Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:34649 WP No. 28912 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI WRIT PETITION NO. 28912 OF 2023 (GM-FC) BETWEEN:
SRI. M.B.RAMACHANDRA S/O LATE SRI M.BALANAIK AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS R/AT NO 26/6, “SNEHAPALLAVI” APARTMENTS, 7TH MAIN, NHBCS LAYOUT, CAUVERY NAGAR, BENGALURU-560 079. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. AJIT KALYAN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT.HEMA, W/O SRI M.B.RAMACHANDRA, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, R/AT NO.306, 10TH MAIN, 3RD BLOCK, 1ST STAGE, MANJUNATHA NAGARA, BENGALURU -560 010.
2.
SRI. ACHINTHYA HEMACHANDRA, S/O. SRI M.B.RAMANCHANARA, AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS, R/AT NO.306, 10TH MAIN, 3RD BLOCK, 1ST STAGE, MANJUNATHA NAGARA, BENGALURU -560 010.
3.
MS. ADITHI HEMACHANDRA, D/O. SRI. M.B.RAMANCHANARA, AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS, R/AT NO.306, 10TH MAIN, 3RD BLOCK, 1ST STAGE,
Digitally signed by MEGHA MOHAN Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
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MANJUNATHA NAGARA, BENGALURU -560 010. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. K.V.RAGHAVENDRA REDDY, ADVOCATE)
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
ORDER DATED 30.10.2023, PRODUCED VIDE ANNEXURE-A PASSED IN CRL.MISC.NO.209/2020 BY THE HONBLE PRINCIPAL JUDGE, FAMILY COURT, NYAYADEGULA, BENGALURU.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN ‘B’ GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM:
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI
ORAL ORDER Aggrieved by the order passed in Crl.Misc.No.209/2020 dated 30.10.2023 by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru whereby the Family Court had accepted the memo of calculation filed by the wife by observing that after adjusting payment of Rs.20,00,000/- made by the husband, there is remaining balance amount of Rs.7,32,000/- towards arrears of maintenance claimed in the petition. Hence, the husband is
directed to pay the same. For balance payment or steps, the matter is posted to 21.11.2023.
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2. The parties are referred to as husband and wife for the sake of convenience.
3. It is the case of the wife that she had filed Crl.Misc.No.313/2009 seeking maintenance of an amount of Rs.45,000/- per month and that came to be allowed by order dated 10.01.2013 whereby the husband was directed to pay an amount of Rs.15,000/- each to the wife and to the two children and also Rs.25,000/- towards the litigation expenses. Thereafter, against that order both the wife and husband had preferred RPFC No.31/2013 and RPFC.No.50/2013 and by order dated 17.12.2019, RPFC.No.31/2013 filed by the husband is dismissed with costs and RPFC No.50/2013 filed by the wife is partly allowed and the order of the Family Court is modified and the wife and two children are awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs.15,000/- per month each from the date of filing of the petition in C.Misc.No.313/2009 till the period stated in the impugned order.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner/husband submits that the parties have entered into compromise and they have signed a joint memo dated 18.02.2021. On 18.02.2021, it is
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observed by the Family Court that petitioner Nos.1 to 3 and respondent along with their counsel present before the court physically. Joint memo is filed. At the request of both parties and their counsel, the case is referred to Lok adalat to be held on 27.03.2021 to report final settlement. Call on 27.03.2021 before Lok adalat. Then the proceedings dated 27.03.2021 discloses that the respondent counsel filed memo. The petitioner and counsel absent i.e., the wife and the children and their counsel are absent. Matter not settled. Send back the file to the court. For objections to memo, if any, call on
26.05.2021. Thereafter, on 14.07.2021, the Court had observed that both advocates are present. At the request of both counsel, case is referred to Lok adalat to be held on 14.08.2021. Then the proceedings dated 14.08.2021 shows that case called out before Lok adalat. Petitioner and petitioner's counsel absent. Respondent and respondent's counsel present. Matter not settled. Send back the case file to the Court. Call on
07.09.2021. It is submitted by the learned counsel that as per the joint memo they have already given back the jewelry and paid an amount of Rs.20,00,000/-. Already the joint memo is acted upon. Now they have filed a memo before the Court
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saying that there are certain arrears of maintenance and by
order impugned the Court had directed that the husband has to pay an amount of Rs.7,32,000/-. Learned counsel submits that when the compromise memo is acted upon by the parties, question of passing this order and the order on the joint memo are not sustainable. It is submitted that when the parties have agreed upon and entered into a joint memo and the same is placed before the Family Court, the Family Court ought not to have relegated the parties to the Lok adalat, instead of that the Family Court ought to have recorded the settlement. It is submitted that the procedure adopted by the Family Court in sending the parties to the Lok adalat is contrary to the settled law. He had relied on the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Akkubai Vs. Shri. Venkatrao and others1. He had relied on paragraph No.11 which reads thus:
“11. I really wonder, whether the learned Judge who has entertained this matter was aware of the elementary aspects of judicial functioning and the Lok Adalath. A common order-sheet cannot be maintained by the Court as well as the Lok Adalath. A Court cannot be converted into a Lok Adalath. In the
order-sheet maintained by the Court, a portion of the
1ILR 2014 KAR 2051
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proceedings is referable to the Court proceedings and another portion refers to the proceedings of the Lok Adalath. The Conciliator has no place inside the Court. The very object of accepting this Lok Adalath as an alternative mode of resolution of dispute is that, all matters do not need adjudication. The matter which could be resolved by persuasion, negotiation and understanding should be taken out of adjudication process and should be resolved by means of Lok Adalath satisfactorily, so that the cases are disposed of expeditiously and the Courts will be saving the time of adjudicatory process, and they can utilize that time which is saved, in adjudicating the cases. If on the day the plaint is presented, the parties are also present before the Court, they are ready with the compromise petition and when they are filing an application under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, when they are admitting the terms of the compromise and execution of the terms and condition, then the Court before which it is presented, is the competent Court to record the compromise and dispose of the suit in terms of the compromise. The question of referring the said dispute to the Lok Adalath would not arise. If it is referred, it is a farce. If this is accepted and encouraged, both the judicial system and this alternative dispute resolution mechanism gets a bad name and would be subjected to redicule in the eyes of public. All persons who are indulging in this process would be doing great injustice and dis- service to the judicial system. They are not conscious of their action and its repercussions and the image of the Judiciary, which would create in the mind of the public. That is not the object with which neither Legal Services Authority Act of 1987 is passed by the Parliament providing for the institution of Lok Adalath nor Section 89 was introduced by the Parliament amending CPC.
The essence of these provisions is neither understood by the learned Judge nor by the learned Counsels who are appearing for the parties.”
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He had relied on another judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court arising out of W.P.No.103766/2018 between Smt. Renuka Vs. Sri. Ramanand and others decided on
31.03.2022. He had relied on paragraph Nos.18 and 20 which reads thus:
“18. This Court has held that such a practice of recording compromise before the Court and thereafter referring to Lok-Adalat is not contemplated in the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and such compromise if recorded before the Lok-Adalat is required to be set aside. 20. This Court has also been coming across several matters relating to such compromise before the LokAdalat which are challenged by way of writ petitions. Hence, I also deem it fit to issue general directions in respect of such matters which are referred to LokAdalat and compromise recorded as under: (i) When a compromise is filed before the Court in terms of the decision in Smt.Akkubai vs. Shri Venkatrao and Others [ILR 2014 KAR 2051] (supra) it is for the Court to record the compromise and not refer the matter to the LokAdalat. (ii) It is only if there is no settlement arrived at before the Court and the parties request for the matter to be referred to Lok- Adalat to enable a settlement then in such event the parties are to be referred to the Lok-Adalat and in the event of a compromise being arrived at before the Lok- Adalat, the same could be recorded by the lokAdalat. (iii) When the matter is referred to Lok- Adalat, separate order sheets would have to be opened and maintained by the said Lok-Adalat
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and the order sheet of the Court in the suit cannot be used by the Lok-Adalat.
(iv) The trial Court and or the Lok-Adalat while recording compromise is required to ascertain if the parties are present personally as also to ascertain and verify their identities by production of suitable documentary proof. (v) In the event of a power of attorney appearing, it would be the bounden duty of the Court or the Lok-Adalat to ascertain if the concerned party has been served with notice. (vi) The Court as also the Lok-Adalat would always have to be suspicious if the party were to enter appearance even before service of notice which is a red flag that there is something that is fishy in the matter. (vii) When recording a compromise being entered into by a power of attorney, the original of the power of attorney is required to be examined by the Court and the Lok-Adalat and necessary endorsement made in the order to that effect and the original power of attorney returned to the parties. (viii) As far as possible the trial Court and or the LokAdalat to secure the presence of the party and obtain signature of such party rather than the power of attorney. (ix) The Trial Courts shall ensure that proper and acceptable proof of identity of the parties to proceedings as mandated by the Government for various purposes (such as Aadhar Card, Driving Licence, Passport Copy, Election Identity card, etc.,) are obtained as a matter of rule.”
He also relied on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat Vs. Rajinder
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Singh and others2. He had relied on paragraph No.19 which reads thus:
“19. Let us now turn to the requirement of 'in writing' in Rule 3. In this case as noticed above, the respective statements of plaintiffs' counsel and defendants' counsel were recorded on oath by the trial court in regard to the terms of the compromise and those statements after being read over and accepted to be correct, were signed by the said counsel.
If the terms of a compromise written on a paper in the form of an application or petition is considered as a compromise in writing, can it be said that the specific and categorical statements on oath recorded in writing by the court and duly read over and accepted to be correct by the person making the statement and signed by him, can be said to be not in writing? Obviously, no. We may also in this behalf refer to Section 3 of the Evidence Act which defines a document as any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means intended to be used or which may be used for the purpose of recording the matter. The statements recorded by the court will, therefore, amount to a compromise in writing.” He had also relied on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K. Srinivasappaand others Vs. M. Mallamma and others3. He had relied on paragraph Nos.16 and 33 which reads thus:
2 AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 2628 3AIR 2022 SUPREME COURT 2381
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“16. Learned counsel for the appellants at the outset contended that the High Court was not right in setting aside the order of the Lok Adalat dated 07th July, 2012, whereby the compromise of the parties was recorded. Elaborating the said contention, it was submitted that the Lok Adalat had, in its order dated 07th July, 2012 noted that every party to the compromise had consented to the terms thereof, and had admitted that the contents of the compromise petition were true and correct, when the same had been read over and explained to them in Kannada language.
That the Lok Adalat in its order dated 27 th April, 2013 had upheld the validity of the compromise between the parties, after considering, in detail the objections raised by plaintiff nos. 4-6 and rejecting the same. It was urged that the Lok Adalat’s order dated 27 th April, 2013 had been passed after detailed examination of the contentions of the parties and the Lok Adalat had rightly rejected the objections raised by plaintiff nos. 4-6. However, the learned Single Judge of the High Court, in the absence of any reasoning, and in a casual and cryptic manner, had reversed the order of the Lok Adalat wherein the compromise of the parties was recorded. 33. This Court in Ruby Sales and Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra- [(1994) 1 SCC 531] observed that a consent decree is a creature of an agreement and is liable to be set aside on any of the grounds which will invalidate an agreement. Therefore, it would follow that the level of circumspection, which a Court of law ought to exercise while setting aside a consent decree or a decree based on a memo of compromise, would be atleast of the same degree, which is to be observed while declaring an agreement as invalid.”
He had relied on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Byram Pestonji GariwalaVs. Union
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Bank of India and others4 and State of Punjab and other Vs. Daljit Singh Sandhu5. He had relied on para Nos.22 to 25 which reads thus:
“22. The doctrine of "approbate and reprobate" is only a species of estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of parties. As in the case of estoppel it cannot operate against the provisions of a statute. (vide C.I.T. vs. Mr. P. Firm Maur, AIR 1965 SC 1216). 23. It is settled proposition of law that once an
order has been passed, it is complied with, accepted by the other party and derived the benefit out of it, he cannot challenge it on any ground. (Vide Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 329). In R.N. Gosain vs. Yashpal Dhir, AIR 1993 SC 352, this Court has observed as under:-
"Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that "a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage."
24. This Court in Sri Babu Ram Alias Durga Prasad vs. Sri Indra Pal Singh (Dead) by Lrs., AIR 1998 SC 3021, and P.R. Deshpande vs. Maruti Balram Haibatti, AIR 1998 SC 2979, the Supreme Court has observed that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel- the principle that one cannot approbate
4(1992) 1 Supreme Court Cases 31 5(2014) 15 Supreme Court Cases 144
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and reprobate inheres in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. 25. The Supreme Court in The Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation and Anr. vs. Diamond and Gem Development Corporation Ltd. and Anr., AIR 2013 SC 1241, made an observation that a party cannot be permitted to
"blow hot and cold", "fast and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must not be applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience.”
5.
Relying on all these judgments learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in fact there is a valid settlement between the parties and that settlement cannot be questioned unless on the ground of fraud and coercion. In this case, none of those grounds are taken and the said joint memo is binding upon the parties and as the Family Court has failed to record the same, this Court has to take a note of it and the compromise needs to be recorded. It is submitted that the parties who have acted upon the joint memo and having had the benefit of the said memo, now they cannot go back on the same, that is impermissible. Once the joint memo is held to be
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correct, now the question of executing an order passed in the RPFC would not arise as the joint memo is subsequent to the
order passed in the RPFC.
6.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/wife submits that the compromise is not recorded by any Court, there is no compromise decree or there is no Lok adalat award. Unless and until there is an award or a decree, the husband cannot rely upon the said joint memo. It is submitted that the Family Court had rightly considered and rightly held that the husband is liable to pay the maintenance amount and there are no grounds to interfere.
7. Having heard the learned counsels on either side, perused the material on record. This Court having heard the
arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner/husband and also perused all the judgments that are placed before this Court. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition laid down by this Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court. First of all questioning a compromise decree or an award is only available under the grounds like fraud, coercion, undue influence. According to the learned counsel, it is nobody’s case that there
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is fraud or coercion. In that case, the compromise decree/award cannot be questioned. Here, the case is that there is no decree of compromise or award which is known to law. If such a decree or an award is passed as per law, then all the judgments that are relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner can be considered. The petitioner is relying on the judgment in Smt. Akkubai’s case referred supra, which was later considered in WP.No.103766/2018. In that, the Learned Judge had discussed about the manner in which the case was decided when the parties have filed a compromise memo, the Court had observed that it is the duty of the Court to record the compromise, but it should not be relegated to the Lok adalat. Petitioner had an option to come before this Court when the parties have filed the joint memo and the Family Court has asked him to go before the Lok Adalat, at that point of time, had the petitioner approached this Court and in those circumstances the judgments that are relied on by the petitioner would come to his rescue, but the petitioner has not done anything and after the matter is referred to the Lok adalat, when the respondent/wife has not turned up and the joint memo was not recorded. In those circumstances, it cannot be argued and it
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cannot be accepted by this Court that it is a compromise decree and the parties cannot go beyond the same. As of now, the
order which is enforceable under law is the order passed in RPFC. If according to the petitioner there is a joint memo and the part of it is already enforced or he has already paid the amounts and his part of the obligation is completed under the law, whatever is the remedy available to the petitioner, it is for him to pursue subject to the law of limitation, but basing on that joint memo, this Court cannot interfere with the order impugned placed before this Court. The order impugned before this Court is as far as the amounts that were granted and what were the arrears from the petitioner. It is not the petitioner’s case that as per the order passed in RPFC, he is not liable to pay a particular amount, even in those circumstances also, this Court cannot interfere with the order impugned. Accordingly, this court is passing the following order.
ORDER i. The impugned
order passed in Crl.Misc.No.209/2020 dated 30.10.2023 by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru requires no interference.
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ii. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. iii. It is left open to the petitioner to question the
order passed by the Family Court referring the parties to the Lok adalat if the law permits and if it is within the limitation. iv. All I.As., in the writ petition shall stand closed.
SD/- (LALITHA KANNEGANTI) JUDGE
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