedings, we cannot say that the quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent was wholly disproportionate to his act of misconduct or otherwise arbitrary.” 23. Likewise, in the case of Govt. of A.P. and Ors. vs. Mohd. Taher Ali, where the respondent who was employed as police constable was imposed with a punishment of compulsory retirement on the account of unauthorized absenteeism from election duty, this Court had held that: - “5. ....In our opinion there can be no hard-and- fast rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has not been mentioned in the charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration by the punishing authority. Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often [necessary] only to reinforce the opinion of the said authority.” 24. ....In our opinion there can be no hard-and- fast rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has not been mentioned in the charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration by the punishing authority. Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often [necessary] only to reinforce the opinion of the said authority.” 24. This Court in Bishamber Das Dogra’s case (supra), has examined a similar issue and, after taking into consideration the judgment of this Court rendered in K. Manche Gowda’s case (supra) held as under: - “24.In State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda , this Court held that the disciplinary authority should inform the delinquent employee that it is likely to take into consideration the past conduct of the employee while imposing the punishment unless the proved charge against the delinquent is so grave that it may independently warrant the proposed punishment. Though his previous record may not be the subject-matter of the charge at the first instance. xx xx xx xx 30.In view of the above, it is evident that it is desirable that the delinquent employee may be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past conduct would be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment. But in case of misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, even in the absence of statutory rules, the authority may take into consideration the indisputable past conduct/service record of the employee for adding the weight to the decision of imposing the punishment if the facts of the case so require. [Emphasis Supplied] 31.It is settled legal proposition that habitual absenteeism means gross violation of discipline [vide Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR p. 530, para 5) and L&T Komatsu Ltd. v. N. Udayakumar (SCC p. 226, para 6).] 32.The instant case is required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. 33.Admittedly, the respondent employee has not completed the service of six years and had been imposed punishment three times for remaining absent from duty. On the fourth occasion when he remained absent for ten days without leave, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. The show-cause notice could not be served upon him for the reason that he again deserted the line and returned back after fifty days. Therefore the disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded expeditiously. On the fourth occasion when he remained absent for ten days without leave, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. The show-cause notice could not be served upon him for the reason that he again deserted the line and returned back after fifty days. Therefore the disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded expeditiously. The respondent submitted the reply to the show- cause notice and the material on record reveal that during the pendency of the enquiry he further deserted the line for ten days. There is nothing on record to show any explanation for such repeated misconduct or absenteeism. The court/tribunal must keep in mind that such indiscipline is intolerable so far as the disciplined force is concerned. 34. The respondent was a guard in CISF. No attempt had ever been made at any stage by the respondent employee to explain as to what prejudice has been caused to him by non- furnishing of the enquiry report. Nor had he ever submitted that such a course has resulted in failure of justice. More so, the respondent employee had never denied at any stage that he had not been punished three times before initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and deserted the line twice even after issuance of the show-cause notice in the instant case. No explanation could be furnished by the respondent employee as under what circumstances he has not even considered it proper to submit the application for leave. Rather, the respondent thought that he had a right to desert the line at his sweet will. It was a case of gross violation of discipline. Appeal filed by the respondent employee was decided by the statutory appellate authority giving cogent reasons. 35. The facts of the present case did not present special features warranting any interference by the Court in limited exercise of its powers of judicial review. In such a fact situation, we are of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority on such technicalities…” 25. 35. The facts of the present case did not present special features warranting any interference by the Court in limited exercise of its powers of judicial review. In such a fact situation, we are of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority on such technicalities…” 25. As observed, in the present case, the absence of the respondent from the duty on various occasions in a short tenure of service of around 7 years, is a gross indiscipline on the part of the respondent and therefore, we do not find any illegality in the order passed by the disciplinary authority whereby the services of the respondent have been dismissed. 26. The facts of Mohd. Yunus Khan’s case (supra), upon which the learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance, is based on different facts and therefore, is of no help to the respondent. In that case, the Administrative Tribunal, examining the punishment order, had concluded that the absence of the delinquent for a short period was bona fide and legally permissible, but on account of his subsequent misconduct and disobedience, held that the dismissal orderwas justified. In that situation, this Court had held that the Tribunal, before taking into consideration the past conduct of the delinquent, must give notice to the delinquent. In such circumstances, the facts of the case of Mohd. Yunus Khan’s case (supra) are distinguishable from the case of the respondent. xxx 33. In the facts of the present case, it is clear that the respondent was dealt by the department earlier on three occasions having remained absent from duty and the penalties were inflicted for the same. It is the fourth time when he remained absent to which, a chargesheet was issued and his guilt was found proved. He himself had not cross- examined the departmental witnesses and also had not produced any witness in his defense. Considering all these aspects and having found proved his misconduct, notice to show cause from dismissal was issued to the respondent. The disciplinary authority, while imposing the penalty, had merely referred the past conduct and also given weight to the gravest act of misconduct. The order of dismissal is not based on the charge of “cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service”. The disciplinary authority, while imposing the penalty, had merely referred the past conduct and also given weight to the gravest act of misconduct. The order of dismissal is not based on the charge of “cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service”. Therefore, mere reference of the past conduct would not amount to constitute dismissal of the respondent based on the second limb of Rule 16.2(1). In our view, the High Court was not justified to apply the principle of K. Manche Gowda (supra) while setting aside the judgment passed by the two Courts. As such, it is concluded that the dismissal of the respondent was based on gravest act of misconduct, for which he was dealt with by the disciplinary authority following the procedure as prescribed and in due observance of principles of natural justice, hence, we do not find any fault in the same. Accordingly, the present appeal stands allowed setting aside the judgment of the High Court. In consequence, suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff stands dismissed. In the facts, parties to bear their own costs.” 34. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid legal principles, it is evident that the case of the petitioner does not fall in the category of grave or incorrigible misconduct warranting the extreme penalty of removal from service. The petitioner is a Class-IV employee who had put in more than three decades of service, and the allegations against him primarily relate to short periods of absence, which were explained on medical and family grounds and were supported by leave applications and medical certificates. There is no finding on record to demonstrate that the petitioner’s absence was willful, deliberate, or actuated by an intention to abandon service. The disciplinary authority has relied upon the petitioner’s past conduct without specifically putting him to notice that the same would be taken into consideration for imposing a major penalty, nor was any opportunity afforded to him to explain or rebut such reliance. Further, the departmental enquiry itself suffers from serious procedural infirmities, including non-supply of the enquiry report, absence of examination of witnesses, and arbitrary rejection of medical documents, thereby causing manifest prejudice to the petitioner. Further, the departmental enquiry itself suffers from serious procedural infirmities, including non-supply of the enquiry report, absence of examination of witnesses, and arbitrary rejection of medical documents, thereby causing manifest prejudice to the petitioner. The appellate authority also failed to exercise its statutory duty under Rule 27 of the CCA Rules, 1966 by dismissing the appeal solely on the ground of limitation, without considering the application for condonation of delay and without examining the merits of the case. In these circumstances, the reliance placed by the respondents on decisions upholding dismissal on the ground of habitual absenteeism or gross indiscipline is clearly misplaced and distinguishable on facts, and the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is grossly disproportionate and shocks the conscience of this Court. 35. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned termination order dated 31.07.2018 and the appellate order dated 04.11.2022 cannot be sustained in law. The departmental enquiry, which forms the foundation of the punishment imposed upon the petitioner, is vitiated by serious procedural irregularities and violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was not supplied with the enquiry report, no witnesses were examined to substantiate the charges, and the medical documents produced by the petitioner were rejected arbitrarily without proper verification or objective consideration. The manner in which the enquiry was conducted reflects a predetermined approach, thereby depriving the petitioner of a fair and effective opportunity to defend himself. 36. This Court further finds that the Appellate Authority failed to discharge its statutory obligation under Rule 27 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. The departmental appeal was dismissed in a summary manner solely on the ground of limitation, without considering the application for condonation of delay and without examining the appeal on merits. Such an approach defeats the very object of providing a statutory appellate remedy and renders the appellate order arbitrary and unsustainable. The failure to record independent findings on the legality of the enquiry, the sufficiency of evidence, and the proportionality of punishment vitiates the appellate decision. 37. Such an approach defeats the very object of providing a statutory appellate remedy and renders the appellate order arbitrary and unsustainable. The failure to record independent findings on the legality of the enquiry, the sufficiency of evidence, and the proportionality of punishment vitiates the appellate decision. 37. On the aspect of punishment, this Court is of the view that the penalty of removal from service imposed upon the petitioner is grossly disproportionate and shockingly harsh, particularly when examined in the backdrop of the petitioner’s long service spanning over three decades, the nature of duties performed by him as a Class-IV employee, and the fact that the alleged misconduct primarily relates to short periods of absence explained on medical and family grounds. The material on record does not establish that the petitioner’s absence was willful or deliberate so as to warrant the imposition of a major penalty. The extreme punishment imposed, therefore, reflects an arbitrary and excessive exercise of disciplinary discretion. 38. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is satisfied that the impugned orders suffer from patent illegality, procedural impropriety, and perversity in decision-making, and are liable to be interfered with in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 39. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed . The impugned orders dated 31.07.2018 (Annexure P-5) and 04.11.2022 (Annexure P-1) are hereby quashed. The respondent authorities are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits, including continuity of service, seniority, pay, allowances, and other service-related entitlements, within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 40. It is, however, clarified that the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate or proceed with disciplinary action against the petitioner, if so advised, strictly in accordance with law and the applicable service rules, after affording him due opportunity of hearing and by adhering to the principles of natural justice, and without being influenced by the findings recorded in the earlier proceedings which have been quashed by this order. There shall be no order as to costs.