1 2025:CGHC:20057 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 316 of 2025 1 - Nirmala Bai W/o Sumant Ambade, Aged About 40 Years, R/o Village Mahuljhopdi, Police Chowki Tumadibod, District Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Lalbag Police Chowki- Tumdibod, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Gajendra Kuma Sahu, Advocate. For State/Respondent : Ms. Sunita Manikpuri, Deputy Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board 01-05-2025 1. The appellant has filed the present criminal appeal under Section 415(2) of BNSS, 2023 against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 08-10-2024 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon (C.G.) in Sessions Case No.57/2023 whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC and sentenced R.I. for 4 years with fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for one month. 2. Brief facts of the case are that, the appellant is mother in law of deceased Neelam Lautre. Deceased Neelam Lautre was married with son of the present appellant on 20-02-2023. They performed love marriage and started residing together at Village Mahul Jhopadi. The present appellant who was not happy with the marriage between the deceased and her son started Digitally signed by MOHAMMAD AADIL KHAN 2 raising quarrel with her and assaulting her due to which the deceased committed suicide on 02-05-2023 in her matrimonial house by pouring kerosene oil and set her ablaze. The deceased was taken to DKS Hospital, Raipur for her treatment and her dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the Executive Magistrate. She succumbed to the burn injuries on 04-05-2023. Merg was intimated by DKS Hospital, Raipur to Police Station Golbazar, Raipur vide Ex.-P/23 on 04-05-2023. Inquest of the dead body Ex.- P/6 was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The dead body of the deceased was sent for its postmortem to Doctor B.R. Ambedkar Hospital, Raipur where PW-11 Doctor Snighdha Jain Bansal conducted postmortem on the dead body of the deceased and gave her report Ex.-P/24. While conducting postmortem the doctor has found the burn injuries to the extent of 85 -90% on all over body and opined that death was due to burn injuries and its complications and the burn injuries are antemortem and show signs of mild infection. The merg intimation was sent from Golbazar Police Station, Raipur to Police Station Lalbagh, District Rajnandgaon which is Ex.-P/2 from where the same was forwarded to Police Station Tumadibod and the unnumbered FIR Ex.-P/16 was registered against the appellant for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC which was again transferred to jurisdictional police station at Lalbagh, District Rajnandgaon where numbered FIR Ex.-P/22 was registered. Spot map Ex.-P/3 was prepared by the police. During investigation one plastic jerrycan having kerosene oil smell, one empty match box and three used match sticks, broken pieces of bangles, half burnt piece of clothes of the deceased and broken pieces of hair of the deceased have been seized from the spot vide seizure memo Ex.-P/4. When the deceased was admitted in DKS Hospital, Raipur her dying declaration Ex.-P/14 was recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Harishkant Dhruv PW-7 on 03-05-2023 at about 02:50 p.m. The appellant was arrested on 16-06- 2023. Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. have 3 been recorded and after completion of investigation charge sheet was filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Rajnandgaon for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC against the appellant. The case was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon for trial. 3. The learned trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove the charge against the appellant the prosecution has examined as many as 11 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. has also been recorded in which she denied the circumstances appearing against her, pleaded innocence and has submitted that she has been falsely implicated in the offence. 5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced her as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence, this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses which cannot be made basis for conviction of the appellant for the offence in question. There is no evidence with respect to instigation or abetment to commit suicide. There was routine domestic petty quarrel happens in day to day life between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. She was hypersensitive and for that reason she committed suicide which cannot be termed as abetment to suicide. He would further submit that the necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 107 of the IPC as well as 306 of the IPC are missing and in absence of any cogent and clinching evidence with respect to instigation or abetment to commit suicide the appellant cannot be convicted. Therefore, she is entitled for acquittal. 4 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. But for minor omissions and contradictions the evidence of the prosecution witnesses are fully reliable. There are witnesses who saw that on the same day when she committed suicide there was quarrel between the appellant and the deceased and the appellant was assaulting the deceased. There was frequent quarrel between them and the appellant used to beat the deceased heavily. By the consistent conduct of the appellant that she used to harass her and beat her she could not bear the conduct of the appellant and ultimately chosen to commit suicide. She would also submit that in the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate she specifically alleged the involvement of the appellant that she committed marpeet with her and due to her conduct she committed suicide. There is no reason to falsely implicate her, but there are sufficient evidence that she involved in the alleged offence and therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced her which needs no interference. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the learned trial Court. 9. It is not disputed that the deceased Neelam Lautre performed love marriage with son of the appellant and both of them were residing together. It is also not in dispute that their marriage was solemnized on 20 February, 2023 and she committed suicide on 02-05-2023 in her matrimonial house who died on 04-05-2023 in unnatural circumstances. Further, her unnatural death has been found proved by the evidence of Doctor Snigdha Jain Bansal (PW-11) who conducted postmortem of the dead body of the deceased. She stated in her evidence that she conducted the postmortem of the dead body of deceased Neelam Lautre on 04-05-2023 and found 85 to 90% burn injuries on all over the body. She found the following injuries:- “There is dermo-epidermal burn injury on whole face, head, neck, 5 chest, abdomen, back, both legs till lower 1/3rd of both shins, both upper limbs. Degloving of skin present in both palms. Pubic hair partly singed. Back is spared in thin bands of 4cm width at lower part and between both buttocks, chest spared below medial part of both breasts. Pubic area partly involved. Margins and base of the burn wound are red, few patches of infection with yellowish discoloration present on the chest region. The burn wound involved 85-90% of the body surface area.” After conducting the postmortem she opined that the burn injuries are antemortem in nature and death was due to burn injuries and its complications. Though she was cross-examined by the defence about the treatment and condition of the body, but she remained firm in saying that the death was due to burn injuries which were antemortem in nature. Thus, death of the deceased within five months of her marriage in unnatural circumstances has been proved by the prosecution. 10. So far as involvement of the appellant in offence in question is concerned, I again examine evidence produced by the prosecution and witnesses to that effect. 11. PW-1, Shankar Lal Verma who is neighbour of the deceased has stated in his evidence that after about 8 days of their marriage dispute started between the appellant and the deceased. The appellant used to raise quarrel with her daughter-in-law. In the month of February when he was in shop he saw that the appellant assaulting her daughter-in-law by pulling her hair and asked her to go outside of her house. She took her inside her house by pulling her hair and after about half an hour smoke coming out from the house of the appellant. When they went to their house they came to know that the deceased was committed suicide. In cross-examination he admitted that the marriage between the deceased and her husband was love marriage. He admitted the suggestion given by the defence that quarrel 6 between them was regularly took place, but he did not know the reason for their quarrel. After marpeet they pacified and went inside the house and thereafter, he came back to his own house. Since it was just 15 days of their marriage he did not intervene between them. Nothing could be abstracted from the evidence of this witness in his cross-examination that he either not saw the quarrel between them or there was no quarrel on that particular day of the date of incident. From the evidence of this witness it is quite clear that just half an hour before the time of incident there was a marpeet between the appellant and the deceased and the appellant beat the deceased by hands and fists and by pulling her hair. 12. PW-2, Manoj Kumar Tembhurkar is brother-in-law of the deceased he stated in his evidence that when he came to know about the incident he made a telephonic call to her, but her grand-mother-in-law received the telephonic call and when he met her in the hospital she disclosed him that on the date of incident her mother-in-law brutally beaten her for which she committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil. In his cross-examination though he stated that he disclosed in his police statement that the deceased informed him about pouring kerosene oil on herself and if it is not there in his police statement Ex.-D/1 he could not tell the reason, but from perusal of his police statement Ex.-D/1 the statement that the deceased informed him about pouring of kerosene oil on herself is not there. The substance of her statement that she disclosed about the incident and quarrel with her mother- in-law is there and it is specific allegation against the present appellant that she used to beat her regularly and on the date of incident also she beat her brutally. 13. PW-4, Tribhuwan Kumar Ambale who is son of the present appellant and husband of the deceased has stated in his evidence that he did not know as to why his wife committed suicide. When he saw his wife set herself ablaze he tried to extinguish the fire and he too has received burn injuries on his 7 hands and legs. He took his wife to Primary Health Center for treatment from where she was referred to District Hospital Rajnandgaon and ultimately referred to Mekahara, Raipur. At Mekahara, Raipur she died during treatment after 2 days. The police has seized the plastic gericane having smell of kerosene oil, match box and broken piece of bangle and half burnt clothes and hair of the deceased from the spot., this witness has been declared hostile and denied the suggestion of the prosecution that there was frequent quarrel between his mother and wife. In cross-examination he supported her mother and stated that they were residing happily and after the incident his wife was not in a position to talk as she received 90% burn injuries. 14. PW-5, Smt. Mathura Bai Lautre who is mother of the deceased has stated in her evidence that the deceased had performed love marriage with the son of the appellant and she was residing in her matrimonial house. When she received information about the incident she had gone to DKS hospital, Raipur where she met with her daughter and then she disclosed that the appellant has brutally beaten her by pulling her hair and also disclosed that her mother-in-law used to abuse her regularly. The incident was witnessed by the villagers. She also disclosed that since she was being brutally beaten by her mother-in-law, she committed suicide for that reason alone. In cross- examination she stated that the marriage between the deceased and son of the appellant was performed three months back to the date of incident. They were not having any conversation with the deceased after her marriage and she was under impression that she was living happily in her maternal house. She denied the suggestion given by the defence that she tutored her daughter to implicate the appellant in the offence. 15. PW-6, Om Prakash Rautre who is father of the deceased has stated in his evidence that when he received the information about the incident they had gone to DKS hospital, Raipur and when they met with his daughter she informed that the appellant and his son have brutally beaten her and they 8 used to raise quarrel with her. When this witness has been declared hostile he stated that the deceased has disclosed to them that she was being harassed and tortured by the appellant and she used to beat her brutally. He too has remained firm in his cross-examination that due to the harassment of the appellant she committed suicide. 16. PW-7, Harishkant Dhruv who is Nayab Tahsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate recorded the dying declaration Ex.-P/13 of the deceased. He stated in his evidence that on 03-05-2023 he received a request letter for recording dying declaration of the deceased from SHO, Police Station Golbazar, Raipur. He recorded the dying declaration of the deceased at burn ward of DKS Hospital, Raipur. Before recording the dying declaration he obtained a certificate from the doctor on 03-05-2023 at about 02:30 p.m. and then he recorded her dying declaration which is Ex.-P/13. After recording her dying declaration he obtained her thumb impression in the same. In cross- examination he stated that the deceased was 90% burned and when he reached to the hospital, she was able to talk and after obtaining certification from the doctor he recorded her dying declaration. The dying declaration was recorded in presence of the doctor. He denied the suggestion that on the instance of police he prepared the dying declaration of the deceased. He recorded the dying declaration in question answer form and at the time of recording her dying declaration her relatives were also present there. From the evidence of this witness the recording of dying declaration has been proved. He being the official and independent witness it cannot be said that he was having any interest to prepare a false dying declaration or something add or reduce in the statement made by the deceased. He being impartial witness has recorded the dying declaration. 17. To resolve the controversy it appears necessary first of all to have a look on the provisions of Section 306 and 107 of IPC which reads as under- “306. Abetment of suicide. ─ If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with 9 imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Abatement has been defined in Section 107 of IPC which reads as under- “107. Abetment of a thing. ─ A person abets the doing of a thing, who─ First─ Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly─ Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly─ Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.” 18. As per definition given in Section 107 of IPC abetment is constituted by- I. Instigating a person to commit an offence; or II. Engaging in a conspiracy to commit it; or III. Intentionally aiding a person to commit it. 19. A person is said to 'instigate' another to an act, when he actively suggests or stimulates him/her to the act by any means of language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the form of express solicitation, or of hints, insinuation or encouragement. The word 'instigate' means to goad or urge forward or to provoke, incite, urge or encourage to do an act. 20. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the dying declaration of the deceased Ex.-P/13 recorded by the Nayab Tahsildar PW-7. In the dying declaration the deceased has clearly implicated the appellant that she brutally beaten her in presence of the villagers and therefore, she committed suicide. She was fed up by the behaviour of the appellant who regularly used to abuse her and beat her. On the date of incident also just before ½ hour she was brutally beaten by the appellant which was witnessed by PW-1 Shankar Lal Verma who is her neighbour. When the deceased performed love marriage with son of the appellant both of them were residing together along with the appellant and the appellant who is her mother-in-law used to 10 abuse and beat her regularly. It cannot be said that the act and conduct of the appellant would not fall under definition of Incitement, particularly when ½ hour prior to the time of incident she was brutally beaten by the appellant. There is no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration of the deceased. It is relevant here to get the contents of the dying declaration for the sake of convenience:- “¼1½ D;k vki eq>s lwu ik jgs gS] D;k uke gS vkidk \ gkWa] esjk uke uhye gSA ¼2½ D;k gqvk gS vkids lkFk \ eSa ty xbZ gwWaA ¼3½ dSls gqvk ;s gknlk \ eS vius vki dks feVVh rsy Mkydj tyk yhA ¼4½ fdrus le; gqvk ;s \ dy ’kke 5 cts ds vkl&iklA ¼5½ D;ksa fd;k vkius ,slk \ esjh lkl ¼ fueZyk ½ eq>s jkst xkyh & xykSt djrh Fkh vkSj cky [khp dj eq>s vk;s fnu ekjrs jgrh FkhA eSa jkst dk bls lgu ugh dj ik jgh Fkh] vkSj eS vkSj esjs ifr vyx [kkrs Fks] fQj Hkh eq>s ges’kk xkyh &xykSp ekj&ihV djrh Fkh] ftlls rax vkdj ,slk fd;k eSus A ¼6½ dc gqbZ ’kknh rqEgkjh \ blh lky tuojh es eS vkSj esjs ifr ?kj ls vyx gksdj ’kknh fd;s A ¼7½ vkSj dqN dguk gS vkidks \ ugha vkSj dqN ugha dgukA” 21. At this stage, it is relevant to notice Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus: “32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.—Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:— (1) when it relates to cause of death.—When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. 11 Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death come into question. XXX XXX XXX 22. The general ground of admissibility of the evidence mentioned in Section 32(1) is that in the matter in question, no better evidence is to had. The provisions in Section 32(1) constitute further exceptions to the rule which exclude hearsay. As a general rule, oral evidence must be direct (Section 60). The eight clauses of Section 32 may be regarded as exceptions to it, which are mainly based on two conditions: a necessity for the evidence and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. Hearsay is excluded because it is considered not sufficiently trustworthy. It is rejected because it lacks the sanction of the tests applied to admissible evidence, namely, the oath and cross-examination. But where there are special circumstances which gives a guarantee of trustworthiness to the testimony, it is admitted even though it comes from a second-hand source. The Supreme Court emphasized on the principle enumerated in the famous legal maxim of the Law of Evidence, i.e., nemo moriturus praesumiture mentire which means a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mount. Our Indian Law also recognizes this fact that “a dying man seldom lies” or in other words “truth sits upon the lips of a dying man”. The relevance of this very fact, is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. 23. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the “dying declaration” section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, in which their Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to “circumstances of the 12 transaction”. “21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:- (1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicidal or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, a indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice. (2) The test of proximity cannot be too literarlly construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32. (3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring. (4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove the case of suicide. (5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant.” 24. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that when a statement, written or verbal, is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in 13 his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question, such statement is relevant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) clearly held that Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible, the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death or deals with circumstances leading to the death. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) has further been followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2324. 25. In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2020) 11 SCC 489, principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability were summed up on paragraph 21 as under:- “21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability could be usefully summed up as under:- 21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the Court. 21.2. The Court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. 21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. 21.4. When the eye-witnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail. 21.5. The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement 21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be 14 requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration. 21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement. 21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the Court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration.” 26. In the preset case the dying declaration of the deceased Ex.-P/13 has been recorded by the Nayab Tahsildar PW-7. In the dying declaration the deceased has clearly stated that the appellant had brutally beaten her in presence of the villagers and therefore, she committed suicide. She was fed up by the behaviour of the appellant who regularly used to abuse her and beat her. On the date of incident also just before ½ hour she was brutally beaten by the appellant which was witnessed by PW-1 Shankar Lal Verma who is her neighbour. In view of the abovementioned judgments of the Hon’ble supreme Court, the dying declaration inspires confidence and there is no reason to disbelieve the same. 27. In the matter of Praveen Pradhan Vs. State of Uttranchal and another, 2012 (9) SCC 734, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para-18 that :- “18. In fact, from the above discussion, it is apparent that instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of a particular case. No straitjacket formula can be laid down to find out as to whether in a particular case there has been instigation which forced the person to commit suicide. In a particular case, there may not be direct evidence in regard to instigation which may have direct nexus to suicide. Therefore, in such a case, an inference has to be drawn from the circumstances and it is to be determined whether circumstances had been such which in fact had created the situation that a person felt totally frustrated and committed suicide. …...” 28. In the matter of Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2017 (7) SCC 780, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para 34, 35 and 36 of its judgment that:- 15 “34. The word ‘abetment’ has not been explained in Section 306 IPC. In this context, the definition of abetment as provided under Section 107 IPC is pertinent. Section 306 IPC seeks to punish those who abet the commission of suicide of other. Whether the person has abetted the commission of suicide of another or not is to be gathered from facts and circumstances of each case and to be found out by continuous conduct of the accused, involving his mental element. Such a requirement can be perceived from the reading of Section 107 IPC. Section 107 IPC reads as under:- “107. Abetment of a thing. ─ A person abets the doing of a thing, who─ First.─ Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.─ Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.─ Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Illustration A, a public officer, is authorized by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C. Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.” “Abetment”, thus, means certain amount of active suggestion or support to do the act. 35. Analysing the concept of ”abetment”, as found in Section 107 IPC, a two-Judge Bench in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(2009) 16 SCC 605 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 367] has held: (SCC p. 610, paras 13 & 15) “13. As per the section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing a thing, if he, firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation to Section 107 states that any wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of “abetment”. It is manifest that under all the three situations, direct involvement of the person or persons concerned in the commission of offence of suicide is essential 16 to bring home the offence under Section 306 IPC. * * * 15. As per clause Firstly in the said section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing of a thing, who “instigates” any person to do that thing. The word “instigate” is not defined in IPC. The meaning of the said word was considered by this Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh [(2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] In the said authority, the learned Judges have referred to the pronouncement in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (supra). 36. The word “instigate” literally means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. A person is said to instigate another person when he actively suggests or stimulates him to an act by any means or language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the form of express solicitation or of hints, insinuation or encouragement. Instigation may be in (express) words or may be by (implied) conduct.” 29. From the above discussion, it is vivid that the consistent conduct of the appellant and her cruel behaviour with the deceased dragged her to commit suicide which in the opinion of this Court certainly comes under the purview of offence under Section 306 of the IPC and therefore, I do not find any perversity or illegality in the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court holding guilt of the appellant for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC and thereby this Court uphold the conviction of the appellant under Section 306 of the IPC. 30. So far as the sentence is concerned, it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant is presently aged about 42 years and is lady. The offence of Section 306 of the IPC does not provide for any minimum sentence which may extend to 10 years R.I. Considering the nature of offence and the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, the undergone period of the appellant may be considered to be sufficient sentence for the alleged offence. The appellant is in jail since 16-06-2023 and till date she remained in jail for about 1 year and 10 months. 31. True it is, that the appellant is a lady and is in jail since 1 year and 10 months, but considering the facts of the present case that the harassment made by the appellant to the deceased was so grave that she compelled to 17 commit suicide within 5 months of her marriage particularly when she had performed love marriage with her husband. Due to the dispute with the appellant she committed suicide. Instead of supporting her in her new phase of life the appellant harassed her in such a manner that she had chosen to take such an extreme step to commit suicide. Therefore, there is no substance in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant may be sentence for the period already undergone by her. However, it can be reduced to some extent. 32. Therefore, while maintaining conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC, sentence awarded by the learned trial Court is reduced to R.I. for 3 years with fine of Rs.1000/- instead of R.I. for 4 years with fine of Rs.1000/-. The default sentence shall remain intact. 33. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 16-06-2023. She is entitled for set off of her undergone period during trial as well as during pendency of the appeal. 34. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing her jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing her that she is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 35. The record of the case along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial court concerned. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil