Judgment : Rajani Dubey, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the legality and validity of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12 th July, 2018 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Surguja (Ambikapur) in ST No.393/2011 whereby the accused/appellant stands convicted and sentenced as under: All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 02. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 27.5.2011 the deceased had gone to Village-Chainpur by bus in marriage ceremony of one Rupesh Uraon of her village where her maternal grant parents reside, along with other villagers including the accused/appellant. Her father (PW-1) also went to Village-Chainpur at the house of his mother- in-law (PW-2) and father-in-law (PW-3) where the deceased was also present. On being asked, the deceased told that she came with the accused. After marriage function being over, when her father went to the house of his father-in-law for taking her back to the village, she was not found there. His mother-in-law (PW-2) informed that at around 8-9 pm the deceased came with the accused and was saying that she would return with him by bus. Though her father searched her everywhere but she was not found. At around 1 am when the marriage party returned to the village, he met the accused and asked him about his daughter, on which he replied that he left her at her maternal grandmother’s house. However, next day when he went with his nephew Sushil to Village-Chainpur, the Village Kotwar informed him that one girl is lying dead in the agricultural field. He went there and saw that it is his daughter and thereafter informed the police about the same. 03. During investigation, the police registered Merg No.53/2011 on 28.5.2011 (Ex.P/1), prepared spot map Ex.P/6, inquest memo Ex.P/5, seized plastic slippers and one underwear from the spot and thereafter sent the dead body for postmortem to Community Health Center, Sitapur where Dr. Vidyabhushan Toppo (PW-8) conducted her postmortem and gave report of Ex.P/10. The wearing apparels of the accused were also seized on being produced by his father. The seized articles were sent for chemical examination to FSL and statements of the witnesses were recorded. After obtaining due permission, DNA test of the accused was also done. After completion of usual investigation charge sheet under Sections 363, 376(2)(f) and 302 of IPC was filed against the accused/appellant. The seized articles were sent for chemical examination to FSL and statements of the witnesses were recorded. After obtaining due permission, DNA test of the accused was also done. After completion of usual investigation charge sheet under Sections 363, 376(2)(f) and 302 of IPC was filed against the accused/appellant. Learned trial Court framed charges under Sections 363, 366, 376(1) and 302 of IPC against him, to which he abjured his guilt and prayed for trial. 04. In order to substantiate its case the prosecution examined 13 witnesses in all. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC wherein he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. However, no witness was examined by him in his defence. 05. After hearing counsel for the respective parties and appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above. Hence this appeal. 06. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the material available on record. The entire case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence but there is no complete chain of circumstances which points towards guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. As per evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, the appellant and the deceased left the house of PW-2 separately and after that no one saw them together. PW-13 CS Netam, IO, states that there were two merg intimation i.e. Merg No.51/2011 and Merg No.53/2011 and the appellant has been prosecuted in relation to Merg No.51/2011. This creates doubt on the authenticity of the prosecution case. The place where the dead body of the deceased was found is also disputed in this case. He submits that DNA test report of the appellant is also doubtful as his blood sample was not properly preserved and there is serious discrepancies in relation to the dates when blood sample of the accused was collected and sent for DNA test. The prosecution has also failed to attribute any motive to the appellant for commission of this offence. He submits that DNA test report of the appellant is also doubtful as his blood sample was not properly preserved and there is serious discrepancies in relation to the dates when blood sample of the accused was collected and sent for DNA test. The prosecution has also failed to attribute any motive to the appellant for commission of this offence. Thus, looking to the nature and quality of evidence, it is crystal clear that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charges by giving him benefit of doubt. Reliance has been placed on the judgment dated 12 th May, 2016 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CRA No.462/2016 in the matter of Rambraksh @ Jalim Vs. State of CG. judgment dated 24 th January, 2024 in CRA No.902 of 2023 in Raja Naykar Vs. State of CG. Chotkau Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 6 SCC 742; judgment dated 05 th November, 2024 in CRA No.291 of 2023 in Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer Vs. State of Kerala; Kattavellai @ Dvevakar Vs. State of Tamilnadu reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1439; judgment dated 24 th February, 2025 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CRA No.1649/2011 in the matter of Md. Bani Alam Mazid @ Dhan Vs. State of Assam ; the judgment of this Court dated 22.2.2023 in CRA No.565 of 2022 in Kishan Lal @ Champa Yadav Vs. State of CG and the judgment dated 13.11.2024 of this Court in CRA No.1484 of 2019 in Dhaneshwar @ Tedu @ Ronha Pando Vs. State of CG 07. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposing the contention of the appellant would submit that in view of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant by the impugned judgment which calls for no interference by this Court. The present appeal being without any substance is liable to be dismissed. 08. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 09. It is clear from the record of learned trial Court that the appellant was charged under Sections 363, 366, 376(1) and 302 of IPC and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, learned trial Court convicted and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. 10. 09. It is clear from the record of learned trial Court that the appellant was charged under Sections 363, 366, 376(1) and 302 of IPC and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, learned trial Court convicted and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. 10. The first question to be decided by this Court is whether death of the deceased was homicidal in nature and whether she was subjected to rape before her death? 11. PW-1 father of the deceased states that the deceased is his daughter and she was aged about 8-9 years. He had gone to attend some marriage function in Village-Chainpur where house of his in-laws situate and there he saw his daughter sitting and the accused was also present there. He asked the accused to come along with him to the wedding house but he did not come, so he with his nephew went to the wedding house. However, at around 7 pm when he returned with his nephew to the house of his in-laws, the deceased and the accused were not there. On being asked, his mother-in-law told that the deceased left her house saying that she is going with the accused by bus. Thereafter he searched for her but she was not traceable. Next day when he went back to the house of his in-laws at village Chainpur with his nephew Sushil Kumar in search of the deceased, there he was informed by the watchman that she has been murdered in the field. Thereafter, they went to the indicated place and found her dead body lying there and lodged merg intimation Ex.P/1 which bears his signature from A to A part. 12. PW-5 Jagmohan admits his signature on notice Ex.P/4 and inquest memo Ex.P/5 from A to A part. PW-13 CS Netam, Investigating Officer, states that he lodged merg intimation Ex.P/1, issued notice Ex.P/4 for inquest and prepared inquest memo Ex.P/5 before the witnesses and also gave application for postmortem Ex.P/9A. 13. PW-8 Dr. Vidyabhushan Toppo along with Dr. M. Nikunj conducted postmortem of the deceased and found following injuries: “External Examination: Rigor mortis present. Nail bed cyanosed. Left eye contused and conjunctiva congested. Tongue protruded and bitten between both upper and lower teeth. Bleeding from nostril. Abrasions on right cheek and fore head. 13. PW-8 Dr. Vidyabhushan Toppo along with Dr. M. Nikunj conducted postmortem of the deceased and found following injuries: “External Examination: Rigor mortis present. Nail bed cyanosed. Left eye contused and conjunctiva congested. Tongue protruded and bitten between both upper and lower teeth. Bleeding from nostril. Abrasions on right cheek and fore head. Face swollen, right hand swollen (arm) and venous engorgement in right and left arm and neck and chest. Nail like marks present on right breast region medial to nipple. Bleeding from around the vagina. Abrasion on right side of back posterior. Also in both elbow region. Stool passed from anal orifice. Swelling in neck. Hymen ruptured and abrasion in labia manora. Internal Examination: Tracheal tiny ruptured. Hymen ruptured may be sexual intercourse.” In their opinion the cause of death was asphyxia resulting from throttling and the death was homicidal in nature. They also prepared five vaginal slides and handed over the same with sample pubic hair and scalp hair of the deceased as also her wearing apparels in sealed condition to the constable for chemical examination. In cross- examination, PW-8 admits that he only wrote about rupture of vagina and not mentioned whether it was old or new rupture. He clarifies that since it was bleeding, the rupture was new one. He also states that looking to the injuries noticed on her body during postmortem, it appears that she struggled at the time of death. 14. In FSL report (Ex.P/21), human spermatozoa was found on Article F – vaginal slides of deceased, G-1 frock of deceased, H-1 & H- 2 underwear and pant of the accused. In cross-examination the defence could not elicit anything from the witnesses which could make the aforesaid medical and forensic evidence doubtful. Thus, from the above, it is clear that the prosecution has proved this fact beyond reasonable doubt that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature and before her death she was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse. 15. Now we have to consider whether it is the accused/appellant who is author of this crime? 16. Learned trial Court after appreciation of overall evidence found that there are certain circumstantial evidence against the appellant proving his guilt to the hilt and delineated the same in para 65 of the impugned judgment as under: 17. 15. Now we have to consider whether it is the accused/appellant who is author of this crime? 16. Learned trial Court after appreciation of overall evidence found that there are certain circumstantial evidence against the appellant proving his guilt to the hilt and delineated the same in para 65 of the impugned judgment as under: 17. PW-1 father of the deceased states that he saw the accused and the deceased sitting in the house of his in-laws and when he returned from the wedding house, he did not find both of them in his in-laws’ house. He states that his mother-in-law informed him that the deceased went away saying that she is going with the accused by bus. He made search for the deceased but she was not traceable. When he asked the accused about his daughter, he kept mum. Next day when he again enquired from the accused about his daughter and asked him to accompany him to village Chainpur for searching his daughter, he (accused) started running away. 18. PW-2 maternal grandmother of the deceased states that the deceased came to village Chainpur with the accused to attend the wedding. When she asked the deceased as to with whom she came, the accused interrupted that it is he who brought her here and would take her back with him. After some time, the deceased went to the wedding house with the accused. In cross-examination she admits that the accused and the deceased came to her house in the afternoon and after 1-2 hours they went to the wedding house. In para 4 she states that when she asked the deceased as to why she did not come with her parents, she replied that she came alone in the Barat (marriage procession). She admits that the deceased came to the marriage without informing anyone in her house and that she had scolded her for coming there without informing anybody. She states that she did not know the accused even by his name prior to the incident and is recognizing him as Ramavtar at the instance of the villagers. 19. PW-3 maternal grandfather of the deceased states that the deceased came to his house with the accused and when he asked her about her arrival, she replied that she came with the accused. 19. PW-3 maternal grandfather of the deceased states that the deceased came to his house with the accused and when he asked her about her arrival, she replied that she came with the accused. At that time, the accused told him that she came with him and he would take her back. Thereafter, she had her meal in his house and left his house and after some time, the accused also left his house. He states that at about 8 pm he went to the wedding house to ascertain whether the deceased went back or not, he did not find the deceased and the accused there and so he returned to his house and slept as the accused had told that he would take her to his house. 20. It is thus clear from the statement of maternal grandfather of the deceased (PW-3) that the deceased first left his house and after some time, the accused left his house. There is no witness examined by the prosecution who saw both of them going together by bus to the wedding house or leaving together the house of PW-3 for wedding house. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused when she was alive. 21. PW-13 CS Netam, IO, seized pant of the accused on 29.5.2011 as per seizure memo Ex.P/15 and also seized one underwear of the accused on 2.6.2011 as per seizure memo Ex.P/16. He also wrote a memo for examination of private part of the accused and preserving the smegma on it vide Ex.P/3A. On 23.6.2011 he gave application to the JMFC, Sitapur seeking permission for collection of blood sample of the accused for conducting DNA test vide Ex.P/23. He states that he had obtained consent from the accused for taking his blood sample for DNA test vide Ex.P/24 and after receiving DNA report from CDFD, Hyderabad vide Ex.P/25 he produced the same before the Court. 22. As per DNA report, the following articles were received for DNA examination: The Superintendent of Police, Surguja made an application Ex.P/20 to the Director, FSL, Raipur for DNA test of the seized articles. This letter bears no date except the one written under signature of SP, Surguja which appears to be 7.8.2011. In this letter, name of the constable is also not mentioned. This letter bears no date except the one written under signature of SP, Surguja which appears to be 7.8.2011. In this letter, name of the constable is also not mentioned. In another memo written by SP, Surguja also there is no date mentioned but it bears the name of constable Praveen Khalkho No.216. Again on 23.8.2011 the SP, Surguja wrote a letter to the Director, CDFD, Hydrabad for DNA profiling of certain articles mentioned in the list of exhibits enclosed therewith, which is as under: 23. PW-13 CS Netam obtained consent of the accused for DNA profiling on 23.6.2011 vide Ex.P/23 & 24. PW-7 Dr. Azad Bhagat states that on 24.6.2011 he collected blood sample of the accused for DNA test and his photograph was also taken and having sealed the blood sample it was forwarded to the forensic laboratory vide Ex.P/8. As per Ex.P/22 in the List of Exhibits, the blood sample of the accused i.e. Article “J” was obtained on 24.6.2011 whereas in the DNA report Ex.P/25, Article F i.e. Bloodstained FTA card said to be of the accused, which matched with the DNA profile of the deceased, is received/collected on 29.8.2011. The Investigating Officer CS Netam in para 17 states as under: 24. This Court in the matter of Dhaneshwar @ Tedu @ Ronha Pando (supra) held in paras 18 & 19 of its judgment as under: “18. Even if the case of the prosecution is accepted as it is that the appellant and the deceased were last-seen together in the night at 8 O'clock on 4.8.2012, the dead-body of the deceased was noticed between 7-8 O'clock in the next morning on 5.8.2012 by one Khemanidhi who informed to PW-7 Bhuneshwar. As such, there is a gap of around 12 hours between the deceased last seen together with the appellant and the recovery of her dead-body. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Navaneethakrishnan v. State by Inspector of Police (2018) 16 SCC 161 , the Supreme Court has held that though the evidence of last seen together could point to the guilt of the accused, but this evidence alone cannot discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and requires corroboration, and observed in paragraph 22 as under:- “22. PW 11 was able to identify all the three accused in the court itself by recapitulating his memory as those persons who came at the time when he was washing his car along with John Bosco and further that he had last seen all of them sitting in the Omni van on that day and his testimony to that effect remains intact even during the cross- examination in the light of the fact that the said witness has no enmity whatsoever against appellants herein and he is an independent witness. Once the testimony of PW 11 is established and inspires full confidence, it is well established that it is the accused who were last seen with the deceased specially in the circumstances when there is nothing on record to show that they parted from the accused and since then no activity of the deceased can be traced and their dead bodies were recovered later on. It is a settled legal position that the law presumes that it is the person, who was last seen with the deceased, would have killed the deceased and the burden to rebut the same lies on the accused to prove that they had departed. Undoubtedly, the last seen theory is an important event in the chain of circumstances that would completely establish and/or could point to the guilt of the accused with some certainty. However, this evidence alone cannot discharge the burden establishing the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt and requires corroboration." 19. In the instant case, in the shape of corroboration nothing has been brought on record except the fact that from the place of incident, a bloodstained knife was recovered, though in the FSL report no blood was found on the said knife. In this regard, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Boby v. State of Kerala 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 50 , following the decisions rendered in the matters of Chandran v. The State of Tamil Nadu (1978) 4 SCC 90 , State of Karnataka v. David Rozario and Anr (2002) 7 SCC 728 , have clearly held that in absence of confessional statement of the accused leading to recovery of the material object, recovery of dead-body cannot be said to be at the instance of the accused. As such, the recovery of the knife from the place of incident is of no use to the prosecution. As such, the recovery of the knife from the place of incident is of no use to the prosecution. Similarly, the recovery of the slippers from the place of incident also cannot be said to be proved to be that of the appellant, as it is not the case of the prosecution that the slippers seized from the place of incident were of such a unique quality that are not available in the local market. Apart from that, the slippers seized were not subjected to identification so as to prove that they actually belonged to the appellant and the appellant had worn them at the time of incident.” 25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Kattavellai @ Devakar (supra) issued certain directions in para 44 of its judgment to be followed in cases involving DNA evidence, which are as under: “44. This lack of a common procedure to be followed, is concerning. As such, we issue the following directions which shall be followed henceforth, in all cases where DNA Evidence is involved: 1. The collection of DNA samples once made after due care and compliance of all necessary procedure including swift and appropriate packaging including a) FIR number and date; b) Section and the statute involved therein; c) details of I.O., Police station; and d) requisite serial number shall be duly documented. The document recording the collection shall have the signatures and designations of the medical professional present, the investigating officer and independent witnesses. Here only we may clarify that the absence of independent witnesses shall not be taken to be compromising to the collection of such evidence, but the efforts made to join such witnesses and the eventual inability to do so shall be duly put down in record. 2. The Investigating Officer shall be responsible for the transportation of the DNA evidence to the concerned police station or the hospital concerned, as the case may be. He shall also be responsible for ensuring that the samples so taken reach the concerned forensic science laboratory with dispatch and in any case not later than 48-hours from the time of collection. Should any extraneous circumstance present itself and the 48- hours timeline cannot be complied with, the reason for the delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary. Should any extraneous circumstance present itself and the 48- hours timeline cannot be complied with, the reason for the delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary. Throughout, the requisite efforts be made to preserve the samples as per the requirement corresponding to the nature of the sample taken. 3. In the time that the DNA samples are stored pending trial appeal etc., no package shall be opened, altered or resealed without express authorisation of the Trial Court acting upon a statement of a duly qualified and experienced medical professional to the effect that the same shall not have a negative impact on the sanctity of the evidence and with the Court being assured that such a step is necessary for proper and just outcome of the Investigation/Trial. 4. Right from the point of collection to the logical end, i.e., conviction or acquittal of the accused, a Chain of Custody Register shall be maintained wherein each and every movement of the evidence shall be recorded with counter sign at each end thereof stating also the reason therefor. This Chain of Custody Register shall necessarily be appended as part of the Trial Court record. Failure to maintain the same shall render the 1.0. responsible for explaining such lapse. The Directors General of Police of all the States shall prepare sample forms of the Chain of Custody Register and all other documentation directed above and ensure its dispatch to all districts with necessary instruction as may be required.” 26. In the matter of Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with a case of circumstantial evidence, observed in paras 10 & 11 of its judgment as under: “10. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to mention the principles as have been enunciated and settled by this Court, which would determine the parameters within which the case of the prosecution, if based on circumstantial evidence, is to be tested with regard to the establishment of the offence stated to be committed by the Appellant. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to mention the principles as have been enunciated and settled by this Court, which would determine the parameters within which the case of the prosecution, if based on circumstantial evidence, is to be tested with regard to the establishment of the offence stated to be committed by the Appellant. This Court in the case of Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy and Another v. State of A.P. (2006) 10 SCC 172 while referring to the various earlier judgments which have been passed by this Court from time to time, summarized key principles which act as a guide for the courts to come to a conclusion with regard to the guilt of an accused in cases which are solely dependent on the circumstantial evidence. The same have been referred to as the "panchsheel principles" and are discussed in paragraph 26 to 28 of the said judgment, which read as follows: 26. It is now well settled that with a view to base a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all the pieces of incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form such a chain of events as would permit no conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused. The circumstances cannot be on any other hypothesis. It is also well settled that suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot be a substitute for a proof and the courts shall take utmost precaution in finding an accused guilty only on the basis of the circumstantial evidence. (See Anil Kumar Singh v. State Bihar [ (2003) 9 SCC 67 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1167 and Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P. (2005) 7 SCC 603 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1710]) 27. The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case the courts should look for some corroboration. 28. In State of U.P. v. Satish ( (2005) 3 SCC 114 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 642) this Court observed: (SCC p. 123, para 22) "22. Even in such a case the courts should look for some corroboration. 28. In State of U.P. v. Satish ( (2005) 3 SCC 114 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 642) this Court observed: (SCC p. 123, para 22) "22. The last-seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses PWs 3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of PW 2. (See also Bodhraj v. State of J&K [ (2002) 8 SCC 45 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 201]) 11. Thereafter, the above principles have been reiterated in the subsequent judgments of this Court and hold the field till date.Thus, these basic established principles can be summarized in the following terms that the chain of events needs to be so established that the court has no option but to come to one and only one conclusion i.e. the guilt of the accused person. If an iota of doubt creeps in at any stage in the sequence of events, the benefit thereof should flow to the accused. Mere suspicion alone, irrespective of the fact that it is very strong, cannot be a substitute for a proof. The chain of circumstances must be so complete that they lead to only one conclusion that is the guilt of the accused. Even in the case of a conviction where in an appeal the chain of evidence is found to be not complete or the courts could reach to any another hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused, the accused person must be given the benefit of doubt which obviously would lead to his acquittal. Even in the case of a conviction where in an appeal the chain of evidence is found to be not complete or the courts could reach to any another hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused, the accused person must be given the benefit of doubt which obviously would lead to his acquittal. Meaning thereby, when there is a missing link, a finding of guilt cannot be recorded. In other words, the onus on the prosecution is to produce such evidence which conclusively establishes the truth and the only truth with regard to guilt of an accused for the charges framed against him or her, and such evidence should establish a chain of events so complete as to not leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of accused.” 27. In light of aforesaid judicial pronouncements reiterating the settled principles of law for basing conviction in cases of circumstantial evidence, if we examine the facts and evidence of the present case, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it is clear that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the last seen theory that the appellant was last seen with the deceased when she was alive and the time gap between the point of time when they were last seen together and her dead body was found is so small that it rules out the possibility of any person other than the appellant being the author of the crime. The other piece of circumstantial evidence available on record is DNA test report (Ex.P/25) according to which profile of the deceased matched with the blood sample DNA profile of the accused. However, as discussed above in detail, the prosecution failed to prove the fact as to when the blood sample of the accused was sent for chemical examination. PW-7 Dr. Azad Bhagat collected the blood sample of the accused on 24.6.2011 and as per letter of SP, Surguja (Ex.P/20) which bears date 7.8.2011, Article H & I i.e. clothes of the accused were sent for DNA test. In DNA report Ex.P/25, bloodstained FTA card said to be of the accused was received/collected on 29.8.2011. As per this report, Article B is underwear of the accused which was collected on 29.8.2011 whereas seizure memo Ex.P/16 shows that his underwear was seized on 2.6.2011. 28. In DNA report Ex.P/25, bloodstained FTA card said to be of the accused was received/collected on 29.8.2011. As per this report, Article B is underwear of the accused which was collected on 29.8.2011 whereas seizure memo Ex.P/16 shows that his underwear was seized on 2.6.2011. 28. As per direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court it is necessary for the investigating officer to ensure that collection of DNA samples is made with due care and compliance of all the necessary procedure including swift and appropriate packaging, and the investigating officer shall be responsible for transportation of the DNA evidence to the concerned police station or the hospital concerned. He shall also be responsible for ensuring that the samples so taken reach the concerned forensic science laboratory with dispatch and in any case not later than 48- hours from the time of collection, and if any extraneous circumstance present itself and the 48-hours timeline cannot be complied with, the reason for the delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary. In the present case, it is clear that consent of the accused for taking his blood sample for DNA test was obtained on 24.6.2011 by the investigating officer vide Ex.P/24 and as per PW-7 Dr. Azad Bhagat blood sample of the accused was collected on 24.6.2011 vide Ex.P/8. As per memo of the SP (Ex.P/22), all the samples were sent to FSL on 23.8.2011 and as per DNA test report (Ex.P/25), the articles for examination were received on 29.8.2011. Thus, it is clear that blood sample taken from the accused on 24.6.2011 was received by FSL, Hybderabad on 29.8.2011 for DNA. However, the prosecution has failed to explain as to where this sample was kept during this long period. The IO admits that Ex.P/20 is written by the SP, Surguja for DNA test and he cannot tell as to when it was sent to Raipur for DNA test. 29. On the basis of aforesaid discussions, we are of the opinion that none of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution against the accused/appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt in accordance with law. The chain of circumstantial evidence is not so complete so as to lead to one and only one conclusion that it is the accused/appellant who is author of the crime in question. The chain of circumstantial evidence is not so complete so as to lead to one and only one conclusion that it is the accused/appellant who is author of the crime in question. Being so, the appellant deserves to be acquitted of all the charges by giving him benefit of doubt. 30. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment convicting and sentencing the accused/appellant under Sections 363, 366, 376(1) and 302 of IPC is hereby set aside and he is acquitted of the said charges by extending him benefit of doubt. He is reported to be in jail, therefore, he be set free forthwith if not required in connection with any other offence. 31. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of BNSS, 2023 the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The record of the trial Court along with copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. A copy of this judgment be also forwarded to the concerned Jail Superintendent for information and necessary action.