- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 10319 OF 2025 (482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS) BETWEEN: B. VINOD KUMAR, S/O B. THIMMAPPA, AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS, RESIDING AT -73, HONNAHALLI, HONNAHALLI, BANDIHATTI, BELLARY, KARNATAKA - 583 102 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. H.S. CHANDRAMOULI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. RAJATH, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY YELAHANAKA NEW TOWN P.S., REP. BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU - 560 001 2. SRINIVASA HANUMANTHAPPA, S/O HANUMANTHAPPA, AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS, R/AT - WARD NO. - 21 AC STREET, KAPAGAL ROAD, GANDINAGARA, BALLARI TOWN, BALLARI - 583 103 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. SMT. RASHMI JADHAV, ADDL. SPP A/W SRI. NEELAKANTAPPA PUJAR, HCGP FOR R1; SRI. SHRIKANT PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S.482 (FILED U/S.528 BNSS) CR.P.C. PRAYING TO QUASHING THE FIR REGISTERED IN CR.NO.243/2025 DATED 30.05.2025 REGISTERED BY THE Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 YELAHANKA NEW TOWN POLICE STATION FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 137(2), 64(2)(m) OF BNS 2023 AND SEC.5(L) AND 6 OF POCSO ACT PENDING BEFORE THE Ld. FTSC-IV ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR ORAL ORDER In this petition, petitioner - sole accused seeks quashing of the impugned proceedings pursuant to the complaint and FIR registered as Crime No.243/2025 dated 31.05.2025 against the petitioner for alleged offences punishable under Sections 5(l) and 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 137(2) and 64(2)(m) of the BNS, 2023 and for other reliefs. 2. Heard learned Senior counsel for the petitioner and learned Addl.SPP for the 1st respondent - State as well as learned counsel for 2nd respondent and perused the material on record. 3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the alleged victim Kum.Bindu is the niece of the 2nd respondent - de facto complainant, who initially filed a complaint dated 28.05.2025 registered as an FIR in Crime No.229/2025 as a missing complaint - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 on the ground that the said Kum.Bindu who did not have any parents and was being looked after by the 2nd respondent was missing. In the said complaint, the 2nd respondent - de facto complainant stated that the victim was aged about 18 years and was studying inB.Com. I year in Seshadripuram college, Yelahanka, Bangalore and staying in the Hostel. Subsequently, the 2nd respondent - de facto complainant filed one more complaint on 30.05.2025 registered as an FIR in Crime No.243/2025 interalia alleging that the victim was aged about 17 years 6 months and that the petitioner had kidnapped and cheated her and also sexually assaulted the victim and married her, thereby committing the alleged offences. In pursuance of the said complaint, the 1st respondent - police authorities registered the impugned FIR against the petitioner - accused, who is before this Court by way of the present petition. 4. Per contra, learned Addl.SPP for the 1st respondent - State submits that there is no merit in the petition and that the same is liable to be dismissed. 5. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that it is an undisputed fact that the 2nd respondent initially filed a complaint - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 on 28.05.2025 specifically contending that the victim was aged about 18 years and without either referring to or naming the petitioner and did not making any allegations as regards the victim being kidnapped or cheated or sexually assaulted by the petitioner, the 2nd respondent merely stated that the victim was missing; however, subsequently, on 31.05.2025, changed his version and filed the impugned complaint interalia alleging that the victim was aged about 17 years 6 months, which clearly indicates that the said allegation was an afterthought and cannot be countenanced or accepted by this Court in the present petition. 6. Along with the petition, the petitioner has produced copies of the SSLC marks card, PUC marks card and Aadhar card of the victim, all of which, clearly indicate that the petitioner was born on 15.04.2006 and was accordingly, more than 18 years as on the date of the incident; though it is sought to be contended that the alleged birth certificate of the victim shows her date of birth as 16.11.2007, it is relevant to state that when school / college records are available, they would take precedence over the birth certificate in the light of the provisions contained in Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for short 'the - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 JJ Act') as held by the Apex Court in the case of P.Yuvaprakash vs. State - 2023 SCC Online SC 846, wherein it is held as under:- “11. Before discussing the merits of the contentions and evidence in this case, it is necessary to extract Section 34 of the POCSO Act which reads as follows: “34. Procedure in case of commission of offence by child and determination of age by Special Court. - (1) Where any offence under this Act is committed by a child, such child shall be dealt with under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016). (2) If any question arises in any proceeding before the Special Court whether a person is a child or not, such question shall be determined by the Special Court after satisfying itself about the age of such person and it shall record in writing its reasons for such determination. (3) No order made by the Special Court shall be deemed to be invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the age of a person as determined by it under sub-section (2) was not the correct age of that person.” 12. In view of Section 34(1) of the POCSO Act, Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 becomes relevant, and applicable. That provision is extracted below: “94. Presumption and determination of age. - (1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age. (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining - (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order. (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.” 13. It is evident from conjoint reading of the above provisions that wherever the dispute with respect to the age of a person arises in the context of her or him being a victim under the POCSO Act, the courts have to take recourse to the steps indicated in Section 94 of the JJ Act. The three documents in order of which the Juvenile Justice Act requires consideration is that the concerned court has to determine the age by considering the following documents: “(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board”. 14. 14. Section 94(2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of Uttar Pradesh; (2021) 12 SCR 502 this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. The State of Uttar Pradesh; (2019) 9 SCR 735 that: - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 “Clause (i) of Section 94(2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal; (2012) 9 SCR 224, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference. 18. Reverting to the facts of this case, the headmaster of M's School, CW-1, was summoned by the court and produced a Transfer Certificate (Ex.C-1). This witness produced a Transfer Certificate Register containing M's name. He deposed that she had studied in the school for one year, i.e., 2009-2010 and that the date of birth was based on the basis of the record sheet given by the school where she studied in the - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 7th standard. DW-2 TMT Poongothoi, Headmaster of Chinnasoalipalayam Panchayat School, answered the summons served by the court and deposed that ‘M’ had joined her school with effect from 03.04.2002 and that her date of birth was recorded as 11.07.1997. She admitted that though the date of birth was based on the birth certificate, it would normally be recorded on the basis of horoscope. She conceded to no knowledge about the basis on which the document pertaining to the date of birth was recorded. It is stated earlier on the same issue, i.e., the date of birth, Thiru Prakasam, DW-3 stated that the birth register pertaining to the year 1997 was not available in the record room of his office. 19. It is clear from the above narrative that none of the documents produced during the trial answered the description of “the date of birth certificate from the school” or “the matriculation or equivalent certificate” from the concerned examination board or certificate by a corporation, municipal authority or a Panchayat. In these circumstances, it was incumbent for the prosecution to prove through acceptable medical tests/examination that the victim's age was below 18 years as per Section 94(2)(iii) of the JJ Act. PW-9, Dr. Thenmozhi, Chief Civil Doctor and Radiologist at the General Hospital at Vellore, produced the X-ray reports and deposed that in terms of the examination of M, a certificate was issued stating “that the age of the said girl would be more than 18 years and less than 20 years”. In the cross- examination, she admitted that M's age could be taken - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 as 19 years. However, the High Court rejected this evidence, saying that “when the precise date of birth is available from out of the school records, the approximate age estimated by the medical expert cannot be the determining factor”. This finding is, in this court's considered view, incorrect and erroneous. As held earlier, the documents produced, i.e., a transfer certificate and extracts of the admission register, are not what Section 94(2)(i) mandates; nor are they in accord with Section 94(2)(ii) because DW-1 clearly deposed that there were no records relating to the birth of the victim, M. In these circumstances, the only piece of evidence, accorded with Section 94 of the JJ Act was the medical ossification test, based on several X-Rays of the victim, and on the basis of which PW-9 made her statement. She explained the details regarding examination of the victim's bones, stage of their development and opined that she was between 18-20 years; in cross-examination she said that the age might be 19 years. Given all these circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the result of the ossification or bone test was the most authentic evidence, corroborated by the examining doctor, PW-9. 20. In this case, the appellant was charged, inter alia, for the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The offence under Section 6 depends on the proof that a “sexual assault” took place. That term is defined by Section 7, which reads as follows: - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 “Whoever, with sexual intent touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is said to commit sexual assault.” 21. The offence under Section 6, at the relevant time, was defined as follows: “Whoever, commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.” 22. Section 3 defines penetrative sexual assault, as follows: “3. Penetrative Sexual Assault. - A person is said to commit “penetrative sexual assault” if - (a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (b)…………………… (c)…………………… (d)……………………” 23. Section 2(a) of the POCSO Act provides that ‘aggravated penetrative sexual assault’ has the same meaning as assigned to it in Section 5. Therefore, Section 5, which defines ‘aggravated penetrative sexual assault’ is relevant. Section 5(l) reads as follows: “5. Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault. - (a) (l) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on the child more than once or repeatedly; or” - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 24. Section 4, at the relevant time, read as follows: “(1) Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.” 25. The expression “assault” is defined in Section 351 IPC as “Whoever makes any gesture, or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person, is said to commit an assault.” 26. The expression “criminal force” is defined by Section 350 IPC as follows: “Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person's consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to that other.” 27. In her statement under Section 164 of the Cr. P.C., the victim M had deposed that she was in love with the appellant, had consumed poison, and had even been hospitalized because she was adamant to live with the appellant. No doubt, she resiled from her statement. Yet, the medical evidence (deposition of PW-11, Dr. Kavitha) indicated that the victim had a ruptured hymen; there was no external injury at her private parts, and that according to her “48 hours before medical examination there was no evidence to show that she had sexual assault is the opinion given by me.” This witness also produced her - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 Notes of examination (Ex. P-11). In view of these facts, this court is of the opinion that the prosecution was not able to establish that there was any penetrative sexual assault as a result of coercion or compulsion on the part of the appellant. Even the High Court recognized this, albeit while reducing the sentence (since, in its opinion, M was a minor at the time), observing that “P.W.3 had gone to the extent of taking poison to commit suicide out of love failure, under enormous pressure, he had accompanied P.W.3, married her and had sexual intercourse with her, both before the marriage as well was after the marriage.” From these facts, and the definitions under POCSO Act, especially the definitions of “sexual assault”, Sections 5 and 6, read with Sections 350 and 351 IPC, it can be seen that it is only when there is penetrative sexual assault, which implies sexual contact with or without consent of the minor victim, that the offences under the POCSO Act are committed. 28. All the facts proved in this case clearly indicate M's willingness to accompany the appellant and even celebrate their marriage. However, she did not support the statement under Section 164 Cr. P.C. To entirely discard that statement, the trial court observed that: “In this case, on the orders of the Inspector of P.W.-16 had produced the girl Madheena before the Judicial Magistrate Court, Erode and she has given a statement voluntarily u/s. 164 Cr. P.C. To prove that the aforesaid statement was not given on any compulsion, no evidences have been put forth before this court.” - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 29. The above surmise by the trial court is untenable. The prosecution did not concededly produce the Judicial Magistrate who recorded the statement; however, that officer was available and was stationed at Erode. She deposed during the trial, as DW-1, and importantly affirmed the veracity of the victim's statement (Ex. P-4) by stating as follows: “It is a true statement given by the said girl wilfully. The said statement was not given on compulsion. It is correct if it is stated that, (M), in her statement, had told me that, I and my neighbour who was in the nearby house, by name Yuvaprakash are in love for the past 1½ years, we used to talk to each other frequently over phone, my grand-mother on seeing me speaking over the phone had told my father about it, I took pesticide for ants and attempted to commit suicide….” 30. The prosecution did not even cross examine this witness. Having regard to these overall factors, the court is of the opinion that M's statement under Section 164 of the Cr. P.C. contained a truthful narration of the events. This, in other words, meant that there was no penetrative sexual assault on her. Therefore, the provisions of the POCSO Act will not be applicable in this case. The impugned judgment set aside the charge under Section 366 IPC against the appellant. The charges against him, under Section 6 of the POCSO Act as well as Section 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, cannot be sustained; the findings of the courts below, i.e., conviction and sentences imposed are, therefore, set aside. - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 31. In view of the foregoing analysis and conclusions, this court is of the opinion that the appellant is not guilty of the offences he was charged with; he is hereby acquitted. The impugned judgment and order is hereby set aside; the appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith unless required in connection with any other case. The appeal is allowed, but without order on costs.” 7. So also, in the case of Jarnail Singh vs. State of Haryana - (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Apex Court held as under:- 22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2007 Rules”). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under: ““12.Procedure to be followed in determination of age.—(1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be, the Committee referred to in Rule 19 of these Rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining— (a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year, and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these Rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of Section 7-A, Section 64 of the Act and these - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 Rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this Rule. (6) The provisions contained in this Rule shall also apply to those disposed of cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3) envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion. 24. Following the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it is apparent that the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 could not be determined on the basis of the matriculation (or equivalent) certificate as she had herself deposed, that she had studied up to Class 3 only, and thereafter, had left her school and had started to do household work. The prosecution in the facts and circumstances of this case, had endeavoured to establish the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 on the next available basis in the sequence of options expressed in Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules. The prosecution produced - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 Satpal (PW 4) to prove the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. Satpal (PW 4) was the Head Master of Government High School, Jathlana, where the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 had studied up to Class 3. Satpal (PW 4) had proved the certificate Ext. PG, as having been made on the basis of the school records indicating that the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 was born on 15-5-1977. In the scheme contemplated under Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules, it is not permissible to determine age in any other manner, and certainly not on the basis of an option mentioned in a subsequent clause. We are therefore of the view that the High Court was fully justified in relying on the aforesaid basis for establishing the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. It would also be relevant to mention that under the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it would have been improper for the High Court to rely on any other material including the ossification test, for determining the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The deposition of Satpal, PW 4 has not been contested. Therefore, the date of birth of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 (indicated in Ext. PG as 15-7-1977) assumes finality. Accordingly it is clear that the prosecutrix VW, PW 6, was less than 15 years old on the date of occurrence i.e. on 25-3-1993. In the said view of the matter, there is no room for any doubt that the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 was a minor on the date of occurrence. Accordingly, we hereby endorse the conclusions recorded by the High Court, that even if the prosecutrix VW, PW 6 had accompanied the appellant-accused Jarnail Singh of her own free will, and - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 had had consensual sex with him, the same would have been clearly inconsequential, as she was a minor.” 8. As stated supra, though the birth certificate purports to indicates that the victim was born on 16.11.2007 in view of the SSLC marks card, PUC marks card and Aadhar card of the victim, which clearly indicate that she was born on 15.04.2006 coupled with the undisputed fact that the victim was studying B.Com Degree course in Seshadripuram College at the time of the alleged incident, in addition to the specific allegation made by the 2nd respondent in his first complaint dated 28.05.2025 that the victim had completed the age of 18 years, I am of the considered opinion that the victim being major as on the date of the alleged incident, the petitioner cannot be incriminated for the alleged offences punishable under the POCSO Act and consequently, the impugned complaint and FIR in this regard deserve to be quashed. 9. 9. Insofar as the allegations relating to offences punishable under Sections 137(2) and 64(2)(m) of BNS 2023 are concerned, as stated supra, the 2nd respondent - complainant initially, merely filed a complaint on 28.05.2025 alleging that the victim was aged about 18 years and was missing and did not make any allegations - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 against the petitioner in relation to the alleged offences of kidnapping, cheating or sexual assault; it follows therefrom that the said allegations made in the impugned complaint dated 31.05.2025 is an afterthought and an altogether new version of the 2nd respondent and in the absence of sufficient and specific allegations pertaining to commission of the aforesaid offences by the petitioner, I am of the view that the impugned complaint and FIR in relation to offences punishable under Section 137(2) and 64(2)(m) of BNS, 2023 also deserve to be quashed. In this context, it is relevant to state that during the course of several interim orders passed by this Court in the present petition, both the victim as well as the petitioner were present physically and both of them stated that they had got married on 26.05.2025 itself, prior to the alleged incident and were residing together and as such, the impugned complaint and FIR deserve to be quashed on this ground also. 10. In the result, I pass the following:- ORDER (i) Petition is hereby allowed. (ii) The impugned FIR in Crime No.243/2025 dated 31.05.2025 registered by the 1st respondent-Police, pending on the - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:39933 CRL.P No. 10319 of 2025 file of FTSC, IV Addl.City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore, for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 5(l) and 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 137(2) and 64(2)(m) of the BNS, 2023, qua the petitioner, is are hereby quashed. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE BMC/SRL List No.: 3 Sl No.: 6