ORDER : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The petitioner has prayed for following reliefs by way of this writ petition:- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue appropriate writ by quashing the impugned order dated 15.02.2023 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Board of Revenue. 10.2 That the respondent's authority may kindly be directed to produce all the records which relates to passing of the impugned order for kind perusal of this Hon'ble court. 10.3 Any other relief, which may be suitable in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be granted.” 2. The case, as presented, is that the earlier Kotwar of village Udka, one Mahendra Kurre, resigned from his post after several complaints were made against him, and it also came to light that he had illegally sold portions of the Kotwari land. Following his resignation, one Raju Diwaker was appointed as a temporary Kotwar under Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Respondent No. 4, Smt. Suniti Bai @ Sunti Bai, wife of the former Kotwar, challenged this temporary appointment through an appeal and subsequent revisions, which culminated in an order dated 30.10.2015 passed by the learned Board of Revenue directing that a regular Kotwar be appointed strictly in accordance with the rules. Pursuant to this direction, an advertisement was issued inviting applications from eligible candidates, and thirteen candidates, including the petitioner, submitted their applications. The Tahsildar sought reports from the concerned Police Station and called for the Gram Panchayat’s proposal regarding the conduct and suitability of all applicants. The Police Station, as well as the Secretary and Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, submitted their reports and forwarded a recommendation in favour of the petitioner. After considering these materials and complying with the procedure prescribed under the rules framed under Section 230 of the Code, the Tahsildar appointed the petitioner as Kotwar of village Udka by order dated 30.01.2016. Respondent No. 4, who was also an applicant and the wife of the ex-Kotwar, challenged this appointment before the SDO (Revenue) on the ground that she was entitled to preference under Rule 4(2) of the Kotwar Appointment Rules. The SDO, after examining the entire record, dismissed her appeal on 27.06.2016, holding that the petitioner was more eligible and meritorious. Her second appeal before the Commissioner, Bilaspur Division was also dismissed on 24.07.2018, affirming the findings of the Tahsildar and SDO. The SDO, after examining the entire record, dismissed her appeal on 27.06.2016, holding that the petitioner was more eligible and meritorious. Her second appeal before the Commissioner, Bilaspur Division was also dismissed on 24.07.2018, affirming the findings of the Tahsildar and SDO. Thereafter, Respondent No. 4 preferred a revision before the Board of Revenue, which allowed the revision by setting aside all previous orders and directed the Tahsildar to reconsider all applications afresh on the basis of a fresh proposal from the Gram Panchayat. This direction was issued solely on the erroneous assumption that two different proposals had been passed by the Gram Panchayat on the same day, despite there being only a single valid proposal passed in an adjourned meeting and forwarded by the Secretary and Up-Sarpanch. The Board of Revenue also failed to consider the mandatory legal bar that prevents the appointment of relatives of an ex-Kotwar who has resigned due to misconduct or negligence. Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 15.02.2023, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 15.02.2023 passed by the learned Board of Revenue is wholly unsustainable in law, being contrary to the statutory provisions contained under Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (CGLRC) and the Rules framed thereunder. It is submitted that the Rules explicitly lay down the qualifications, procedure and parameters for the appointment of a Kotwar, and the learned Board of Revenue has failed to adhere to these mandatory requirements. The order under challenge proceeds on assumptions that are directly inconsistent with the statutory framework, thereby rendering the same illegal and liable to be quashed. Learned counsel further contends that the learned Board of Revenue has transgressed the limits of its revisional jurisdiction. Under the scheme of the CGLRC, a revisional authority is confined to examining jurisdictional errors, legal infirmities or manifest perversity in the orders under challenge. However, in the present case, the learned Board has virtually re-appreciated the entire factual matrix, reassessed the evidence and substituted its own conclusions in place of the well-reasoned concurrent findings recorded by the Tahsildar, SDO (Revenue) and the Commissioner. Such an exercise is impermissible in revision, and the impugned order is vitiated on this ground alone. However, in the present case, the learned Board has virtually re-appreciated the entire factual matrix, reassessed the evidence and substituted its own conclusions in place of the well-reasoned concurrent findings recorded by the Tahsildar, SDO (Revenue) and the Commissioner. Such an exercise is impermissible in revision, and the impugned order is vitiated on this ground alone. It is next submitted that the learned Board of Revenue has committed a grave factual error by erroneously concluding that two separate proposals of the Gram Panchayat were passed on 09.01.2016. The record clearly evidences that only one proposal, Proposal No. 2, was passed in an adjourned meeting on the said date in favour of the petitioner. Before arriving at the contrary finding, the Board neither called for any report from the Gram Panchayat nor summoned the original records/register. The conclusion drawn regarding “two proposals” is therefore perverse, unsupported by material, and contrary to the record, rendering the impugned order legally untenable. Learned counsel submits that the Board has further misread and misconstrued the order of the Tahsildar dated 30.01.2016. The Tahsildar’s order was passed strictly in compliance with Section 230 of the CGLRC and pursuant to the reports submitted by the Police Station, Mungeli and the proposal of the Gram Panchayat dated 09.01.2016. The findings of the Tahsildar were affirmed first by the SDO (Revenue) on 27.06.2016 and thereafter by the Commissioner, Bilaspur Division on 24.07.2018, both authorities having carefully evaluated the relevant documents, antecedents of candidates and the statutory provisions. The Board of Revenue, however, has erroneously interfered with these concurrent findings by re-evaluating evidence, which is outside the permissible scope of revision. It is also urged that the Board failed to consider the statutory mandate embedded in Rule 4(2) of the Rules framed under Section 230, along with the Note appended thereto. The Note specifically prohibits the appointment of any family member of an ex-Kotwar who has been removed or has resigned due to misconduct, bad character or irregularities. In the present case, the vacancy arose due to the misconduct and illegal acts of the ex-Kotwar, Mahendra Kurre, including selling portions of Kotwari land. Hence, Respondent No. 4, being his wife, was expressly disqualified from claiming preferential right. The Board’s failure to consider this binding legal bar renders the impugned order contrary to the Rules and therefore unsustainable. In the present case, the vacancy arose due to the misconduct and illegal acts of the ex-Kotwar, Mahendra Kurre, including selling portions of Kotwari land. Hence, Respondent No. 4, being his wife, was expressly disqualified from claiming preferential right. The Board’s failure to consider this binding legal bar renders the impugned order contrary to the Rules and therefore unsustainable. Learned counsel submits that the respondent No. 4 had already exhausted her remedies by filing an appeal before the SDO and a second appeal before the Commissioner, both of which were dismissed by detailed and reasoned orders affirming the selection of the petitioner. However, in the revision, respondent No. 4 raised entirely new grounds, particularly the allegation of “two proposals”, which were never raised before any authority earlier. The Board erroneously entertained such new grounds and reversed findings that had attained finality, thereby acting beyond its jurisdiction. It is further submitted that the impugned order sets aside the petitioner’s appointment after nearly six years of continuous, satisfactory service as Kotwar of village Udka, during which no complaint has ever been made regarding his conduct or performance. Such interference after an inordinate delay, without any compelling reason or legal foundation, is arbitrary and unjust, causing severe prejudice to the petitioner. Learned counsel also clarifies that the new allegation raised by respondent No. 4 regarding the petitioner’s residence is frivolous and baseless. Such an issue was never raised before the Tahsildar, SDO, Commissioner, or even in the revision. The unverified, unauthenticated voter list filed by respondent No. 4 cannot be relied upon, particularly when the petitioner has already produced multiple authentic documents, Aadhaar card, ration card, voter list, and land records, clearly showing that he is a resident of village Udka and possesses ancestral property there. This allegation is an afterthought and deserves to be rejected outright. It is submitted that the petitioner fulfills all eligibility criteria prescribed under the advertisement dated 16.11.2015 and is academically far more qualified than respondent No. 4, who has only studied up to Class V, whereas the petitioner is a Postgraduate. Even otherwise, preferential rights under Rule 4(1) apply only when qualifications are equal, which is not the case here. It is submitted that the petitioner fulfills all eligibility criteria prescribed under the advertisement dated 16.11.2015 and is academically far more qualified than respondent No. 4, who has only studied up to Class V, whereas the petitioner is a Postgraduate. Even otherwise, preferential rights under Rule 4(1) apply only when qualifications are equal, which is not the case here. Additionally, the ex-Kotwar’s resignation due to misconduct forecloses any claim of preference by his family, as held by this Court in Jems Toppo v. State of Chhattisgarh (WPS 3889/2015) , which has been affirmed in Writ Appeal No. 166/2025 4. Reliance is placed upon the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Singh v. Khacheru (SLP (C) No. 34407–34408/2013, decided on 02.01.2025) wherein the Court held that re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court or revisional authorities is impermissible unless findings of the lower authorities are perverse or illegal. The Board of Revenue, in the instant case, has violated this settled principle by substituting its own factual findings in place of the concurrent findings of three authorities. In view of the aforesaid facts, statutory provisions, and binding judicial precedents, learned counsel submits that the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue suffers from jurisdictional error, factual perversity, and violation of statutory rules and thus deserves to be quashed. The petitioner accordingly prays for restoration of his appointment order dated 30.01.2016 and the concurrent orders of the SDO (Revenue) and the Commissioner. 5. Learned State counsel, along with learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4, submit that the present writ petition is wholly devoid of merit and does not warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the petitioner has approached this Court being aggrieved by the order dated 15.02.2023 passed by the learned Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, whereby the orders passed earlier by the Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, the SDO (Revenue), Mungeli, and the Tahsildar, Mungeli, have been set aside, and the matter has been remanded to the Tahsildar for fresh consideration regarding the appointment of Kotwar of Village Udka. The Board of Revenue has directed that a fresh exercise be undertaken only after granting adequate opportunity to all eligible candidates and after obtaining a valid and legally sustainable proposal from the Gram Panchayat, strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code and the Kotwari Rules. The Board of Revenue has directed that a fresh exercise be undertaken only after granting adequate opportunity to all eligible candidates and after obtaining a valid and legally sustainable proposal from the Gram Panchayat, strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code and the Kotwari Rules. It is further submitted that the facts of the case reveal that the petitioner was initially appointed as Kotwar of Village Udka vide order dated 30.01.2016 passed by the Tahsildar, Mungeli. Respondent No.4 had challenged the said appointment by filing an appeal before the SDO (Revenue), which came to be dismissed vide order dated 27.06.2016. A second appeal before the Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, was also dismissed on 24.07.2018. Thereafter, respondent No.4 preferred a revision before the learned Board of Revenue, which, upon detailed consideration of the records, found serious procedural irregularities in the Gram Panchayat proposals forming the basis of the petitioner’s appointment. Learned counsel submit that the Board of Revenue rightly observed that two separate proposals of the Gram Panchayat, both dated 09.01.2016, existed on record, an occurrence that itself renders the proposals suspicious, manipulated, and unreliable. One proposal did not name any candidate, whereas in the second proposal, the petitioner’s name appeared to have been inserted separately. Such inconsistencies clearly indicate that the appointment was not based on a genuine and validly passed resolution of the Gram Panchayat. Moreover, the so-called meeting was conducted without the requisite coram as required under Section 44(3) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, which further vitiates the entire process. It is additionally submitted that the Tahsildar acted mechanically and failed to apply an independent, reasoned, and objective mind to the matter, despite the suspicious nature of the documents before him. There was no evaluation of relative merits of candidates by the Panchayat, nor did the Tahsildar undertake any independent scrutiny as required under law. The proposition is well-settled that a Tahsildar is not bound by the recommendation of the Gram Panchayat in matters of appointment of Kotwar and must exercise his independent discretion; however, this mandatory requirement was ignored in the petitioner’s case. Learned counsel further submit that even the petitioner’s eligibility was doubtful. While the petitioner relied on a caste verification committee certificate, the said document cannot be construed as proof of residence. Learned counsel further submit that even the petitioner’s eligibility was doubtful. While the petitioner relied on a caste verification committee certificate, the said document cannot be construed as proof of residence. On the contrary, respondent No.4 demonstrated by producing the petitioner’s ration card and voter ID that he is actually a resident of Village Parasakapa, and therefore not eligible for appointment as Kotwar of Village Udka. Such material evidence was ignored by the Tahsildar at the time of the petitioner’s appointment. It is also pointed out that earlier, in Case No. R.N./02/R/A-56/59/2014, the learned Board of Revenue, vide order dated 30.10.2015, had already held that the petitioner’s brother, Raju Diwakar, was working illegally as a temporary Kotwar for about four years in violation of the Kotwari Rules. The Board directed the Tahsildar to make a regular appointment following due procedure. Pursuant to that order, a fresh advertisement dated 16.11.2015 was issued prescribing, inter alia, the essential condition that the candidate must belong to the same village. The petitioner’s appointment, therefore, was not only made in violation of statutory procedure but also appears to be a continuation of the irregularities earlier committed by his own family member, thereby demonstrating a pattern of misuse of the local administrative process. Learned State counsel and counsel for respondent No.4 submit that the impugned order passed by the learned Board of Revenue is well-reasoned, legal, and passed after thorough examination of the factual and procedural irregularities involved. The contention of the petitioner that certain records were not produced is baseless, since the Board had already examined all relevant materials. The petitioner cannot seek to perpetuate an illegal appointment by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. Accordingly, it is jointly submitted that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any illegality, perversity, or error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference by this Hon’ble Court. The writ petition is frivolous, unsustainable, and liable to be dismissed in limine. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records with due care, this Court finds that the central consideration in the matter pertains to the eligibility of the petitioner in respect of his residence in the concerned village, which is a mandatory requirement for appointment to the post of Kotwar. 7. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records with due care, this Court finds that the central consideration in the matter pertains to the eligibility of the petitioner in respect of his residence in the concerned village, which is a mandatory requirement for appointment to the post of Kotwar. 7. Though learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the issue of residence was never raised before the Tahsildar, the SDO or the Commissioner, the fact remains that the Board of Revenue, while passing the impugned order, has recorded a clear finding that the petitioner is not a resident of the concerned village or Gram Panchayat. Once the statute prescribes residence within the village as an essential qualification, the same becomes a jurisdictional fact, and such a foundational requirement cannot be ignored merely on the ground that it was not urged earlier. The Court cannot shut its eyes to a statutory disqualification that goes to the root of eligibility. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the said issue cannot now be considered, is wholly without merit. 8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Amrit Yadav vs. State of Jharkhand and Others , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 280 has held as under : “31. In our view, since the very selection and appointment of the appellant- employee was a nullity in the eyes of law, the learned Single Judge committed no error in directing the respondent-State to prepare fresh panel of selected candidates without hearing the candidates who were likely to get affected. In this regard, we are benefitted by the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Raghuwar Pal Singh23, wherein, it was held that when the appointment of the candidates is a nullity in law making them disentitled to hold the posts, the principles of natural justice were not required to be complied with, particularly when the same would be nothing short of an exercise in futility. The relevant portion is extracted hereinbelow:- “ 20. For taking this contention forward, we may assume, for the time being, that the then Director Incharge H.S. Rathore, Agriculture Officer had the authority to issue a letter of appointment. Nevertheless, he could do so only upon obtaining prior written approval of the competent authority. The relevant portion is extracted hereinbelow:- “ 20. For taking this contention forward, we may assume, for the time being, that the then Director Incharge H.S. Rathore, Agriculture Officer had the authority to issue a letter of appointment. Nevertheless, he could do so only upon obtaining prior written approval of the competent authority. No case has been made out in the original application that due approval was granted by the competent authority before issuance of the letter of appointment to the respondent. Thus, it is indisputable that no prior approval of the competent authority was given for the appointment of the respondent. In such a case, the next logical issue that arises for consideration is : whether the appointment letter issued to the respondent, would be a case of nullity or a mere irregularity? If it is a case of nullity, affording opportunity to the incumbent would be a mere formality and non-grant of opportunity may not vitiate the final decision of termination of his services . The Tribunal has rightly held that in absence of prior approval of the competent authority, the Director Incharge could not have hastened issuance of the appointment letter. The act of commission and omission of the then Director Incharge would, therefore, suffer from the vice of lack of authority and nullity in law. … 23. In State of Manipur [State of Manipur v. Y. Token Singh, (2007) 5 SCC 65 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 107], the appointment letters were cancelled on the ground that the same were issued without the knowledge of the department of the State. The Court after adverting to the reported decisions concluded that the candidates were not entitled to hold the posts and in a case of such nature, principles of natural justice were not required to be complied with, particularly when the same would result in futility. …” (emphasis supplied) 32. Hence, in view of the above principle and the factual scenario in the case at hand, it is clear that if the subject appointments were ab- initio nullity in the eyes of law, it was not incumbent on the learned Single Judge to pass the order after hearing all the parties that were likely to be affected by such decision, i.e., the candidates who were already appointed on the subject posts including the appellant-employee. xxx xxx xxx 35. xxx xxx xxx 35. Thus, it is clear that once the appointment process is declared to be a nullity in law, every action taken in furtherance of such appointment process is also illegal, and, therefore, the constitutional courts have jurisdiction to set aside such appointments wholly and ab- initio. This power of the Court is not curtailed even in a situation where a third-party right has been created in those who have been offered appointment or have even joined the service.” 9. The material produced by respondent No. 4, including the voter list, is a primary public document, prepared in the discharge of statutory functions and carrying a presumption of correctness unless disproved by cogent evidence. The petitioner has not been able to rebut the said presumption or produce any unimpeachable material to demonstrate his residence in Village Udka. In such circumstances, this Court finds no infirmity in the reasoning adopted by the Board of Revenue. 10. In view of the above analysis, and considering that residence within the same village is a mandatory criterion for appointment of a Kotwar, this Court is satisfied that the order passed by the learned Board of Revenue does not suffer from any legal or factual error warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No case for exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction is made out. 11. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed .