JUDGMENT : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. Being aggrieved by the award/order dated 14.02.2025 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh Madhyastham Adhikaran, Raipur (hereinafter referred to as “the Learned Tribunal” for the sake of brevity) in Reference Case No. 02/2023, titled Maa Bhagwati Construction v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, whereby the Reference Petition filed by the petitioner has been dismissed as not maintainable, the petitioner is constrained to prefer the present Civil Revision Petition under Section 19 of the Chhattisgarh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983. 2. Facts of the case, as projected by the applicant, in a nutshell, are that the applicant is an A-Class Contractor and is duly eligible to participate in various tenders issued by the Public Works Department of the State of Chhattisgarh. The applicant filed a Reference Case before the Learned Tribunal seeking an award allowing its claims to the tune of Rs. 40,27,584/- (Rupees Forty Lakhs Twenty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred and Eighty-Four Only) along with ante-lite, pendente-lite and post-lite interest, costs of arbitration and other appropriate reliefs. However, without adjudicating the claims on merits, the Learned Tribunal erroneously dismissed the reference petition solely on the ground of maintainability. The respondent department issued a Notice Inviting Tender dated 01.05.2017 for execution of certain construction work. The applicant, being an eligible bidder, participated in the tender process and its bid was accepted vide letter dated 05.07.2017. Pursuant thereto, an agreement bearing No. 64/D.L./2017-18 was executed for the work titled “Construction of 50-50 Capacity Prisoners Barracks (G+1) (12 Units) at Central Jail, Raipur with Electrification Work” (hereinafter referred to as the subject work). A work order was thereafter issued on 18.09.2017, and the applicant commenced execution of the subject work accordingly. The total contract value of the subject work was Rs. 11,12,33,000/-. The time allowed for completion of the work was 18 months, including the rainy season, with the stipulated date of completion being 17.03.2019. Immediately after issuance of the work order, the applicant submitted a detailed work programme dated 20.09.2017, clearly demonstrating its intention to complete the work well before the due date. The applicant successfully executed and completed the entire work on 12.11.2018, i.e., much prior to the stipulated date of completion, and a completion certificate to that effect was issued by the competent authority. The applicant successfully executed and completed the entire work on 12.11.2018, i.e., much prior to the stipulated date of completion, and a completion certificate to that effect was issued by the competent authority. During execution of the work, payments were made by the respondent department in accordance with the contractual terms at various stages. The final agreement bill, except for the incentive bonus, was released on 19.12.2019, which was acknowledged by the applicant under protest. As required under Clause 5 of the agreement, the petitioner submitted a written undertaking dated 05.11.2018, expressly waiving its right to seek any extension of time, thereby fulfilling all conditions necessary for entitlement to Incentive Bonus under Clause 5.3 of the agreement. Clause 5.3 of the agreement specifically provides that where the contractor completes the work before the original stipulated time and waives the right to claim extension of time, the contractor shall be entitled to payment of incentive bonus at the prescribed rates. Since the applicant fulfilled all the conditions under the said clause, it became legally entitled to the incentive bonus. The undertaking dated 05.11.2018 was duly served upon the respondent authorities both personally and by post. Despite completion of the entire work, including electrification, and despite there being no dispute with regard to the quality or quantity of work executed, the respondent authorities arbitrarily withheld the incentive bonus. Repeated representations made by the applicant asserting its entitlement under the agreement were not considered. Initial representations dated 11.11.2019 and 03.12.2019 were submitted, followed by forwarding of the matter by higher authorities, including the office of the concerned Minister; however, no action was taken. In the meantime, the final bill excluding the incentive bonus was released on 19.12.2019, which the applicant accepted under protest. As the respondent authorities failed to act on the representations, the petitioner approached this Court by filing WPC No. 461 of 2020, which was disposed of on 03.02.2020 with a direction to the respondents to consider the claim of applicant for incentive bonus and interest in terms of the agreement. Pursuant to the directions of this Court, the applicant submitted a fresh detailed representation dated 11.02.2020. However, the respondent authorities reiterated their earlier stand and rejected the claim vide letters dated 03.03.2019 and 06.07.2020, without reconsidering the matter in light of this Court’s order. This rejection gave rise to a formal dispute under Clause 28 of the agreement. Pursuant to the directions of this Court, the applicant submitted a fresh detailed representation dated 11.02.2020. However, the respondent authorities reiterated their earlier stand and rejected the claim vide letters dated 03.03.2019 and 06.07.2020, without reconsidering the matter in light of this Court’s order. This rejection gave rise to a formal dispute under Clause 28 of the agreement. Thereafter, the applicant invoked the dispute resolution mechanism under Clause 28 by submitting representations to the Superintending Engineer, Chief Engineer and other higher authorities within the prescribed time. All such representations were rejected, the final rejection being communicated vide order dated 24.11.2020 by the Chief Engineer. Aggrieved by the said rejection, the applicant filed WPC No. 3320 of 2020, which was dismissed on 11.08.2021 on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of arbitration. The writ appeal and Special Leave Petition preferred thereafter were also dismissed, culminating in dismissal of SLP No. 4304/2022 on 21.03.2022. It is submitted that the cause of action for filing the reference arose from the rejection order dated 24.11.2020, and the limitation period stood extended owing to the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in view of the Covid-19 pandemic. Consequently, the reference filed before the Learned Tribunal was well within limitation and after due compliance of Clause 28 of the agreement. There is no dispute regarding completion of the work within the stipulated time or submission of the undertaking waiving extension of time. The sole dispute pertains to arbitrary non- payment of incentive bonus, which is contrary to the express terms of the agreement, particularly Clause 5.3. In this factual backdrop, the applicant filed a reference under Section 7 of the Chhattisgarh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, seeking adjudication of its claims. The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability, which was duly replied to by the applicant. However, the Learned Tribunal, instead of adjudicating the dispute on merits, wrongly upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the reference petition, giving rise to the present civil revision. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the impugned award dated 14.02.2025 passed by the learned Tribunal is ex facie illegal, perverse and bad in law. The learned Tribunal has committed a manifest error of law in dismissing the reference petition on the ground of maintainability, without adjudicating the claim on merits, despite the existence of a live and arbitrable dispute between the parties. The learned Tribunal has committed a manifest error of law in dismissing the reference petition on the ground of maintainability, without adjudicating the claim on merits, despite the existence of a live and arbitrable dispute between the parties. It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case in their proper perspective and has adopted a hyper-technical approach, thereby rendering the applicant remediless. Such an approach defeats the very object of the Chhattisgarh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, which is intended to provide an efficacious forum for resolution of contractual disputes involving the State. Learned counsel submits that the rejection of the claim by the respondent authorities, denying payment of Incentive Bonus despite admitted completion of the work within the stipulated time, issuance of completion certificate and submission of the undertaking waiving extension of time, is arbitrary, discriminatory, illegal, without jurisdiction and contrary to the express terms of the contract. The learned Tribunal failed to examine this arbitrariness and mechanically upheld the stand of the respondents. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate the settled position of law that any contractual clause which absolutely restricts a party from enforcing its rights or curtails the statutory period of limitation is void to that extent under Section 28 of the Contract Act, 1872. The interpretation adopted by the learned Tribunal has the effect of extinguishing the applicant’s remedy and is therefore legally unsustainable. Learned counsel further submits that it is a fundamental principle of law that no person can contract out of the protection of the courts. The underlying rationale is to ensure fairness, particularly where the parties are not on an equal footing. Courts and tribunals are therefore duty-bound to interpret contractual clauses in a manner that advances justice and preserves remedies, rather than adopting a narrow and technical construction that frustrates legitimate claims. It is contended that where two interpretations of a contractual clause are possible, the interpretation that keeps the remedy alive must be preferred. In the present case, the agreement does not curtail the period of limitation but merely provides the stage at which rights crystallize upon rejection of the claim. Therefore, filing the reference after rejection of the claim cannot be held to be violative of Section 28 of the Contract Act. In the present case, the agreement does not curtail the period of limitation but merely provides the stage at which rights crystallize upon rejection of the claim. Therefore, filing the reference after rejection of the claim cannot be held to be violative of Section 28 of the Contract Act. Learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that the agreement does not contain any clause which is contrary to Section 28 of the Contract Act, nor does it impose an unreasonable restriction requiring the claimant to approach the Tribunal prior to rejection by the final authority under Clause 28. Treating delayed reference as a bar would, in fact, render the clause vulnerable to invalidation under Section 28. It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal erroneously held that the applicant had not complied with the time limits prescribed under Clause 28 of the agreement and, on that basis, concluded that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. Such a finding is wholly erroneous and contrary to the material placed on record. Learned counsel submits that the right of the applicant was asserted when the claim was made and was enforced only after the dispute arose upon rejection of the claim by the Executive Engineer vide letter dated 03.03.2020 and finally by the Chief Engineer vide order dated 24.11.2020. The cause of action to approach the Tribunal therefore arose only on 24.11.2020. The agreement governs assertion of rights, not enforcement before a judicial forum, which is governed by law. 4. It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to consider the specific reply filed by the applicant to the preliminary objection, wherein the entire chronology of rejection under Clause 28 was clearly pleaded, including rejection by the Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer and finally the Chief Engineer on 24.11.2020. It was also categorically pleaded that the limitation would commence from 24.11.2020 and end on 24.11.2021. Learned counsel submits that in the first round of litigation, this Court had clearly directed the respondent authorities to consider the applicant’s claim in terms of the agreement. It was pursuant to such direction that, for the first time, a formal rejection was communicated, culminating in the final order dated 24.11.2020. The learned Tribunal completely ignored this crucial aspect. Learned counsel submits that in the first round of litigation, this Court had clearly directed the respondent authorities to consider the applicant’s claim in terms of the agreement. It was pursuant to such direction that, for the first time, a formal rejection was communicated, culminating in the final order dated 24.11.2020. The learned Tribunal completely ignored this crucial aspect. It is submitted that the object of incorporating Clause 5.3 in the agreement is to incentivize early completion of work and to avoid escalation of costs due to delay. The applicant completed the work well before the stipulated time, thereby fulfilling the very object of the clause, and is therefore entitled to the Incentive Bonus as a matter of contractual right. Learned counsel submits that Clause 5.3 only requires the contractor to waive the right to seek extension of time. In the present case, the applicant’s intention to complete the work early is evident from the work programme, correspondence and the undertaking submitted. In absence of any prescribed format for such undertaking, the applicant’s conduct and communications ought to have been treated as sufficient compliance. It is further submitted that the work stands completed, completion certificate has been issued and the undertaking has been submitted. Withholding the Incentive Bonus on grounds not contemplated under the contract is arbitrary, violative of principles of natural justice and suffers from the vice of unreasonableness. Learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal ought to have allowed the claim petition by holding that rejection of the claim and non-payment of Incentive Bonus is arbitrary, illegal, whimsical and intended only to harass the applicant. It is further contended that the action of the respondent authorities is actuated by arbitrariness and lack of transparency, and the learned Tribunal failed to examine this aspect, thereby causing grave prejudice to the petitioner. Learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal has erroneously held that there was non-compliance of Clause 28 and has wrongly relied upon the judgment in Sanjay Dubey v. State of M.P. , 2012 MPLJ 212 without appreciating the distinct facts and circumstances of the present case. It is submitted that the findings recorded in paragraphs 11, 13 and 14 of the impugned award, holding that there was no compliance of Clause 28 and that strict compliance of time limits was not made, are patently erroneous, contrary to the record and unsustainable in law. It is submitted that the findings recorded in paragraphs 11, 13 and 14 of the impugned award, holding that there was no compliance of Clause 28 and that strict compliance of time limits was not made, are patently erroneous, contrary to the record and unsustainable in law. By dismissing the reference as not maintainable, the learned Tribunal has rendered the applicant completely remediless, in clear violation of Section 28 of the Contract Act. Learned counsel submits that the present revision petition has been filed within limitation, as the certified copy of the impugned award dated 14.02.2025 was received by the petitioner on 10.03.2025. In support of the above submissions, learned counsel places reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gannon Dunkerley & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, Inder Singh Rekhi v. DDA, and National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. G.C. Kanungo , which categorically hold that limitation commences from accrual of cause of action and that a dispute arises only upon assertion and denial of a claim. 5. At the outset, it is submitted by learned State Counsel that the impugned award dated 14.02.2025 passed by the learned Tribunal is legal, justified and strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract as well as the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983. The Tribunal has rightly dismissed the reference petition as not maintainable after appreciating the pleadings, documents and the contractual scheme governing the parties. It is submitted that the Tribunal has not adopted any hyper-technical approach, as alleged, but has merely enforced the contractual obligations voluntarily accepted by the applicant. The applicant, being an experienced A- Class contractor, entered into the agreement with open eyes and is bound by the dispute resolution mechanism and timelines prescribed therein, particularly under Clause 28 of the agreement. Learned State Counsel submits that entitlement to Incentive Bonus under Clause 5.3 of the agreement is not automatic and is subject to strict compliance of the conditions stipulated therein. The applicant failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements in the manner and within the time contemplated under the contract. Mere completion of work prior to the stipulated date does not, by itself, confer a vested right to Incentive Bonus. The applicant failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements in the manner and within the time contemplated under the contract. Mere completion of work prior to the stipulated date does not, by itself, confer a vested right to Incentive Bonus. It is further submitted that the undertaking waiving the right to seek extension of time was not submitted in accordance with the terms of the contract and at the relevant stage. The belated submission of such undertaking, coupled with inconsistent conduct on the part of the petitioner, disentitles the applicant from claiming Incentive Bonus. The respondent authorities have therefore rightly rejected the claim after due consideration. Learned State Counsel submits that the rejection of the applicant’s claim cannot be termed arbitrary or discriminatory. The competent authorities examined the claim at multiple levels, including the Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer and Chief Engineer, and consistently found that the petitioner had not fulfilled the contractual requirements. The decisions were reasoned and taken strictly in terms of the agreement. It is submitted that the reliance placed by the applicant on Section 28 of the Contract Act is misconceived. Clause 28 of the agreement does not curtail the statutory period of limitation nor does it restrict access to courts. It merely provides a structured and time-bound dispute resolution mechanism, which is permissible in law. Failure to adhere to such agreed timelines validly results in forfeiture of the contractual remedy. Learned State Counsel further submits that the principle that “no man can exclude himself from the protection of the courts” has no application in the present case. The applicant was not prevented from approaching any forum; rather, the applicant failed to invoke the contractual dispute resolution mechanism within the stipulated time. The loss of remedy is thus a consequence of the petitioner’s own default and not of any illegal contractual restriction. It is submitted that the Tribunal has correctly held that compliance with Clause 28 is a condition precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In absence of strict compliance with the said clause, the Tribunal rightly declined to entertain the reference petition. The finding that jurisdiction was not attracted is therefore sound and unassailable. Learned State Counsel submits that the cause of action, as asserted by the applicant, cannot be artificially postponed to the date of the Chief Engineer’s order dated 24.11.2020. In absence of strict compliance with the said clause, the Tribunal rightly declined to entertain the reference petition. The finding that jurisdiction was not attracted is therefore sound and unassailable. Learned State Counsel submits that the cause of action, as asserted by the applicant, cannot be artificially postponed to the date of the Chief Engineer’s order dated 24.11.2020. The applicant was aware of the rejection of its claim much earlier, and the correspondence relied upon clearly demonstrates that the dispute had arisen prior thereto. The reference, therefore, was hopelessly barred by limitation. It is further submitted that the pendency of writ petitions before this High Court and proceedings before higher forums does not automatically extend or suspend the contractual timelines prescribed under Clause 28. The applicant consciously chose to pursue writ remedies instead of invoking arbitration in time and cannot now seek to take advantage of its own conduct. 6. Learned State Counsel further submits that the judgments relied upon by the applicant are clearly distinguishable on facts and do not assist the petitioner. In the present case, the agreement specifically provides the manner and time within which disputes are to be raised, which the petitioner failed to follow. It is further submitted that Clause 5.3 has been incorporated to incentivize timely completion, but such incentive is subject to strict adherence to contractual conditions. The applicant cannot seek equitable relief contrary to the express terms of the contract. Courts and Tribunals cannot rewrite contracts under the guise of equity. Learned State Counsel submits that the Learned Tribunal has rightly relied upon the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sanjay Dubey v. State of M.P. , 2012 MPLJ 212 , and correctly applied the ratio thereof to the facts of the present case. The finding that non-compliance of Clause 28 renders the reference not maintainable is in consonance with settled law. It is submitted that the allegations of arbitrariness, malafides and violation of principles of natural justice are bald, vague and unsupported by any material. The applicant was granted ample opportunity to represent its case at every stage, and the claim was rejected only after due consideration. Learned State Counsel submits that the Tribunal has neither misinterpreted the agreement nor ignored any material fact. On the contrary, it has recorded clear findings based on the contractual terms and conduct of the parties. The applicant was granted ample opportunity to represent its case at every stage, and the claim was rejected only after due consideration. Learned State Counsel submits that the Tribunal has neither misinterpreted the agreement nor ignored any material fact. On the contrary, it has recorded clear findings based on the contractual terms and conduct of the parties. Interference in revision is therefore not warranted, as no jurisdictional error or material irregularity is made out. In view of the above submissions, learned State Counsel that the present revision petition, being devoid of merit, be dismissed and the impugned award dated 14.02.2025 passed by the Learned Tribunal be upheld. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the pleadings, documents placed on record and the impugned award dated 14.02.2025 passed by the Learned Tribunal. 8. From perusal of the record, it is not in dispute that an agreement bearing No. 64/D.L./2017-18 was executed between the parties for execution of the subject work. Clause 28 of the said agreement contains the arbitration clause and provides a structured dispute resolution mechanism. Clause 28 is quoted hereunder for ready reference : “ARBITRATION CLAUSE: Clause 28 Except as otherwise provided in this contract all question and dispute relating to the meaning of the specification, designs, drawings and instruction herein before mentioned as to thing Except as otherwise provided in this contract all question and dispute relating to the whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to the contract designs, drawings, specification, estimate, concerning the works, or the execution or failure to execute the same, whether arising during the progress of the work, or a after the abandonment there of shall be referred to the Superintending Engineer for his decision, within a period of 30 (thirty) days of such an occurrence (s). There upon the Superintending Engineer shall give his written instructions and/or decisions, after hearing the contractor and Executive Engineer within a period of 15 (fifteen) days of such request. This period can be extended by mutual consent of parties. Upon receipt of written instructions or decisions, of Superintending Engineer the parties shall promptly proceed without delay to comply such instructions or decisions. This period can be extended by mutual consent of parties. Upon receipt of written instructions or decisions, of Superintending Engineer the parties shall promptly proceed without delay to comply such instructions or decisions. If the Superintending Engineer fails to give his instruction or decisions in writing within a period of 15 (fifteen) days or mutually agreed time after being requested and/or, if the party (es) is/are aggrieved against the decision of the Superintending Engineer, the aggrieved party may within 30 days prefer an appeal to the Chief Engineer, who shall afford an opportunity to the parties of being heard and to offer evidence in support of his appeal. The, Chief Engineer will give his decision within 30 (thirty) days, or such, mutually agreed period. If any party is not satisfied with the decision of the Chief Engineer he can file the petition for resolving the dispute through arbitration in the arbitration tribunal. A reference to Arbitration Tribunal shall be no ground for not continuing the work on the part of the Contractor. Payment as per original terms and condition of the agreement shall be continued by the Executive Engineer in accordance with clause 8 above.” 9. As per the clause, whenever any dispute arises, the contractor is required to first raise its grievance before the Executive Engineer, thereafter before the Superintending Engineer and finally before the Chief Engineer. It is only when the dispute is not resolved up to the level of the Chief Engineer that the parties are entitled to approach the Tribunal for seeking reference of the dispute. A bare perusal of Clause 28 makes it abundantly clear that the dispute attains finality, for the purpose of reference before the Tribunal, only upon rejection by the Chief Engineer. The clause does not contemplate invocation of arbitration prior to exhaustion of the said departmental remedies. Therefore, compliance with Clause 28 is a condition precedent, and the cause of action to approach the Tribunal crystallizes only upon final rejection by the Chief Engineer. 10. In the present case, the record reveals that the applicant’s claim for Incentive Bonus was examined at various levels in terms of Clause 28 of the agreement. Ultimately, the concerned Chief Engineer rejected the claim vide order dated 24.11.2020. Thus, the dispute, in the strict sense of the term, arose on 24.11.2020, when the claim was finally denied by the competent authority under the contract. 11. Ultimately, the concerned Chief Engineer rejected the claim vide order dated 24.11.2020. Thus, the dispute, in the strict sense of the term, arose on 24.11.2020, when the claim was finally denied by the competent authority under the contract. 11. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to Section 7-B(1) of the Chhattisgarh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, which prescribes the period of limitation for filing a reference before the Tribunal. Section 7-B(1) is quoted hereunder for ready reference : “7-B. Limitation. 11. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to Section 7-B(1) of the Chhattisgarh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, which prescribes the period of limitation for filing a reference before the Tribunal. Section 7-B(1) is quoted hereunder for ready reference : “7-B. Limitation. - [(1) The Tribunal shall not admit a reference petition unless- (a) the dispute is first referred for the decision of the final authority under the terms of the works contract; and (b) the petition to the Tribunal is made within one year from the date of communication of the decision of the final authority: Provided that if the final authority fails to decide the dispute within a period of six months from the date of reference to it, the petition to the Tribunal shall be made within one year of the expiry of the said period of six months.] (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where no proceeding has been commenced at all before any Court preceding the date of commencement of this Act or after such commencement but before the commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1990, a reference petition shall be entertained within one year of the date of commencement of Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1990 irrespective of the fact whether a decision has or has not been made by the final authority under the agreement.] (2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Tribunal shall not admit a reference petition unless it is made within three years from the date on which the works contract is terminated, foreclosed, abandoned or comes to an end in any other manner or when a dispute arises during the pendency of the works contract: Provided that if a reference petition is filed by the State Govenment, such period shall be thirty years.] CHHATTISGARH AMENDMENT Amendment of Section 7-B - After sub-section 2 of Section 7-B of the Chhattisgarh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (No. 29 of 1983) (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), the following sub-section shall be added, namely: - "(2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Tribunal shall not admit a reference petition unless it is made within three years from the date on which the works contract is terminated, foreclosed, abandoned or comes to an end in any other manner or when a dispute arises during the pendency of the works contract: Provided that if a reference petition is filed by the State Govenment, such period shall be thirty years.] [Vide C.G. Act No. 3 of 2005] 12. As per the said provision, the reference is required to be made within three year from the date on which the cause of action arises, i.e., from the date of final rejection of the claim by the competent authority under the agreement. However, it is a matter of record that during the intervening period, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in view of the Covid-19 pandemic, had passed a series of orders extending and excluding the period of limitation from March 15, 2020 to February 28, 2022 for all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The said orders were applicable to proceedings before tribunals as well. 13. Hon’ble Supreme Court exercising its Civil Original Jurisdiction has passed an order dated 10.01.2022 reported in (2022) 3 SCC 117, Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Res. and has held as under : “5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by learned counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the M.A. No. 21 of 2022 with the following directions: I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasijudicial proceedings. II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022. III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. IV. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. IV. It is further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.” 14. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the period covered by the Covid-19 extension is liable to be excluded while computing the limitation. When the aforesaid period is excluded and the limitation is re-calculated, it is evident that the reference application filed by the applicant on 23.09.2022 falls within the prescribed period of limitation. 15. The Learned Tribunal, while dismissing the reference as not maintainable, has failed to take into consideration the true import of Clause 28 of the agreement as well as the statutory provision contained under Section 7-B(1) of the Act. The Tribunal has also overlooked the effect of the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court extending limitation due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The approach adopted by the Tribunal, in treating the reference as barred by limitation, is thus found to be legally unsustainable. 16. Once it is held that the cause of action arose on 24.11.2020 and that, after excluding the Covid-19 period, the reference was filed within limitation, the finding of the Learned Tribunal regarding non- maintainability cannot be sustained. The Tribunal was required to adjudicate the dispute on merits instead of non-suiting the applicant on a hyper-technical ground of limitation. Accordingly, it is held that the reference application filed by the applicant was within limitation and was maintainable. The impugned award dated 14.02.2025, insofar as it dismisses the reference petition on the ground of maintainability, suffers from a manifest error of law. 17. Accordingly, it is held that the reference application filed by the applicant was within limitation and was maintainable. The impugned award dated 14.02.2025, insofar as it dismisses the reference petition on the ground of maintainability, suffers from a manifest error of law. 17. Resultantly, the impugned award dated 14.02.2025 passed by the Learned Tribunal is set aside . The matter is remitted to the Learned Tribunal for fresh consideration and adjudication of the reference on merits, in accordance with law. No order as to costs.