1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 284 of 2019 Judgment Reserved on: 28.8.2025 Judgment Delivered on: 26.9.2025 • Jhaduram Sahu S/o Shri Rameshwar Sahu Aged About 36 Years R/o Village - Rohina, Police Station Rajim, District Gariyaband, Chhattisgarh., District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus • The State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Rajim, District Gariyaband Chhattisgarh., District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Ms. Sareena Khan, Advocate. For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Devesh G. Kela, Panel Lawyer. Division Bench RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J & Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. C A V Judgment Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The present criminal appeal under Section 374 (2) of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the appellant herein calling in question legality, validity and correctness of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.1.2019, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gariyaband, C.G., in Sessions Trial No. 16/2017, by which, the appellant herein has been convicted as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 of IPC Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 500/- and, in default of payment of fine, additional SI for 2 months. 2. Brief facts of the case, is that, on 17/01/2017, a phone call was received at Rajim police station reporting the murder of a woman in the village of Rohina. To verify the information, the investigating officer along with the staff went to the Rohina village. Based on the statement of the victim’s husband, Ramji Sahu, a report was registered under section 174 of the CrPC regarding the murder of Sumari Bai on land owned by Rajiv Lochan Trust. Ramji and his brother Jhaduram Sahu farm about 70 and 50 decimals of land respectively on this property. On the day of the incident, both 3 Ramji and his wife went to work around 8 AM, Ramji went to Rajim and returned by 9 AM, while his younger brother Jhaduram was working in his field. At about 1:15 PM, a villager named Naresh Devangan came to Ramji’s house and informed him that Jhaduram had killed his wife Kumari Bai at Rampa and was heading to the police station. Upon checking the field with his son Lilesh and Naresh, Ramji found his wife lying dead in a waterlodged field with multiple injuries including deep wounds on the head and face, damage to ribs and spine, swelling, and injuries on the right thigh. Ramji informed the village head (Sarpanch) and Kotwar via mobile, who then notified the police station. It was suspected that Jhaduram killed her over a water dispute. Consequently, a murder case (Section 302 IPC) was registered against Jhaduram. Following Ramji’s instructions, a site sketch was prepared, witnesses were recorded, and the body of Kumari Bai was sent to the Rajim Community Health Center for post-mortem, after which the dead body was handed over to the family. Soil samples were collected from the site, and the accused’s memorandum was recorded in front of witnesses on the same day. Upon presenting the accused, an iron spade (rapa), a blood-stained maroon check shirt, and an old blue lungi were seized from his home in front of witnesses. The victim’s clothes and belongings sealed by the doctor after the post-mortem were 4 also recovered. The accused was arrested in front of witnesses and his family was informed. A report was sent to the Medical Officer at Rajim Community Health Center for the victim’s post- mortem report. After returning to the station, a first information report (FIR) was registered against the accused under Section 302 IPC. A letter was sent to the Medical Officer to confirm that the injuries on the victim could have been caused by the seized spade, which had blood stains and soil from the crime scene. The Tehsildar was requested to provide a map of the incident site. The seized items were sent for chemical analysis to the State Forensic Science Laboratory in Raipur through the Superintendent of Police, Gariyaband. Witness statements were recorded accordingly. 3. After completion of investigation, appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences before the jurisdictional Criminal Court, which was ultimately committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated. 4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses and exhibited 33 documents. Statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he 5 denied the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, pleaded innocence and false implication. 5. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellant / accused for the offences as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the prosecution’s entire case is fundamentally based on weak and insufficient circumstantial evidence, which has not been established in strict accordance with the law. There exists a crucial missing link in the chain of circumstances presented, rendering the evidence incapable of conclusively proving the appellant’s guilt. The alleged extra-judicial confession, memorandum, seizure, and forensic scientific laboratory (FSL) reports fail to connect the appellant to the crime in a manner that excludes all reasonable hypotheses other than his culpability. Furthermore, the prosecution has not satisfactorily demonstrated that no other person could be responsible for the offense, thus failing to meet the requisite standard of proving the case beyond all reasonable doubt. The memorandum of discovery and the seizure effected under it, 6 originating from the accused’s own statements, cannot be considered as reliable or incriminating evidence on their own merit. Consequently, the conviction rests on conjectures and surmises rather than solid proof, and for these reasons, the appellant is entitled to acquittal and the impugned judgment should be set aside. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State, while opposing the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant, submits that the trial Court, after a threadbare appreciation of the entire evidence available on record, has rightly arrived at the conclusion of guilt against the appellant. He further submits that the trial Court has taken into consideration every relevant aspect of the matter and has meticulously analyzed the chain of circumstances which, when taken cumulatively, unerringly point towards the guilt of the appellant. Learned counsel further submits that the circumstances proved against the appellant stand firmly established and are consistent only with the hypothesis of his guilt, thereby excluding every other possibility. The so-called weaknesses pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant are without any substance and have already been duly dealt with and repelled by the trial Court with cogent reasons. It is therefore argued that the impugned judgment is well-reasoned, based on proper appreciation of evidence, and does not suffer from any perversity 7 or illegality warranting interference by this Hon’ble Court. Accordingly, the conviction recorded against the appellant deserves to be upheld and the appeal is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. The first question for consideration would be whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature which has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative relying upon the postmortem reports (Ex.P-8) proved by PW-16 Dr. Pankaj Nagrachi, which is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 10. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the seizure pursuant to made on the basis of the memorandum and the FSL report connect the appellant in the crime in question. The trial Court curled down the following circumstances in order to establish. Memorandum, seizure, blood stained and the FSL report in which human blood is certified. In order to examine the aforesaid aspect the evidence of witnesses is required to be seen. 11. Mahesh Kumar Dewangan (PW-1), testified that he was informed via mobile phone by Dhaniram that Jhaduram had allegedly 8 murdered either his wife or sister-in-law and had then gone to the police station. Subsequently, he was further apprised of the incident by Ramji Sahu, who is the brother of the appellant and the husband of the deceased. Although the defense extensively cross-examined him, his testimony primarily amounts to hearsay, lacking any direct or substantive evidence, and therefore, it holds little probative value in the context of the case. 12. Smt. Bhagwati Bai Sahu (PW-2) is both a neighbour and a relative of the appellant. In her testimony, she deposed that she came to know about the murder of the deceased, allegedly committed by Jhaduram, through hearsay. She was present at the time of the inquest proceedings and signed the relevant inquest documents. However, she categorically stated that her signature was obtained solely as a witness to the proceedings and not on account of any personal knowledge or observation of the injuries on the body of the deceased. She expressly denied having seen any of the injuries sustained by the deceased, thereby clarifying that she had no direct knowledge of the condition of the body at the time of the inquest. 13. Naresh Kumar Dewangan (PW-3), a neighbour of the parties involved, is a hearsay witness who stated that he was informed about the incident by Dhaniram Kotwar. He is a witness to several procedural documents, including the notice (Ex. P/1), the inquest 9 report (Ex. P/2), the seizure memo (Ex. P/3), the memorandum (Ex. P/4), the arrest memo (Ex. P/6) and the spot map (Ex. P/7). Although not an eyewitness to the actual occurrence, his testimony supports the procedural aspects of the investigation. During cross-examination, he firmly denied the suggestion that the appellant suspected the deceased of practising witchcraft, thereby refuting any motive attributed to such belief. 14. Rupesh Sahu (PW-4) is classified as a hearsay witness in this matter. Following the occurrence of the incident, he proceeded to the scene to observe the aftermath. He has been identified as a witness to several procedural documents integral to the investigation, including the notice (marked as Exhibit P/1), the inquest report (Exhibit P/2), the post-mortem report (Exhibit P/8), and the recorded statement (Exhibit P/9). It is important to note that Rupesh Sahu has explicitly and unequivocally stated that he did not personally witness the incident itself. His suspicions regarding the appellant’s involvement in the alleged murder of the deceased arise solely from information acquired through hearsay and rumors circulating after the fact, rather than from any direct or firsthand knowledge. 15. Vijay Laxmi Nirmalkar (PW-5) and Manish Chelkar (PW-7) are the designated witnesses who testified to the seizure documented as Exhibit P/10. 10 16. Ramji Sahu (PW-7), the husband of the deceased and brother of the present appellant, testified that he was informed of his wife’s murder by the Kotwar. He stated that on the day of the incident, all parties were present together in the agricultural field, and when his brother mentioned not knowing the method of water curing for the field, the appellant assured him he would take care of it. Ramji Sahu lodged the Dehati Merg (Exhibit P/8A) and produced several documents bearing his signature, including the Dehati Nalsi (Exhibit P/9A), the notice (Exhibit P/1), the inquest report (Exhibit P/2), and the memorandum handing over the dead body (Exhibit P/10A). In cross-examination, he clarified that both household and landed properties had been partitioned among the brothers, with each living separately, and that he and his brother were cultivating equal halves of land belonging to the Rajiv Lochan Trust. He categorically denied any disputes between the brothers or with his wife. Overall, his testimony did not reveal any material facts that could significantly impact the case. 17. Nandlal (PW-8) testified that the appellant arrived at the police station, reporting that he had previously lodged a complaint concerning the murder of the deceased. Additionally, the appellant indicated his intention to surrender to the authorities. However, during cross-examination, Nandlal admitted that he could not confirm any details regarding the conspiracy purportedly hatched 11 between the appellant and the village chowkidar, Dhaniram. Thus, while he acknowledged the appellant’s actions in coming forward and reporting the crime, he remained uncertain about the alleged collusion between the two individuals. 18. Dhaniram Nagrachi (PW-9), who serves as the Kotwar of the village, was the first to report the incident to the authorities before proceeding to the police station. Upon arrival, he noticed the appellant already present and seated there. Having known the appellant since their school days, Dhaniram recognized him and, prompted by their acquaintance, inquired about the situation. During cross-examination, Dhaniram testified that the appellant informed him he had come to the police station to file a report regarding the murder of his sister-in-law. The appellant further expressed that despite his intention to lodge this report, the police had detained him without any clear justification or cause. 19. Rekhu Ram Satnami (PW-10), who testified as a witness to Exhibit P/14, provided a detailed police statement in which he asserted that the appellant was responsible for the murder of his sister-in-law. He clarified that his knowledge of this accusation was not based on his own direct observation but rather on information he had heard from the deceased’s sons. Thus, his testimony reflects a secondhand account relayed to him by the close relatives of the victim. 12 20. Johnu Ram Sahu (PW-11) serves as the Mukhtiyar of the Rajiv Lochan Trust, a position through which he diligently oversees and manages all aspects of the Trust’s agricultural operations. In his role, he ensures the smooth functioning and effective administration of the farming activities, taking responsibility for planning, coordinating, and supervising the cultivation processes. His involvement is crucial in maintaining the productivity and sustainability of the Trust’s agricultural ventures, reflecting his deep commitment and expertise in managing the land and resources entrusted to him. 21. Lilesh Kumar Sahu (PW-12), the driver and son of the deceased, testified that upon receiving information about the incident, they went to the spot and found his mother’s body lying in the mud with a head injury, which he stated appeared to have been caused by a kudali. He also mentioned that a dispute had occurred between the appellant and his mother prior to the discovery. However, since Lilesh Kumar did not witness the actual incident and his testimony is based on hearsay, his statement should be considered with caution. Therefore, the case must be evaluated primarily in light of the surrounding circumstances rather than solely relying on his account. 22. M.L. Ajgale (PW-18), the Investigating Officer, was examined and testified that the entire investigation was conducted 13 strictly based on the memorandum statement provided by the appellant. He emphasized that all evidence was meticulously recorded in accordance with the testimonies of the witnesses, without any exaggeration or alteration on his part. The statements documented by him faithfully reflect what was actually narrated by the witnesses during the inquiry, ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the investigation process. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ramu Appa Mahapatar vs. State of Maharashtra (2025) 3 SCC 565 has observed as under:- “20. In State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180, this Court explained the concept of extra-judicial confession. Confession may be divided into two classes i.e. judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made before a Magistrate or a court in the course of judicial proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or a court. Extra- judicial confessions are generally those that are made by a party before a private individual who may be a judicial officer also in his private capacity. As to extra-judicial confessions, two questions arise firstly, whether they are 14 made voluntarily and secondly, are they true? If the court is of the opinion that the confession was not made voluntarily but was a result of an inducement, threat or promise, it would not be acted upon. It follows that a confession would be voluntary if it is made by the accused in a fit state of mind and if it is not caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against him proceeding from a person in authority. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case judged in the light of Section 24 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (briefly "the Evidence Act" hereinafter). The law is clear that a confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the court is satisfied that it was voluntary. At that stage, the question whether it is true or false does not arise. If the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the veracity and voluntariness of the confession, the court may refuse to act upon the confession even if it is admissible in evidence The question whether a confession is voluntary or not is always a question of fact. A free and voluntary 15 confession is deserving of the highest credit because it is presumed to flow from the highest sense of guilt. 21. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession witt have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession like any other evidence depends upon the reliability of the witness to whom it is made and who gives the evidence. Extra-judicial confession can be relied upon and conviction can be based thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from a witness who appears to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused. The words spoken by the witness should be clear, unambiguous and unmistakenly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and that nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the extra-Judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility. 16 22.If the evidence relating to extra-judicial confession is found credible after being tested on the touchstone of credibility and acceptability, it can solely form the basis of conviction. The requirement of corroboration is a matter of prudence and not an invariable rule of law. 23. In Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan, this Court accepted the admissibility of extra-judicial confession and held that there is no absolute rule that an extra- judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction although ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material. 24. Evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession was again examined in detail by this Court in Sahadevan v. State of T.N. That was also a case where conviction was based on extra-judicial confession. This Court held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove the complete chain of events which shall undoubtedly point towards the guilt of the accused. That apart, in case of circumstantial evidence where the prosecution relles upon an extra- judicial confession, the court has to examine the same with a greater degree of care and caution. An extra- judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit 17 state of mind can be relied upon by the court. However, the confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession like any other evidence depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. 25. This Court acknowledged that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the court intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If the extra-judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent Improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent, such evidence should not be considered. This Court held as follows: (Sahadevan case, SCC p. 410, para 14)” 14. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution evidence, intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If, however, the extra- 18 judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent as per the prosecution version, it may be difficult for the court to base a conviction on such a confession. In such circumstances, the court would be fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration." 26. Upon an indepth analysis of judicial precedents, this Court in Sahadevan summed up the principles which would make an extra-judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused: (SCC pp. 412-13, para 16). 16. (i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution. (ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful. (iii)It should inspire confidence. (iv)An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence. (v)For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. (vi)Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law." 19 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Raja Naykar vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2024) 3 SCC 481 has held as under:- “It can thus be seen that, the only circumstance that may be of some assistance to the prosecution case is the recovery of dagger at the instance of the present appellant. However, as already stated hereinabove, the said recovery is also from an open place accessible to one and all. In any case, the blood found on the dagger does not match with the blood group of the deceased. In Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthans, this Court held that sole circumstance of recovery of bloodstained weapon cannot form the basis of conviction unless the same was connected with the murder of the deceased by the accused. Thus, we find that only on the basis of sole circumstance of recovery of bloodstained weapon, it cannot be said that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt.” 25. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Thakore Umedsing Nathusing vs. State of Gujarat 2024 SCC OnLine SC 320 has dealt with the recovery and blood stains not found to be that of the deceased and the relevant para reads as under:- “35. We have gone through the evidence of the concerned police officials associated with the 20 recoveries and find their testimonies to be highly doubtful. The knife which was recovered at the instance of A3 was found from a nala which is a place open and accessible to all. The knife attributed to A4 was presented by one Shobhnaben wife of Kanji Chhara and thus it cannot be linked to A4. Thus, these recoveries in no manner can be treated to be incriminating in nature. In the case of Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 724, this Court held that the solitary circumstance of recovery of blood-stained weapons cannot constitute such evidence which can be considered sufficient to convict an accused for the charge of murder. We thus find the recoveries to be highly doubtful and tainted. Even if it is assumed for a moment that such recoveries were effected, the same did not lead to any conclusive circumstance in form of Serological report establishing the presence of the same blood group as that of the deceased and hence they do not further the cause of prosecution. In addition thereto, we find that the prosecution failed to lead the link evidence mandatorily required to establish the factum of safe keeping of the 21 muddamal articles and hence, the recoveries became irrelevant.” 26. In the matter of Debapriya Pal vs. State of West Bengal (2017) 11 SCC 31, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held with the issue that even if blood stain was found, the blood group of accused or deceased was not ascertained. The relevant para reads as under:- “For the sake of argument, we are presuming that they were present at the time when the appellant brought bloodstained clothes from his house and gave the same to the police. What is material is the reliance on these bloodstained clothes for the culpability of the appellant herein. As per the prosecution, the blood group on these bloodstained clothes matched with the blood on the bedsheet on which the body of one of the deceased persons was found. The record reveals that though blood of both the deceased persons was drawn and sent for examination, it is not known as to what was the report thereupon and what was the blood group of the deceased persons. No such blood report has been produced. So much so, blood group of the accused persons was also not ascertained. Even if we presume that the blood on the bedsheet 22 was that of the deceased, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the same blood group as of the appellant-accused thereof. Therefore, mere matching of the blood group on the bloodstained clothes, which was even on the bedsheet, would not lead to the conclusion that it is the appellant who had committed the crime.” 27. In the matter of Shantabai and others vs. State of Maharashtra (2008) 16 SCC 354, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “25. In support of the fifth circumstance, the prosecution has examined Dr. Hanumant, who performed post-mortem on the dead body of the deceased Gunwant on 15-8-1993. The doctor noticed as many as thirteen injuries on the body of the deceased as described in the post-mortem report (Ext. 41). According to the opinion of the doctor, the cause of death was because of shock due to cardio- respiratory failure caused by injury to brain and brain haemorrhage. The chemical analyser's report would reveal that ethyl alcohol was found in the viscera contents of the deceased. 23 26. We may point out that the investigating officer has not cared to collect the fingerprints appeared on the stones and axe, the alleged weapons of offence, at the time of seizure of the articles nor had he taken the fingerprints of the appellants for comparison with the fingerprints, if any, detected on the alleged weapons of offence. The articles collected by the investigating officer from the spot were found lying in the open place which was accessible to all and sundry. The prosecution has not led any evidence to prove that axe, which was the alleged weapon of offence, found on spot in the open place belonged to A-1, A-2 and A-3. Thus, the prosecution has not established beyond reasonable doubt that A-1, A-2 and A-3 had used the recovered weapons of offence in the commission of the crime. 28. The chemical analyser's report (Ext. 72) reveals that human blood of Group 'B' was detected on the clothes, which were seized by the police, allegedly belonging to the appellants. The blood group on those clothes did not tally with the blood of Group 'O', which was found on the clothes of the deceased and on the sample of soil, axe, stones, handles, etc, 24 which were taken from the spot by the investigating officer. The investigating officer has categorically stated that when he along with A-1 and panch witnesses had gone in search of the clothes of the appellants, the lock to the door of the house of the appellants was kept with the Police Patil which was opened by them later on. In this view of the matter, the prosecution has not proved that d the clothes, which were allegedly seized by the police at the instance of A-1 and lying in the open place, were stained with Blood Group 'O' of the deceased found on the deceased's clothes and on the articles which were seized by the investigating officer from the place of occurrence. These circumstances are not proved by the prosecution by lending cogent, satisfactory and convincing evidence to hold A-1, A-2 and A-3 guilty of the offence.”” 28. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dhananjay Shanker Shetty vs. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 596 has held as under:- “9. Another circumstance which was alleged against the appellant was that bloodstained clothes and weapon were recovered from his house, but the trial 25 court as well as the High Court did not place any reliance upon this circumstance in view of the fact that according to the report of the chemical examiner, the blood group found thereon did not tally with that of the deceased.” 29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that such failure materially affects the evidentiary value of the alleged recoveries. In Kansa Behera v. State of Orissa, (1987) 3 SCC 480, the Court held: “Unless the blood stains found on the clothes or weapons are proved to be that of the deceased, the discovery cannot be said to incriminate the accused beyond doubt.” 30. Similarly, in Sattatiya @ Satish Rajanna Kartalla v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 3 SCC 210 , it was observed: “In the absence of a serological report confirming that the blood on the clothes or weapon belonged to the deceased, the recovery is of no substantial help to the prosecution.” 31. Again, in Vijay Shankar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 10 SCC 353, the Apex Court reiterated: “The prosecution’s failure to establish, through scientific evidence, that the blood found on the 26 weapon or clothes matched that of the deceased creates a serious doubt about the veracity of the recovery and the guilt of the accused.” 32. It is profitable here to note following five golden principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 which constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence and same read as under: “153.…. (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.” It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." 27 (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 33. The legal principles governing extra-judicial confessions are well- settled and have been consistently recognized by courts. It is a fundamental requirement that any such confession must be made voluntarily, in a free and unconstrained manner, without the application of any undue influence, coercion, or pressure of any kind. The law emphasizes that the integrity of such confessions is contingent upon the absence of any external force or inducement. At the same time, it is widely acknowledged that an extra-judicial confession constitutes a form of weak or fragile evidence. Consequently, while it may have probative value, it cannot, by itself, serve as a conclusive basis for conviction unless 28 corroborated by other independent and reliable evidence that supports the circumstances surrounding the alleged offence. In the present matter except extra judicial confession, two other circumstances viz memorandum based seizure and FSL report, however as discussed above, it was also not proved, which is missing chain of circumstances. As such in absence of proven chain of circumstances, conviction cannot be sustained. 34. Considering the aforesaid circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution and accepted by the trial Court, in order to establish the veracity of an extra-judicial confession, it is imperative that further corroborative evidence be produced, as such confessions, by their very nature, constitute a weak form of evidence. A conviction cannot be predicated solely on the basis of an extra-judicial confession unless it is supported by independent, reliable, and corroborative material that substantiates the claims made therein. In the absence of such corroboration, the circumstances alleged cannot be deemed conclusively proved, and reliance solely on the confession would render any conviction unsustainable. Therefore, without additional corroborative evidence, the court cannot maintain a conviction merely on the strength of an extra- judicial confession. Thus, from every perspective, the prosecution has utterly failed to discharge its burden of proof. All the circumstances when they are taken into consideration could not establish suit of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubts. There are missing link of chain. Consequently, this Court finds no hesitation in setting aside the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court. 29 35. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.1.2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gariyaband, C.G., in Sessions Trial No. 16/2017 is hereby set- aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, the appellant is reported to be on bail as per order dated 22.7.2019. 36. In compliance with Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond of Rs. 25,000/- with two sureties of the like amount before the concerned court. The bond shall be effective for six months and include an undertaking that in case of filing a Special Leave Petition or grant of leave against this judgment, the appellant will appear before the Supreme Court upon receipt of notice. 37. Registry is directed to transmit the lower court record along with a copy of this judgment to the trial court forthwith for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Raghu Jat