2025:JHHC:25743 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (S) No. 4036 of 2016 --------- Amod Krishan Jha, son of late Raghuwar Jha, residence of village /Muhalla Kajichak P.O + P.S- Mirjan Hat Dist. Bhagalpur (Bihar) at present posted at police station Biran P.O + P.S- Biran Dist - Giridih Jharkhand. ......Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. The Director General of Police, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O.+P.S.-Dhurwa Jharkhand Ranchi. 3. The Inspector General of police, Chotanagpur Division, Project Building, Dhurwa, PO+PS-Dhurwa, Ranchi. 4. The Deputy Inspector of police North Chotanagpur Division Hazaribagh, P.O. + P.S. Hazaribagh, Dist.-Hazaribagh. 5. The Superintendent of police, Chatra, PO + PS + Dist.- Chatra. 6. The Deputy Superintendent of police Chatra, PO+PS+Dist.- Chatra. 7. The Superintendent of police Giridih, PO+PS+District-Giridih. .....Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN --------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajiv Nandan Prasad, Advocate Mr. Manoj Kumar Sah, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Varun Prabhakar, A.C. to G.P.-III --------- 11/Dated:-28.08.2025 1. Heard learned counsels for the parties. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner praying therein for a direction upon the respondent authorities to pay the salary of the petitioner from 05.10.2004 to 28.12.2009 i.e., the period of termination. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after termination, the petitioner moved before this Court earlier in W.P.(S) No.2128 of 2007 and vide order dated 18.11.2009 passed by this Court, the said termination order was quashed with the following direction: “9. In the light of the above facts and circumstances and finding merit in this application, the same is allowed. Both the impugned orders dated 05.10.2004 (Annexure-1) passed by the disciplinary authority and the order dated 06.03.2007 (Annexure-C to the counter 2025:JHHC:25743 2 affidavit of the respondents) passed by the appellate authority are hereby quashed. The Respondents are therefore directed to forthwith reinstate the petitioner in service and to treat the period from the date of termination of his service, till the date of his reinstatement, as the period of his duty. The order of reinstatement shall be effective only if the petitioner has not crossed the age of superannuation. The respondent authorities shall be at liberty to initiate any proceeding afresh, if they so desire, against the petitioner on any charges which they deem fit and proper.” 4. He further submits that after remand, though a show cause notice was issued but thereafter, the respondents did not choose to proceed further. He contended that now, the law is well settled that if any employee has not worked for a particular period due to the fault of the employee himself, he is not entitled for any remuneration; on the contrary, if an employee is prevented from working for a certain period due to the fault of the State officials, then certainly, he is entitled for the entire salary. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Writ Court in the above referred writ application has directed “.....The Respondents are therefore directed to forthwith reinstate the petitioner in service and to treat the period from the date of termination of his service, till the date of his reinstatement, as the period of his duty.” Relying upon this sentence, learned State counsel contended that they have regularized the period of break in service, but, they have not paid any amount to the petitioner. 6. Looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case that the termination order was quashed by this Court and pursuant thereto; though the petitioner was reinstated, but no backwages was given. 7. It is true that specifically the term ‘backwages’ has not been indicated by the coordinate bench of this Court, but the 2025:JHHC:25743 3 subsequent action of the respondents, not to proceed with any departmental proceeding even after the liberty given by this Court, clearly goes to show that non-working of the petitioner during the period of termination was solely due to the act of the respondents and in this regard in catena of judgments, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the delinquent would be entitled for the salary, if his absence is not due to his fault and if his absence is due to his fault only, then he is not entitled for a single amount. 8. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case that the petitioner remained out of service for a period of about 5 years; as such, interest of justice would be sufficed that he should be entitled for some remuneration for that period. 9. At the cost of repetition, in spite of liberty given to the respondents, they did not choose to proceed further and accepted the reinstatement; as such, this Court feels that the petitioner is entitled for 60% of the basic salary plus D.A. for the aforesaid period. 10. Accordingly, the instant writ application is allowed and the respondents are directed to pay the 60% of basic salary plus D.A. for the entire intervening period i.e., from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement, within a period of 12 weeks. 11. As a result, the instant writ application stands allowed. Pending I.A., if any, also stands closed. (Deepak Roshan, J.) vikas/-